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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Main conclusions 
 
The present study simulates recovery of stocks and elimination of overcapacity  ) of seven EU fisheries, 
which represented in 2005-7 about 20% of the EU fisheries production. The main results are presented in 
terms of net profit which is interpreted as an indicator of the level and trend of the resource rent.  
 
The seven fisheries generated in 2005-7 annually a net profit of 212 mln euro with about 7,400 vessels. In 
the baseline scenario the total nominal net profit of these fisheries increases to 1 bln euro by year 15, while 
the fleet would be reduced to 5,700 vessels. Consequently, the net profit/vessel would increase by 520%. 
Despite the significant costs of such adaptation, the total annual average net present value of the net profit 
over the 15 years would be almost 500 mln euro, 130% more than the average profits of 2005-7. The 
average discounted net profit per vessel would be over the 15 years 200% higher than in 2005-7 
 
The scenarios indicate that the structure of the fleets involved in the various fisheries would change, in 
some case even very significantly, towards the relatively more efficient segments. This implies that 
significantly higher earnings would be shared among a smaller group of beneficiaries. 
 
It must be stressed that the calculation of net profit is based on data which is far from satisfactory and 
consequently far reaching assumptions were unavoidable. However, the scenarios confirm that 
significantly better economic performance can be achieved in the EU fisheries sector in general. The 
potential for improvements is very different in different fisheries. The study demonstrates that 
management policies must be tailored to the nature of the fisheries and that one panacea does not exist. 
It cannot be concluded that more restrictive policies would in general lead to better economic results. The 
scenarios show that structural changes in the fleet composition are one of the drivers of higher profits. 
This implies that promotion of economic efficiency and optimization of the fisheries contribution to the 
EU economy calls for creation of conditions within which the vessel operators will be able to adapt 
flexibly to the existing fishing opportunities within the long term sustainability constraint. 
 
Terms of reference 
 
The objective of this study is to establish an analytical approach to estimate the potential resource rent and 
apply it to a number of case study fisheries, which are representative for the total EU fisheries sector. In 
this way the study demonstrates to which extent it is desirable and feasible to pursue policies aiming at 
exploitation of fish stocks at the levels of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) or maximum economic yield 
(MEY). 
 
The terms of reference of the study are: 
1. To examine possible alternatives (e.g. MSY, MEY) for estimating the resource rent in EU fisheries; 
2. To identify and use bio-economic model(s) suitable for estimation of resource rents; 
3. To apply the analysis to a range of fisheries, representing the EU diversity;  
4. To explore the impact of a range of interest rates for net present value; 
5. To estimate potential resource rents for the current fleets and for a fleets without overcapacity.  
6. To assess costs of management and the feasibility of their recovery.  
 
Theoretical background 
 
Apart from the Introduction, the report is composed of 9 chapters. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical 
background to the study in two respects – the theory of the resource rent and the state-of-art in bio-
economic modelling of the resource rent.  The resource rent is reviewed in a broader scope, beyond the 
simplified static single species approach. It is demonstrated that in a multi-species situation a unique MSY 
or MEY may not exist and ‘political’ choices are required, affecting fishermen as well as fish stocks. 
Benefits of fish production are interpreted also in relation to welfare economics and producer and 
consumer surplus. Making a direct link of these two concepts to the resource rent is not possible, which 
shows that resource rent may be a too narrow concept in relation to welfare. Finally, the role of the 
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fisheries sector is interpreted within input-output analysis. This brief review leads to the conclusion that 
benefits of fish production to the society need to be evaluated in a broader context. However, not all of 
these considerations could be applied empirically. The study takes fully into account the multi-species 
multi-fleet character of most EU fisheries, but considerations of welfare economics and input-output 
analysis are not included. 
 
Resource rent is usually related to ‘above normal profits’, which can be extracted by the society as 
remuneration of a natural resource. These above normal profits are at present divided between capital and 
labour, as a result of historically established agreements, i.e. the remuneration of crews on share basis.  In 
chapter 2 this study argues that it is the total ‘benefits to the society’ obtained from the natural resource 
which matter. How these benefits should be divided between labour, capital and resources (or royalties 
paid to society) is a political question, to which economics cannot give an answer. Following the request 
of the European Commission the study uses the net profit as the main benchmark of the resource rent.  
 
Second part of chapter 2 is related to bio-economic modelling. Five potentially relevant bio-economic 
models were reviewed and compared on a large number of criteria. It was concluded that these models fell 
short of the terms of reference of the present study. On the basis of experiences with these models a new 
bio-economic model was developed which integrates a number of specific features:  
 Ability and flexibility to deal with multi-species / multi-fleet situations; 
 Simulation and optimization; 
 Input and output driven fisheries management policies; 
 Independency and full feedback between biology (stock-growth function), economics (production 
function) and behaviour (investment function); 
 Tailored to the available data from DCF and ICES. 
 
The model (called FISHRENT) simulates values of biological and economic variables and shows explicitly 
the consequences of different policy decisions. The calculations are based on a 3-year average of 2005-7 
and the simulation runs for a period of 25 years, although only the first 15 years are used for the analysis. 
The main result of the model is the net present value of net profit and gross value added calculated for the 
first 15 years of the simulation. The model generates also a variety of other indicators, e.g. size of stocks 
and fleets, production costs, catches and landings.  
 
To deal fully with the points 3-6 of the terms of reference 14 scenarios were designed for model 
simulations: 
 Six scenarios (1-6) deal with different management approaches, based on TACs, effort and open 
access. The scenario which is closest to the present management regime is selected as the ‘baseline’ 
scenario and is used as benchmark and basis for the scenarios 7-14; 
 Two scenarios (7-8) deal with application of different discount rates; 
 One scenario (9) addresses the consequences of the recovery of management costs; 
 Five scenarios (10-14) evaluate the net profit generated by fleets without overcapacity under different 
adaptation paths. Two of these scenarios are based on maximization of the net present value of net 
profit and of gross value added. 
 
EU overview 
 
The analysis has been implemented in seven case study fisheries: 
1. North Sea flatfish 
2. North Sea cod 
3. Baltic Sea cod 
4. Atlantic hake 
5. Atlantic anchovy 
6. Mediterranean anchovy (GSA 16) 
7. Mediterranean hake (GSA 9) 
These case studies reflect the varieties of policies (input and output management), gears (passive and 
active), vessel sizes (<12m as well as >40m) and species (demersal, pelagic, benthic). 
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Chapter 3 summarizes the results of the seven case studies, presenting an overview at EU level. It shows 
the role of the case study fisheries within the total EU fisheries sector and integrates the results of the 14 
scenarios.  
 
The case studies represent approximately 20% of the value and volume of EU fisheries production in the 
period 2005-7, 10% of the number of vessels, 20% of gross tonnage (GT) and 26% of net profit. They 
cover fisheries of 10 Member States, representing 11% in Italy, 80% in Belgium and between 34% and 
62% in the other eight MS. The multi-species character of these fisheries follows clearly from the role 
which the identified target species play in the total revenues, which range from about 20% to 50%.  
 
Most of the quantitative analysis is based on data for 2005-7 collected under the Data Collection 
Regulation (Reg. 1639/2001). 
 
Information on management costs has been drawn from several sources and estimates have been made 
accordingly. OECD data 2004-2006 was used as a primary source.  This data was compared to the budgets 
of EFF priority axis 1, data collection and research and costs of management, enforcement and control, 
obtained from various sources. The relevant EU costs were estimated at a total of almost 1.4 billion euro 
per year. They were allocated to the individual fleet segments in the different fisheries, using their share in 
production value of the national fisheries.  
 
At EU level the case study results of the different scenarios were compared using three indicators: 
nominal 15-year average net profit, nominal net profit in year 15 and discounted 15-year average net 
profit. Furthermore, dynamic comparison is presented in trends of nominal net profit, fleet and 
profit/vessel.  
 
The results are consistent with the theoretical expectations. They illustrate that different fisheries need to 
be managed differently in order to achieve an improvement from the current situation. Restrictive policies 
may be expected to produce positive results in the North Sea and Baltic Sea fisheries, but much less in the 
Atlantic and the Mediterranean, because restrictions on target species significantly affect the revenues 
from ‘other’ (non-target) species. The analysis illustrates that there is not one single measure of rent. Even 
considering only one indicator, namely net profit, produces analytical nuances. In most fisheries, 
restrictive measures will in the end lead to recovery of the economic performance, reduction of the size of 
the sector and concentration of benefits among a smaller number of vessel owners and fishermen. 
However, optimum benefits (maximum net profit or gross value added) can be only achieved if the fleet is 
able to react flexibly to the new fishing opportunities and allowed to grow along with the stocks. Some 
segments are more efficient than others and generate relatively higher profits. This means that 
redistribution of the fishing opportunities among the segments towards the more efficient ones will 
increase the profits further. 
 
Discount rates can be used either to compare different streams of benefits (profits) or to compare the 
profits of year 15 with the year 1 (situation in 2005-7). The simulations use a basic discount rate of 3.5%. 
Sensitivity analysis shows that application of a discount rate of 5% reduces the net present value of net 
profits (NPV Prf15) by 10-14%. On the other hand a lower discount rate of 2% increases the NPV Prf15 
by 11-18%. Comparing the Prf in 2005-7 to the discounted Prf in year 15 appears to be rather sensitive to 
the value of the discount rate. This sensitivity is illustrated by the calculation of a ‘break-even’ discount 
rate, which ranges approximately between -1% and +10%.  
 
Simulations of imposition of recovery of management costs conclude that impact on fleet behaviour 
(investments) is rather limited and consequently the net profit before cost recovery is not affected. 
Evidently, this result is determined by the selected level of cost recovery, and should this level be 
increased, the impact may change. 
 
Five scenarios of different adaptation paths towards fleet without overcapacity were tested. Three of these 
scenarios deal with elimination of technical capacity, distinguishing between instantaneous adaptation and 
gradual adaptation. The instantaneous adaptation of effort takes place either through the number of 
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vessels or through the number of days at sea per vessel.  The last two scenarios optimize NPV GVA15 and 
NPV Prf15. Result of scenario 14 can be interpreted as MEY. Results of the scenario 13 reflect  the 
contribution to GNP. 
 
The results of the scenarios 10-12 eliminating technical capacity are very similar. Five out of seven 
fisheries do not produce significantly higher NPV Prf15 than the baseline scenario, exceptions being NS 
flatfish and Mediterranean anchovy. This means that approaches like a ‘one-off scrapping scheme’ may 
not produce a significantly better result than a continuation and full implementation of the present 
management.  
 
The level of flexibility assumed under the two optimization scenarios is far from realistic. The 
optimization scenarios mostly lead to the highest aggregate profits, but not necessarily highest profits per 
vessel. This illustrates that private and public interests are not served with the same policy approach. In 
general, elimination of overcapacity leads to higher profits and smaller fleets, i.e. greater benefits are 
reaped by a smaller group of producers. Overcapacity may be eliminated by scrapping or by an 
autonomous process of strict imposition of TAC or effort restrictions. The public costs of scrapping 
schemes have not been included in the analysis. This would certainly reduce the attractiveness of scenarios 
10 and 12 compared to other options. 
 
Case study results 
 
Chapters 4-10 present the individual case studies. Each case study describes first the present situation in 
terms of definitions of fleet segments, their dependence on specific species and their economic indicators. 
Management of each fishery is analysed by reviewing the existing input and output measures, including 
property rights. The main part of each case study is devoted to the elaboration of the 14 scenarios to 
determine the potential net profit. The scenarios are based on different runs of the FISHRENT model. 
 
It is important to stress that the FISHRENT model generates scenarios under an explicit set of 
assumptions (e.g. the selected form of the mathematical relations) and does not forecast the future. The 
value of the scenarios lies in their mutual comparisons and in precise identification of the required political 
choices and their relative consequences. 
 
The core question of this study is whether well managed fisheries and recovered stocks will generate a 
higher resource rent, using net profit as a proxy. For this purpose a detailed analysis of various 
management approaches and fleet adaptations paths has been carried out in the case studies. The main 
results are summarized below as follows: 
 Static comparison of net profit of 2005-7 and nominal (i.e. not discounted) net profit realized in year 
15 of the simulation. This comparison shows the potential improvement of the performance of the 
sector, but it disregards the costs which must be born in the initial period as fishing effort has to be 
reduced to allow the stocks to recover.  
 Dynamic comparison of net profit 2005-7 with an average net present value of net profit over a 
period of 15 years (average NPV Prf15). This simplified comparison accounts for the costs and 
benefits of the entire simulation period. 
 Apart from net profit, also comparisons of the size of the fleet and the performance per vessel in the 
different situations are presented. Size of the fleet is also a proxy for employment. Net profit / vessel 
indicates how much the efficiency of the fleet would increase and consequently the potential for 
imposition of payment for access, i.e. recovery of resource rent. 
 
It must be repeated that all results presented below are based on the simulation runs of the FISHRENT 
model and should be interpreted in the light of the detailed discussion presented in the main part of the 
report. All relevant figures are presented in table 0.1. 
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North Sea and Baltic Sea fisheries 
 
The baseline scenarios for the North Sea and Baltic Sea fisheries indicate that TAC min policy would lead 
to a significant increase of the net profits. In 15 years the net profit of these 3 fisheries could increase 
from about 140 mln euro in 2005-7 to about 840 mln euro. At the same time the size of the fleet would be 
reduced from 4,600 vessels to 3,600 vessels.  
 
The static comparison conceals the importance of the costs which have to be born in order to achieve the 
indicated improvement. The average NPV Prf15 is estimated at 370 mln euro, i.e. an average increase of 
annual net profit by 160% from 2005-7. The average NPV Prf15 per vessel would increase by 240%. 
 
In these fisheries, comparison of the baseline and the optimisation scenario shows that part of the 
potential resource rent may remain unexploited if too strict fleet policies are followed.   
 
Atlantic fisheries 
 
In the two Atlantic fisheries net profit generated in year 15 in the baseline scenario would be over 100 mln 
euro, i.e. 320%, higher than the net profit of 2005-7, while the fleet would be reduced by 26%. Net profit 
per vessel would be in the year 15 about 470% higher than in 2005-7. 
 
The dynamic comparison shows that, when adaptation costs are accounted for, the average NPV Prf15 
would be about 160% above the level of 2005-7. The average NPV Prf15/vessel would be about 260% 
higher than in 2005-7. 
 
Mediterranean fisheries 
 
The two Mediterranean fisheries which have been analysed show a much more mixed picture than the five 
fisheries discussed above. Profits of anchovy fishery remain overall at a constant level, in terms of nominal 
and net present value. The average NPV Prf15 of the hake fishery would deteriorate. 
 
In total in year 15 the net profit in Mediterranean fisheries would be approximately equal to 2005-7As the 
number of vessels would fall by little over 20%, the average net profit/vessel would be about 45% above 
the 2005-7 level. 
 
The dynamic comparison shows that the average NPV Prf15 would be 17% lower than in 2005-7. The 
productivity per vessel would remain constant. 
 
Final comments 
 
The simulations indicate clearly that different fisheries need to be managed with different means, due to 
the differences in their structure in terms of composition of fleets and catches. 
 
Significant improvements of performance can be achieved in the long term, although the short term costs 
(in terms of reduction of fishing effort, catches and revenues) are in some cases significant. 
 
Analysis of the report is based on net profit as a proxy of the resource rent, assuming that the capital value 
and costs provided under DCR are representative. An estimation of the resource rent in its original 
meaning, accounting for ‘normal profit’ with adapted capital costs is presented in Annex 3.  
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Table 0.1 Comparison of net profit, fleet and net profit/vessel in year 2005-7, baseline scenario and 
optimisation scenario 14.  
Year 
2005-7 
Baseline scenario
  
Optimisation 
scenario 14 
Baseline scenario 
  
Optimisation 
scenario 14 
Net profit  Million euro Index (Year 2005-7=100) 
  
Nominal 
year 15 
Average 
NPV  
Yr 1-15
Nominal 
year 15
Average 
NPV  
Yr 1-15
Nominal 
year 15
Average 
NPV  
Yr 1-15 
Nominal 
year 15 
Average 
NPV  
Yr 1-15
NS flatfish -24 143 50 162 67 
NS cod 130 577 259 667 373 443 199 512 286 
BS cod 38 122 65 187 109 319 169 491 285 
 - Sub-total NS + BS 144 842 374 1,016 549 583 259 704 380 
Atl. hake 56 121 81 175 116 217 146 314 208 
Atl. anchovy -21 27 11 84 66 
 - Sub-total Atlantic 35 148 92 260 182 424 264 743 520 
Med. anchovy 5 4 5 8 6 77 114 180 122 
Med. hake 28 31 22 47 32 112 78 167 116 
 - Sub-total Mediter. 33 35 27 55 38 107 83 169 117 
Total 7 fisheries 212 990 462 1,331 769 467 218 628 363 
Fleet  Number of vessels Index (Year 2005-7=100) 
    Year 15 
Average 
Yr 1-15 Year 15
Average 
Yr 1-15 Year 15
Average  
Yr 1-15 Year 15 
Average 
Yr 1-15
NS flatfish 626 317 338 958 552 51 54 153 88 
NS cod 1,475 1,506 1,148 4,214 2,536 102 78 286 172 
BS cod 2,533 1,828 2,001 2,304 2,295 72 79 91 91 
 - Sub-total NS + BS 4,634 3,651 3,487 7,476 5,383 79 75 161 116 
Atl. hake 650 547 522 705 573 84 80 108 88 
Atl. anchovy 295 153 179 498 419 52 61 169 142 
 - Sub-total Atlantic 945 700 701 1,203 992 74 74 127 105 
Med. anchovy 53 112 157 116 191 211 296 219 360 
Med. hake 1,729 1,204 1,354 1,244 1,243 70 78 72 72 
 - Sub-total Mediter. 1,782 1,316 1,511 1,360 1,434 74 85 76 80 
Total 7 fisheries 7,361 5,667 5,699 10,039 7,809 77 77 136 106 
Net profit/vessel  1000 euro Index (Year 2005-7=100) 
    
Nominal 
year 15 
Average 
NPV  
Yr 1-15
Nominal 
year 15
Average 
NPV  
Yr 1-15
Nominal 
year 15
Average 
NPV  
Yr 1-15 
Nominal 
year 15 
Average 
NPV  
Yr 1-15
NS flatfish -39 450 149 169 122 
NS cod 88 383 226 158 147 434 255 179 167 
BS cod 15 67 32 81 47 442 214 539 314 
 - Sub-total NS + BS 31 231 107 136 102 740 344 436 328 
Atl. hake 86 221 156 249 203 258 182 290 236 
Atl. anchovy -71 177 60 170 157 
 - Sub-total Atlantic 37 212 132 216 183 572 356 584 495 
Med. anchovy 87 32 34 72 30 37 38 82 34 
Med. hake 16 26 16 38 26 161 100 233 162 
 - Sub-total Mediter. 18 26 18 40 27 145 98 222 146 
Total 7 fisheries 29 175 81 133 98 607 282 461 342 
Note: it is not possible to calculate indexes of series with changing signs. 
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Table 0.2 Comparison of the effect of different policies on average NPV Prf15 and the average net profit 
in 2005-7in the 7 fisheries (mln euro) 
Scenarios 
North S. 
flatfish 
North S. 
cod 
Baltic S. 
cod 
Atlantic 
hake 
Atlantic 
anchovy 
Medit. 
anchovy 
Medit. 
hake 
Average 2005-7 -24 130 38 56 -21 5 28 
Average NPV Prf 15 
1. TAC min 50 259 65 81 7 
2. Effort min 48 251 79 74 11 5 22 
3. TAC max 0 60 21 
4. Effort max -1 40 23 6 -2 
5. Open access -2 177 34 22 23 6 -2 
6. Min min 62 258 64 81 7 
7. Discount rate 2% 2% 50 81 11 5 22 
8. Discount rate 5% 50 81 11 5 22 
9. Recovery mgt. costs 53 259 65 79 11 6 22 
10. Static present fleet 13 242 56 62 0 5 18 
11. Static minimum fleet 37 239 66 85 4 5 18 
12. Dynamic minim. fleet 61 264 68 97 16 5 26 
13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 51 367 91 99 40 4 30 
14. Optimum fleet (profit) 67 373 109 116 66 6 32 
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SUMMARY FOR NON-SPECIALISTS 
 
 
Fish stocks are a renewable natural resource. Exploitation of fish stocks generates benefits to the society, 
either in the physical form of food or in monetary form of income. A rational fisheries management 
should maintain the fish stocks at a relatively high sustainable level and it should promote an economically 
efficient exploitation, avoiding excessive investments and its undesirable consequences. 
 
The objective of the present study is to determine what benefits could be generated from the EU fish 
stocks and how. It is expected that higher catches could be realized in the long run if the stocks would be 
able to recover. Such recovery is only possible if fishing pressure (catches) would be reduced in the short 
run. Lower catches mean evidently lower earnings for the fishing fleets. The decrease in earnings can be 
considered as investment, which will be earned back by higher production in the future.  
 
The study presents a quantitative analysis of these processes – interactions between fishing fleets, fish 
stocks and management measures. A mathematical model (FISHRENT) was developed for this purpose. 
The model is based on real statistical data for the period 2005-7 and generates simulations of 15-25 years. 
The model is a tool for exploration of scenarios, evidently it does not forecast the future. 
 
In total 14 scenarios were designed to deal with the terms of reference of this study. Six scenarios reflect 
different management regimes, based on restrictions of catches, fishing effort or leaving the fishery free. 
Two scenarios evaluate the consequences of different discount rates, i.e. different ways to account for 
benefits obtained only in the (distant) future. One scenario assumes that the costs of fisheries 
management would be charged to the catching sector and evaluates the consequences of a cost recovery 
regime. Finally, four scenarios consider how much the benefits would increase if fleet overcapacity would 
be completely eliminated. 
 
The model and the 14 scenarios are applied to seven EU fisheries, whose variety reflects the realities of 
the EU catching sector. These fisheries differ in terms of size of vessels, types of gears, regions, exploited 
species and management regimes.  
 
Main conclusions 
 
The main conclusions of the study can be summarized as follows: 
 There is not one single way to measure the benefits of fish stocks to the society. Higher production of 
food may not lead to the highest creation of income. And income (i.e. access to fish stock) allocated 
to one part of the fishing industry may be at the expense of another part.  
 In a multi-species fishery, where a group of fleets exploit several fish stock concurrently, it is unlikely 
that all stocks can be exploited at their maximum potential level. Allowing one stock to grow implies 
that other stocks may be constrained, or even depleted. 
 Instantaneous elimination of overcapacity does not lead to significantly higher benefits than its 
gradual elimination and continuation of the existing management regime, assuming it is fully 
implemented. 
 The simulations confirm that unmanaged open access fisheries are not sustainable and produce low 
benefits to the society. 
 In order to pursue optimum benefits from the fishery resources to the society, explicit political 
objectives need to be formulated allowing for a definition of a proper benchmark against which the 
benefits should be measured.  
 
The present study simulates recovery of stocks and elimination of overcapacity) of seven EU fisheries, 
which represented in 2005-7 about 20% of the EU fisheries production. The main results are presented in 
terms of net profit which is interpreted as an indicator of the level and trend of the resource rent.  
 
The seven fisheries generated in 2005-7 annually a net profit of 212 mln euro with about 7,400 vessels. In 
the baseline scenario the total nominal net profit of these fisheries increases to 1 bln euro by year 15, while 
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the fleet would be reduced to 5,700 vessels. Consequently, the net profit/vessel would increase by 520%. 
Despite the significant costs of such adaptation the total annual average net present value of the net profit 
over the 15 years would be almost 500 mln euro, 130% more than the average profits of 2005-7. The 
average discounted net profit per vessel over the 15 years would be 200% higher than in 2005-7 
 
Taking into account the assumptions made, the scenarios show that overall major improvements of the 
economic performance in EU fisheries could be achieved. Evidently, significant differences between the 
different fisheries exist, which leads to different conclusions on potential for improvement as well as 
appropriateness of various management approaches. It cannot be concluded that more restrictive policies 
would in general lead to better economic results. The scenarios show structural changes in the fleet 
composition. This implies that promotion of economic efficiency and optimization of the fisheries 
contribution to the EU economy calls for creation of conditions within which the vessel operators will be 
able to adapt flexibly to the existing fishing opportunities within the long term sustainability constraint. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Objective and terms of reference 
 
The objective of the study is to establish an analytical approach to estimate the potential resource rent and 
apply it to a number of case study fisheries, which are representative for the total EU fisheries sector. In 
this way the study demonstrates to which extent it is desirable and feasible to pursue policies aiming at 
exploitation of fish stocks at the levels of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) or maximum economic yield 
(MEY). 
 
The terms of reference of the study were specified as follows: 
1. To examine possible alternatives for estimating the resource rent in EU fisheries, using different 
targets of sustainability (e.g. MSY, MEY); 
2. To identify and use bio-economic model(s) suitable to estimate resource rents in EU fisheries, by 
appropriately allocating resource rents between fish stocks and fleet segments that exploit those 
stocks; 
3. To give practical case studies for a range of EU fishery and fleet types, using different management 
regimes (e.g. effort regulation, TAC regulation, individual transferable quotas).  
There shall be 2 cases per each of the following geographical areas: Baltic/North Sea, Atlantic, and 
Mediterranean/Black Sea and shall represent the diversity of EU fisheries and fishing fleets, and cover 
a mix of: 
 Active and passive gears 
 Demersal, pelagic and benthic fisheries (single species, multi-species) 
4. To explore the impact of a range of interest rates for net present value, applied to the practical cases 
above. 
5. An estimation of potential resource rents for each case should be assessed for the current fleet and for 
a fleet size without overcapacity.  
6. Assess costs of management of each case (e.g. fisheries administration, control and enforcement, 
research, subsidies) and assess to what extent successfully generated and extracted resource rents can 
cover these costs. Also, to what extent could additional rents be captured by society (e.g. as a payment 
for resource use?  
 
The report is structured as follows. After the Introduction, chapter 2 presents the theoretical background 
along with a variety of considerations and assumptions, required to develop an empirical application of the 
concepts of resource rent, MSY and MEY. The chapter presents a brief review of the main bio-economic 
models and compares them to the model FISHRENT which was developed for the purpose of this study. 
The chapter 2 also discusses topics related to valuation (shadow pricing), uncertainty and discount rates. 
Finally, chapter 2 describes the logic of the 14 scenarios which were elaborated for each case study in 
order to highlight various aspects of the determination of the resource rent. Chapter 2 shows that in a 
multi-species  multi-fleet situation, which is characteristic for most EU fisheries, one single optimum 
(maximum) resource rent cannot be determined without subjective value judgements (e.g. political 
preferences). The last part of chapter demonstrates that political choices must be made in terms of species 
to be protected, fishing fleets to be restricted and time within which specific conservation goals should be 
achieved. The bio-economic model which was developed for the purpose of this study shows explicitly 
the quantitative consequences of such choices. 
 
Chapter 3 summarizes the results of the seven case studies and puts them in EU-wide context. It shows 
the role of the case study fisheries within the total EU fisheries sector and integrates the results of the 14 
scenarios runs in terms of which they are analysed.  
 
Chapters 4-10 present the individual case studies. Each case study describes first the present situation in 
terms of definitions of fleet segments, their dependence on specific species and selected economic 
indicators. Management of each fishery is analysed by reviewing the existing input and output measures, 
including property rights, as far as relevant. The main part of each case study is devoted to the elaboration 
of 14 scenarios to determine the potential resource rent. The scenarios are based on different runs of the 
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FISHRENT model. The model generates the net present value of net profit, used as the main proxy for 
resource rent. The model also shows the adaptation paths of stocks, fleets and their various indicators of 
economic performance. 
 
The first six scenarios reflect the different types of policy – i.e. input or output driven and the level of 
restrictions imposed (high or low). One scenario simulates an open access fishery. The policy scenario 
which is closest to the present practice is selected as a ‘baseline scenario’, to which the results of other 
scenarios are compared. Scenarios 7 and 8 analyse the consequences of different time preferences, 
expressed in different discount rates compared to the baseline. Scenario 9 compares the resource rent of 
the baseline scenario to the estimated management costs and evaluates consequences of costs recovery. 
Finally, scenarios 10-13 simulate different approaches to achieving an optimum result, in terms rapid 
(instantaneous) or gradual adaptation of fishing effort and consequently faster or slower recovery of 
stocks. Not all scenarios are relevant for each case study, but consistent numbering has been maintained 
throughout for easier comparisons. 
 
It is important to stress that the FISHRENT model generates scenarios under an explicit set of 
assumption (i.e. the selected form of the mathematical relations) and does not forecast the future. The 
value of the scenarios lies in their mutual comparisons and in precise identification of the required political 
choices and their relative consequences. 
 
The report is completed with two annexes. Annex 1 presents a detailed description of the FISHRENT 
model, how it can be used and the procedures for its adaptation to the different ‘sizes’, in terms of 
number of fleet segments and species. Annex 2 contains details of management costs by MS. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.1. Theory of resource rent 
 
In theoretical textbooks, determination of the resource rent is usually based on simple examples of single 
species, single fleet situations, which produce one neat optimum. However, the reality is a little more 
complex and attempting to determine one simple optimum proves rather elusive. This section discusses 
therefore several issues which are relevant in general, although not all have been applied for the purposes 
of this study: 
 Single species / single fleet situation is presented to show the basic concept. 
 Multi-species situation shows that an optimum may not be socially or environmentally acceptable. 
This example highlights the limits of scientific contribution to policy preparation and the need for 
political decisions. 
 
Static single species case 
 
The general concept of resource rent and the relation between MSY and MEY is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
In many EU fisheries the level of fishing effort lies to the right of MSY. Theoretically, production volume 
and value could be increased while production costs could be reduced by reducing fishing effort. This 
concept has been formulated by Warming1 already in 1911, Gordon (1954)2 and many other authors since 
then. MEY is the level of production at which maximum resource rent could be collected by the society in 
a well-managed fishery. 
 
Fishing effort at MEY level lies below the MSY-level. Although physical production is lower, it is 
conventionally assumed that the accompanying lower fishing effort and consequently lower costs and 
higher productivity more than off-set the loss in physical production and lead to a higher resource rent 
(bold line at MEY). However, the static approach assumes implicitly a low discount rate, i.e. a weak time 
preference. If a high discount rate would be assumed, than the MEY fishing effort would be higher than 
the effort at MSY level because the fishing fleet would not only take the yield of the stock, but also part of 
the stock itself.  
 
Although the Figure 2.1 clearly represents the concepts of MSY and MEY, the far reaching simplification 
does not do justice to the complex reality. Figure 2.1 reflects a single species, static situation. In reality, 
several species, with different economic and biological characteristics are caught at the same time. The 
stock abundance as well as prices of fish and inputs change from year to year. Adjustment of the fleet and 
fishing effort takes place gradually and is not costless. If the duration of adjustment and time preferences 
are taken into account it may not be beneficial to reduce effort in the short run. It will take a number of 
years for the stocks to recover and to produce a higher yield. In a dynamic evaluation, the costs of 
recovery, in terms of income foregone in the short run must be compared to the benefits in the long run. 
(See Conrad and Clark (1994, p. 75)3 for “the golden rule” of capital accumulation, and Clark, Clarke and 
Munro (1979)4 for irreversible investments.) 
 
  
                                                     
1 Warming, J. (1911), Om grundrente af fiskegrunde, Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift, 49, 499-505. 
2 Gordon, H. Scott (1954): The economic theory of a common property resource: the fishery. Journal of Political Economy 
62: 124-142. 
3 Conrad, J. M. and C. W. Clark (1994) Natural resource Economics. First printed 1987, Cambridge University Press.  
4 Clark, C. W., F. H. Clarke and G. R. Munro (1979) The Optimal Exploitation of Renewable Resource Stocks: 
Problems of Irreversible Investment. Econometrica 47: 1, pp. 25-47.  
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Figure 2.1. Relation between MSY, MEY and the present situation 
 
 
 
Static multi-species case 
 
Management of two species with very different biological characteristics may offer a single best solution to 
MSY and MEY, but as illustrated in Figure 2.2 solution may not be socially or environmentally acceptable. 
The situation in Figure 2.2 assumes that the management area contains two species. Species 1 is a small 
stock of highly priced fish, but very vulnerable to overfishing and even extinction. Species 2 fetches a 
much lower price, but the stock is large and if fully exploited can deliver higher contribution to the 
economy (MEY2), greater production of food (MSY2) and as the fishing takes place at a much higher 
level of effort, it may also offer more employment. Price for this increase in ‘welfare’ is that species 1 is 
(almost) completely fished out.  
 
Figure 2.2. Dilemmas of multi-species management 
 
 
The multi-species situation in Figure 2.2 illustrates the scope of political decisions required to determine 
an optimum – food production, employment and income versus maintenance of environmental integrity. 
 
Dynamic case 
 
The above presented single- and multi-species cases are static. They do not account for different 
adaptation paths which follow from the policy measures taken, biological characteristics of species and 
behaviour of fleets.  
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4. Implications for policy advice. 
These aspects are briefly discussed below. 
 
Annex 3 presents an estimation of the resource rent of the seven fisheries making all required 
assumptions. 
 
Ad. 1 Relevance of theoretical assumptions 
 
The theory uses a production function in which the catch is a function of effort, i.e. homogeneous 
production factors (labour, capital and other inputs), and fish stocks. It is assumed that capital is owned by 
firms which pursue profit maximization. Labour availability is driven by utility functions, inter alia by 
choices between income and free time. This strengthens the clarity of the concept.  
 
In empirical analysis the theoretical assumptions have to be tested and adaptations must be introduced if 
the assumptions do not hold sufficiently. The main issues to address are in general the lack of 
homogeneity.  
 
Ad. 2 Availability of data 
 
Calculation of profit requires reliable data on depreciation costs and capital value. Under DCR (2002-7) 
capital costs included depreciation and interest costs. However, various MS followed different approaches 
to estimate these two values. The same argument applies to the valuation of capital (called ‘investment’). 
This problem has been addressed under the new DCF programme. However, DCF data was not yet 
available for the purposes and the present study and it would offer only one observation (namely 2008), 
while the present study uses a 3-year multi-annual average as baseline data to eliminate influences of short 
term fluctuations.  
 
Apart from valuation of vessels and their equipment, there are two other assets which present specific 
statistical or empirical problems: 
 Fishing rights: Value of fishing rights is included under DCF, but for 2008 not many MS have 
managed to provide it. In some MS the value of fishing rights is at least equal to the value of the 
vessels. At present a common approach to valuation of fishing rights has not yet been developed. It 
presents also specific problems.  
o When fishing rights (ITQs, effort allocations or licenses) are tradable then part of the ‘rent’ is 
included in the market prices, which makes them unsuitable for valuation purposes when 
resource rent is to be determined.  
o A market price does not exist for non-tradable fishing rights, although the value may be hidden 
in prices of vessels to which these rights are attached5. 
o An approach to valuation of fishing rights will have to deal with the question whether all fishing 
rights should be valued or only those which have been actually acquired and not only obtained 
free of charge from the government. It can be argued that opportunity costs exist in both cases.  
 Investments on shore: Particularly multi-vessels firm and firm operating larger vessels have assets (and 
personnel) on shore. Information on the value of these assets is not collected under DCF at all. 
 
Ad. Estimation of normal profit 
 
Obtaining an indicator of ‘normal profit’ depends on perceptions of risk, time preference, etc. Normal 
profit level (or opportunity costs of capital) is different in different economic sectors. Normal profit may 
be even different in different fleet segments. Finally, required profitability would have to be applied as a 
percentage of capital value, for which reliable data does not exist. Therefore estimation of ‘normal profit’ 
would have to be based on two figures, both being highly uncertain. Result of such calculation, making all 
necessary assumptions, is presented in annex 3. 
 
                                                     
5 Guyader, O. et al. (2003). A hedonic analysis of capital stock in fisheries: the case of second hand market of the 
French fishing vessels. XVth EAFE Conference Proceedings. Ifremer, Brest. 
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The concept of profit, while simple in theory, is elusive in practice, i.e. in statistics. This is also the reason 
why Eurostat does not publish any data on profits realized in various economic sectors. The Structural 
Business Statistics do not contain an explicit definition of profit. The closest indicator in SBS is the ‘Gross 
operating surplus’, which is the difference between revenues and operational costs.  
 
 
2.2. Bio-economic modelling  
 
Relevance of existing models  
 
An in-depth review of existing bio-economic models (developed in the EU) has been prepared under the 
project ‘Survey of existing bio-economic models’6. Of the 13 models which are discussed in the report, only few 
are concerned with the calculation of the resource rent. Detailed comparison of these models and 
FISHRENT is presented in Table 2.2. 
 
The EIAA model (Economic Interpretation of the ACFM Advice) has been widely used to assess the 
economic consequences of the TAC/quota management of the EU7. The model is output driven. 
Extended version of the EIAA model developed in 2004 / 2005 contains a biological yield function 
(Ricker) and an economic production function (Cobb-Douglas) and allows estimation of maximum 
profit8. EIAA model is convenient as it is written in Excel. However, during the years of development of 
the model, it had become rather complex and difficult to understand and retrace how the various variables 
are linked. For this reason EIAA was not considered suitable to develop further for the purpose of this 
project. 
 
BEMMFISH (Bio-economic Model for the Mediterranean Fisheries) is an input driven model developed 
for Mediterranean fisheries9.  
 
The World Bank/FAO study (WBF-model) is an output driven model. It generates the yield from the fish 
stocks as a function of the stock size. Based on the yield, the minimum effort to catch the yield at any 
stock size is calculated. By use of fish prices and effort costs the yield and effort that provides the largest 
profit is selected and the maximum resource rent (profit) is found. The WBF-model uses only “one stock” 
and “one fleet”, all aggregated at the global level. It makes a point estimate of the ’rent’ but it does not 
consider how and when this point could be reached and at which cost. 
 
The EMMFIDD, the Swedish Resource Rent Model for the Commercial Fishery (SRRMCF model) and 
the Norwegian model are linear programming models that maximize profit (resource rent) subject to 
quota and catch constraints. These models are static but very detailed and flexible in terms of use of 
harvest control rules that can contain input as well as of output constraints. These models generate the 
fleet composition in terms of the number of vessels in each fleet segment that would maximize the 
resource rent. 
 
Model requirements 
 
On the basis of the review of models and the objective of the project, it became evident that a new model 
had to be constructed which would meet the following requirements: 
 Integrate simulation (application of different management strategies) and optimization (determination 
of optimum value of resource rent and other variables). This is implemented by having a simulation 
model in which optimization can be achieved by using the Excel Solver. 
 Integrate output- and input-driven policies, so that one model could be consistently applied to 
different situations in the EU, particularly in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean / Black Sea areas. 
 Multi-species / multi-fleet, with flexible number of species and segments to be accommodated. 
                                                     
6 AZTI et.al., Survey of existing bio-economic models, FISH, 2007/07, Final report April 2009 
7 Frost et al., 2009 
8 Frost et al. 2009, p.10-11. 
9 Guillen et al. 2004 
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 Close link to available economic and biological data, to allow empirical applications. 
 Balanced construction between various components: biology-economics-policy. 
 Dynamic behaviour, including investment and effort functions, to allow simulation of adjustment 
paths to an optimum. 
 Flexibility for applications of various types of relations which play an important role in any bio-
economic model (e.g. different stock-growth functions, approaches to payment for access, etc.). 
 Use of a well-known platform (Excel) to allow easy use by the members of the project team, a broad 
introduction and accessibility to new users. 
 
A new model, named FISHRENT, was developed on the basis of earlier experiences. FISHRENT 
contains six modules as presented in the project proposal: 
1. Biological module 
2. Economic module 
3. Interface module 
4. Market module 
5. Behaviour module 
6. Policy module 
 
The main characteristics of the basic model are: 
 The model accounts for eight species and eight fleet segments, but can be extended to a larger 
number if required10. Procedure for such extension is described in Annex 1. 
 The model is a dynamic simulation model, running for a period of 25 years. Extension to a longer 
period is possible. 
 By using the Excel Solver tool, the model can be used as an optimization model, which is particularly 
relevant in relation to the estimation of the resource rent. 
 The model combines input and output based management, as well as their combinations. This has 
been achieved by a two stage calculation, in which first relevant combination of effort and catch is 
determined (starting either from catch or from effort constraints) and subsequently applied in the 
actual simulation. 
 The model contains various options for the collection of rent (payment for access), including fixed 
payment per unit of capacity (vessel), payment per unit of effort (days-at-sea) and tax on revenues or 
profits.  
 
Figure 2.4 shows some of the features of the FISHRENT model. Once the data of the baseline period is 
inserted and the parameters of the equations have been estimated, changing the policy type adapts 
instantaneously the graphics and the estimations of the rent so that the results of the various policy 
scenarios can be easily viewed. In addition, the model produces output of all variables, which can be 
transferred to a separate database for further analysis. 
 
The FISHRENT model is as closely tailored to the real world as possible11. It contains three distinct 
dynamic processes: 
1. The fish stocks develop using a 2nd degree polynomial stock-growth function. The catchable biomass 
is determined by its growth and the realized catch, which may exceed the sustainable catch when too 
much fishing effort is allowed. 
2. The changes of the fleet size are determined with an investment function, which in its turn is related 
to profit level of the previous year, using the ratio between realized revenue and break-even revenue. 
3. The production of the fleet is based on a Cobb-Douglas production function, where catch depends 
on effort and the biomass. 
4. Changes in fleets and stocks are related only indirectly, through the consequences of the choices of 
the management regimes and several simultaneous interactions. 
Consequently, the model allows stock to be over- or underexploited and fleets to grow and to contract. 
The model is described in detail in annex 1. 
                                                     
10 Various other sizes have been implemented for the case studies. 
11 Full description is presented in Annex 1. 
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Table 2.2 Comparison of FISHRENT with selected bio-economic models 
Criteria FISHRENT EIAA BEMMFISH World Bank EMMFID Norwegian 
model 
Model objective Estimation of net 
profit and GVA 
for specific  EU 
fisheries 
Economic 
evaluation of 
biologic advice 
Modelling of 
Mediterranean 
fisheries 
Estimation of 
resource rent on 
global level 
Estimation of 
resource rent for 
the whole 
Danish fishery 
Estimation of 
resource rent for 
the major part of 
the Norwegian 
fishery 
Estimates 
resource rent 
Annual and NPV - 
profits  
Annual profit Annual and 
NPV of profits 
Point estimate of 
maximum profit
Point estimate of 
maximum profit 
Point estimate 
of maximum net 
profit 
Simulation / 
optimization 
Simulation and 
optimization using 
Excel solver 
Simulation Simulation Optimization by 
solving the profit 
equation 
Optimization 
using linear 
programming 
Optimization 
using linear 
programming 
Input / output 
driven 
Input and output Output Input Output  Input and output Input and 
output 
Policy options Open access, 
TAC, effort 
restriction, access 
fees, taxes 
TAC Fishing time 
(effort), vessels, 
taxes 
None Open access, 
TAC and effort 
restriction 
Open access, 
TAC and effort 
restriction 
Fish prices 
elasticity 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Accounting for 
exogenous fuel 
price changes 
Yes No No No No No 
Investment 
function 
Yes No Yes No No No 
Biological input Biomass, Stock-
growth function in 
a flexible format.  
Source: ICES and 
Italian institutes 
Average 
recruitment and 
yield per recruit  
Source: ICES 
Stock-growth 
function 
Single species 
Logistic (2nd deg. 
polynomial) and 
Fox function.  
Sources: FAO 
and other 
TAC/catch 
restrictions 
TAC/catch 
restrictions 
Economic input Multi fleet. DCF 
data, 
distinguishing 5 
cost components 
Multi fleet. DCF 
data, 
distinguishing 5 
cost components 
DCF with minor 
assumptions 
Variable and 
fixed costs, 
Source: large 
variety of data 
Detailed cost 
structure 
Detailed cost 
structure 
Dynamic/static 
Number of years 
Dynamic: 25 years, 
expandable 
Static: 3 point 
estimates current 
year, next year, 
long term. 
Dynamic: 
40 years 
Static Static Static 
HCR / 
management 
plans 
Multi-species – 
multi-fleet mgt. by 
TACs, effort, 
access fees and 
taxes 
Single species and 
managements 
plans in terms of 
TAC/quota 
Effort and taxes No Single species 
and management 
plans in terms of 
TAC/quota and 
effort 
No 
Discards  Undersized and 
over-quota disc. 
No No No No No 
Software Excel Excel Java Excel GAMS/Excel Matlab 
Dynamic / Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Static Static 
Dimensions:       
 Fleets Up to eight, 
expandable 
Unlimited Multi-fleet 
 
Single fleet 26  
 
25 aggregated to 
11 
 Species 8 species, 
expandable 
25 species; all EU 
stock management 
areas (> 130) 
Unlimited Single species 118 stocks 10 
 Area unit Fishery areas, 
defined on basis of 
target stocks 
Based on stock 
management 
definition 
None 
 
Single area 
(earth) 
34 stock 
management 
areas; 14 regions 
None 
 Time unit Year Year Year NA Month Year 
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One of the management scenarios (1-6) which reflects the closest the present situation is selected as 
baseline and all other scenarios (7-13) are adaptations of the baseline scenario. 
 
The scenarios 10-13 are based on the baseline scenario and reflect various options of moving from the 
present situation to a situation without overcapacity. In these scenarios the stock recovers always 
gradually, but it is assumed that the adaptation of the fleet can take place gradually as well as 
instantaneously. This is presented in Figure 2.5 and described further under scenarios 10-13.  
 
Figure 2.5. Conceptual adaption paths 
 
 
 
Scenario 1. TAC minimum 
 
The stock-growth function of each species determines the sustainable harvest level, i.e. in practice the 
TAC for a given year. Effort of each fleet segment is set at a level consistent with the most restrictive 
TAC. Which species is most restrictive for a specific segment depends on its catch per unit of effort of 
that species and its allocation of TAC. Therefore different species may be most restrictive to different 
fleet segments in any given year. The dynamics of the model allow also changes of the most restrictive 
species for a specific segment in the course of the years. 
 
Scenario 2. Effort minimum 
 
Harvest ratio on a specific species in a given year is compared to the sustainable harvest ratio. Effort is 
adapted proportionately to the ratio of the two mortalities. Comparison of these mortalities for each 
species allows to select a ratio which is most restrictive and accordingly the lowest allowable level of effort 
is than applied to each segment. 
 
Scenario 3. TAC maximum 
 
The stock-growth function of each species determines the sustainable harvest level, i.e. in practice the 
TAC for a given year. Effort of each fleet segment is set at a level consistent with the least restrictive 
TAC. Which species is least restrictive for a specific segment depends on its catch per unit of effort of 
that species and its allocation of TAC. Therefore different species may be least restrictive to different fleet 
segments in any given year. The dynamics of the model may also lead to changes of the least restrictive 
species for a specific segment in the course of the years. 
 
Present  
fleet 
‘MSY’ 
stock 
Minimum 
fleet 
Present  
stock 
Gradual adaptation 
‘Jump’ from present to minimum fleet and then 
adaptation along steady state yield curve
Scenario 10
Scenario 12
Scenario 11
Scenario 13-14
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Scenario 4. Effort maximum 
 
Harvest ratio on a specific species in a given year is compared to the sustainable harvest ratio. Effort is 
adapted proportionately to the ratio of the two mortalities. Comparison of these mortalities for each 
species allows to select a ratio which is least restrictive and accordingly the highest allowable level of effort 
is than applied to each segment. 
Scenario 5. Open access 
 
In this scenario there are no constraints on output or input. The size of the fleet segments varies with the 
investments, which depend on profits. Production and productivity of each segment depend on the size of 
the stock and on the level of effort. 
 
Scenario 6 TAC minimum / Effort minimum 
 
The most restrictive management measure, input or output, determines the level of effort which each 
segment may apply in any given year. This scenario may be more constraining than the scenarios 1 and 2 
as the constraint may be based on TAC in one year and on effort in another one. 
 
Scenario 7. Discount rate 2% 
 
All management scenarios apply a discount rate of 3.5% to calculate the net present values. Scenario 7 is 
identical with the selected baseline scenario, but applies a discount rate of 2%. Lower discount rate implies 
a lower time preference, i.e. net profit in the future is valued almost as much as net profit at present. 
Specifically, net profit of 100 euro in year 15 is valued as much as net profit of 74 euro in year 0. 
 
Scenario 8. Discount rate 5% 
 
All management scenarios apply a discount rate of 3.5%. Scenario 8 is identical with the selected baseline 
scenario, but applies a discount rate of 5%. Higher discount rate implies a higher time preference, i.e. net 
profit in the future is valued less than net profit at present. Specifically, net profit of 100 euro in year 15 is 
valued as much as net profit of 48 euro in year 0. 
 
Scenario 9. Recovery of management costs 
 
The annual management costs are determined on the basis of OECD data and cross-checked with several 
other sources. The costs are allocated to each fleet segment proportionately to its share in value of the 
national fishery production. The scenario assumes that a lump sum payment equal to the allocated annual 
management costs is charged to each segment. 
 
Scenario 10. Static present fleet 
 
Scenario 10 is based on the baseline scenario and it assumes further that the size of the present fleet 
cannot be reduced and adaptation of effort can only take place by adjusting the number of days-at-sea per 
vessel. There are no investments or disinvestments. The number of vessels remains constant. The 
maximum level of effort is determined by the maximum number of days-at-sea per vessel times the umber 
of vessels. 
 
Scenario 11. Static minimum fleet 
 
In this scenario the present fleet is reduced instantaneously to the minimum required to exploit the 
present fishing opportunities (either in terms of TAC or in terms of effort). This means a ‘one-off 
scrapping scheme’. After that reduction, the effort is adapted by changing the number of days-at-sea per 
vessel, as long as it remains below a specified maximum. The number of vessels is maintained constant at 
the original minimum level.  
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Scenario 12. Dynamic minimum fleet 
 
The number of vessels is reduced instantaneously to the minimum, each fishing the maximum number of 
days-at-sea. After the first year the size of the fleet changes according to the allowed level of effort, i.e. 
number of vessels is equal to the allowed effort divided by the maximum number of days-at-sea per vessel. 
The investment function is disabled. 
 
Scenario 13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 
 
The scenario uses the Excel Solver to calculate the optimum number of vessels which would generate the 
maximum net present value of gross value added in 15 years. Vessels of each segment use the maximum 
possible number of days-at-sea per year. This scenario produces the optimum solution for each individual 
year. The annual investments in each segment are constrained to maximum change of -20% and +10% of 
the number of the vessels per year. This means that further improvement of the optimum could be 
achieved if this constraint would be eliminated.  
 
Results of the scenario 13 can be interpreted as maximum contribution to GNP. 
 
Scenario 14. Optimum fleet (profit) 
 
This scenario is identical to scenario 13, but it maximizes net present value of net profit instead of gross 
value added. The results of the scenario 14 can be interpreted as the MEY situation. 
 
Scenarios 13 and 14 reflect ranges of the theoretical solution under an ITQ system. ITQs are expected to 
lead to a high level of efficiency, as each individual producer is expected maximize his income (profit and 
labour remuneration) through acquisition of an optimum amount of fishing rights to operate at a 
maximum level of days-sea13 (i.e. optimum utilisation of the production capacity). 
 
Optimization in scenarios 13 and 14 implies that the policy constraints described under scenarios 1-4 are 
not active.   
 
 
2.4. Other topics 
 
Baseline period 
 
The model is based on average economic data of the period 2005-7, as collected under the Date 
Collection Regulation. 
 
Discount rate 
 
Low discount rates will produce higher net present value and lead to preference of higher benefits in the 
future. This means that policies imposing major restrictions in the short term, which are expected to 
generate higher benefits in the future, would be evaluated favourably. 
 
On the other hand, high discount rate favours more gradual policies, where the stock recovery lasts 
relatively longer, while income for the fishing sector is maintained at a higher level in the short run. 
 
The baseline discount rate is set in this study at 3.5%. This value is proposed by the UK Treasury14 for the 
purposes of ‘green accounting’. Alternative values have been set at 2% and 5%.  
 
                                                     
13 See P. Andersen, J.L. Andersen and H. Frost, ITQs in Denmark and  resource rent gains, Marine Resource Economics, 
Volume 25, p.11-22, 2010 
14 HM Treasury, The Green Book, Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government,  
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Uncertainty and stochasticity 
 
The FISHRENT model is dynamic, but deterministic. It must be stressed that the results must not be 
interpreted as forecasts of the future. The model is suitable to generate sets of scenarios, which can be 
mutually compared. Comparison of the scenarios generates information in the following areas: 
 consequences of different types of policies; 
 differences in levels of achieved benefits; 
 ranges of possible outcomes. 
More than 60 scenarios were elaborated for the seven case studies. Review of the results shows that they 
are consistent with developments which can be expected on the basis of qualitative, theoretical or expert 
analysis. This may be considered as an important validation of the operation of the model. 
 
The model version used does not contain stochastic elements. However, it is in principle possible to 
introduce stochasticity by replacing the stock-growth function by a RANDBETWEEN function, available 
in Excel.  
 
Prices 
 
The analysis is based on constant average market prices, observed in the baseline period 2005-7. The 
choice for constant prices was agreed with the Commission, based on the following arguments: 
 Results of the model reflect more clearly the consequences of changing size of stocks and fleets, while 
with variable prices, part of the calculated resource rent would have to be ascribed to price effects. 
 Application of price elasticity for the purpose of this study is questionable for at least two reasons: 
 The landings of a specific species by the segments in the case study fisheries represent an unknown 
share of the total landings of that species. However, the price of the species depends on the total 
landings. It would have to be assumed that the relative change in the landings of each species in the 
case study fishery is equal to the relative change in total landings. 
 One value of price elasticity is valid only for relatively small changes of total supply. However, 
recovery of stocks from overexploited to sustainable level may imply that the changes in landings are 
substantial. In that case application of one value for price elasticity may not be correct. 
 
Nominal, real and discounted values 
 
All calculations are based on constant prices, so that effects of inflation are eliminated. It is assumed that 
the change of prices of inputs and fish would be identical, not having any net effect on net profit or 
profits. The term ‘real’ value is usually related to deflated prices, after accounting for inflation. As inflation 
is not considered, the term ‘real’ is not used. 
 
Future net profit and profit is discounted with a rate specified above. This rate reflects time preference. 
Comparing discounted values is particularly relevant when a choice has to be made between several 
options where costs and benefits occur at different points of time. 
 
Within one scenario it may be relevant to compare nominal net profit in time (e.g. year 1 and year 15). The 
comparison reflects the net effects of underlying variables - i.e. changes of composition of the fleet and its 
production costs, catches, state of stocks, etc. – before time preference is taken into account15. 
 
  
                                                     
15 This may be illustrated with the following example: Assume that a fishery is in a stable MSY or MEY situation in 
year 1 and remains there for the entire period. Comparing nominal values shows that performance remains 
unchanged. However, comparing Prf of year 1 to a discounted Prf of year 15, could lead to a wrong conclusion that 
the performance deteriorates as with a discount rate of 3.5%, Prf of year 15 would be about 60% of the year 1, even 
if the nominal values are equal. 
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Management costs 
 
The estimated resource rents should be compared to the management costs (i.e. administration, control 
and enforcement, research and subsidies) of each case fishery. This task faced a number of problems, 
which were addressed as follows: 
1. Management costs are incurred at the level of the MS or EU, but not at the level of fishery or 
segment. Therefore, national management costs were allocated to the individual segments on the basis 
of the share of the production value of that segment in the national total. 
2. National management costs are not directly available from any source.  
3. Administration, control and enforcement are in different MS carried out by different organizations, 
which also deal with other areas than fisheries alone. The budget allocations are not necessarily related 
to one activity, but may be shifted according to need. Costs of administration, control and 
enforcement used in this study are therefore based on two recent sources – OECD16 and MRAG17. 
These two independent sources were used to check consistency of the results, which proved to be 
satisfactory. 
4. In many MS fisheries research is carried out by several research institutes. However, these institutes 
are not only involved in fisheries research, but also in other areas related to aquaculture, environment, 
oceanography, etc. Costs of research were therefore estimated using the 2009 budget for the Data 
Collection Framework, with an add-on of 30% for data analysis. 
5. The main lines of subsidies in EU fisheries are: 
a. European Fisheries Fund, in particular priority axis 1 and partly axis 3 and 4. As priority axis 3 
and 4 are partly dedicated to other activities, they were accounted for by taking 50% of their 
value, but only for the EU totals not for the individual case studies. 
b. Access to the waters of third countries. This subsidy is not relevant to any of the case studies. 
c. De minimis support – the allowed expenditure is highlighted in the text but not accounted for in 
the case studies as most countries have made little or no use of it, with the exception of Spain and 
France18. 
 
The costs accounted for under ‘management costs’ are costs directly related to management measures 
taken within CFP (e.g. EFF) and costs incurred to prepare and implement those measures (research, 
control and enforcement), Certain subsidies, not directly related to management, e.g. support to social 
security, exoneration from excise taxes, de minimis and third country agreements have not been taken into 
account. These subsidies would reduce the resource rent by the same nominal amount. 
 
Details of management costs are presented in Annex 2. 
 
Shadow prices 
 
The market prices reflect at best short term scarcity in imperfect markets. The market prices of fish do not 
reflect well the stock sustainability, the utility19 of the fish stocks to the society nor the needs and interests 
of future generations. The societal utility may contain many widely varying aspects ranging from existence 
value to production of food and creation of employment in remote areas. To account for these 
considerations requires the use of shadow (or economic) prices. 
 
The theory of resource rent proposes to apply a required profitability (shadow interest rate or opportunity 
costs) to the capital value of the catching sector and to calculate the resource rent as the difference 
between the realized and required profitability. The section on ‘Resource rent’ points out that focussing 
on profit alone is a too narrow interpretation of the concepts proposed in the theory and that part of the 
rent may be also contained in the remuneration of labour. The theory assumes that shadow value of both 
production factors can be estimated, i.e. shadow price as well as the volume of capital  and labour, to 
                                                     
16 OECD, Financial support to fisheries: Implications for sustainable development, Paris 2006, p.30 
17 MRAG Ltd., Oceanic Développement, Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management Ltd, Lamans s.a., Institute of 
European studies and IFM, ‘Impact Assessment of a Proposal to Reform and Modernise the Control System 
applicable to the Common Fisheries Policy’, May 2008 
18 Framian bv, Economic analysis of raising de minimis aid for fisheries, project MARE/2008/12, January 2009, 63p. 
19 Utility may contain user as well as existence value. 
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which shadow prices should be applied, (i.e. value=price*volume). However, that is not the case at the 
moment. 
 
From the above it follows that estimation of shadow values for capital and labour requires four 
components, each of them bringing with it specific problems: 
1. Determination of a shadow profitability (interest) rate requires taking into account the risk profile of 
the economic activity. This means that a unique shadow profitability rate does not exist and that it 
may be even different between different parts of the catching sector. Furthermore, if shadow 
profitability is interpreted as ‘opportunity costs’, it must be clearly defined to whom these opportunity 
costs apply. Opportunity costs to the society may be relatively low, because constraints of shifting 
from one capital good to another are limited or absent. On the other hand, opportunity costs to the 
fishing firms may be relatively high because their flexibility is limited and investing in alternative 
activities implies also high transfer costs. There has been no empirical research in this area. Within this 
study the value would be therefore highly speculative. 
2. The shadow profitability has to be applied to the value of capital invested in the sector. Valuation of 
capital is complex. Some values have been estimated under DCR, but these are not based on a 
common set of definitions. First steps for homogenization were taken under DCF for 2008 data20. 
However, this data was not available in time for application in this study. Furthermore, ad hoc review 
of the 2008 data points still to a number of inconsistencies, which need to be addressed first before 
the data can be used. 
3. Determination of shadow price of labour requires taking into account different wage levels in the 
various MS, but also by professional profile, including risk, educational level and sex. Eurostat data 
appears to be highly incomplete21, so that ad hoc estimations would be unavoidable. Furthermore, the 
Eurostat data are based on earnings of employees, which would have to be adapted to self-employed 
status of fishermen and possibly significant difference in working hours. Application of average 
opportunity costs of labour assumes that shifting from one occupation to another is costless and not 
constrained, assumptions which barely hold in practice. 
4. Shadow price of labour has to be applied to the employment, expressed in full-time equivalents. A 
similar argument applies in this case as in relation to capital. DCR does not provide FTE standardized 
data and DCF 2008 data was not available in time for the project. Ad hoc review of the new FTE22 
values raises questions about the reliability23. 
 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
 
Sensitivity analysis is presented by comparing the results of the 14 scenarios. This comparison shows how 
much the resource rent changes under different conditions of management, discount rate, costs recovery 
and fleet adaptations. 
 
Sensitivity has not been carried out in relation to changes of the parameters of the equations. However, as 
stated earlier, the model is a tool to generate scenarios and the value of the scenarios is in their mutual 
comparison. Consequently, comparing results of the model using different function parameters would be 
conceptually inconsistent. Rather, for each set of parameters, all 14 scenarios would have to be run and 
mutually compared. This would require resources beyond those available for this study and it is not likely 
that this would lead to a higher quality of the overall analysis. 
 
                                                     
20 Standardisation is based on: IREPA Onlus et.al., 2006. Evaluation of the capital value, investments and capital 
costs in the fisheries sector Study No FISH/2005/03.  
21 This applies in particular to wages by economic activity and educational level (series: earn-gr-nace2, earn-ses06-49 
and earn-gr-isco) and to lesser extent to minimum wages (series: earn-mw-avgr1).  
22 Standardisation is based on: ‘LEI et.al., 2006, Calculation of labour including full-time equivalent (FTE) in fisheries 
Study No FISH/2005/14, 142 p.’ and amended by the SGECA 07-01 report (15-19 January 2007, Salerno, 21 p. + 
annexes 
23 All statistical systems have to be improved in time to solve arising problems. Therefore it is not surprising that this 
also applies to DCF 2008 data. 
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Resource rent by species 
 
The calculation of the resource rent is based on the segments participating in the seven selected fisheries. 
 
Annex 4 presents an estimation of the resource rent (average NPV Prf15) by species. The resource rent 
has been allocated to individual species on the basis of their relative role in the total revenues of the 
fishery. This approach implies that a proportionate share of the resource rent has been allocated to ‘other’ 
species, which are not explicitly specified in the calculation. 
 
 
Interpretation of the scenarios 
 
With the exception of the baseline statistics on 2005-7, all other figures are results of the 
simulation model FISHRENT. The only correct interpretation is in relative comparisons between 
scenarios and indicators, but NOT in their absolute values. The model does not forecast the 
future, and certainly not for a period of 15 or 25 years. The model is a mathematical expression of 
generally accepted theoretical concepts. The model is a tool for consistent exploration and 
comparison of consequences of specific policy decisions. Therefore it may not be concluded, for 
example, that the nominal net profit of the various case study fisheries could reach the indicated 
values within the indicated period of time. 
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3. EU OVERVIEW 
 
 
3.1. Role of case studies within EU fisheries 
 
Fleet and landings 
 
The seven case studies analysed in the report represent overall around 20% of the total EU fisheries, 
varying from about 9% in terms of the number of vessels to almost 24% in terms of value of production 
and in line with these numbers also 26% of the net profit24. This can be considered as a significant share. 
The comparison of the number of vessels and the value and volume of landings implies, that the case 
studies reflect the operation of the relatively more commercially orientated fleet segments. The 
profitability of the various fisheries differs widely. While some make losses others make significant profits 
of up to about one third of the value of landings. 
 
Table 3.1 Selected indicators of case studies and EU total (average 2005-7) 
Fleet Landings Net profit 
(mln euro) 
Employ-
ment No. vessels 1000 GT Value
(mln euro)
Volume 
(1000 t) 
1. North Sea flatfish 626 100 392 240 -24 1,883 
2. North Sea cod 1,475 87 390 224 130 4,244 
3. Baltic Sea cod 2,533 37 151 116 38 4,499 
4. Atlantic hake 650 87 517 124 56 1,018 
5. Atlantic anchovy 295 35 225 73 -21 2,934 
6. Mediterranean anchovy 53 3 21 8 5 1,276 
7. Mediterranean hake 1,729 17 133 13 28 7,980 
Total case studies 7,361 366 1,829 798 212 19,339 
EU total 77,097 1,903 7,718 4,060 806 129,569 
Case studies as % of EU total 9.5% 19.2% 23.7% 19.7% 26.3% 14.9% 
Source: DCR 2009 (data 2002-2007) 
 
The case studies cover fisheries of 10 Member States, representing 11% of the average value of landings in 
2005-7 in Italy, 80% in Belgium and between 34% and 62% in the other eight MS. 
 
Most case study fisheries are multi-species, so that fleets depend only partially on the species and stocks 
defined as ‘target’. In terms of value, the dependence varies between 17% for North Sea cod and 49% for 
North Sea flatfish. In case of Atlantic anchovy, the figures for 2005-7 do not reflect current dependence 
well due to the restrictions under the present recovery plan.  
 
The multi-species character of these fisheries has significant consequences for the analysis of their 
functioning under various management regimes and estimation of the ‘resource rent’, which is discussed in 
section 2.1 
 
  
                                                     
24 See comments on the reliability of the data on net profit in chapter 2. 
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Table 3.2 Overview of case studies in relation to national and EU-27 fisheries25  
   (value of landings - average 2005-7, mln euro) 
Member 
State 
 
National 
total 
(DCF) 
Case study Total 
case 
studies 
Case 
studies 
as % of 
MS total
North 
Sea 
flatfish 
North 
Sea 
cod 
Baltic 
Sea 
cod 
Atlantic 
hake 
Atlantic 
anchovy
Mediterr
anean 
anchovy
Mediterr
anean 
hake 
AZO 31 0 0% 
BEL 86 69 69 80% 
CYP 11 0 0% 
DEU 155 45 40 85 55% 
DNK 393 86 72 32 190 48% 
ESP 1,735 188 128 316 18% 
EST 14 0 0% 
FIN 25 0 0% 
FRA 1,248 329 97 426 34% 
GBR 822 66 273 339 41% 
GRC 776 0 0% 
IRL 224 0 0% 
ITA 1,426 21 133 154 11% 
LTU 4 0 0% 
LVA 21 0 0% 
MLT 11 0 0% 
NLD 383 171 171 45% 
POL 42 26 26 62% 
PRT 343 0 0% 
SVN 1 0 0% 
SWE 114 53 53 46% 
Total 7,718 392 390 151 517 225 21 133 1,829 24%
Source: DCR 2009 (data 2002-2007) 
 
Table 3.3 Share of target species in the total value and volume of the case study fisheries  
 (average 2005-7) 
Case study Value Volume 
1. North Sea flatfish 49% 26% 
2. North Sea cod 17% 12% 
3. Baltic Sea cod 36% 22% 
4. Atlantic hake 29% 26% 
5. Atlantic anchovy 40% 82% 
6. Mediterranean anchovy 34% 53% 
7. Mediterranean hake 31% 40% 
Source: Calculation on the basis of DCR 2009 (data 2002-2007) 
 
Table 3.4 shows that there are significant differences between the average performance of the different 
fisheries. In particular, the Mediterranean hake fishery ‘enjoys’ an average price, which is many times 
higher than the price in the other fisheries. Consequently, this fishery achieves a relatively high net profit 
per tonne of landings. All other fisheries achieve a Prf/tonne between -300 and 600 euro. 
 
The North Sea flatfish fishery has the highest fuel intensity, with 33% of total revenues being spent on 
fuel costs. This fishery is relatively homogenous, being composed largely of beam trawlers. The average 
fuel efficiency in other fisheries is substantially lower, although the fleets involved are often more diverse, 
so that the average hides a spread of fuel intensity among the fleet segments involved. 
 
  
                                                     
25 Note: The national totals are the sums of segments included in DCF data. The actual values may be for some 
countries higher. However, countries included in the case studies have a high or full coverage in DCF. 
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Table 3.5 Economic indicators (average 2005-7) 
Case study Average price 
(euro/tonne) 
Fuel costs as 
% of income 
Net profit / 
tonne landings 
(euro/tonne) 
CPUE  
total 
(tonnes/day at 
sea) 
CPUE 
target species 
(tonnes/day at 
sea) 
1. North Sea flatfish 1,631 33% -101 2.4 0.6 
2. North Sea cod 1,746 10% 581 1.4 0.2 
3. Baltic Sea cod 1,307 11% 329 0.6 0.1 
4. Atlantic hake 4,187 19% 450 0.9 0.2 
5. Atlantic anchovy 3,069 13% -285 1.5 na 
6. Mediterranean anchovy 2,666 14% 580 1.2 0.6 
7. Mediterranean hake 10,258 22% 2,144 0.1 0.0 
Source: Calculation on the basis of DCR 2009 (data 2002-2007) 
 
Management costs 
 
For the purpose of this study management costs compiled by OECD (data for 2004-6) have been used in 
the scenario simulation. They were cross checked against three types of management costs obtained from 
various sources: capacity adjustment; management, enforcement and control and research. The OECD 
allocation to the case study fisheries amounts to 117 mln euro, while on the basis of other sources an 
amount of 138 mln euro was found. Comparison of the various sources implies that the data used is 
reliable. The overall EU management costs are presented in Annex 2.  
 
Table 3.6 Management costs (mln euro/year) 
EFF – axis 1
(a) 
Management, 
enforcement 
and control 
(b) 
Research
(c) 
Total 
(a+b+c) 
Total used in 
FISHRENT 
(OECD) 
1. North Sea flatfish 5.4 14.2 6.6 26.2 24.2 
2. North Sea cod 4.3 23.2 6.6 34.1 23.1 
3. Baltic Sea cod 14.9 16.8 1.8 33.5 16.9 
4. Atlantic hake 15.1 7.4 6.0 28.5 28.5* 
5. Atlantic anchovy 4.8 1.8 1.5 8.1 11.0 
6. Mediterranean anchovy 0.7 0.2 0.1 1.0 1.6 
7. Mediterranean hake 4.7 1.5 0.8 7.0 11.8 
Total case studies 49.9 65.1 23.4 138.4 117.1 
EU total 262.4 354.8 107.5 642.9 
Sources: Annex 2 and OECD; * based on Annex 2. 
 
 
3.2. Comparison of policy options (scenarios 1-6) 
 
The terms of reference of the study call for comparison of the performance of the case study fisheries 
under different management regimes. This comparison was carried out with a new bio-economic model 
FISHRENT, distinguishing 6 policy options: 
1. TAC min: policy decisions are driven by the most restrictive TAC advice. 
2. Effort min: policy is driven by the stock with the most restrictive fishing effort. 
3. TAC max: policy decisions are driven by the least restrictive TAC advice. 
4. Effort max: policy is driven by the stock with the least restrictive fishing effort. 
5. Open access: no active policy. Changes in the fishery are driven by fishermen behaviour only. 
6. Min min: the most restrictive of the two policies TAC min or Effort min determines the constraints 
imposed on the fishery each year 
Detailed description of the scenarios and the model is presented in section 2.3 and annex 1. 
 
The main benchmark for the comparison of the policy options is the net profit (Prf), which is considered 
as a proxy for the resource rent. The six policy options can be compared in three different static ways 
among themselves and to the situation in the baseline (average 2005-7, year 1 of the simulation). 
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1. Prf of the baseline (year 1) and the average nominal Prf of the 15 years of each scenario run. This 
comparison allows conclusions on attractiveness of the policies from the perspective of the total 
period of 15 years. Time preference is not included. 
2. Prf of the baseline (year 1) and the nominal Prf of the year 15 of each scenario run. This approach 
shows how the fishery is expected to perform in the year 15 in relation to the baseline and it compares 
the performance of the scenarios in the year 15 mutually. Time preference is not included. 
3. Prf of the baseline (year 1) and the average discounted Prf of the 15 years of each scenario run. This 
approach accounts for the time preference, using the main discount rate of 3.5%. 
These comparisons can be considered static, as they take one single number to represent the whole period 
of 15 years.  
 
Although static comparisons have their analytical value, they disregard the details of the ‘adjustment 
process’. A more dynamic comparison is therefore presented to reflect also the short and long term 
consequences of restrictions. 
 
In the following comparisons, scenarios 1, 2 and 6 are restrictive, while scenarios 3, 4 and 5 impose little 
or no restrictions. Not all scenarios are relevant for all case studies. Therefore in some case studies, some 
scenarios have not been elaborated. Detailed evaluation of the impact of the various policies in the case 
study fisheries is presented in the respective chapters. These evaluations show that in some situations 
positive resource rents can be generated while some stocks would be completely depleted. 
 
Comparison of average nominal net profit 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that the consequences of various policies lead to very different outcomes in the different 
fisheries: 
1. North Sea flatfish faced losses in 2005-7. It would significantly benefit from restrictive policies, while 
the non-restrictive policies would reduce the average nominal profits to zero (break-even level). There 
is not a significant difference between effort or TAC management. 
2. Restrictive TAC and effort policies would be very beneficial in case of North Sea cod, increasing the 
level of average nominal profits about three times. However, non-restrictive policies could not be 
tested26, except for the Open access. This policy could also lead to doubling of average nominal net 
profit, because the restrictions to exploit other species than cod would be lifted. This illustrates that 
from the perspective of rent creation, it would be rational to manage the ‘NS cod fishery’ with focus 
on other species than cod, because cod plays only a minor role in the performance of most fleet 
segments involved. 
3. Restrictive policies would increase the rent created in the Baltic Sea cod fishery. Open access would 
be clearly detrimental. 
4. In the case of Atlantic hake, TAC min policy would about double the profits. Also Effort min and 
TAC max would produce an improvement from the situation of 2005-7. Open access would lead to a 
deterioration. 
5. The Atlantic anchovy fishery made on average loss in 2005-7. The non-restrictive policies would raise 
the net profit most,, primarily because the fleet would be able to exploit other species than anchovy 
more intensively. 
6. The nature of the Mediterranean anchovy fishery (in GSA 9)is such that none of the policy scenarios 
would significantly improve its profitability.  
7. In the Mediterranean hake fishery (in GSA 16) the Effort min policy would maintain the profits at the 
level of 2005-7. Open access policy would reduce the present profits to zero. 
 
 
  
                                                     
26 The scenario has only one target species, namely cod. Consequently there is no distinction between minimum and 
maximum effort. 
 Figure 3.
 
Compariso
 
The resu
comparis
Sea cod 
profits in
 
Figure 3.
 
 
Compariso
 
Analysis 
profit to 
future, w
choices. 
 
1 Net profit 
n of nominal n
lts presented
ons of the n
and Atlantic 
to losses. 
2. Net profit
n of average di
of discounte
the situation
hich is not 
– average 20
et profit in yea
 above rega
ominal net p
hake, where
 – average 20
scounted net pr
d net profit 
 in 2005-7 a
certain. The 
05-7 and nom
r 15 
rding the 15
rofit in year 
 Open acces
05-7 and yea
ofit 
takes time p
ssumes impli
comparison 
inal 15 year
 year averag
15, as presen
s would lead
r 15 by fishe
reference int
citly that thi
highlights th
 nominal ave
e nominal n
ted in Figur
 to a signific
ry and scena
o account. C
s performanc
e dilemma b
rage by fishe
et profit are
e 3.2. The on
ant deteriora
rio 
omparing av
e would be m
etween shor
ry and policy
 rather simil
ly exception
tion and tur
erage discou
aintained a
t term and l
39 
 scenario  
 
ar to the 
 is Baltic 
n present 
 
nted net 
lso in the 
ong term 
 The seve
baseline 
1. In th
disco
2. Rest
seem
not b
3. In ca
4. The 
scen
5. In th
prese
level
6. The 
anch
7. In th
scen
 
Figure 3.
 
Dynamic e
 
Figure 3.
were eith
rises sub
of the se
result of
followed
 
The soci
number o
between 
3,800, i.e
where 70
recovers 
 
 
n analysed 
situation 200
e NS flatfis
unted profit
rictive polici
s to have so
e tested. 
se of Baltic S
average disc
arios. 
e Atlantic a
nt losses. T
. 
average disc
ovy fishery.  
e Mediterran
ario than in t
3. Net profit
valuation 
4 highlights 
er TAC min
stantially in t
ven fisheries
 the very su
 by NS flatfis
al ‘price’ of 
f vessels. Th
the individu
. by 24%. I
% of the v
even beyond
fisheries sho
5-7 (see Figu
h fishery all
s.  
es could pro
me merits as
ea cod, impr
ounted net p
nchovy the 
he restrictiv
ounted net 
ean hake fis
he baseline 2
 – average 20
the dilemma
 or Effort m
he subsequen
, the nomina
bstantial gai
h which con
this improve
e reduction 
al fisheries. I
n some fishe
essels would
 the level of 
 
w rather dif
re 3.3):  
 restrictive p
duce signific
 well, comp
ovements ca
rofit in the 
non-restrict
e scenarios w
profit is not
hery the aver
005-7. Other
05-7 and dis
s of restrictiv
in. In most 
t period. Be
l net profit i
ns in the N
tributes 21%
ment is the 
of the fleet l
n that period
ries the flee
 have to sto
the baseline,
ferent result
olicies can 
ant improve
ared to the p
n be achieve
Atlantic hak
ive scenario
ould lead t
 very sensiti
age discount
 scenarios le
counted 15 y
e measures 
fisheries the 
tween the ye
ncreases by 4
S cod fishe
 to the total 
reduction in
asts overall f
 the number
t is reduced
p operating
 overall it rem
s of the vari
be expected 
ments in cas
resent situat
d, in particul
e increases 
s produce an
o performan
ve to the po
ed net profit
ad to comple
ear average b
in fisheries. 
nominal net
ars 10-15 it r
00%, or 800
ry, which ac
increase.  
 the size of 
or about 7 ye
 of vessels f
by 30-50%,
 by year 9. 
ains about 1
ous scenario
turn losses 
e of North S
ion. Non-res
ar by the Eff
somewhat in
 improvem
ce slightly a
licy choice 
 is slightly lo
te dissipation
y fishery and
The basic sc
profit decre
eaches its m
 mln euro. T
counts for 5
the sector, e
ars, although
alls from littl
the extreme
While in som
0% below it
s compared 
in 2005-7 to
ea cod. Op
trictive polic
ort min polic
 the restricti
ent compare
bove the br
in the Medi
wer in the E
 of profits. 
 scenario 
enarios in all
ases for 1-2 
aximum. For
his is partic
3% of this 
xpressed in 
 there are di
e over 5,000
 being in N
e fisheries 
.  
40 
with the 
 average 
en access 
ies could 
y. 
ve policy 
d to the 
eak-even 
terranean 
ffort min 
 
 fisheries 
years and 
 the total 
ularly the 
increase, 
terms of 
fferences 
 to about 
S flatfish 
the fleet 
41 
 
The following further comments can be made: 
1. It can be safely assumed that employment is affected more or less proportionately with the size of the 
fleet.  
2. The consolidation process allows a smaller group of fishermen to collect the larger benefits. As 
outlined in the section 2.2 part of the created resource rent will be collected by the labour. 
 
Conclusion on policy comparisons 
 
The model results illustrate that different fisheries need to be managed differently in order to achieve an 
improvement from the current situation. Restrictive policies may be expected to produce positive results 
in the North Sea and Baltic Sea fisheries, but much less in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Restrictive 
measures will in the end lead to recovery of the economic performance, reduction of the size of the sector 
and concentration of benefits among a smaller number of vessel owners and fishermen. 
 
The analysis illustrates that there is not one single measure of rent. Even considering only one indicator, 
namely net profit, produces analytical nuances, as illustrated in Table 3.7: 
 .Nominal net profit would increase from 200 mln in 2005-7 to 1,000 mln in 15 years.   
 Total average NPV Prf15 would be 132% higher than then in 2005-7. 
 Total average nominal net profit would be 175% higher than then in 2005-7. 
 About 46-55% of the increase of the net profit indicator can be attributed to NS cod, 21-26% to NS 
flatfish, 10% to BS cod and 16-20% to the two Atlantic fisheries. The net profit in the Mediterranean 
fisheries would barely change. 
 
Table 3.7 Comparison of three profit indicators in the baseline scenario with 2005-7 (mln euro) 
2005-7 
(nominal) 
15 year average 
(nominal) 
Average 
NPV Prf15 
(discounted) 
Year 15 
(nominal) 
NS flatfish -24 73 50 143 
NS cod 130 362 259 577 
BS cod 38 89 65 122 
Atlantic hake 56 109 81 121 
Atlantic anchovy -21 16 11 27 
Mediterranean anchovy 5 7 5 4 
Mediterranean hake 28 29 22 31 
Total 212 686 493 1,025 
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Figure 3.4. Trends in nominal net profit and fleet in baseline scenario 
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3.3. Role of discount rate (scenarios 7-8) 
 
The influence of the discount rate on the net present value of a ‘stream of benefits’ depends on the 
composition of those ‘benefits’ over time. Lower discount rate favours situations where large incomes are 
generated further in the future. In that case the time preference is low, i.e. it is less relevant when the 
benefits are realized. Higher discount rate favours flows of income realized in the short term. 
 
Table 3.8 presents the effect of different discount rates. Baseline results have been discounted against 
3.5% and two alternatives of 2% and 5% have been subsequently applied to the baseline scenario. Despite 
the differences in the various models used, a lower discount rate leads to a NPV Prf15 which is 11-18% 
higher than the baseline. On the other hand, the higher discount rate reduces the NPV Prf15 by 10-14%. 
 
Table 3.8 Impact of different interest rates on NPV Prf15  
Scenario 1. NS 
flatfish 
2. NS
cod 
3. BS
cod 
4. Atl. 
hake 
5. Atl. 
anchovy 
6. Med. 
anchovy 
7. Med. 
hake 
Mln euro 
01. TAC min, 3.5% 754 3,885 969 1,222 
02. Effort min, 3.5% 161 79 328 
07. Discount rate 2% 884 4,468 1,109 1,381 190 88 369 
08. Discount rate 5% 645 3,395 850 1,087 136 71 293 
Index (baseline scenario = 100) 
01. TAC min 100 100 100 100 
02. Effort min 100 100 100 
07. Discount rate 2% 117 115 114 113 118 111 113 
08. Discount rate 5% 86 87 88 89 85 90 89 
 
Considering only the discounted value in the year 15, at a discount rate of 3.5% value of 1000 euro now, 
would be equal to 1,675 euro in year 15. At 2% and 5% respectively, the values in year 15 would be 1,345 
euro and 2,079 euro. These values reflect only the effect of the time preference. They have nothing to do 
with deflating to account for inflation.  
 
As presented in Table 3.7 the baseline scenarios for most fisheries lead to substantially higher nominal net 
profit in year 15, except for the two Mediterranean fisheries. After application of baseline discount rate of 
3.5%, the discounted net profit in year 15 is significantly higher than in year 1 in the North Sea and Baltic 
Sea fisheries, but much less in the Atlantic fisheries. This value is even lower in the Mediterranean 
fisheries. Using a lower discount rate of 2% increases the discounted net profit of year 15 above year 1 for 
the fisheries 1-5, but not for Mediterranean fisheries 6 and 7. 
 
The ‘break-even’ discount rate shows the value at which net profit in year 15 would be equal to the net 
profit in year 127. For the NS flatfish and Atlantic anchovy fishery, these values are extremely negative as 
these fisheries make a loss in 2005-7. For Baltic fisheries NS and the Atlantic hake the break-even 
discount rate is 5-10%. Substantially lower values of -2% to 1% result in the Mediterranean fisheries. 
 
The time preference depends on specific conditions of the fishery and the (local) economy in general. 
Relatively high discount rate may be applicable in regions with a dynamic economy, where it is likely that 
losses due to contraction of the fishing sector would be compensated by other activities. On the other 
hand, in a stagnating economy, a low discount rate may be justified as even low income in the future is 
given a relatively high importance. The choice of discount rate depends also on ‘political’ preferences 
regarding the inter-generational division of welfare (income). Consequently, different discount rates may 
be appropriate in different fisheries and at different times. It is not possible to identify one single ‘best’ 
discount rate. 
 
  
                                                     
27 This value is calculated as [(Prf15/Prf1)^(1/15) – 1] 
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Table 3.9.Impact of different interest rates on discounted net profit in year 15 
Indicator 1. NS 
flatfish 
2. NS
cod 
3. BS
cod 
4. Atl. 
hake 
5. Atl. 
anchovy 
6. Med. 
anchovy 
7. Med. 
hake 
Mln euro 
Prf, 2005-7 -24 130 38 56 -21 5 28 
Nominal Prf, year 15 143 577 122 121 27 4 31 
Discounted Prf, yr 15, 3.5% 85 344 73 72 16 2 19 
Discounted Prf, yr 15, 2% 106 429 91 90 20 3 23 
Discounted Prf, yr 15, 5% 69 278 59 58 13 2 15 
‘Break-even’ discount rate -212.6% 10.4% 8.1% 5.3% -201.8% -1.7% 0.8% 
Index (baseline scenario = 100) 
Prf, year 1 100 100 100 100 100 
Nominal Prf, year 15 443 320 217 77 112 
Discounted Prf, yr 15, 3.5% 265 191 130 46 67 
Discounted Prf, yr 15, 2% 329 238 161 57 83 
Discounted Prf, yr 15, 5% 213 154 104 37 54 
  
Conclusion on impact of discount rate 
 
Discount rates can be used either to compare different streams of benefits (Prf) or to compare the Prf of 
year 15 with the present one. Sensitivity analysis shows that changing the baseline discount rate of 3.5% to 
5% reduces the NPV Prf15 by 10-14%. On the other hand a lower discount rate of 2% increases the NPV 
Prf15 by 11-18%. Comparing the Prf in the baseline (year 1) to the discounted Prf in year 15 appears to be 
rather sensitive to the value of the discount rate. This sensitivity is illustrated by the calculation of a ‘break-
even’ discount rate, which ranges approximately between -2% and +10%, excepting the fisheries with 
losses in 2005-7. One unique ‘best’ discount rate does not exist, as it depends on a broad variety of 
conditions and considerations. 
 
 
3.4. Recovery of management costs (scenario 9) 
 
Management costs have been estimated for the seven case study fisheries on the basis of the shares of the 
involved fleet segments in the value of the national fisheries production, related to the total national costs 
of management (national totals are presented in annex 2). The management costs attributed to each 
segment were than subtracted from the profits of each fleet as a lump sum amount. In this approach, in 
principle payment of management costs reduces profitability, raises the level of the break-even revenues 
and consequently reduces the level of investments. The extent to which this leads to significant differences 
with the baseline scenario depends on various relations within the overall dynamics of the fishery, e.g. 
relation of management costs to revenues and their impact on change in break-even revenues. 
 
Table 3.10 shows that payment of management costs would reduce the profits in scenario 9 by 65% in 
case of Atlantic anchovy, but only by 6% in case of the North Sea cod. In most other fisheries the 
reduction would amount to 20-30%. Due to the above mentioned process, costs recovery leads to a 
further increase in efficiency and consequently to slight improvement of profits before payment of 
management costs, which can be seen by comparing scenario 9 to the baseline scenario (Table 3.10).  
 
  
45 
 
Table 3.10 Average annual profits in baseline and in scenario 9 and management costs (mln euro) 
Fishery Baseline Scenario 9 
Profit Profit before
payment of 
management costs 
Management costs Management costs 
as % of profit 
1. North Sea flatfish 73.4 76.3 24.2 32% 
2. North Sea cod 361.9 361.9 23.1 6% 
3. Baltic Sea cod 89.3 89.3 16.9 19% 
4. Atlantic hake 109.3 106.7 28.5 27% 
5. Atlantic anchovy 15.9 16.8 11.0 65% 
6. Mediterranean anchovy 6.8 7.2 1.6 22% 
7. Mediterranean hake 29.0 29.8 11.8 40% 
 
In the year 15 of the scenario 9 most fleets are slightly smaller compared to the baseline scenario. 
However, there are almost no changes in the net profit.  
 
Table 3.11 Comparison of the baseline (1 or 2) and scenario 9 in year 15 
Scenario 1. NS flatfish 2. NS cod 3. BS cod 4. Atl. hake 5. Atl. anchovy 6. Med. anchovy 7. Med. hake
Fleet (number of vessels) 
Baseline 317 1,506 1,828 547 153 112 1,204 
9 314 1,506 1,828 531 146 101 1,328 
Net profit before payment of management costs (mln euro) 
Baseline 143 577 122 121 27 4 31 
9 146 577 122 125 29 6 32 
 
 
3.5. Adaptation paths (scenarios 10-14) 
 
This section deals with the question of potential resource rents which could be achieved if overcapacity 
would be eliminated. Five distinct adaptation paths to fleets without overcapacity are explained in section 
2.3 (scenarios 10-14). Scenario 10 maintains the fleet at the present level, but eliminates overcapacity by 
reducing the number of days at sea. Scenario 11 reduces the number of the vessels to the technical 
minimum, while the number of days at sea per vessel is set at the maximum level. Scenario 12 reduces the 
number of vessels to the technical minimum in the first year, but allows adjustment in the course of time 
if stocks and profits allow it. Scenarios 10-12 eliminate the technical overcapacity and consequently also 
solve implicitly the ‘control problem’. The fleet does not have the capacity to exceed sustainable level of 
exploitation. However, in these scenarios it is possible that the production remains below the sustainable 
level, as the fleet may be too small to make full use of the available fishing opportunities. Scenario 13 
maximizes the net present value of gross value added. This scenario shows the net profit when the 
fisheries contribution to the EU GNP would be maximized. Scenario 14 is similar to scenario 13, but 
maximizes the NPV Prf15. Scenario 13 represent the interests of the society at large, while scenario 14 
stresses primarily the interests of the vessel owners. Scenarios 13 and 14 optimize the economic capacity 
and achieves catches at a sustainable level in the long run, although not necessarily in each year, because 
investments in the fleet are constrained to a maximum of 10% up and 20% down. 
 
Consequences for the net profit 
 
Table 3.12 shows that recovery paths in scenarios 10-12 have relatively little impact on the NPV Prf15 in 
the two Mediterranean fisheries, the two cod fisheries and the Atlantic hake, the indexes remaining 
between 75 and 120. Considering that net profit is the bottom line, and consequently may fluctuate 
strongly, and stochasticity of the data, this may be considered as a very stable result. This implies that 
taking measures in addition to the TAC min or Effort min is unlikely to produce noticeable results. 
However, the structure of the fleets which produce the similar values of NPV Prf15 may significantly 
differ. This is illustrated in the development paths of the fleets presented in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7. The 
most important conclusion for these five fisheries is that different approaches to effort adaptation do not 
lead to significantly different NPV Prf15. It is not relevant whether fleet or effort are constrained and how, 
but rather that the imposed constraints need to be effectively implemented. 
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The NS flatfish and Atlantic anchovy, the two fisheries making loss in 2005-7, the type of adaptation path 
makes a significant difference. The highest net profit would be achieved in scenario 12, when the fleet is 
instantaneously reduced in the beginning and subsequently allowed to grow again with the recovered 
stocks. Scenarios 11 and 12 contain explicitly a ‘one off scraping scheme’ but the public costs of scrapping 
schemes have not been taken into account in the simulations. Doing so may (significantly) reduce the 
benefits of these scenarios. 
 
The two optimization scenarios 13 and 14 would lead in the cod and hake fisheries to an increase in NPV 
Prf15 by 20-70% over the 2005-7 situation, in most case approximately 40%. In the NS flatfish fishery, 
scenario 14 does not lead to significantly better results than scenario 12. This applies also to 
Mediterranean anchovy fishery. The Atlantic anchovy fishery would very significantly benefit from further 
optimization.  
 
It must be stressed that optimization scenario are highly hypothetical as it is not clear which additional 
policies could achieve such results. In principle, optimization requires reduction of the fleet which is 
already profitable and there are no policy instruments which could oblige fishing firms, which operate 
according to the management rules, to stop fishing. 
 
Table 3.12 Impact of the recovery paths on NPV Prf15 
Scenario 1. NS 
flatfish 
2. NS
cod 
3. BS
cod 
4. Atl. 
hake 
5. Atl. 
anchovy 
6. Med. 
anchovy 
7. Med. 
hake 
Mln euro 
01. TAC min 754 3,885 969 1,222 
02. Effort min 161 79 328 
10. Static present fleet 202 3,628 834 923 -5 79 264 
11. Static minimum fleet 555 3,586 994 1,279 57 75 273 
12. Dynamic minimum fleet 921 3,965 1,024 1,461 235 80 392 
13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 760 5,509 1,370 1,481 594 67 449 
14. Optimum fleet (profit) 1,010 5,599 1,630 1,742 985 85 486 
Index (baseline scenario = 100)
01. TAC min 100 100 100 100 
02. Effort min 100 100 100 
10. Static present fleet 27 93 86 76 -3 100 80 
11. Static minimum fleet 74 92 103 105 36 95 83 
12. Dynamic minimum fleet 122 102 106 120 146 102 119 
13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 101 142 141 121 369 85 137 
14. Optimum fleet (profit) 134 144 168 143 612 108 148 
 
 
Resource rent is often related to the ‘excessive profits’ realized by private producers over and above 
normal profit level (section 2.1). Figure 3.5 shows how total profits in year 15 and average profits per 
vessel would be affected by the different adaptation paths in the seven case study fisheries 
 
In relation to the net present value of profits, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
1. The NPV of total profits over 15 years in scenario 10 is lower than in the baseline, while in scenario 
11 it is either lower or about equal to the baseline. The constraints imposed on the fishing capacity in 
these two scenarios do not allow to exploit fully the sustainable fishing opportunities. 
2. Scenario 13 leads to higher aggregate profits than in the baseline in most fisheries, except NS flatfish 
(1) and Mediterranean anchovy (6).  
3. By definition, scenario 14 produces highest NPV Profit15, although in some fisheries the differences 
from the results of some other scenarios are not significant. 
4. Due to the reduction of the number of vessels, the NPV of profit per vessel is highest in scenario 12 
or 14 for all fisheries. From the perspective of individual firms, these are the most attractive scenarios. 
They combines the benefits of reduction of the fleet in the beginning, with fleet adaptations during 
the entire period. However, it is interesting to notice that optimization of aggregate profits does not 
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Figure 3.6 GVA and fleet in scenarios 10-14 by fishery 
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Figure 3.7 Profit and profit per vessel in scenarios 10-14 by fishery 
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4. NORTH SEA FLATFISH FISHERIES 
 
 
4.1. Summary and conclusions 
 
Main conclusion 
 
The seven segments analysed in this fishery realized in 2005-7 on average a total net loss of 24 mln euro. 
Average annual discounted net profit ranges under most scenarios between 50 and 70 mln euro. 
Elimination of overcapacity and recovery of stocks would produce a discounted net profit of 55-97 mln 
euro by the year 15. (see Figure 4.1) 
 
Brief description of the case study 
 
The target species of the North Sea flatfish sector are European plaice and Common sole. The first part 
of this case study report (section 1-6) provides information about the seven fleet segments that contribute 
the most to the North Sea flatfish sector, including the fleets of Belgium, Denmark, The UK and the 
Netherlands. Fleet economic indicators are estimated and compared, after a more general presentation of 
the various segments. Most values applied in this case study are based on an average of the years 2005-7.  
 
Section 7 describes the results of 14 scenario runs with the FISHRENT model. The model was run for 6 
policy simulation scenarios and four optimization scenarios with different fleet adaptation paths. 
Furthermore, the possibilities for recovery of management costs were investigated using this model and 
effects of different discount rates were tested.  
 
Divergence / convergence of the results 
 
Results of the different scenarios are compared in terms of the net present value of net profit over 15 
years (NPV profit15). Comparison of the policy scenarios to the Open access scenario shows that the most 
restrictive policy scenarios (TAC min, Effort min and Min min) score much better than no policy at all. 
The TAC min scenario, which resembles the present policy in the North Sea flatfish fishery most, has a 
NPV profit15 of 750 million euro while the Open Access scenario shows a negative NPV of profit. The 
optimum fleet scenario 14, where NPV profit15 is maximized, scores 34% higher than the TAC min 
scenario. 
 
Choice of baseline policy 
 
The TAC min scenario was chosen as baseline policy scenario as this resembles the present policy for the 
NS flatfish fishery. In this scenario, effort is determined by the most restrictive TAC and TACs cannot 
vary more than 15% from year to year. In reality the fishery is also managed by both TACs and effort 
restrictions. TACs, however, may be considered the primary management tool.  
 
Achieving MSY 
 
On basis of the stock growth function of the FISHRENT model, MSY of sole was estimated at 28,000 
tonnes, with Hmsy of 0.3. This MSY is only reached in the Effort min scenario. This is an effort 
management scenario where allowable effort in each year is determined by the most restrictive target 
harvest ratio. Hmsy of plaice was estimated at 0.26. None of the scenarios reaches Hmsy for plaice. In the 
TAC max, Effort max and Open access scenarios, where in the first simulated years effort is higher than 
sustainable from the perspective of the sole stock. In these scenarios, the sole stock is depleted and 
profitability of the fishery is very poor. The fleet does not have the possibility to invest and expand to the 
size required to fish the complete plaice TAC. 
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Achieving MEY 
 
MEY is here defined as the maximum net present value of net profit over 15 years. The maximum 
discounted profit was found in the Optimum fleet scenario 14. This is not surprising because this is the 
only scenario where NPV profit15 is explicitly maximized. The policy scenarios with highest NPV profit15 
were the Min min, the TAC min and Effort min scenario, the three most restrictive policy scenarios.  
 
Role of discount rate 
 
The basic discount rate, used in all scenarios, is 3.5%. A higher discount rate implies lower discounted 
profit and a lower discount rate implies higher discounted profit. Using a discount rate of 2% instead of 
3.5%, results in a 15% higher NPV profit15. Using a discount rate of 5% instead of 3.5% results in a 13% 
lower NPV profit15 . 
 
Impact of eliminating overcapacity 
 
Four optimization scenarios with different adaptation paths of the fleet have been run with the 
FISHRENT model. In the static present fleet scenario, overcapacity is not removed but a capacity ceiling 
is imposed which keeps the fleet at the size of the base year. Disadvantage of this scenario is that there is 
also no downward adjustment of the fleet when this would be required. This scenario has a much lower 
score on the NPV profit15 years than the main TAC min scenario.  
 
In the static minimum fleet scenario, overcapacity is completely removed in year one and the fleet is kept 
at that size throughout the simulation. The NPV profi15 of this scenario is higher than in the static present 
fleet scenario. In the dynamic minimum fleet scenario the fleet is maintained at minimum level throughout 
the simulation period. In other words the fleet is operating at full capacity level, using the maximum 
number of days at sea per vessel. This scenario scores much better than the static present fleet scenario 
and the static minimum fleet scenario. In the optimum fleet scenario, where NPV profit15 is maximized, 
all segments are also operating at full capacity throughout the simulation period but on top of that, the 
relative size of each of the segments is optimized. Not surprisingly, this scenario has by far the best results 
in terms of NPV profit15. 
 
Management costs and rent recovery 
 
Payment of an annual access fee equal to the management costs directly affects the profit of the segments. 
All segments had negative profits in the base year and the extra costs of payment for access cause profits 
in the first years to be even more negative and it takes longer than in the main scenario before the profits 
turn positive. Nevertheless, after 5 years all segments are making a profit. NPV profit15 after payment for 
access is about 10% lower than in the main scenario. The difference is app. equal to the total discounted 
payment for access over these 15 years. The discounted value of profits over these 15 years is 33% lower 
than in the main scenario.  
 
If the government would try to capture more resource rent from the fishery, by for instance doubling the 
payment for access to twice the management costs the NPV of profit would decrease to 266 million euro, 
a further deterioration by 33%.  
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Figure 4.1 North Sea flatfish – discounted annual net profit by scenario, years 1-15, mln euro 
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4.2. Case study definition 
 
4.2.1. Fleet and landings 
 
In this section the largest contributors to the North Sea flatfish fishery are presented. They include a total 
of seven segments, with 619 vessels, in the four countries Belgium, Denmark, the UK and the 
Netherlands. The Danish demersal trawl/seiner category (DTS) and the polyvalent passive gears (PGP) – 
both of 12-24 meters are involved, and also beam trawlers (TBB) in Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands 
are included. The beam trawlers consist of two vessel categories; one with vessels between 24-40 meters 
and one with vessels >40 meters. The role of the fleet segments within their national fishery sectors is 
presented in  
 
Table 4.1 Role of case study fisheries within national fishery sectors 
Member State Total fishery sector Case study fleets 
Total revenues 
(mln euro) 
Total fleet 
(number of vessels) 
Revenues
(mln euro) 
Fleet 
(number of vessels) 
BEL 86 110 69 55 
DNK 794 2,114 86 365 
GBR 822 4,129 65 69 
NLD 383 612 172 137 
 
Of the 619 vessels, more than half (365) belongs to the Danish fleet and about one third (173) to the 
Dutch fleet. Only 48 vessels belong to the Belgian fleet, and 69 to the British fleet. However, in terms of 
GT, the largest fleet segment is the Dutch beam trawlers of more than 40 meters (42,190 GT), followed 
by the Belgian beam trawlers of 24-40 meters (16,200 GT). Whereas the British and the Dutch beam 
trawlers of 24-40 meters are almost equal in terms of tonnage (11,040 GT and 10,670 GT respectively), 
the three smallest categories are the UK beam trawlers of >40 meters and the two Danish fleet segments 
Table 4.2. 
 
The target species, Common sole and European plaice, constitute a large share of total value of landings 
but a much smaller share of the volume of landings. Whereas the target species are 56% of the total value, 
they are only 30% of total volume of landings. Table 4.2 presents all harvest by the selected segments that 
operate in the North Sea, implying that also the Belgian and the UK catches in the Atlantic area are 
included. 
 
Table 4.2 Role of target species 
MS Gear Size No. vessels GT (1000) Value (mln euro) Landings (1000 t)
Target 
species 
Total Target 
species 
Total
BEL TBB 24-40 55 16.2 12.4 69.1 3.4 16.2
DNK DTS 12-24 258 8.6 12.6 59.7 5.7 132.9
DNK PGP 12-24 107 3.9 11.2 26.2 3.5 20.4
GBR TBB 24-40 54 11.0 8.4 41.1 3.8 12.9
GBR TBB >40 15 7.4 16.7 23.6 6.6 8.6
NLD TBB 24-40 48 10.7 26.0 43.7 5.9 10.3
NLD TBB >40 89 42.2 109.2 128.1 24.4 39.0
Other   33.4 33.4 
Total 626 100 230 391.4 63 240.3
Averages 2005-7. Source: DCR 
* Sole and plaice are also caught by other fleet segments. Volume and value of these landings by other segments can 
be found in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. 
 
The largest volume of target species is landed by the Dutch beam trawlers >40meters (35% of total 
landings of European plaice and Common sole), followed by the Danish trawl/seiner (21%). All the other 
fleet segments land from 7-10% each of the total landings of target species. Looking at the share of total 
value of landings, the Dutch beam trawl fleet over 40 meters is also here contributing the most (42%), 
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followed by the Belgian beam trawlers (15%) and the Dutch beam trawlers of 24-40 meters as well as the 
Danish trawl/seiner (both 11%). The remaining categories contribute 6-8% each to the total value of 
landings of the target species. 
 
Further 11 segments are fishing European plaice and common sole in the North Sea than the seven 
already mentioned. They include a Belgian segment (beam trawl between 12-24 meters), three more 
Danish segments (beam trawl between 12-24 meters, pelagic trawlers of 12-24 meters and combined 
mobile and passive gears of 12-24 meters), four German segments (demersal trawl/seiner, drift nets/fixed 
nets and three beam trawl segments of 12-24 meters, 24-40 meters and >40 meters), one more British 
segment (beam trawl between 12-24 meters) and two more Dutch segments (demersal trawl/seiner and 
beam trawl between 12-24 meters). Note that these 11 other segments are contributing with 14% and 16% 
of volume and value of landed European plaice and Common sole, respectively, considering only harvests 
made in the North Sea (harvests in the Atlantic Sea excluded). These seven segments represent 79% of the 
total landings of plaice and sole from the North Sea. 
 
4.2.2. Composition of landings 
 
In the Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, not only European plaice and Common sole are included, but also the 
volume and value of other important fish species harvested by the different segments, such as the Atlantic 
cod, turbot and the lemon sole. Whereas turbot is important to most segments, the Atlantic cod is 
particularly important to the two Danish segments. Lemon sole is harvested by the Belgian and the UK 
beam trawlers.  
 
The total volume of Atlantic cod is 11,200 tonnes (5% of total) and the value is 25 mln euro (6% of total). 
The shares of turbot and lemon sole are very small. A large share of the harvests of the two Danish 
segments as well as the largest vessel segment of the UK are species not mentioned here included under 
‘others’. They compose 74%, 60% and 67% of total value of these three segments, respectively. This share 
is almost 30% for the Belgian beam trawl segment and around 20% for both Dutch vessel segments. The 
shares are even higher when looking at the total values, as, for example, the Danish demersal trawl/seiner 
category harvests almost 90% in tonnes of other not mentioned species.  
 
The last two columns of the Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 provide information about landings of target species 
from the North Sea. As mentioned above, only the beam trawlers of 24-40 meters in the UK and in 
Belgium have catches of target species outside the North Sea, namely in the Atlantic area. Table 4.3 and 
Table 4.4 also show the contribution of ‘other fleets’ that harvest Common sole and European plaice in 
the North Sea. Their shares are rather small. 
 
Table 4.3. Composition of landings by segment (1000 tonnes) 
MS Gear Size Comm. 
 sole 
Europ. 
plaice 
Atlantic 
cod 
Turbot Lemon 
sole 
Other Total Comm. 
sole 
Europ. 
plaice 
   North S. North S.
BEL TBB 24-40 2.9 4.2 0.0 0.3 0.8 8.1 16.2 0.6 2.8
DNK DTS 12-24 0.2 5.5 9.3 0.0 0.0 117.8 132.9 0.2 5.5
DNK PGP 12-24 0.6 3.0 2.5 0.1 0.0 14.3 20.4 0.6 3.0
GBR TBB 24-40 0.8 4.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 7.9 12.9 0.2 3.6
GBR TBB >40 0.5 6.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 1.7 8.6 0.5 6.1
NLD TBB 24-40 1.7 4.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 4.0 10.3 1.7 4.2
NLD TBB >40 7.2 17.2 0.0 1.4 0.0 13.2 39.0 7.2 17.2
Other    1.8 7.9
Total 13.8 44.2 11.8 2.6 1.0 166.8 240.3 12.7 50.3
Averages 2005-7. Source: DCR 2007       
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Table 4.4. Composition of landings by segment (mln euro) 
MS Gear Size Comm. 
sole 
Europ. 
plaice 
Atlantic 
cod 
Turbot Lemon 
sole 
Other Total Comm. 
sole 
Europ. 
plaice 
   North S. North 
S. 
BEL TBB 24-40 32.3 8.2 3.3 3.7 20.3 69.1 6.6 5.8
DNK DTS 12-24 2.3 10.3 17.6 87.0 59.7 2.3 10.3
DNK PGP 12-24 6.0 5.2 7.5 1.4 29.6 26.2 6.0 5.2
GBR TBB 24-40 9.5 7.5 2.3 23.6 41.1 2.2 6.2
GBR TBB >40 5.2 11.5 2.6 0.7 2.9 23.6 5.2 11.5
NLD TBB 24-40 17.8 8.2 3.5 11.3 43.7 17.8 8.2
NLD TBB >40 76.2 33.0 4.1 31.8 128.1 76.2 33.0
 Other      18.3 15.0
Total 149.4 83.8 25.0 17.2 4.4 206.5 391.4 134.7 95.1
Averages 2005-7. Source: DCR 2007 
 
 
4.3. Historical indicators 
 
In Figure 4.2 and 4.3, the total landings and TACs in the North Sea over the years 1982 to 2008 are 
shown. Whereas the total landings and TACs have been rather close over the years for Common sole, the 
TAC has been a lot higher than the landings for European plaice before 1996.  
 
Figure 4.2 shows that for common sole, there was a decrease in landings and TAC in the mid-80s 
followed by a rather stringent increase until a peak was reached in 1994. After 1994, the TACs and 
landings decreased significantly. Presently landings and TAC are less than half the weights landed in 1994. 
During the very last years, the TAC has been higher than the landings for Common sole.  
 
Figure 4.3 shows a slightly different trend of landings and TAC for European plaice. In the second half of 
the eighties there was a peak in landings and TAC. Thereafter, both landings and TAC for European 
plaice have decreased until present with less than one third of the observed peak in landings and one 
fourth of the peak of the TAC. 
 
Figure 4.2 Total landings and TAC of Common sole in the North Sea, 1982-2008.  
 
 (Source ICES, 2009). 
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Figure 4.3 Total landings and TAC of European plaice in the North Sea, 1982-2008.  
 
 (Source ICES, 2009) 
 
 
The largest landings of the two target species took place for Common sole in 1994 (31,291 tonnes) and 
for European plaice in 1990 (156,261 tonnes). In comparison, the landings and TACs for European plaice 
and Common sole were 13,435 tonnes and 147,687 tonnes, respectively. 
 
According to ICES (2009), the mortality rate for maximum sustainable yield (Hmsy) is 0.3 for European 
plaice and 0.2 for Common sole in the North Sea (See Annex 1, Table A1). However, it is not 
straightforward to judge on the exact maximum sustainable yield (MSY), although it is possible to assume 
that this value would be close to the largest landings in the past years, which were 31,000 tonnes for 
Common sole and 156,000 tonnes for European plaice29. Note that this would imply that the sustainable 
spawning biomasses (SSB) should be larger than they are at present (See Annex 1, Table A1). 
 
For two successive years, the stocks of plaice and sole have been classified within safe precautionary 
boundaries. An increase is observed for the SSB the two last years for both species. The main reason for 
this increase is the reduction of fishing mortality under the present management plan (ICES, 2009). Also a 
reduction of capacity of the fleets, limitation of fishing effort and high fuel prices have contributed to the 
decrease in fishing mortality.  
 
The North Sea flatfish fisheries are currently preparing to meet future challenges, such as expected high 
future oil prices, increased fishing restrictions by regulations on target species as well as lower price on fish 
products because of cheap fish substitutes imported from Asia. As a consequence, the vessels in the 
North Sea flatfish sector are now more diverse than before.  
 
 
4.4. Fleet efficiency 
 
In this section, several economic indicators are estimated to compare the different segments. The profits 
of all fleet segments are negative, and most negative for the beam trawl segments of 24-40 meters in the 
UK and Belgium. 
 
Employment is measured in FTE, except for the Belgian segment where employment is presented in 
terms of number of people. Employment is highest for the Dutch beam trawlers longer than 40 meters 
and the Danish demersal trawl/ seiner, and lowest for the British segment of Beam trawl longer than 40 
                                                     
29 The biomass growth function used in the FISHRENT model implies MSY of 28,000 tonnes for sole and 140,000 
for plaice 
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meter. Looking at the average price efficiency indicator, they all have a value between 2400-3700 (euro/t), 
but the Danish demersal trawl/seiner has a much lower value (<1000). The fuel costs as a share of income 
is the lowest for the two Danish segments. The profit/ landings is least negative for the Danish demersal 
trawlers and seiners. The catch per unit effort (CPUE) is high for largest vessel sizes in the UK and the 
Netherlands, but small for the polyvalent passive gear of Denmark. The value per unit effort (VPUE) is 
high for the beam trawl segments and low for the Danish segments.  
 
Table 4.5 Economic indicators (average 2005-7) 
MS Gear Size Gross 
value 
added 
(mln 
euro) 
Profit
(mln 
euro) 
Empl. 
(FTE) 
Average 
price 
(euro/t) 
Fuel 
costs % 
of 
income
Profit / 
tonne 
landings 
CPUE 
total 
(t/day) 
VPUE 
target 
species 
(1000 
euro/day)
BEL TBB 24-40 7.1 -2.1 338.3* 3472.1 39% -328.7 1291.7 5.4
DNK DTS 12-24 35.0 -1.6 518.4 882.3 11% -24.1 1877.7 1.7
DNK PGP 12-24 16.7 -0.7 254.1 2431.1 6% -68.4 778.7 1.9
GBR TBB 24-40 11.1 -2.5 268.3 3136.0 34% -193.6 1225.6 3.8 
GBR TBB >40 2.6 -7.5 77.9 2641.4 50% -877.2 2604.5 6.9 
NLD TBB 24-40 15.5 -1.9 211.0 3637.5 38% -185.6 1445.0 6.2
NLD TBB >40 42.2 -3.5 552.9 3651.0 42% -89.8 2307.4 7.6
*Total employment is provided, FTE is not available         
 
In Table 4.5, efficiency measures of the different fleet segments are compared with respect to income per 
vessel, income per GT, income per day, average price and fuel consumption per income. Compared with 
the Belgian fleet, both the Danish fleet segments are more efficient when it comes to income per GT and 
fuel consumption per income, and less efficient for the others. The British beam trawlers of 24-40 meters 
are more efficient in terms of fuel consumption per income, and less efficient with the other efficiency 
measures. The British beam trawlers of more than 40 meters are more efficient in terms of income per 
vessel and income per day, but less efficient with fuel consumption per income. This is also the case for 
the largest Dutch beam trawl category. The segment of Dutch beam trawlers of 24-40 meters is rather 
close to the Belgian efficiency measures, although lower income per vessel and lower average prices are 
observed. 
 
In Figure 4.4, the different fleets are compared with the Belgian fleet segment with respect to several 
efficiency measures. The Belgian beam trawl segment is standardised to 100 to find relative differences 
with the other segments..  
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successive years. In the second stage, the management plan aims for exploitation of plaice at and F=0.3 
and sole at H = 0.230. 
 
4.5.2. Output management 
 
Main output management measures in the flatfish fishery are the TACs for sole and plaice. The four 
countries Denmark, Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands, contributing with the largest landings of plaice 
and sole in the North Sea, have implemented the management of their national share of these TACs in 
different ways. In the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark, quota are allocated individually to fishermen or 
fishing companies. In these countries, individual quota can be traded.  
 
1.5.2.1 Catch restrictions 
 
Catch restrictions in the Netherlands 
 
An official system of ITQ trade was implemented in 1985, after a period when extensive ‘unofficial’ 
transfers took place. This system is managed by a co-management framework with fishers being 
responsible for the industry, organized by groups of fishing firms since 1992. Fishermen in each group are 
in charge of controlling ITQ transfers, and controlling accessory maximum days-at-sea that has been 
introduced, between members on a permanent basis (buying/selling), or on a yearly basis (leasing), using 
agreed transfer prices (Smit, 2001). In 1993, the transfer of quotas became restricted by limited periods at 
the end of the year when quotas were nearly exhausted to prevent doubtful transfers. 
 
Catch restrictions in the UK 
 
In the UK, the national share of the TACs is distributed over vessels on basis of landings in a fixed 
reference period, namely the years 1994-96 (MRAG, 2007). This is referred to as the fixed quota allocation 
system (FQA). The FQAs are grouped within their Producers’ organisation (POs) and the government 
manages quotas for non-members of the POs. (Van Hoof et al, 2002). Hence, UK quota is allocated to 
POs, non-sector, and < 10m vessels proportionally to the aggregate number of FQA units held by vessels 
in each group at the beginning of each year (MRAG, 2007). Since 2002, the FQA units can be traded 
separately from vessel licences. 
  
Catch restrictions in Belgium 
 
In Belgium the main management aim is to fish the EU TAC quota share as efficiently as possible – 
implying as high incomes and as low costs as possible (Task Force Visserij, 2006). The quotas in Belgium 
are divided by means of area and species by a national quota commission that meets every month to give 
advice on quota allocation. Their advice is further implemented at Ministry level (Adriansen, 2009).  
Catches are spread over the whole fishing season mainly by setting maximum catches of a given stock per 
day. Since 2006 it was made more flexible by setting the upper limit of harvest per day to the sum of the 
day limits (Adriansen, 2009).  
 
Catch restrictions in Denmark 
 
Until 2006, the Danish fishery was based on common pool quotas (CPQ) (Raakjær Nielsen and 
Christensen, 2006). Fisheries management in Denmark is primary about dividing the national quotas over 
time and space. Catch rations are allocated in accordance with vessel length irrespective of gear used and 
only take limited geographical considerations (Christensen and Raakjær, 2006).  
 
                                                     
30 ICES interprets the F for the preceding year as the estimate of F for the year in which the assessment is carried 
out. The basis for this F estimate in the preceding year will be a constant application of the procedure used by 
ICES in 2007. 
60 
 
Vessel Transferable Quotas (VTQs) were implemented in the Danish demersal fisheries 1 January 2007 
(MRAG, 2007). The main difference between the ITQ and VTQ systems is that in the former the fish 
quota can be transferred by the owner independently of the fishing vessel to which it was initially 
allocated. In the case of the VTQ system the fish quotas (allocated on a 3 year historic record) and the 
vessel to which they are allocated are inseparable and thus only transferable together 
 
1.5.2.2 Property rights 
 
Property rights in the Netherlands 
 
As mentioned above, an official system of ITQ trade was implemented in 1985. Co-management groups 
have pooled the quota (ITQs) since 1993, whereby the board of each group is responsible for the 
compliance with the group quota. The ownership of the rights remains with the individual holders. These 
groups facilitate trade, hiring and renting of the ITQs between their members, which make the system 
flexible. The ITQs also serve as security for banks if a loan is required to finance, for example, a vessel. 
The values of harvesting rights have increased 30 times per vessel over the years 1983-1998. (Smit, 2001).  
 
The transfers since 1985 are subject to some main rules (MRAC, 2009). For instance, quotas can only be 
bought by owners of a fishing vessel that is registered on an EU list and who is in the possession of a 
license. Moreover, the transfers have to be approved and registered by the Fisheries Department.  
It is very difficult for newcomers to access fishing rights in the existing quota transfer market (MRAG, 
2009). Also is it difficult for nationals of other Member States to access fishing rights, although in 
principle this is possible. 
 
Property rights in the UK 
 
The stated purpose of the POs management responsibilities is to enable planning of the use of particular 
quotas in order to optimise the returns to their members. The POs administer and manage a total of 95% 
of the quotas for their member vessels. They manage the quota as a collective transferable quota, as there 
is a lively trade in fishing licences and quotas in the UK. The pooling of quotas allows fishermen to have 
some flexibility for their actual catch in a multispecies fishery. In the UK the trading in quotas is not 
explicitly allowed, but not illegal either. Consequently there are no restrictions on the trade in quotas in the 
UK.  
 
FQAs can now be leased, traded permanently, or ‘swapped’ in the UK independently of vessel licences 
(MRAG, 2007). These processes are managed by POs and Fisheries Administrations. Quota trading 
among POs increased nearly seven-fold between 1995 and 2000. Quite a number of UK vessels are owned 
and used by Dutch fishermen as a result of quota hopping in the past. (Van Hoof et al, 2002; MRAG, 
2007). 
 
Property rights in Belgium 
 
Belgium is against transferable rights and works with a collective utilisation system (MRAG, 2007). Quota 
for sole and plaice are distributed over vessels on basis of engine power. These vessel quota are in 
principle not tradable. The only way to acquire more quotas within the collective system is to buy a 
withdrawn vessel without the use of public aid. When a vessel leaves the fleet without public aid, its 
registered engine power can be used for addition to the registered engine power of an existing fishing 
vessel. In doing so, the vessel owner receives extra catch possibilities for those stocks that are allocated in 
function of kW. 
 
The difficulty for newcomers to access the sole and plaice fishery is principally related to the availability of 
vessels, as the value of the right to fish is included in the vessel price. The fishing licence follows the 
vessel and is in principle not tradable.  
 
The access of nationals of other Member States to fishing rights is theoretically possible, but limited in 
practice because of the need to prove a genuine economic link with the coastal area. Criteria for this are 
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that at least 50% of the crew members live in the Belgian coastal area, or at least 50% of the landings of 
the vessel on a yearly basis occur in Belgium. 
  
Property rights in Denmark 
 
VTQs have been allocated free of charge according to the historical 3-year record of the fishing vessels 
applying for quotas (MRAG, 2007). The quotas are not divisible from the vessel to which they have been 
allocated, meaning that vessel and quotas can only be traded together. There is a high demand for vessels 
with quotas.  
 
Fishers can establish groups where VTQs are pooled on a yearly (13-months) basis. Members of a pool 
group are free to swap, lease or lend their quotas within the group. Pool groups must have by-laws and a 
chairperson, who must approve swaps and keep track of, and report on group quota utilisation. In 2008 
there were 11 pool groups in Denmark comprising 670 fishing vessels. 
 
There is a holdback/reserve scheme through which new entrants can make a multi-annual quota loan. 
Every year a small proportion of the national quota is set aside for loan to new entrants below the age of 
40 (young fishers). The loan period is a maximum of 8 years. After 4 years the loan is reduced each year. 
In addition, new entrants are allowed (within some limitations) to buy VTQ from existing vessels without 
necessarily taking ownership of the vessel. The intention is that during the 8 year loan period (especially 
after year 4) the newcomer becomes well established and financially able to buy the VTQ he wants on 
normal conditions. At present there are 20 young fishers who have taken out VTQ loan. 
 
The Danish fisheries law is very strict on who can own a fishing vessel. The requirement that 60% of the 
vessel capital shall be owned by active fishermen excludes company ownership. The owners shall be 
Danish or EU citizens and hold Danish A-licence. To fulfil the license requirements the rights holder 
must be a resident of Denmark.  
 
4.5.3. Input management 
 
In all EU Member States licences in kW and GT are obligatory on the basis of the EU Fleet Register 
regulation. Whereas in Denmark and in the UK the licence management is a major component, limitation 
on days at sea seems to be the most important in Belgium and the Netherlands. Only in the Netherlands 
several input restrictions are tradable, including the days at sea.  
 
Effort restrictions in the Netherlands 
 
The right to fish is established by possession of a fishing licence. The engine power of a vessel is 
registered on the licence. Fishing licences can be freely transferred. It is also possible to aggregate more 
than one licence on one vessel. The licensing scheme is coupled to the EU fleet register. 
 
Fishing vessels are restricted by a maximum number of days at sea. The allocation of days at sea is 
dependent on the type of fishery. For example, the North Sea beam trawl fleet was limited to a maximum 
of 143 days per vessel in 2007. Days at sea are transferable between vessels within the same fishery. The 
system of transferable effort quota (days at sea) is managed by the co-management groups. Days at sea can 
be transferred between members on a permanent basis (buying/selling), or on a yearly basis (leasing).  
 
Effort restrictions in the UK 
 
All UK-registered vessels must hold a licence issued by the UK Fisheries Department. Detailed 
administrative rules specify how fishermen can transfer or aggregate licences. (Van Hoof et al, 2002). No 
new fishing vessel licences are issued in UK because of the need to control the size of the fleet. People 
wishing to license a vessel for the first time must obtain an existing licence ‘entitlement’. This arises when 
an existing licensed vessel is sold, scrapped, or is otherwise de-registered.  
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UK vessels holding quota must also comply with numerous restrictions on fishing methods, closed areas, 
etc (MRAG, 2007). Notable are the limitations on days-at-sea during 2007 for vessels >10 m, designed to 
protect hard-pressed stocks of cod and sole around the UK. Days-at-sea are transferable from one vessel 
to another in the same fishery.  
 
Effort restrictions in Belgium 
 
Anyone fishing for species subject to the quota system is required to hold a government licence for the 
vessel. The licensing system is an additional measure to control fishing capacity and is directly connected 
to the EU Fleet Register. The licence determines the power, tonnage and length of the vessel. Licences are 
granted within a given segment on the basis of the engine power: The fishing capacity licences are not 
transferable. Access to rights (quotas, licence) is determined by the purchase of a withdrawn vessel 
(without public aid).  
 
Specific rules apply to the kW and tonnage of a new vessel. Increasing the engine power on a fishing 
licence is possible, through the principle of combining the engine power of fishing vessels which are 
definitively withdrawn from the fleet without receiving aid. Maximum allowed engine power per vessel has 
risen from 957 to 1,200 kW in 2006. A new vessel (either newly built without State aid or second-hand) 
may be placed on an existing fishing licence at any time, but for the large-vessel fleet and the coastal 
fishing fleet, the tonnage of the new vessel is limited to 0.3 times the withdrawn engine power in KW. For 
the small-vessel fleet, this factor is increased to 0.445. (MRAG, 2009). 
 
In addition to these arrangements, individual non-transferable effort quotas have been introduced in the 
sole and plaice fishery. A days-at-sea system was introduced to control activity in an attempt to ensure an 
optimal time repartition of catches. In 2009 the total Belgian number of days at sea in the flatfish sector 
decreased by 9.5% for the flatfish sector, compared to the previous years (Adriansen, 2009 p 38). 
 
Effort restrictions in Denmark 
 
Within the framework of CFP, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (MFAF) has the right to 
define access to and exclusion from fisheries through the distribution of licences. The Danish 
management of fishery builds on access regulation in combination with regulation of the total fleet 
capacity measured by tonnage and engine power. Access regulation implies that in order to fish, a person 
must be an authorised full time/part time fisher and the vessel must be registered as a fishing vessel and 
granted a license. This license specifies tonnage and engine power of the vessel. Hence, fleet capacity 
constitutes an integrated part of the access regulation. (OECD, 2003).  
 
Effort regulation is used to directly regulate the activity of fishing vessels. The regulation specifies the 
maximum number of days at sea for each vessel based on fishing gear and mesh size used by the vessel. 
The days at sea are transferable. 
 
Input property rights 
 
As mentioned above, the Netherlands has a rights based fisheries management regime consisting of a 
number of transferable individual rights, including licenses expressed in quantities of engine power per 
vessel, and transferable days at sea. Trade in days at sea is managed by the co-management groups. In 
Denmark days at sea are also transferable while licences are not. Input rights are not transferable in the 
UK and Belgium.  
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4.6. Management costs 
 
4.6.1. Summary of OECD data 
 
Table 4.6 presents the management costs by fleet segment based on OECD data. The national 
management costs have been attributed to individual fleet segments assuming that their share in 
management costs is equal to their share in total revenues of the national fishing sectors. Management 
costs of the fleet segments are in general between 4 and 7% of total revenues except for the Belgian fleet 
segment where management costs are 21% of total revenues. 
 
Table 4.6 Management costs according to OECD, average 2004-2006* , (mln euro) 
 
BEL 
TBB  
24-40 
DEN 
DTS  
12-24 
DEN 
PGP 
12-24 
GBR 
TBB  
24-40 
GBR 
TBB  
40- 
NL 
TBB  
24-40 
NL 
TBB  
40- 
Direct Payments 3.1 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.8 2.2 
 - Decommissioning   0.9 0.4     0.8 2.2 
 - Fleet renewal and modernization   0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0     
 - Other   0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1   0.0 
General Services 1.5 3.5 1.5 1.4 0.8 1.9 5.6 
 - Management and enforcement   1.0 0.4 1.2 0.7 0.1 0.4 
 - Research    0.5 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.0
 - Other   1.9 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.2 
Total 4.5 4.5 2.0 1.7 0.9 2.7 7.9 
*sum of national and EU contributions regarding marine capture fisheries. 
 
4.6.2. Support to fishing sector (FIFG and EFF) 
 
Table 4.7 presents the average annual support to marine fisheries by fleet segment from FIFG and EFF. 
The share of national costs allocated to individual segments has been assumed proportionate to the share 
of the segment in the total revenues of the national marine fisheries sector. For most segments, the FIFG 
support is higher than the costs according to the OECD. For reasons of consistency across the case 
studies, OECD data is used in the FISHRENT model when simulating the effects of recovery of 
management costs. 
 
Table 4.7 Average annual support to the marine fisheries from FIFG and EFF, (mln euro)* 
 
BEL 
TBB  
24-40 
DEN 
DTS  
12-24 
DEN 
PGP  
12-24 
GBR 
TBB  
24-40 
GBR 
TBB  
40- 
NL  
TBB  
24-40 
NL  
TBB  
40- Total 
FIFG - Axis 1 and 2 5.4 3.5 1.5 0.6 0.3 5.1 15.0 31.6 
EFF - Axis 1 1.7 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.7 2.1 5.4 
 
4.6.3. Costs of research and management  
 
 shows an estimation of management and enforcement costs by segment based on data from the MRAG 
report (MRAG, 2008, p. 160) Research costs by segments have been estimated on basis of National DCF 
budget plus 30%. Again, the management and research costs have been allocated to the fleet segments on 
basis of their share in total revenues of the national fishery sectors. This estimation of management and 
research costs gives somewhat lower results than the OECD data. 
 
Table 4.8 Estimated management and research costs, (mln euro)  
 
BEL 
TBB  
24-40 
DEN 
DTS  
12-24 
DEN 
PGP  
12-24 
GBR 
TBB  
24-40 
GBR 
TBB  
40- 
NL  
TBB  
24-40 
NL  
TBB  
40- Total 
Management, control, enforcement  1.1 2.4 1.1 1.5 0.9 1.9 5.4 14.2 
Research (DCF+30%) 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.6 1.7 5.5 
Sources: MRAG (2008) and Com. Decision 811/2009  
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4.7. Estimation of the resource rent 
 
4.7.1. Comparison of scenarios  
 
The model FISHRENT has been run for 14 scenarios with different options for development of effort, 
fleet and catches. Table 4.9 presents the basic results from these model runs in terms of NPV profit15 and 
profit, catch, fleet and effort in year 15.  
 
Table 4.9 Comparison of the scenarios 
Scenario  
 
Effort 
(1000 DAS) 
Fleet
(no. vessels) 
Catch
(1000 t) 
Discounted 
Profit year 15 
(mln euro) 
NPV profit15 
(mln euro) 
Average values 2005-7
2005-7  95,542 626 53,382 -24,1 
Values in year 15 of the scenario
1. TAC min 62,755 317 75,072 85.2 753.9
2. Effort min 115,982 646 99,558 31.9 716.0
3. TAC max 161,154 715 65,354 8.2 -4.8
4. Effort max 161,647 716 66,791 6.8 -22.4
5. Open access 162,114 718 67,593 5.2 -31.0
6. Min min 98,857 494 94,587 69.5 934.1
7. Discount rate 2% 62,755 317 75,072 106.1 870.3
8. Discount rate 5% 62,755 317 75,072 68.7 656.8
9. Recovery mgt. costs 62,857 314 75,180 87.0 788.6
10. Static present fleet 62,755 626 75,072 54.8 201.8
11. Static minimum fleet 75,486 430 83,113 77.6 555.0
12. Dynamic min. fleet 65,867 297 76,563 86.9 921.3
13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 217,374 958 106,002 64.7 760.4
14. Optimum fleet (profit) 88,199 388 65,071 96.5 1009.5
 
The first 6 scenarios are simulations of different policy options. These policy options concern different 
strategies for limiting catches by TACs or effort restrictions. In scenario 1 and 3, catches are restricted by 
TACs, that are calculated on basis of target harvest ratio. In the TAC min scenario effort is determined by 
the most restrictive TAC (the TAC that requires lowest effort) while in the TAC max scenario effort is 
determined by the least restrictive TAC. This implies that in the TAC max scenario one of the stocks will 
be overfished. In Scenarios 2 and 4 the fishery is managed by effort restrictions. These effort restrictions 
are directly calculated from target harvest ratio. In the Effort min scenario, the effort is determined by the 
stock with most restrictive harvest ratio and in the Effort max scenario by the stock with least restrictive 
harvest ratio. Scenario 6 is the most precautionary scenario where effort is chosen as the minimum of the 
effort determined by the most restrictive TAC and by the most restrictive target harvest ratio. Scenario 5 
is the Open Access scenario where landings and effort are not restricted at all. 
 
The TAC min scenario has been selected as the main scenario because this is regarded as the scenario that 
comes closest to the present policies with respect to North Sea flatfish. In this scenario, effort is each year 
determined by the most restrictive TAC, in other words, the TAC that requires lowest fishing effort. This 
would guarantee that none of the target species will ever be overfished. However, in line with the present 
policy, the TAC is not allowed to vary by more than 15% from year to year. This means that in some cases 
it is still possible that catches and landings are higher than the sustainable catch.  
 
The TAC min and Min min scenarios and the Effort min scenario score best in terms of NPV profit15. 
These are also the most restrictive scenarios where catches are restricted most in the first years of the 
scenario and where biomass grows quickest. This results in much higher catches and biomass in year 15 
compared to the base year. Catches in Effort min scenario are almost twice as high as in the base year. In 
these restrictive scenarios effort is cut in the first period, but in the last year it is slightly higher than in the 
base year. The Effort min scenario scores third of the 6 policy scenarios in terms of NPV profit15, but 
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substantially lower than the TAC min and Min min scenario. This is largely due to differences in the size 
of the fleet, which is much larger in the Effort min scenario than in the other two scenarios.  
 
The less restrictive scenarios Effort max and TAC max have considerably lower – even negative - scores 
on NPV profit15, which indicates that it is essential to invest in biomass growth in the first years in order 
to have a profitable fishery in the second half of the scenario period. The results of these scenarios are 
quite similar in terms of fleet, effort, catch and NPV profit15. They are only slightly better than the results 
in the open access scenario.  
 
In scenario 7 and 8 the effects of different discount rates are investigated. Scenario 7 demonstrates that 
using a discount rate of 2% instead of 3.5% results in a 15.4% higher NPV profit15 . In scenario 8 the 
discount rate is 5% instead of 3.5%. This results in an 12.9% lower NPV profit15. 
 
Scenario 9 (recovery of management costs) shows that NPV profit15 is slightly (5%) higher than in the 
basic TAC min scenario when the fishery has to compensate the government for the management costs. 
Thus it is possible for the government to introduce a payment for access to the fishery that compensates 
for the management costs. There is even room for a higher payment for access, so that society is able to 
capture a larger part of the resource rent without seriously disturbing the profitability of the fishery. 
 
Scenarios 10 to 14 are different types of optimization scenarios. Of these scenarios, the optimum fleet 
scenario 14 has by far the best results in terms of NPV profit15, as could be expected because this is the 
only scenario where NPV profit15 is explicitly maximized . Discounted profit in year 15  in this scenario is 
also higher than in the other scenarios.  Details of the optimization scenarios will be discussed in section 
4.7.5. 
 
Total resource rent from target stocks 
 
The segments included explicitly in the case studies catch only a part of the sustainable catches of sole and 
plaice. The rest is caught by other segments, possibly within other fisheries. It was decided that this 
distinction must be made explicitly by calculating the ratio between the total value of target species caught 
by the included segments and the total value of sustainable total catch. In this case study this ratio is 0.79, 
which means that the segments explicitly considered in the model are assumed to capture 79% of resource 
rent. Total resource rent from the sole and plaice rent, can thus be found by multiplying the NPV profit15 
reported in Table 4.9 with 1/0.79. Discounted resource rent over 15 years in the MEY situation (scenario 
14) can thus be estimated at 1.3 billion euro, while in the TAC min scenario (scenario 1), total resource 
rent from the sole and plaice stocks is 0.95 billion euro. 
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4.7.2. Policy options (selection from scenarios 1-6)  
 
Summary 
 
Six policy scenarios have been simulated using the FISHRENT model. Results of these 6 policy scenarios 
are summarized in Table 1.10. 
 
Table 4.10 Effect of different policies on net profit, harvest ratio, catches, effort and fleet 
Indicator / 
segment 
2005-7 Scenarios**
1. TAC 
min 
2. Effort 
min 
3. TAC 
max 
4. Effort 
max 
5. Open 
access 
6. Min 
min 
NPV profit15  753.9 716.0 -4.8 -22.4 -31.0 934.1 
Harvest ratio (year 15)*
Sole 0.5231 0.1929 0.3028 1 1 1 0.2511 
Plaice 0.2166 0.0812 0.1222 0.0985 0.1004 0.1014 0.1107 
Catch in (1000 t, year 15)
Sole 10,907 15,470 20,130 0 0 0 20,027 
Plaice 42,475 59,602 79,428 65,354 66,791 67,593 74,560 
Effort (1000 DAS, year 15)
BEL TBB 24-40 12,650 8,084 13,904 8,311 7,916 8,048 13,923 
DEN DTS 12-24 35,346 25,777 44,491 106,395 106,133 105,432 39,088 
DEN PGP 12-24 13,161 4,159 14,307 23,748 23,569 23,544 7,789 
GBR TBB 24-40 10,550 7,688 13,280 13,500 13,738 13,756 11,658 
GBR TBB 40- 3,317 2,417 3,876 3,197 3,130 3,121 3,665 
NL TBB 24-40 7,008 4,739 8,821 3,171 3,236 4,263 7,735 
NL TBB 40- 16,827 12,308 21,180 6,030 7,054 7,072 18,664 
Fleet (no vessels, year 15)
BEL TBB 24-40 55 35 65 36 34 35 69 
DEN DTS 12-24 258 132 249 463 461 458 181 
DEN PGP 12-24 107 21 75 103 102 102 40 
GBR TBB 24-40 54 34 72 59 60 60 52 
GBR TBB 40- 15 11 20 14 14 14 20 
NL TBB 24-40 48 21 46 14 14 19 46 
NL TBB 40- 89 64 118 26 31 31 86 
*F=1 implies that the stock is almost extinct. 
 
On basis of the stock growth functions in FISHRENT, MSY harvest ratio has been estimated at 0.3 for 
sole and 0.26 for plaice. This has been used as target harvest ratio in all policy scenarios. In the base year 
harvest ratio for sole is 0.52, much higher than Hmsy. Base year harvest ratio for plaice was 0.21, lower 
than target mortality. In the main scenario for this case study, the TAC min scenario, catches of sole and 
plaice at the end of the simulation period are almost 50% higher than in the base year. However, harvest 
ratio of sole and plaice is still below MSY level. 
 
At the end of the 15 year simulation period, target harvest ratio for sole is only reached in the Effort min 
scenario. Catches of sole in this scenario are app. 20,000 tonnes. This corresponds to MSY (28,000 
tonnes) when catches of other segments and undersized discards, that have been estimated at 10% of the 
total catch weight, are included. In the Min min scenario harvest ratio for sole is slightly lower , but at a 
higher level of biomass. The resulting sole catch is almost equal to that in the Effort min scenario.  
 
None of the scenarios reaches Hmsy for plaice. Highest H for plaice is found in the Effort min scenario 
(0.12) and in the Min min scenario (0.11), which is far below Hmsy (0.26). The results of the TAC max 
scenario and the Effort max scenario tells us why. If effort is determined by the least restrictive stock 
(plaice), the sole stock will be completely fished out. In these scenarios, there is no sole stock left at the 
end of the simulation period and hence sole catches in year 15 are zero. NPV in these scenarios is much 
lower than in the more restrictive scenarios because also the catch of plaice is lower than in the Effort min 
and Min min scenario. The plaice TAC is not fully fished, because, when only catching plaice, profitability 
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of the fishery is not good enough to invest in new vessels up to the point where the plaice TAC can be 
fished. 
 
The results of the six policy scenarios show that policy does matter for achieving good economic results. 
Comparison of the policy scenarios to the Open access scenario shows that the most restrictive policy 
scenarios (TAC min, Effort min and Min min) score much better in terms of NPV profit15 than no policy 
at all. Results of the TAC max and Effort max scenario are quite similar to those of the Open access 
scenario, which indicates that in these scenarios the fishery is hardly restricted. 
 
Scenario 1. TAC min 
 
The TAC Min scenario is considered the main scenario for the NS flatfish case study because it resembles 
the actual policy for this fishery more than the other scenarios. In this scenario the effort is determined by 
the most restrictive TAC. This means that in principle none of the target species would ever be 
overfished. However, there is an extra condition that prevents the TAC from varying by more than 15% 
from year to year. This way the TAC and the catch in some years can be higher or lower than what is 
considered sustainable catch. 
 
In the base year harvest ratio of sole is 0.52 while Hmsy has been estimated at 0.3. Harvest ratio of plaice 
was below Hmsy. All fleet segments considered in the model were suffering losses, partly due to the 
historically high fuel prices and partly due to the fact that the fish stocks were below MSY level. 
 
After the base year, in which harvest ratio of sole was far above Hmsy, effort in terms of both number of 
vessels and days at sea starts to decrease as a consequence of the decreasing TAC for sole. Biomass of sole 
and plaice are increasing from the start of the simulation period because of the decreasing fishing activity. 
The minimum level of effort and landings is reached after 7 years. From that year, effort and landings, 
revenues and net profit are increasing again until they stabilize around year 15. At that time harvest ratio 
of sole has moved up to 0.25, which is close to Hmsy (0.3).  
 
Catches of sole in year 15 are app. 40% higher than in the base year. Catches of sole are equal to the TAC, 
while catches of plaice are much smaller than the TAC. This is the consequence of the assumption that 
effort is tuned to the most restrictive TAC, in this case the TAC of sole. Profit of all segments increases 
from the start of the period because of the lower effort and costs and because of the growing stocks that 
cause CPUE to increase. In year 15, total profit of the segments is 143 million Euro compared to a loss of 
24 million in the base year. The number of vessels of each of the fleet segments is lower than in the base 
year. Biomass of plaice and sole is about four times the level of the base year. 
 
The NPV profit15 of this scenario is 753.9 million Euro, 5% higher than the Effort Min and 24% lower 
than the Min min scenario.  
 Figure 4.
 
 
 
5 Results of scenario 1. T
 
AC min 
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Scenario 2. Effort min  
 
In the Effort min scenario, effort is cut severely immediately after the base year. As a result of that also 
landings and revenues are decreasing in the first few years. The sole and plaice stocks are recovering from 
the start of the simulation, also causing profitability of the fleet to increase because of lower costs and 
higher CPUE. In year 4 landings and revenues reach a minimum and after that they are increasing again. 
Fleet size and days at sea are increasing from year 6.  
 
In year 15, stocks have recovered and both the sole and plaice stock have quadrupled. Net profit in the 
last year of the simulation period has increased from -24 million euro in the base year to more than 50 
million Euros in year 15. Harvest ratio of sole in year 15 equals Hmsy (0.3) and sole catch by the 7 
segments is around 20,000 tonnes which corresponds to MSY of 28,000 tonnes when catches by other 
segments and discards of undersized fish are included. Sole catch is about 33% higher than in the TAC 
min scenario. Harvest ratio of plaice in year 15 is 0.12, much lower than Hmsy, like in all scenarios. Due 
to the recovered plaice stock, plaice catch is considerably higher (+87%) than in the base year while effort 
is 33% higher. Catch of plaice is 33% higher than in the TAC min scenario. 
 
The NPV profit15 of this scenario is 716 million Euro, 5% lower than in the TAC Min scenario and 23% 
lower than in the Min min scenario but much higher than the TAC max and Effort max scenarios, where  
NPV profit15 is negative.  
 
 Figure 4.6 Results of scenario 2. Effort min 
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Scenario 3. TAC max 
 
In the TAC max scenario, effort is determined by the least restrictive TAC. This can be TACs for 
different stocks in different years, but in North Sea flatfish case study it is usually the TAC for plaice. As a 
result of that, the sole stock is structurally overfished in this scenario. 
 
In first years of the simulation period there is no decrease of effort like in scenario 1 and 2. Total effort is 
even increasing compared to the base year. Catches of sole are higher than the sole TAC and hence part 
of the sole catch is discarded and the sole stock is gradually decreasing in size until it is depleted in year 10. 
Catches of plaice are within the TAC and the plaice stock is recovering. The TAC for plaice is gradually 
increasing but landings increase much slower as the fleet doesn’t have the capacity to catch the whole 
plaice TAC. 
 
During the first years, profitability of the fishery is improving and turning from negative to positive, but as 
the sole stock is getting depleted the profits are going down and turning negative again. The declining 
profitability does not allow for investments that would be needed to increase capacity to the point where 
the plaice TAC can be fished completely. During the simulation period, there are periods with slightly 
positive profits and small investments and periods with negative profits and disinvestments. 
 
In year 15, net profit of the whole fishery is app 8 million euro but turning negative again two years later. 
The NPV profit15 in the 15 years simulation period is -4.8 mln euro, less negative than in the Effort max 
and Open access scenario. However, it’s clear that the TAC max scenario performs much worse than the 
more restrictive scenarios TAC min, Effort min and Min min. 
 
Economic results of the fleet segments differ widely in this scenario, depending on their relative efficiency 
for catching sole or plaice. After an initial decrease in size, the profitability of the Danish segment of 
demersal trawlers is improving substantially, causing investments in new vessels. As these investments 
continue, the fixed costs of the fleet are rising and profits are going down again. The segments of Dutch 
and, to a lesser extent, Belgian beam trawlers are decreasing in size significantly during the simulation 
period, because of their high dependence on sole in combination with high fuel costs. These fleets cannot 
be profitable when fishing only for plaice, at least not at the 2005-7 level of fuel prices.  
 Figure 4.7 Results of scenario 3. TAC max 
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Scenario 4. Effort max  
 
In the Effort max scenario, effort of each fleet is determined by the target harvest ratio that is least 
restrictive in terms of effort which is usually the target harvest ratio for plaice. 
 
Developments in this scenario are very similar to those in the TAC max scenario. The sole stock gets 
depleted and at the same time the plaice stock is growing, causing effort to increase too. Profitability of 
the fishery as a whole is low and most of the segments are either decreasing in size or roughly staying at 
the same level. The only exception is the Danish segment of demersal trawlers that almost doubles in size. 
 
NPV profit15 is -22 million euro, only slightly less negative than in the Open access scenario. The 
similarity of economic results to the Open access scenario indicates that the fishery is hardly restricted in 
the Effort max scenario. 
 Figure 4.8 Results of scenario 4. Effort max 
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Scenario 5. Open access 
 
In the Open access scenario, the fishery is not restricted by any policy measures. Effort is determined by 
the number of vessels in each fleet segment. These vessels assumingly are operating at a full capacity, as 
they are not restricted by any policy. Development of the fleet size is determined by the same investment 
function as in the other scenarios with investment depending on profit. 
 
As profits of all segments are negative in the base year, all segments are initially decreasing in size. Total 
effort, however, shows an increase from the beginning of the simulation period because the remaining 
vessels are operating at full capacity. Landings of plaice and sole are gradually increasing. Landings of sole 
are higher than sustainable and the sole stock is structurally overfished until it is depleted after year 8. 
 
In year 15, net profit of the total fishery is 8.8 million euro, about 37% lower than in the TAC max 
scenario and 24% lower than in the Effort max scenario. Profits in the more restrictive scenarios are much 
higher, which shows that a restrictive fisheries management is essential for extracting the potential 
resource rent.  NPV of total profit is negative at app. -31 million Euro, which is slightly more negative 
than in the Effort max and the TAC max scenario.  
Developments in this scenario are similar and parallel to the Effort max and TAC max scenario. This 
indicates that these two scenarios are hardly restricting the fishery. 
 Figure 4.9 Results of scenario 5. Open access 
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Scenario 6. Min min 
 
In the Min min scenario, effort of the flatfish fleet is determined by either the most restrictive TAC or the 
most restrictive target harvest ratio in terms of effort, whatever is the most restrictive of these two. If the 
TAC is always more restrictive this scenario would be similar to the TAC min scenario and if the effort 
restriction would be always most restrictive this would be similar to the Effort min scenario. However, it 
appears that in this case study sometimes the TAC restriction is most restrictive and sometimes the effort 
restriction, so the Min min scenario, has its own dynamics and economic results. Nevertheless, these 
dynamics are very much similar to those of the Effort min scenario and to a lesser extend the TAC min 
scenario. 
 
Just like in the TAC Min and Effort min scenario, effort decreases during the first years of the simulation 
period. As a result of that, the sole and plaice stock increase in size and profitability of the fleet improves. 
The higher profits cause new investments and fleet size increases again and in year 15 most of the 
segments are back at their original size. After a few years of decline, landings and revenues increase again 
and in year 15 both landings and revenues are about twice the level of the base year. Harvest ratio of sole 
is 0.25, slightly under Hmsy, and harvest ratio of plaice is 0.11, about 50% of Hmsy. 
 
NPV profit15 is app 934 million euro, 24% higher than in the TAC min scenario and 30% higher than in 
the Effort min scenario.  
 Figure 4.10 Results of scenario 6. Min min 
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4.7.3. Role of discount rate (scenarios 7-8)  
 
Table 4.11 Effect of discount rate on net profit 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenario
Main scenario 
Discount rate 3.5% 
7.
Discount rate 2% 
8. 
Discount rate 5% 
NPV profit15 (mln euro)  753.9 870.3 656.8
Nominal profit15* (mln euro) -24.1 142.8 142.8 142.8
Discounted profit15* (mln euro)  85.2 106.1 68.7
*year 15 
 
The appropriate discount rate depends on time preference of the relevant economic subjects. A higher 
discount rate is appropriate when the relevant economic subjects attach relative high value to present costs 
and benefits and low value to future costs and benefits. Table 4.1 shows the effect of different discount 
rates on the discounted economic results. The basic discount rate, used in all scenarios, is 3.5%. A higher 
discount rate implies lower discounted profit and a lower discount rate implies higher discounted profit. 
 
Scenario 7. Discount rate 2% 
 
Using a discount rate of 2% instead of 3.5% results in a 15% higher NPV profit15 . The discounted value of 
Profit15 is 24% higher than in the main scenario. 
 
Scenario 8. Discount rate 5% 
 
Using a discount rate of 5% instead of 3.5% results in a 13% lower NPV profit15 . The discounted value of 
Profit15 is 19% lower than in the main scenario. 
 
4.7.4. Resource rent and recovery of management costs (scenario 9)  
 
Table 4.11 Effect of recovery of management costs on net profit 
Indicator 2005-7
 
Scenarios 
Main scenario: 
No recovery of management 
costs 
9. 
Recovery of management 
costs 
NPV profit15 before pfa* 753.9 788.6 
NPV profit15 after pfa 753.9 510.5 
Nominal Profit15 (mln euro) before pfa -24.1 142.8 145.7 
Nominal Profit15 (mln euro) after pfa -24.1 142.8 121.6 
Fixed payment for access (mln euro) 0.0 24.2 
NPV Payment for access15 0.0 278.1  
Pfa = payment for access 
 
This scenario investigates whether recovery of management costs is possible without affecting profitability 
of the fishery in unacceptable ways. The scenario is based on the management costs data from the OECD 
as presented in section 4.6 . The share of national costs allocated to individual segments has been assumed 
proportionate to the share of the segment in the total revenues of the national marine fisheries sector (see 
Table 4.6). 
 
In this scenario, each fleet segment has to pay an annual access fee equal to the management cost allocated 
to the segment. This directly affects the profit of the segment and consequently investments. All segments 
had negative profits in the base year and the extra costs of payment for access cause profits in the first 
years to be even more negative and it takes longer than in the main scenario before the profits turn to 
positive. Nevertheless, after 5 years all segments are making a profit.  
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The discounted value of profits after payment for access over these 15 years is 32% lower than in the 
main scenario.  NPV profit15  before payment of access is 5% higher than in the main scenario . This is 
due to the lower profits that limit investment and hence the capacity of the fleet. Effort is also slightly 
lower in the first few years of the scenario and the fish stocks are growing quicker. However, this is a 
minor effect. Nominal profit in year 15 after payment for access is 15% lower than in the main scenario.  
 
If the government would try to capture more resource rent from the fishery, by for instance doubling the 
payment for access to twice the management costs the NPV of profit would decrease to 266 million euro, 
a further deterioration by 33%. Nominal profit after payment for access would decrease by 16% to 102 
million euro.  
 Figure 4.11 Results of scenario 9. Recovery of management costs 
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4.7.5. Optimization of capacity (scenarios 10-14)  
 
Table 4.12 Impact of optimization of the fleet size 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios*
  Main 
scenario 
TAC min
10.
Static 
present 
fleet 
11.
Static 
minimum 
fleet 
12.
Dynamic 
minimum 
fleet 
13. 
Optimum 
fleet 
(GVA) 
14.
Optimum 
fleet 
(profit) 
NPV profit15 (mln euro)  753.9 201.8 555.0 921.3 760.4 1009.5
Nominal profit15 (mln euro) -24.1 142.8 91.8 130.0 145.6 108.4 161.7
Discounted profit15 (mln euro)  85.2 54.8 77.6 86.9 64.7 96.5
Fleet15 (no vessels) 626 317 626 430 297 958 388
Effort15 (1000 DAS) 95,542 62,755 65,292 75,486 65,867 217,374 88,199
Catch15 (1000 t) 53,382 75,072 76,322 83,113 76,563 106,002 65,071
*NPV row refers to the sum, other rows refer to values in year 15 
 
The five optimization scenarios deal with different adaptation paths of the fleet. Scenarios 10-12 simulate 
different adaptation paths within the TAC min scenario. Scenario 13 and 14 are “policy free” scenarios 
where NPV GVA15 is and  NPV profit15, respectively, are maximized with just one condition that annual 
investment and disinvestment cannot exceed the maximum as defined by the investment function. 
 
In the static present fleet scenario the number of vessels is kept constant after the base year. This scenario 
has 73% lower NPV profit15 than the main scenario. Effort and catch in this scenario are comparable to 
the main TAC min scenario, but fixed costs are much higher because the fleet is not reduced.  
 
In the static minimum fleet scenario, the number of vessels is reduced to the minimum number required 
for the effort exerted in the first year (430 vessels) and maintained at that level throughout the whole 
simulation period. NPV profit15 is 26% lower than in the main scenario) and  the underlying developments 
in fleet size, effort and catch are quite different. In year 15, effort and catches in scenario 11 are 
significantly higher than in scenario 10 and 12 and in the main scenario while the number of vessels is 
36% higher than in the main scenario. This causes relatively high fixed costs and, consequently, lower 
NPV profit15 
 
The dynamic minimum fleet scenario has the highest NPV profit15 of the three “policy optimization 
scenarios” and also higher than the main scenario. The dynamic fleet scenario ends up with a smaller fleet 
in year 15 than the main scenario.  
 
The optimum fleet scenario 13, where NPV GVA15 is maximized, shows a quite different development. 
The resulting NPV GVA15 is much higher than in the main scenario and the “policy optimization” 
scenarios 10-12, but NPV profit15 is only slightly higher than in the main scenario and substantially lower  
than in scenario 12. By year 15 the fleet has expanded to 958 vessels, three times as much as in the main 
scenario and 50% more than in base year. This is mainly due to expansion of the two Danish segments 
with relatively small vessels and low fixed costs. Effort in terms of days at sea is almost four times as high 
as in the main scenario, but these are days at sea of relatively small vessels. Catches in year 15 are more 
than 50% higher than in the basic TAC min scenario.  
 
In scenario 14, where net profit is maximized, NPV profit15 is - of course - higher than in all other 
scenarios, including scenario 13. NPV GVA15 is significantly higher than in the main scenario and in the 
policy optimization scenarios 10-12, but much lower than in scenario 13.  Obviously, maximization of net 
profit requires a different strategy than optimization of GVA. The most striking difference is in the 
development of the fleet. In year 15 the fleet is app. 60% smaller than in scenario 13 (but still larger than 
in the main scenario and in the dynamic minimum fleet scenario). Catches in year 15 are lower than in the 
main scenario and all other optimization scenarios. Effort in year 15 is much lower than in scenario 13 but 
higher than in the main scenario and in the other optimization scenarios. However, it must be noted that 
this concerns effort in terms of days at sea of relatively small vessels. Just like in scenario 13, there is a 
relative shift of effort from the Dutch, Belgian and UK segments to the two Danish segments with 
relatively small vessels. The effort of all other segments is reduced compared to the base year.  
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Scenario 10. Static present fleet 
 
In the static present fleet scenario, the number of vessels in each segment is frozen at the level of the base 
year, 626 vessels for the total of the seven segments considered. This means that effort can only vary by 
changes in the number of days at sea per vessel. 
 
This scenario has a 73% lower NPV profit15 than the main scenario. Main difference is that throughout 
the simulation period, the main scenario has a much smaller fleet (app 50%) and, consequently, lower 
fixed costs. Development of effort in this scenario is similar to the developments in the main scenario. 
Catches, harvest ratio and revenues also develop similarly.  
 
In year 15, the (constant) number of vessels in the fleet is almost twice as high as in the main scenario. 
Effort in year 15 is almost equal in both scenarios and hence the number of days per vessel is about 50% 
lower in the static present fleet scenario. Catches and harvest ratio of sole and plaice in year 15 are 
practically equal in both scenarios. In year 15, nominal and discounted net profit of the fishery are about 
36% lower in the static present fleet scenario than in the main scenario, mainly because of higher fixed 
costs and capital costs due to the larger number of vessels. In general, development in the fishery is similar 
in both scenarios. The main difference is that effort varies both by changes in the number of vessels and 
by number of days at sea per vessel in the main scenario and only by number of days at sea per vessel in 
the static fleet scenario. As a consequence, the fleet is operating far below full capacity in the static present 
fleet scenario during the period of adaptation with relatively low effort. 
 
The conclusion is that keeping the fleet at the present size may become a burden to the fleet when effort 
has to be decreased in order to let the stocks recover and also afterwards when stocks have recovered and 
less effort is needed for sustainable catches.  
 
 
 Figure 4.12 Results of scenario 10. Adaptation with ‘present’ fleet 
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Scenario 11. Static minimum fleet  
 
In this scenario the fleet of all segments is reduced to the minimum level required for the effort exerted in 
the first year (430 vessels) and maintained at that level throughout the whole simulation period. As a 
consequence, effort can never be higher than in year 1. Just like in the static present fleet scenario, effort 
can only vary by changes in the number of days at sea per vessel. 
 
From year 3 to 7 this scenario shows a decreasing number of days at sea per vessel and hence decreasing 
effort caused by the decreasing TACs for sole and plaice. After year 7, effort, landings and revenues are 
increasing again, reaching a stable level after year 15.  
 
In year 15, catches and harvest ratio of sole and plaice are higher than in the main TAC min scenario and 
the static present fleet scenario. Harvest ratio of both sole and plaice is, however, still below Hmsy. 
Nominal profit is lower than in the main scenario and the other policy optimization scenarios 10-12.  
 
NPV profit15 is 130 million euro, 9% lower in the main scenario and also lower than in the dynamic 
minimum fleet scenario (scenario 12) but higher than in the static present fleet scenario.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 4.13 Results of scenario 11. Static minimum fleet 
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Scenario 12. Dynamic minimum fleet  
 
In this scenario the fleet is maintained at minimum level throughout the simulation period. In other words 
the fleet is operating at full capacity level, using the maximum number of days at sea per vessel. The 
investment function is passive, meaning that fleet size each year adjusts to the minimum level required for 
the effort of that year and there are no limits to investment or disinvestment. Contrary to scenario 10 and 
11, in this scenario the number of days at sea per vessel is constant at the maximum level and effort can 
only vary by changes in the number of vessels. 
 
In year 15, catches and harvest ratio of both sole and plaice are slightly higher than those in the main 
(TAC min) scenario while effort is 5% higher with a 6% smaller fleet. Harvest ratio of both sole and 
plaice, however, is still below Hmsy.  
 
NPV profit15 is only 22% higher than in the TAC min scenario. This difference is caused by lower capital 
costs in the dynamic minimum fleet scenario during the adaptation process between year 1 and 15. In the 
dynamic fleet scenario, the fleet can adjust immediately to the changing effort levels while investment is 
limited in the TAC min scenario. 
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Scenario 13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 
 
This scenario has a different character than the other optimization scenarios 10-12, which are all based on 
the TAC min scenario, simulating different adaptation paths for the fleet. In the optimum fleet scenario, 
the number of vessels of each segment in each year is optimized, maximizing NPV GVA15. The only 
condition is that investment and disinvestment in any year do not exceed the limits specified in the 
investment function. However, in this case the investment function is disabled and investment does not 
depend on profit or BER. There is no restriction of the fishery by TACs, allowable effort or any other 
policy in this scenario. How this optimum solution is reached could be achieved not relevant. The 
optimum fleet scenario is not simulating any reality, but merely exploring what is in principle possible in 
terms of maximizing NPV GVA15. 
 
Developments in this scenario are quite different from all other scenarios. During the first years of the 
simulating period, there is a decrease in effort (days at sea) but the decrease is much smaller than in the 
policy based scenarios. After year 5, the total number of days at sea starts increasing until in year 15 it is 
more than two times the base year effort. Similarly, after an initial decrease, the total number of vessels 
starts increasing from year 6. In year 15 the fleet consists of 958 vessels, 53% more than in the base year. 
From year 2, all fleet segments are operating at full capacity, using the maximum number of days at sea. 
The development differs widely per fleet segment. In year 15, the two Dutch segments are app. 30% 
smaller than in the base year. The British segment of beam trawlers of 24-40m has more than doubled in 
size while the UK segment of large beam trawlers has been reduced by 18%. The two Danish segments of 
12-24m have increased in size by 68% and 85%. This indicates that for optimizing GVA it is optimal to 
use relatively small vessels with low fuel costs although it should also be noticed that in the long run there 
is a place for all segments; none of the segments goes to zero. 
 
In year 15, total effort in terms of number of days at sea is almost 3.5 times as high as in the main (TAC 
min) scenario, but the average size of the vessels has decreased. Catches of sole are 25% higher and 
catches of plaice are 60% higher than in the main scenario. Harvest ratio of sole is 0.38, substantially 
higher than Hmsy (0.3) and harvest ratio of plaice is 0.15, higher than in the main scenario but lower than 
Hmsy (0.2). Maximizing GVA in the flatfish fishery clearly means finding a compromise between the 
optimal exploitation of the two target species.  
 
NPV profit15 is 760 billion euro, only 1% higher than in the TAC min scenario and substantially lower 
than in scenario 12 and 14. Apparently, maximization of profits takes a different strategy than 
maximization of gross value added. 
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Scenario 14. Optimum fleet (profit) 
 
In this scenario, the number of vessels of each segment in each year is optimized, maximizing NPV 
profit15. Just like in scenario 13, the only condition is that investment and disinvestment in any year do not 
exceed the limits specified in the investment function. The optimization of net profit scenario is not 
simulating any reality, but merely exploring what is in principle possible in terms of maximizing NPV 
profit15. 
 
In the beginning of the simulation period, fleet and effort are reduced significantly, but less than in the 
main (TAC min) scenario. After year 7, effort starts increasing again until in year 15 it is only 8% lower 
than in the base year. The fleet shows a similar development, but is reduced much more than effort. In 
year 15 the number of vessels is 38% lower than in the base year. All fleet segments are smaller than in the 
base year, but the two Danish segments and the British segment of small beam trawlers are reduced less 
that the others. All other segments are reduced by more than 50%. 
 
From year two, all segments are using the maximum number of days at sea per vessel. Catches of sole and 
plaice are 14% and 24%, respectively, higher than in the base year. Harvest ratio of sole and plaice are 0.15 
and 0.07 respectively, much lower than in the base year and also lower than Hmsy of both species. 
 
In year 15, the total fleet consists of 388 vessels, 22% more than in the main scenario.  All fleet segments 
are operating at full capacity, using the maximum number of days at sea per vessel. Total effort in year 15 
is 41% higher than in the main scenario. Catches of plaice are 12% lower than in the TAC min scenario 
and catches of sole are 19% lower. Harvest ratio of sole is 0.15, 25% lower than in the main TAC min 
scenario and only 50% of Hmsy (0.3). Harvest ratio of plaice is 0.07, 12% lower than in the main scenario 
and only 27% of Hmsy (0.26). This indicates that in year 15 the fleet has not been able to expand to an 
optimal size after its initial reduction. 
 
The development of the individual fleet segments differs substantially between the profit optimization 
scenario and the main scenario. At the end of the simulation period, the Danish segments DTS 12-24 and 
PGP 12-24 are 78% and 169%, respectively, larger in scenario 14 than in the main scenario. All other 
segments are smaller than in the main scenario. Apparently, profit maximization is enhanced by 
investments in smaller vessels, saving fuel costs and capital costs. The higher effort in scenario 14 
compared to the main scenario concerns days at sea of – on average – smaller vessels. This also may 
explain why profit is maximized with higher effort in terms of days at sea and lower catches of plaice and 
sole than in the main scenario. 
 
NPV profit15 is 34% higher than in the main scenario. This is mainly due to higher revenues and lower 
capital costs throughout the simulation period. Net profit in year15 is 13% higher than in the main 
scenario, although revenues are slightly lower. This is more than compensated by lower crew costs and 
capital costs. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.16 Results of scenario 14 – Optimum fleet (profit) 
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Comparison of scenarios 13 and 14 
 
Scenario 14 can be regarded as representing the private sector perspective. Resource rent is viewed as net 
profit as this is the excess remuneration of capital. Scenario 13 takes a society perspective, maximizing the 
sum of capital and labour remuneration. In other words, this scenario maximizes the contribution of the 
fisheries sector to the GDP. 
 
In scenario 14, NPV profit15 is 34% higher than in scenario 13 and 33% higher than in the main (TAC 
min) scenario.  However, NPV GVA15 is 12% lower than in scenario 13 and only 16% higher than in the 
main scenario. This is caused by lower NPV Crew costs15 (28%) and NPV capital costs15 (27%). (Table 
4.14).  The same pattern can be seen when comparing GVA, net profit, labour costs and capital costs in 
both scenarios in year 15 of the simulation. In scenario 14, net profit is 49% higher than in scenario 13, 
but GVA is 28% lower, mainly due to a lower remuneration of labour (48%). 
 
Apparently, strict maximization of net profit does not (necessarily) lead to maximization of total 
remuneration of all production factors. The most striking difference between the two scenarios concerns 
the development of the fleet. In year 15 the total fleet is 60% smaller in scenario 14 than in scenario 13, 
38% smaller than in the base years 2005-7 but still 22% larger than in the main scenario. 
 
Comparing year 15 in scenario 14 to the base years 2005/2007, shows that maximization of net profit in 
this case leads to significant increase in GVA (145%) and crew costs (44%) but also to a decrease of 
capital costs (54%) because of the smaller fleet in scenario 14. Net profit in year 15 is 161 mln euro 
compared to a 24 mln euro loss in 2005-7. 
 
Table 4.13 Comparison of scenarios 13 and 14 (values in mln euro, fleet number of vessels) 
 Scenario 13 Scenario 14 
NPV GVA15  2,966.2 2,601.5 
NPV profit15  760.4 1,009.5 
NPV Crew costs15  1,792.7 1,288.4 
NPV capital costs15  413.1 303.6 
GVA year 15   491.1 354.2 
Profit year 15  108.4 161.7 
Crew costs year 15  323.5 168.8 
Capital costs year 15  59.2 23.8 
Fleet – average 1-15 552 321 
Fleet – year 15 958 388 
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ANNEX 1. 
 
Table A1. Basic economic data of the flatfish sector in the North Sea, including a total of seven 
segment classifications of four EU member countries.  
        
  Seg. 1 Seg. 2 Seg. 3 Seg. 4 Seg. 5 Seg. 6 Seg. 7
SEGMENT CLASSIFICATION             
Member State Belgium Denmark Denmark UK UK Netherlands Netherlands
Gear TBB DTS PGP TBB TBB TBB TBB
Length group 24-40  12-24  12-24 24-40 >40 24-40 >40
EFFORT DATA               
No vessels 55 258 107 54 15 48 89.3
DAS/vessel 110 137 123 204 196 146 190
Max DAS (estimate)    270 270 270 270 270  270
CPUE (calculated) (t/day) 1292 1877.73 778.65 1225.55 2604.50 1444.99 2307.40
Effort (DAS) 12563 35373 13113 11000 3000 7000 17000
Technol. Progr. (% p.y. if available)  0.1 0.1  0.1 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
COSTS DATA               
Fuel 26.8 6.46 1.50 14.17 11.77 16.6 53.35
Labour 24.6 27.63 13.04 10.09 4.77 10.1 26.55
Variable c. 10.6 7.27 3.16 5.10 5.61 3.2 10.04
Fixed costs 5.3 4.62 1.95 5.15 1.74 4.7 12.37
Capital costs (depr+inter.) 3.7 8.90 4.32 3.48 5.37 7.3 19.14
REVENUES AND CATCH               
Total revenue 69.00 59.83 26.20 41.00 24.00 44.00 128.00
Catch composition (4-8 species per segment + rest) (tonnes)         
Common sole 2.86 0.21 0.57 0.79 0.48 1.68 7.19
European plaice 4.17 5.52 2.95 4.06 6.10 4.22 17.23
Atlantic cod 0.00 9.30 2.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Turbot 0.28 0.00 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.39 1.41
Lemon sole 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00
OTHERS 8.08 117.82 14.25 7.90 1.67 3.95 13.15
 -incl Monkfishes Norw.lobst Europ.hake Anglerfish Com.dab Com.shrimp Brill
 -incl.     Cuttlefish   Brill Com.dab
Prices               
Common sole 11.28 10.94 10.82 10.98 10.98 10.89 10.73
European plaice 1.97 1.86 1.78 1.72 1.88 1.93 1.91
Atlantic cod 0.00 1.90 3.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Turbot 11.69 0.00 9.77 12.55 11.94 9.06 9.05
Lemon sole 4.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.22 0.00 0.00
                
Biological parameters SSB MSY Hmsy         
European plaice 245823.3  156261  0.3         
Common sol 26294.3  31291  0.2         
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5. NORTH SEA COD FISHERIES 
 
 
Cod in the North Sea and cod in the Baltic Sea are exploited by the same type of vessels and to some 
extent by the same fleet segments. The characteristics of the fisheries are also to a large extent the same. 
Therefore it could be argued that these fisheries should be analysed together in the same model, but as 
these are two distinct cod stocks which are exploited independently of each other the two fisheries are 
analysed separately. However, the statistics are produced on fleet segment basis irrespective of the fishing 
areas. Therefore, it was necessary to allocate the fleet segments’ landings, costs and earnings between these 
two areas in an arbitrary way. Because of the similarities there is a great overlap of the text for the North 
Sea and the Baltic Sea cases. 
 
 
5.1. Summary and conclusions 
 
Main conclusion 
 
The six segments analysed in this fishery realized in 2005-7 on average a total net profit of 130 mln euro. 
Average annual discounted net profit ranges under different scenarios between 180 and 370 mln euro. 
Elimination of overcapacity and recovery of stocks would produce a discounted net profit of 240-370 mln 
euro by the year 15. (see Figure 5.1) 
 
Brief description of the case study 
 
The cod stock in the North Sea is assessed together with the Skagerrak and the Eastern Channel (all for 
short named the North Sea) although three different quotas are set for these three waters. In the Kattegat 
there is also a small stock which is not assessed due to its currently low size. Further a cod fishery takes 
place is around the British Isles outside of the North Sea, which impact the catch statistics of the UK fleet 
segments. United Kingdom (40% of landings), Denmark (25%) and Germany (10%) are the main actors 
from the EU. Belgium and the Netherlands take another 12-15% and Norway the rest.  
 
Fleet segments from UK, Denmark and Germany particularly dependent on cod are selected for the case. 
The total TAC for cod in the North Sea, the Skagerrak and the Kattegat has constituted around 20,000 
tonnes per year over the last years. The quota around the British Isles constitutes a little less than 6,000 
tonnes of which around 4,500 tonnes came from the Channel. Cod is caught in almost all fisheries in the 
North Sea which impacts the cod fishery seen in isolation strongly as any change in the cod landings 
affects other species and vice versa.  
 
Two approaches could be pursued in analyses of the cod fishery in the North Sea. One is to consider cod 
an unavoidable by-catch in other fisheries. Cod catches are therefore dependant on these fisheries’ species 
compositions. The other approach is to consider cod the main target species and treat other species as by-
catches in the cod fishery i.e. dependant on the cod fishery. It is the latter approach that is pursued here. 
 
There are three characteristics of the cod fishery in the North Sea, which make it very difficult to analyse. 
The first one is that cod is hardly the most important target species for any of the fleet segments at the 
moment. That means that the profitability of these segments is strongly influenced by a number of other 
species for some of which the biological information is poor. Secondly, presently the spawning stock 
biomass is lower than 40,000 tonnes, which is 25% of the precautionary spawning stock biomass of 
150,000 tonnes. If a conventional approach to estimating a stock recruitment function based on historical 
data is used this would lead to a rather rapid growth of the stock if the present quotas are low enough to 
secure the growth. In practice this growth may be obstructed as the cod is an un-avoidable by-catch for 
many fleet segments. Discards are taken into account in the case. Thirdly, the recruitment to the stock is 
very variable with a number of “outliers”, which influences the estimate of the stock-growth function. 
Therefore a modified stock-growth data set is used for the estimation in which outliers, 10% of the 
observations, are removed before estimation. This procedure produces a lower growth but a more robust 
result. 
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Divergence / convergence of the results 
 
Comparing the scenarios that have been tested by use of the developed model some divergence is 
observed but it could be argued that for practical reasons the divergence is not big. Model calculations 
show that it is important that the management plan is fine-tuned with respect to the path to the optimal 
harvest ratio which seems not to be the case for the North Sea cod if the resource rent over time is going 
to be maximized. 
 
It has been decided to include only cod as target species although the fishery is a multi-species fishery. For 
the North Sea, species such as cod, haddock, saithe, whiting, plaice, sole, herring and sprat are subject to 
the kind of assessment that is required for estimation of yield functions. In cod fisheries the first four 
species are relevant. The importance of these four species varies substantially among the cod-dependant 
fleet segments. Further data is not published in AER on the level of detail that makes a full species 
specification by segment possible. Therefore, these species are put together with the non-assessed stocks, 
in particular nephrops. 
 
The inclusion of other species except cod in the model is important for the results. Three options have 
been used: a) the value of other species is a function of the landings value of cod, b) the value of other 
species is fixed per sea day and c) the value of other species is constant. Option a) forms basis for the 
presented results. The consequence is that landings of other species increase when the cod landings 
increase and the implicit assumption is that other species are “overexploited” to a similar extent as cod. In 
option b) the number of days at sea increases in the long run when the cod stock recovers and the 
landings of other species increase too. In option c) the change is associated only with cod. The 
development of the various indicators is similar for option a) and b) although there are differences among 
the fleet segments. The results for option c) show lower values for catches of other species, effort and 
profit.  
 
Choice of baseline policy 
 
Since 1983 and even before the cod fishery in the North Sea has been subject to comprehensive 
management in terms of TACs, gear and landings restrictions. Since 2004 a management plan for cod has 
been in place in terms of a target minimum spawning stock biomass (SSB) at 150,000 tonnes. The SSB-
target is pursued by reducing the harvest ratio, transformed into a TAC, by 10% each year until the target 
SSB will be reached. If the proposed TAC is lower than 85% of last year’s TAC, 85% of last years TAC is 
the new TAC. A similar limit, 15% higher, upwards counts. This TAC policy is chosen as the baseline 
although it is not necessarily performing best among the options tested here.  
 
Achieving MSY  
 
The maximum sustainable yield is derived from the estimated stock-growth function for the North Sea 
cod stock. Applying a 2nd degree polynomial relation produces statistically good results and this function 
can be solved for the optimal stock size with respect to MSY. The difficulties appear when different fleets 
with different species compositions and cost structures are introduced.  
  
Achieving MEY (NPV Profit15) 
 
The maximum economic yield is by definition the combination of fish stock abundance and number of 
vessels times days at sea (effort) that maximizes the resource rent – defined as the discounted net profit 
(NPV Profit). The dominant technology in the cod fishery is trawl, although for Denmark the fishery is 
also executed by small gill netters 0-12m. These two types of vessels are chosen for the calculations for the 
North Sea cod case, with five segments of trawlers and one segment of gill netters. It is assumed that the 
gill netters are more impacted by stock abundance than the trawlers implying that catches per unit of 
effort increase more for gill netters than for trawlers when the stock abundance increases. A technological 
progress rate of 1% is used in the model. 
 
 Figure 5.
 
              
31 As only
1 North Sea 
                   
 one species h
cod – discou
 
                   
as been used, 
nted annual 
TAC-max and
net profit by
 Eff-max scen
 scenario, yea
arios were no
rs 1-15, mln
t calculated. 
 euro31  
99 
100 
 
Role of discount rate 
 
The choice of discount rate plays a role in particular in the assessment of the recovery of the cod stocks. 
Using a high discount rate makes recovery less attractive than a low discount rate. The reason is that the 
landings will have to decrease for some years to allow the stock to increase. By using a high discount rate 
less emphasis is placed on future gains compared to present losses. The net present value is dependent of 
the length of time considered. A short period tends to favour that no changes should be made as short 
term losses exceed the long term gains. A long period favours changes which can produce stock recovery.  
 
Impact of eliminating overcapacity 
 
Overcapacity reduces the economic performance of the fishery, but does not necessarily impact the stock 
recovery if the fishermen comply with restrictions in terms of TAC/quotas or fishing effort. In the 
TAC/quota case fishermen are allowed to land an amount of fish equal to the quotas and discard over-
quota catches. In certain cases this leads to substantial discards in other cases no discards takes place. 
 
In the first year of the model the number of days at sea per vessel is lower than the, physically, possible 
number per year. In the model no investments in vessels take place if the current number of days per 
vessel is lower than 70% of the maximum number. In this way some overcapacity is avoided over the 
years. It is important to observe, however, that the capacity in terms of number of vessels will increase 
compared to the initial capacity as the stock size and hence the catches increase. 
 
Management costs and rent recovery 
 
Recovery of management costs and other types of contemporary public costs affect the profit of the 
fishermen as they consider this type of payment a cost. In principle this impacts the investments. From a 
socio-economic viewpoint management costs recovered by a fee are considered a transfer payment and 
not as a cost to the society. Therefore, a fee does not affect the gross value added but is included in the 
gross value added alongside remuneration of labour and capital. 
 
 
5.2. Case study definition  
 
5.2.1. Fleet and landings 
 
The annual TAC for cod for the North Sea, the Skagerrak and the Kattegat 2005-7 was around 22,000 
tonnes per year of which the TACs for the North Sea were around 18,000 tonnes, for the Skagerrak 
around 3,000 tonnes and for the Kattegat around 800 tonnes. The TAC for the English Channel was 
around 4,500 tonnes, mainly exploited by France with 75% and the UK with less than 10%. 
 
The Danish fleet segments fish in the North Sea, the Skagerrak and the Kattegat. The German and the 
UK fleet segments fish in the North Sea, with small catches of the UK segments in the Channel. The 
quotas for the North Sea, the Skagerrak and Kattegat are included in the model in the calculation of quota 
shares and the German, Danish and UK shares of the total TAC for these three areas were 11%, 30% and 
39% respectively. The rest was taken by mainly Belgium, the Netherlands and France. Outside the EU, 
Norway takes an additional 15% on top of the EU quota. Table 5.1. shows the estimated size of the case 
study fleet segments of the total fleets. 
 
Table 5.1 Role of case study fisheries within national fishery sectors. North Sea cod 
Member State Total fishery sector Case study fleets 
Total revenues 
(mln euro) 
Total fleet 
(number of vessels) 
Revenues 
(mln euro) 
Fleet 
(number of vessels) 
Germany 156 2,134 36 65 
Denmark 384 3,120 60 805 
United Kingdom 847 6,852 320 605 
Source: AER 
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As it is not possible from the AER data to distinguish the cod landings between the fishing areas an 
estimated distribution of the landings has been made. The British fleet segments are fishing in the North 
Sea mainly. The total German landings are distributed based on the distribution of days at sea, according 
to the AER, between the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, which is 71% for DTS 12-24m and 39% for DTS 
24-40m to the North Sea. Danish landings are divided (based on national statics) with 49% to the North 
Sea for PGP 0-12m and 73% to the North Sea for DTS 12-24m. The rest is allocated to the Baltic Sea. 
When this distribution is applied both for cod, for the total of species, for days at sea and for number of 
vessels Table 5.2 shows the role of cod for the North Sea compared to the total landings of the selected 
segments. 
  
Table 5.2 Role of target species. Estimated for the North Sea, Skagerrak and Kattegat, average 2005-7 
MS Gear Size No. 
vessels 
GT 
(1000) 
Landings (1000 t) Value (mln euro)
Cod Total Cod Total
DEU DTS 12-24 55 3.9 3.4 13.8 5.5 13.6
DEU DTS 24-40 10 6.4 3.6 23.0 7.5 22.6
DNK PGP 0-12 617 2.3 3.5 7.6 7.3 16.1
DNK DTS 12-24 188 6.4 6.8 48.5 12.8 42.8
GBR DTS 12-24 496 40.1 3.6 71.9 9.4 189.8
GBR DTS 24-40 109 28.1 4.9 58.9 14.1 120.8
Other   -3.8  
Total 1)   22.0  
1) Average TAC for North Sea, Skagerrak, Kattegat 
Source: AER 
 
Table 5.2 also shows that the total landings of the selected fleets exceed the TAC with 3,800 tonnes. There 
are two explanations for this. One is that the landings of the UK fleet segments include landing from 
other waters around the British Isles, and another one is that the distribution for the German and the 
Danish segments is not correct. As the UK share of the cod quotas around the British Isles is less than 
1,000 tonnes this alone cannot explain the difference, therefore the German and the Danish allocations 
seem too high. The German cod quota in the North Sea was 2,400 tonnes and the Danish was 6,600 
tonnes. This problem is dealt with in the model using a scaling procedure and does not affect the 
parameter estimates of the model’s equations. 
 
5.2.2. Composition of landings 
 
Only the total composition of landings is available for all fishing areas i.e. from the British Isles to the 
Baltic Sea. Gill netters and small trawler in the Baltic Sea have the highest share of cod in their landings. 
Table 5.3 shows the landings of seven species including cod for the selected segments. The group “Other” 
constitutes a relatively large share of the total landings and shows that a variety of other species constitutes 
important shares of the fleet segments’ landings. For the North Sea fleet segments sprat and herring are 
included in “Other”. 
 
Table 5.3 Composition of landings by segment, all areas, average 2005-7 (1000 tonnes) 
MS Gear Length 
(m) 
Cod Haddock Saithe Plaice N. 
lobster 
Other Total
DEU DTS 12-24 4.8 1.5 0.2 12.9 19.4
DEU DTS 24-40 9.2 1.8 15.1 32.9 59.0
DNK PGP 0-12 7.1 1.7 6.6 15.4
DNK DTS 12-24 9.3 5.5 1.6 50.0 66.4
GBR DTS 12-24 3.6 14.2 30.2 23.9 71.9
GBR DTS 24-40 4.9 24.2 2.1 27.7 58.9
Source: AER  
 
Norway lobster plays an important role in terms of value for many trawl fleet segments, see Table 5.4. 
Norway lobster is found in the waters outside the Baltic Sea. Further, haddock is important for the UK 
trawlers but not for other segments. Saithe is important for the large German trawlers.  
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Table 5.4 Composition of landings by segment all areas, average 2005-7 (mln euro) 
MS Gear Length 
(m) 
Cod Haddock Saithe Plaice N. 
lobster 
Other Total
DEU DTS 12-24 7.8 2.7 1.4 7.2 19.1
DEU DTS 24-40 19.2 2.8 11.6 24.5 58.1
DNK PGP 0-12 14.9 3.3 14.6 32.8
DNK DTS 12-24 17.6 10.3 14.1 16.6 58.6
GBR DTS 12-24 9.4 20.0 110.5 49.9 189.8
GBR DTS 24-40 14.1 38.8 9.7 58.2 120.8
Source: AER  
 
For the UK segments cod measured in value plays a minor role with only 5% for DTS 12-24m and 12% 
for DTS 24-40m. These two segments are the most important “cod segments” of the UK fleet. Therefore 
they are included in the analysis, although it could be argued that they should have been excluded all 
together to avoid disturbance of the results. The calculations show that, in particular, these two segments’ 
development is strongly impacted by other species than cod.  
 
To include haddock in the model as a target species would have made this impact smaller and the required 
stock assessment for estimation of a stock-growth function for the model is available. Haddock is only 
important, relatively, for the UK DTS 24-40m, but for the DTS 12-24 Norway lobster is completely 
dominant, and as no stock assessment is available for nephrops the problem could not be alleviated.  
 
 
5.3. Historical indicators  
 
From the mid 60ies until the mid 80ies the catches from the North Sea cod stock have fluctuated between 
200,000 and 400,000 tonnes (ICES 2008). The estimated MSY catches are around 200,000 tonnes. Since 
the beginning of the 90ies the catches have decreased from around 200,000 tonnes to around 50,000 
tonnes. The discards are significant and the landings are only around half of the catches over the last ten 
years. 
 
The spawning stock biomass (SSB) has over the last ten years declined from around 70,000 tonnes to 
around 30,000 tonnes and has been lower than the annual catches and at about the same size as the 
landings. From the mid 60ies to the mid 80ies the SSB exceeded 150,000 tonnes which is considered the 
general goal to which the stock should recover (equal to the precautionary Bpa). The minimum level for 
the North Sea SSB is estimated at 70,000 tonnes (which is equal to Blim). The average harvest ratio for age 
groups 2-4 has been 0.9 for the period 1993-2007 with an increasing trend from the 60ies to the 90ies and 
then a decreasing trend.  
 
 
5.4. Fleet efficiency  
 
Looking at the profit (gross revenue minus all costs) the Danish segments perform worse, while the 
German trawlers DTS 24-40m perform very well. The UK fleet segments show positive profit as well. 
Whether this is caused by different methods of estimating the fixed costs, in particular, or it reflects real 
differences is difficult to say. The Danish data are considered reliable being collated on a regular basis 
since 1995, and there is no reason to expect that the Danish segments are performing significantly worse 
than the other fleet segments.  
 
The total landings in volume and value of the selected segments and the share of cod of the total landings 
combined with the economic indicators show, in general, a very diverse picture, cf. Table 5.5. 
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5.5. Management measures 
 
5.5.1. General description 
 
Recovery plans for cod in the North Sea have been in place since 2004. Furthermore, an effort (days at 
sea) limitation programme has been in place since 2003. 
 
5.5.2. Output management 
 
Catch restrictions 
 
The general goal is to recover the North Sea cod stock to a level at 150,000 tonnes SSB (which is equal to 
Bpa). The minimum level for the North Sea SSB is estimated at 70,000 tonnes (which is equal to Blim).  
 
The means to achieve the goal is to gradually reduce the fishing mortality by 25% if the SSB is lower than 
Blim. If the SSB is above Blim but lower than Bpa the reduction should be 15%, and if SSB is above Bpa the 
reduction should be 10%. If the SSB is above Blim the TAC must not be lower or higher than 15% of the 
previous year’s TAC 
 
Property rights 32 
 
Denmark has since 1993 applied a system with non-transferable individual quotas for demersal species. 
From 2007 the system was transformed into a system with individual transferable quotas. The United 
Kingdom has applied a system with restricted transferability of individual quotas management via the 
producer organizations. In Germany the national quotas are divided on fleet segments. Individual vessel 
quotas are used for the deep-sea fleet, which is not included in the analysis.  
 
5.5.3. Input management 
 
Effort restrictions  
 
Days at sea limitations were introduced in 2003 as regard the maximum days per month present within the 
area and absent from port by fishing gear in Kattegat, North Sea and Skagerrak, Eastern Channel, West of 
Scotland and Irish Sea. Within each member state the days at sea can be transferred between vessels and 
segments by use of kW-days coefficients taking into account the differences in engine power.  
 
From 2006, 2007 and 2008 the allowable number of days at sea was specified for a further detailed range 
of gear types and mesh sizes and became gradually more restrictive. From 2009 the days at sea 
management has been changed from a general provision laying down the maximum number of days at sea 
per gear type to an allocation of a maximum number of days at sea per vessels group per member state. 
 
 
Input property rights 
 
All the fleets have been subject to the fleet limitation programmes of the EU in terms of capacity and kW 
ceilings. These ceiling have increased the value of the vessels in the fleet. 
 
 
  
                                                     
32 Info on property rights is drawn from the MRAG – RBM study 
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5.6. Management costs 
 
The impact of an accession fee has been tested on the profit of the fleet segments and the consequences 
for the investments i.e. lower profit would lead to lower investments and hence lower fishing mortality. 
From the fishermen’s point of view an accession fee is considered a cost, but for the society it is part of 
the resource rent.  
 
Only incomplete information about financial transfers from the Government to the fisheries sector is 
available. One source is the OECD as shown in Table 5.6, while other sources are the allocation from the 
European Fisheries Fund (EFF), see Table 5.7, and estimates made by MRAG, see Table 5.8.  
 
The financial transfers are made on a national basis and have been allocated to the fleet segments 
according to their landing value in proportion to the total national landings value.  
 
The costs estimated by MRAG for management and control (Table 5.8) are used in the model to test the 
impact of cost recovery for these management items. 
 
5.6.1. Summary of OECD data 
 
The OECD data has been distributed among fleet segments according to the value of landings in the 
segment in proportion to the total number of vessels. The level of detail of the OECD data varies 
significantly between member states.  
 
Table 5.6 Management costs according to OECD, average 2004-2006*, (mln euro), North Sea cod 
DEU
DTS 
12-24m 
DEU
DTS 
24-40m 
DNK
PG 
0-12m 
DNK
DTS 
12-24m 
GBR 
DTS 
12-24m 
GBR
DTS 
24-40m 
Direct Payments 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.5   
 - Decommissioning 0.5 1.3   
 - Fleet renewal and modernization 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 
 - Other 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.6 
General Services 1.9 5.2   
 - Management and enforcement 1.1 3.0 9.7 6.1 
 - Research  0.3 0.8 6.0 3.8 
 - Other 0.5 1.4 0.1 0.1 
Total 0.3 0.4 2.5 6.7 17.2 10.9 
*sum of national and EU contributions regarding marine capture fisheries. 
 
5.6.2. Support to fishing sector (EFF) 
 
The data from the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) have been distributed among fleet segments in the 
same way as above.  
 
Table 5.7 Average annual support to the marine fisheries from EFF, (mln euro). North Sea cod 
DEU 
DTS  
12-24m  
DEU
DTS  
24-40m  
DNK
PG 
0-12m  
DNK
DTS 
12-24m  
GBR
DTS 
12-24m  
GBR 
DTS 
24-40m  
Total
EFF - Axis 1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.8 1.1 4.3 
 
 
5.6.3. Costs of research and management  
 
Table 5.8 shows the estimated management and research costs from the MRAG-RBM study and the DCF 
budgets raised by 30%, distributed among fleet segments in the same way as above. The MRAG data have 
been used in the model in the costs recovery scenario. 
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Table 5.8 Estimated management and research costs, (mln euro). North Sea cod 
DEU
DTS  
12-24m 
DEU
DTS  
24-40m 
DNK
PG 
0-12m  
DNK 
DTS 
12-24m  
GBR 
DTS 
12-24m  
GBR
DTS 
24-40m 
Management, control, enforcement (MRAG) 2.6 4.3 1.4 3.7 6.9 4.3 
Research (DCF+30%) 0.7 1.1 0.1 0.2 2.8 1.7 
Sources: MRAG (2008) and Com. Decision 811/2009 
 
 
5.7. Estimation of the resource rent 
 
5.7.1. Comparison of scenarios  
 
The analysis is designed in such a way that the species of the fleet segment’s catch compositions are 
caught in a mixed fishery. One scenario covers the case where the fishery stops as soon as the quota of the 
most restrictive species is taken (TAC min scenario) while another scenario considers the case where the 
fishery stops when the least restrictive quota is taken (TAC max scenario). Further the model evaluates in 
a similar manner two scenarios where the fishery stops when the most and the least restrictive number of 
days at sea are reached (Effort min and Effort max scenario). In the effort scenarios, the days at sea are 
estimated from the Htarget in proportion to the current H multiplied to the effort in the preceding year, 
starting with the baseline effort. In the TAC scenarios the TACs are estimated from the Htarget/H 
proportion applied to the stock in the baseline (start year). The most restrictive scenario is the Min min, in 
which the TAC and effort restrictions are compared and the most limiting is selected every year. 
 
Finally, an Open access scenario has been tested in which there are no restrictions apart from the physical 
number of days at sea and the speed and magnitude of the (dis)investments. The latter is limited so that 
investments in new capacity can at most constitute 10% of the capacity in the year before, while 
disinvestments can at most constitute 20% of the previous year’s capacity. 
 
These six policy scenarios are used to test implications of different types of TAC and effort policies. 
Further, the impact of the magnitude of the discount rate is investigated in scenario 1 (TAC min), which is 
considered to be the baseline policy scenario. A discount rate at 2% is compared to the default at 3.5% 
(scenario 7) and a discount rate at 5% (scenario 8). In scenario 9 the impact of cost recovery of the 
management and control costs is estimated. 
 
Finally, based on the policy option of TAC management scenarios 10-12 have been estimated where the 
present number of vessels have been kept constant for the whole simulation period (scenario 10), the 
minimum present number of vessels required if all vessels are using their maximum number of days at sea 
per year is kept constant (scenario 11), and eventually (scenario 12) the minimum number of vessels in 
scenario 11 is allowed to change by use of the investment function which is disregarded in scenario 10 and 
11. 
 
The analyses are closed by scenario 13 which is a dynamic optimization (non-linear programming) where 
optimal effort and cod stock are determined by maximising the gross value added (GVA) over 15 years, 
and by scenario 14 where profit is maximized. By this procedure an estimate of the maximum resource 
rent is obtained i.e. an estimate of the MEY. 
 
The model can work with several species/stocks subject to quota restrictions. A meaningful inclusion 
requires that future quotas are known or could be estimated based on stock assessment. Further, some 
importance of each single species in the catch composition is also required to be used as a meaningful 
restriction. This is necessary to avoid that the species which in practice are disregarded by the fishermen 
and the managers play a role in the analysis. None of these assumptions are fulfilled, and there is a risk 
that “strange” results may occur if species/stocks for which the conditions are not fulfilled are included in 
the model and admitted to control the fishery. Therefore, only one target (quota) species, cod, is included 
in the model, and catch of other species is a function of the cod fishery. Including only one quota species 
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entails that the TAC min and the TAC max as well as the Effort min and Effort max scenarios are the 
same. Hence, scenario 3 and 4 are left blank in Table 5.9. 
 
In order to match the cod landings of the selected fleet segments with the total quota it is necessary to 
allocate share of the total quota to the fleet segments considered in the model and use a scaling procedure 
to secure that cod landings of segments not included in the model are taken into account. The landings of 
cod of these other segments have been set to a fixed share of the landing of the selected fleet segments. 
 
The start values for days at sea per vessel per year are lower for all segments than the assumed maximum 
number, in particular, for gill netters for which many inactive vessels is included in the statistics. The 
maximum number of days at sea per vessel per year is set at 120 days for gill netter 0-12m, 200 days for 
trawlers 12-24m, and 240 days for trawlers 24-40m. These value have been assumed because of lack of 
information about the maximum number of days at sea. 
 
The shape of the stock-growth function is extremely important for the results. For cod the estimated 
growth is strong as the present catches could potentially be increased 3-4 times to reach MSY. In the TAC 
scenarios the effort is determined by the cod TAC. Therefore, the fishery stops when the TAC is 
exhausted and there is no discard of over-sized fish. The discard of undersized fish is set at 20% (ICES 
2008). In the effort scenarios it is assumed that all over-sized fish can be landed. 
 
Table 5.9 shows that the effort and capacity will have to increase in almost all scenarios once the cod 
stock is recovered. Landings (catch) of cod will increase 3-4 times compared to the baseline and in the 
optimal case (scenario 13) six times. In this case effort must increase four times and the number of vessels 
three times. 
 
Table 5.9 Comparison of the scenarios 
Scenario  
no. 
Effort 
(1000 DAS) 
Fleet
(no. vessels) 
Catch of cod
(1000 t) 
Profit year 15 
discounted 
NPV Profit15
 Average values 2005-7
2005-7 164 1,475 25.6 130  
 Values in year 15 of the scenario
1. TAC min 268 1,506 77.9 344 3,885 
2. Effort min 399 2,300 89.8 392 4,529 
3. TAC max - - - - - 
4. Effort max - - - - - 
5. Open access 797 4,507 141.1 490 5,838 
6. Min min 268 1,506 77.9 344 3,885 
7. Discount rate 2% 268 1,506 77.9 429 4,468 
8. Discount rate 5% 268 1,506 77.9 278 3,395 
9. Recovery mgt. costs 268 1,506 77.9 206 3,619 
10. Static present fleet 202 1,479 69.9 296 3,628 
11. Static minimum fleet 164 881 60.1 270 3,586 
12. Dynamic min. fleet 268 1,434 78.2 353 3,981 
13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 678 4,214 141.3 384 5,525 
14. Optimum fleet (profit) 355 1,750 114.5 398 5,599 
 
The effort scenarios are performing better than the TAC scenarios. The Open access (scenario 5) is 
apparently performing very well. This is happening because the effort and investments are restricted 
upwards and downwards in the Open access scenario, by incidence in an almost optimal way. Finally, the 
Min min is controlled both by TACs and effort restrictions. This scenario 6 is the same as scenario 1 
because the TAC restrictions are binding.  
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5.7.2. Policy options  
 
Summary 
 
Table 5.10 shows specific indicators for selected policy options which is TAC management, effort 
management, open access (no TAC of effort management), and both TAC and effort management. 
 
Effort management performs better than TAC management comparing the net present value of the profit 
over 15 years (NPV Profit15), but this is partly because the TAC management is not fine-tuned in terms of 
the harvest ratio with respect to rate of increase in the fishery from present to year 12 where the stock is 
built up to a long term sustainable level. The built up rate of the stock is determined by the interaction of 
the stock growth, the investment behaviour and the management restrictions. 
 
The harvest ratio is defined as the proportion between the catches and the catchable stock and cannot be 
compared directly with the “biological” fishing mortality rates that are determined for age groups 2-4. The 
present harvest ratio in the model is 0.14 e.g. 14% of the total catchable biomass. This rate is halved under 
the TAC and effort management programmes. In the Open access scenario the rate is 0.14. The Open 
access scenario performs best but it is actually controlled as the increase in investments per year is limited 
to 10%. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the results strongly depend on the assumption made for other species. 
This assumption is that other species are basically as “overfished” as cod. Therefore when cod landings 
increase other species increase too and that assumption probably leads to an overestimation of profit and 
effort. 
 
If the calculations are performed based on the assumption that the landing value of other species than cod 
is constant the effort and the capacity will build up according to the recovery of the cod stock. However, 
after 10-15 years the profit of the fleet segments goes significantly down because the fleet is built up too 
much. This will not lead to disinvestments because the profit is still positive. Instead it will lead to capital 
stuffing. This happens because the fishery is managed via the harvest ratio which is transformed either 
into a TAC or an effort in terms of days at sea. Capital stuffing can be avoided either by direct control of 
effort or the number of vessels or by an ITQ-scheme. 
 
Table 5.10 Effects of different policies on profit, harvest ratio, catches, effort and fleet 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios**
TAC min Effort min TAC max Effort max Open access Min  min 
NPV Profit15  3,885 4,529 - - 5,838 3,885
Profit year 15 
discounted 
130 565 546 - - 893 565
Harvest ratio (year 15)*
Cod 0.14 0.06 0.07 - - 0.13 0.06
Catch in (1000 t, for scenarios year 15)
Cod 25.6 77.9 89.8 - - 141.1 77.9
Effort (1000 DAS, for scenarios year 15)
Cod 164 268 399 - - 797 268
Fleet (no vessels, for scenarios year 15)
Cod 1475 1,506 2,300 - - 4,507 1,506
 
Further, it is assumed that the cod stock is able to increase if the present harvest ratio is reduced. It is 
difficult to judge whether this assumption is reasonable. If the cod is caught as by-catch in other fisheries 
and these fisheries are allowed to continue according to the present pattern, and as it is compulsory to 
discard the catches of cod over the quota the required growth may not happen.  
 
In the following Figures 5.3-11 including six sub-figures the development of some indicators are shown. 
The sustainable catch shows the catch according to the management rules be it TAC or effort. Landings 
net of discard are shown in the next one. Effort and capacity is shown in terms of total days at sea for the 
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segments and the number of vessels. These two panels are shown only for 15 years as in most case effort 
continues to increase overall 25 years and because of the scale blurs the development of the first years too 
much. The two lower panels show the profit (gross revenue minus all costs) and the gross value added 
(remuneration of labour, capital and fish stocks).  
 
Scenario 1. TAC min 
 
The fishery conducted by the six fleet segments is driven by the TAC for cod. For each segment the 
landing value of all other species is estimated in proportion to the value of cod. The species compositions 
of the fleet segments are very different, but it is assumed that the cod drives the fishery. 
 
The fishery is carried out by small or medium sized trawlers and small gill netters. For the latter group 
information is uncertain as a large part of the registered vessels are inactive in practice.  
 
The model calculations show that when the fishery is managed by TACs, based on the target H the 
landings will fall in year two and three (year one is the base) and then increase gradually to the MSY level. 
The number of days at sea will fall until year six and after that increase. The number of vessels will stay 
below the initial level almost throughout the period in particular for the gill netters which is a consequence 
of the very low level of days at sea per vessel in the base line. There is no discard of over-quota catches in 
scenario 1 as the fishery will stop when the TAC is taken. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Results of scenario 1. TAC min 
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Scenario 2. Effort min  
 
The target effort in a given year is chosen by adjusting the number of days at sea in the baseline with the 
proportion between Htarget and the current H calculated each year. This development is, however, 
restricted by the borders of the investment in vessels (10% up and 20% down as maximum each year). If 
the potential effort is less than the target effort then catches are based on the potential effort, leading to a 
lower harvest ratio than ‘proposed’. In the effort managed fisheries there is no discard of over-quota 
catches as there are no quotas. 
 
Given these assumptions scenario 2 performs better than scenario 1. The NPV Profit15 is higher in 
scenario 2 and so is the number of days at sea and the number of vessels. The reason for this result is that 
in scenario 1 the fleet is reduced to a too low level and the stock reaches a too high level. Therefore 
potential landings are not fully exploited in scenario 1 compared to scenario 2.  
 
 
Figure 5.4 Results of scenario 2. Effort min 
 
 
 
Scenario 3. TAC max 
 
As only one species, namely cod, determines the effort, TAC max is the same as TAC min. If other 
species than cod are chosen as “drivers” e.g. by assuming that the catch of other species determines the 
catch of cod the tendency is that the cod will by overexploited and in certain cases driven to extinction.
  
Scenario 4. Effort max 
  
As for scenario 3. 
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Scenario 5. Open access 
 
In the Open access scenario the catches are unrestricted by TAC/quota or days at sea limitations. It is, 
however, important to notice that the same upper and lower ceilings regarding investment in number of 
vessels applies as in scenario 1 and 2 to reflect that adjustments cannot be made instantly.  
 
Because the fleet segments are profitable in the baseline, investments take place, which entails that the 
landings increase but the stock biomass and the sustainable catch go down in the very long run i.e. after 
year 15. There is no discard of oversized fish in this case because Open access is by definition not limited 
by quotas. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Results of scenario 5. Open access 
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Scenario 6. Min min 
 
In this scenario the model chooses each year the lowest number of days at sea either because of quota or 
because of effort limitation. In all years the TAC/quotas determine this restriction and therefore the 
scenario is identical to TAC min. 
 
Figure 5.6 Results of scenario 6. Min / min 
 
 
 
5.7.3. Role of discount rate (scenarios 7-8)  
 
Scenario 1 is chosen as the main scenario and the discount rate is 3.5%. If the discount rate is reduced to 
2% (scenario 7) the NPV Profit15 increases by 15%. In year 15 the profit is 25% higher. If the discount 
rate is increased to 5% the NPV Profit15 is 13% lower, and the profit in year 15 is 19% lower. It is thus 
clear that the simulation results are sensitive to the choice of discount rate, which is also shown in Table 
5.11.  
 
Table 5.11 Effect of discount rate on profit (mln euro) 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenario
Main scenario 
Discount rate 3.5% 
7.
Discount rate 2% 
8. 
Discount rate 5% 
NPV Profit15  3,885 4,468 3,395
Nominal Profit15* 130 577 577 577 
Discounted Profit15*  344 429 278 
*this is the value in year 15, not the sum of profits 
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5.7.4. Resource rent and recovery of management costs (scenario 9) 
 
MRAG data is used in the calculation of cost recovery. The scenario does not differ from the TAC 
scenario. The reason is that investments are not affected, although higher costs lead to higher break-even 
revenues. However, the profit is lower in scenario 9 than in scenario 1. If recovery of management costs is 
considered as a tax it will not influence the gross value added.  
 
Table 5.12 Effect of cost recovery of management costs (mln euro) 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios* 
Main scenario:
No recovery of 
management costs 
9. 
Recovery of 
management costs 
NPV GVA15 (mln euro) 6,436 6,436 
Nominal GVA15 (mln euro) 268 947 947 
NPV Profit15 3,885 3,619 
Fixed payment for access (mln euro) 0 23 
NPV Payment for access15 0 266 
Nom Profit15 (mln euro) 130 577 554 
 
The conclusion is that the profit to the fishermen will decrease and thereby influence the economic 
performance of the fleet, but from a management point of view there will be no changes. Changes will 
occur if the imposed ‘access fees’ would be further increased.  
 
Figure 5.7 Results of scenario 9. Recovery of management costs 
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5.7.5. Optimization of capacity (scenarios 10-14) 
 
The scenarios shown in Table 5.13 deal with the question of instantaneous or gradual adaptation of the 
fleet and parallel elimination of overcapacity. The baseline shows the present situation (2005-7), while the 
main scenario is scenario 1 with TAC and investment restrictions. In the static present fleet (scenario 10) 
the number of vessels is constant but the number of days at sea per vessel is allowed to vary subject to the 
management option which is TACs. In the minimum static fleet the number of vessels is reduced 
presently to number of vessels required if all vessels use the maximum number of days at sea per vessel. 
This number is then kept constant. The dynamic fleet is the fleet after the investment behaviour is re-
introduced into the model. And finally the optimal case is shown.  
 
Table 5.13 Impact of optimization of the fleet size 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios*
  Main 
scenario 
TAC min
10.
Static 
present 
fleet 
11.
Static 
minimum 
fleet 
12. 
Dynamic 
minimum 
fleet 
13. 
Optimum 
fleet 
(GVA) 
14.
Optimum 
fleet 
(profit) 
NPV Profit15 (mln euro)  3,885 3,628 3,586 3,981 5,525 5,599
Nominal Profit15 (mln euro) 130 577 496 450 591 644 667
Discounted Profit15 (mln euro) 130 344 296 270 353 384 398
Fleet15 (no vessels) 1,475 1,506 1,475 881 1434 4,214 1,750
Effort15 (1000 DAS) 164.3 268.3 251.6 164.3 267.8 667.9 355.2
Catch15 (1000 t) 25.7 77.9 76.7 66.4 78.2 141.3 114.5
*NPV row refers to the sum, other rows refer to values in year 15 
 
The scenarios for optimization of the size of the fleet show that the NPV Profit with a static fleet 
(scenario 10 and 11) is almost the same as for the TAC min scenario. But there are large differences in the 
underlying number of vessels, days at sea and catches in year 15 after adjustments have taken place. A 
more comprehensive adjustment will take place in scenario 12 and 13 where investments are allowed. In 
scenario 12 the fleet is allowed to adjust from a very low level i.e. the level of the minimum fleet, while the 
adjustment in scenario 13 takes place from the baseline with a higher number of vessels in year one. The 
best scenario is no. 13 where catches are estimated at around 140,000 tonnes. This Figure could be 
compared with the MSY for cod which is around 200,000 tonnes. However, in scenario 13 the stock 
biomass is higher than in the MSY. The effect of a high stock is a high catch per unit effort and hence 
lower cost per catch unit but on the other hand the growth of the stock is lower than in the MSY case. 
The result of scenario 13 is therefore in line with what should be expected from the MEY situation. The 
profit (revenue – all costs) is maximized in scenario 14. This scenario performs worse than scenario 13 
and, in particular, the number of vessels and the number of days at sea are lower in scenario 14 compared 
to scenario 13. The reason is that the low profit recorded for vessels PG 0-12m (small gill netters) implies 
that the fleet is competed out.   
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Scenario 10. Static present fleet 
 
The assumption in this scenario is that the number of vessels is kept constant at the initial level (2005-7). 
The TAC min scenario is chosen. The total number of days at sea for each segment is calculated, and this 
number of days is divided by the constant number of vessels. Therefore the number of days per vessel 
varies over time. If the number of days per vessel exceeds the maximum number of days at sea per vessel 
the maximum number of days is used. Such a situation does not occur for any of the fleet segments until 
year 10. 
 
As the present fleet is controlling scenario 10 the total number of vessels is the same as in the baseline, 
but the number of days at sea in year 15 is almost 50% higher in scenario 10. The catches are 30% higher 
compared to scenario one and three times higher compared to the baseline in year 15. 
 
Figure 5.8 Results of scenario 10. Adaptation with ‘present’ fleet 
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Scenario 11. Static minimum fleet  
 
In scenario 11 the number of vessels is reduced according to the total number of allowed days at sea per 
fleet segment, so that each vessel in the segment uses the maximum allowed number of days at sea per 
vessel. This number is maintained throughout the 25 years for each fleet segment. 
 
As the management is kept at the minimum fleet the number of days at sea is the same as the in the 
baseline. The economic performance in terms of profit is not improved significantly compared to scenario 
one and ten, but there are large underlying differences in catches number of vessels and days at sea.  
 
 
Figure 5.9 Results of scenario 11. Static minimum fleet 
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Scenario 12. Dynamic minimum fleet  
 
Compared to scenario 11 it is now possible to invest in scenario 12 according to the same rules as in 
scenario one. The TAC min management is the same as for scenario one. The stock conditions are 
therefore the same and there are no differences from scenario one. The economic performance is further 
improved. The number of vessels in year 15 is almost the same as in scenario one. The difference between 
scenario 12 and 11 is bigger in terms of gross value added and profit over time, but in year 15 the number 
of vessels in scenario 12 is 1,434 compared to 881 in scenario 11 and around 1,500 in scenario one and the 
baseline.. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Results of scenario 12. Dynamic minimum fleet 
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Scenario 13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 
 
In the scenario for the optimal fleet the objective is to maximize gross value added over 15 years. The 
applied method is non-linear programming. There are no management restrictions in this version i.e. no 
TAC or effort limitations apart from the natural physical limitations such as the growth conditions for the 
stocks and that the number of days per vessels cannot exceed the maximum number of days. This means 
that the model chooses the number of vessels and hence the catches and the size of the fish stock that 
maximizes gross value added. 
 
One restriction is kept, however, and that is the investments limits according to which the number of 
vessels cannot change upwards by more than 10% and downwards by more than 20% per year. 
 
There are several combinations of vessels that will yield maximum resource rent, each equally good, and 
thus the model chooses one of them.  
 
This scenario yields the highest GVA, number of days at sea, number of vessels and catches and landings. 
 
Figure 5.11 Results of scenario 13. Optimum fleet 
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Scenario 14. Optimum fleet (profit) 
 
This scenario is carried out under the same assumptions as for scenario 13. The difference is that in 
scenario 14 profit (revenue – all costs) is maximized contrary to the GVA in scenario 13. Scenario 14 is 
performing worse than scenario 13, in particular, because the number of vessels in segment PG 0-12m is 
driven down. In scenario 13 the number of vessels in this segment increases over time, see Figure 5.12 
and Table 5.14.  
 
Figure 5.12 Results of scenario 14. Optimum fleet (profit) 
 
 
Table 5.14 Comparison of scenarios 13 and 14 (values in mln euro, fleet number of vessels) 
 Scenario 13 Scenario 14 
NPV GVA15 9,950 9,607 
NPV profit15 5,525 5,599 
NPV Crew costs15 3,813 3,457 
NPV capital costs15 612 551 
GVA year 15 1,228 1,140 
Profit year 15 644 667 
Crew costs year 15 493 401 
Capital costs year 15 91 72 
Fleet – average 1-15 2,552 1,526 
Fleet – year 15 4,214 1,750 
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6. BALTIC SEA COD FISHERIES 
 
 
Cod in the Baltic Sea and cod in the North Sea are exploited by the same type of vessels and to some 
extent by the same fleet segments. The characteristics of the fisheries are also to a large extent the same. 
Therefore it could be argued that these fisheries should be analysed together in the same model, but as 
these are two distinct cod stocks, which are exploited independently of each other the two fisheries are 
analysed separately. However, the statistics is produced on fleet segment level irrespective of the fishing 
areas. Therefore, it has been necessary to divide the fleet segments’ landings, costs and earnings between 
these two areas in an arbitrary way. Because of the similarities there is a great overlap of the text for the 
Baltic Sea and the North Sea cases. 
 
 
6.1. Summary and conclusions 
 
Main conclusion 
 
The eight segments analysed in this fishery realized in 2005-7 on average a total net profit of 38 mln euro. 
Average annual discounted net profit ranges under most scenarios between 55 and 109 mln euro. 
Elimination of overcapacity and recovery of stocks would produce a discounted net profit of 65-112 mln 
euro by the year 15. (see Figure 6.1) 
 
Brief description of the case study 
 
The cod stock in the Baltic Sea is divided in an Eastern and a Western stock where the Eastern stock is 
the largest and probably also the most vulnerable with respect to environmental conditions and impact of 
fishing. Both stocks have sustained very high harvest ratios over the last 50 years, and the growth has 
declined significantly, in particular for the Eastern stock, since the 90ies (Bastardie et al. 2010; Lindegren 
et al. 2009).  
 
Two approaches could be pursued in the analyses of the cod fishery in the Baltic Sea. One is to consider 
cod an unavoidable by-catch in other fisheries. Cod catches are therefore dependant on these fisheries’ 
species compositions. The other approach is to consider cod the main target species and treat other 
species as by-catches in the cod fishery i.e. dependant on the cod fishery. It is the latter approach that is 
pursued here as cod is the most important species economically in the Baltic Sea. 
 
There are two problems with the cod fishery in the Baltic Sea which makes it difficult to analyse. Firstly, 
presently the spawning stock biomass of the Eastern stock is around 100 000 tonnes which is around 20% 
of the highest spawning stock biomass recorded in the latter half of the 70ies and the beginning of the 
80ies. The Western spawning stock biomass is presently around 30,000 tonnes. If a conventional approach 
to estimating a stock growth function based on historical data is used this would lead to a rather rapid 
growth of the stock if the present quotas are low enough to secure the growth could commence. In 
practice this growth may be obstructed as the cod is competing with other species and apparently a 
downwards shift in the level and the variability of the growth took place in the 80ies (Bastardie et al. 2010; 
Lindegren et al. 2009). Secondly, the Eastern and the Western stocks should be analysed separately, which 
would require a further division of the statistics of the fleet segments. Therefore a modified stock-growth 
data set is used for the estimation of the stock-growth function in which the very high growth and SSB in 
the 70ies and 80ies have been disregarded in the estimation. This procedure produces a lower growth but 
a more robust result. As the SSB of the Western stock is around 25% of the Eastern stock the study is 
delineated to the Eastern stock.  
 
Divergence / convergence of the results 
 
Comparing the scenarios that have been tested by use of the developed model some divergence between 
the scenarios is observed but it could be argued that for practical reasons the divergence is not big. It 
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seems to be very important that the management plan is fine-tuned with respect to setting the TAC over 
time in an optimal way which seems not to be the case for the Baltic Sea cod. 
 
Cod is the target species for the Baltic Sea and although the fishery is a multi-species fishery the other 
species are not assessed and less important. The two other important species in the Baltic Sea is herring 
and sprat but these species are not caught together with cod. As data for catch compositions is not 
published in AER on fishing area level it means for the Danish and German fleet segments that some 
overestimation of the catches of other species for the Baltic Sea occurs as the catch of species from the 
North Sea is allocated to Baltic Sea. 
 
The inclusion of other species except cod in the model is important for the results. Three options have 
been used: a) the value of other species made a function of the landings value of cod, b) the value of other 
species is fixed per sea day and c) the value of other species is constant. Option a) forms basis for the 
presented results. The consequence is that landings of other species increase when the cod landings 
increase and the implicit assumption is that other species are “overexploited” such as cod. In option b) the 
number of days at sea increases in the long run when the cod stock recovers and the landings of other 
species increase too. In option c) the change is associated only with cod. The development of the various 
indicators is similar for option a) and b) although there are differences among the fleet segments. The 
results for option c) show lower values for catches of other species, effort and profit.  
 
Choice of baseline policy 
 
The cod fishery in the Baltic Sea has been subject to comprehensive management in terms of TACs, gear 
and landings restrictions. Since 2007 a management plan for cod has been in place in terms of target 
harvest ratios (Htarget). The harvest ratio has been transformed into TACs that are adjusted each year 
until the Htarget has been reached. As for the North Sea case if the TAC is lower than 85% of last year’s 
TAC, 85% of last year’s TAC will count as the TAC. A similar limit, 15% higher, upwards counts. This 
policy is chosen as the baseline scenario although it is not necessarily performing best among the options 
tested here.  
 
Achieving MSY  
 
The maximum sustainable yield is derived from the estimated stock growth functions for the Eastern 
stock disregarding the smaller Western stock. Applying a 2nd degree polynomial relation produces 
statistically good results and this function could be solved for the optimal stock size with respect to MSY.  
 
Achieving MEY (NPV Profit15) 
 
The maximum economic yield is by definition the combination of fish stock abundance, catches and fleet 
sizes that maximizes the resource rent – defined as the maximum profit. In the Baltic Sea nine countries 
are exploiting the cod stock although Denmark, Germany, Poland and Germany are the main actors as the 
stock abundance is higher in the Southern part of the Baltic Sea than in the Northern part. The dominant 
technology is trawl and gill net. Gill net is used by small vessels many of which are active only part of the 
year. These types of vessels are chosen for the calculations in the Baltic Sea cod case in order to obtain 
variability in the fishery. It is assumed that the gill netters are more impacted by stock abundance than the 
trawlers implying that catches per unit effort increases more for gill netters than for trawlers when the 
stock abundance increases. A technological progress rate at 1% is used in the model. 
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Role of discount rate 
 
The choice of discount rate plays a role in particular in the assessment of the recovery of the cod stocks. 
Using a high discount rate makes recovery less attractive than low discount rates. The reason for this is 
that the landings will have to decrease for some years to allow the stock to increase. By using a high 
discount rate less emphasis is placed on future gains compared to present losses. The net present value is 
dependent of the length of time considered. A short period tends to favour that no changes should be 
made as short term losses exceed the long term gains. A long period favours changes which can produce 
stock recovery.  
 
Impact of eliminating overcapacity 
 
Overcapacity reduces the economic performance of the fishery but does not necessarily impact the stock 
recovery if the fishermen comply with restrictions in terms of TAC/quotas or fishing effort. In the 
TAC/quota case fishermen are allowed to land an amount of fish equal to the quotas and discard over-
quota catches. 
 
In the first year of the model the number of days at sea per vessel is lower than the, physically, possible 
number per year. In the model no investments in vessels take place if the current number of days per 
vessel is lower than 70% of the maximum number. In this way some overcapacity is eliminated over the 
years. It is important to observe, however, that the capacity in terms of number of vessels will increase 
compared to the initial capacity as the stock size and hence the catches increase. 
 
Management costs and rent recovery 
 
Recovery of management costs and other types of contemporary public costs affect the profit of the 
fishermen as they consider this type of payment a cost. In principle this impacts the investments. From a 
socio-economic viewpoint management costs covered by a fee or a tax is often considered a transfer 
payment and not a cost. Therefore, a fee does not affect the gross value added but is covered by the gross 
value added alongside remuneration of labour and capital. 
 
 
6.2. Case study definition  
 
6.2.1. Fleet and landings 
 
The statistics produced by JRC for the annual economic report (AER) that form basis for this description 
do not allow for a distinction between landings of cod from the Baltic and the North Sea. In the 
calculations of the resource rent of one particular fish stock it is necessary to allocate landings and costs to 
fishing fleets, whose catch compositions and exploitations patterns on fishing grounds are very diverse.  
 
The Baltic Sea cod is divided into the Eastern and the Western stock separated by the island Bornholm. 
These stocks are exploited by all the countries around the Baltic Sea. The total landings 2005-7 were on 
average 65,000 tonnes. Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Poland account for more than 80% of the 
landings as the cod abundance is higher in the Southern part of the Baltic Sea than in the Northern part. 
Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia account for less than 20% of the total cod landings (ICES. 
2008). 
 
The most important fleet segments are trawlers 12-24m and 24-40m as well as gill netters 0-12m and 12-
24m. Two fleet segments for each of the countries Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Poland are selected 
for the calculations carried out in this case, but it is not possible to distinguish landings by Danish and 
German vessels of cod from the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, the Skagerrak and the Kattegat. For 
Germany the statistics provided by JRC includes a disaggregation of days at sea on the Baltic and the 
North Sea. The cod landings of the two German segments are divided in the same proportion. For 
Denmark no disaggregation of days at sea is available. However, national Danish statistics from the 
Directorate of Fisheries include landings by fleet segments, species and fishing grounds. The statistics 
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show that 51% of the total catch value of gill netters 0-12m and 27% of trawlers 12-24m originates from 
the Baltic Sea. Therefore, the number of days at sea and vessels for these segments is divided in the same 
way. For Poland and Sweden it is assumed that all landings and hence all fishing effort are placed in the 
Baltic Sea. For at least Sweden it is an overestimation as some of the Swedish landings originate from the 
Kattegat and the Skagerrak. 
 
Table 6.1 shows the total number of vessels registered for fishery and the estimated number fishing in the 
Baltic Sea according to the assumptions mentioned above. Not all vessels are active. As an example only 
on third of the registered Danish vessels are active with an annual turnover above 30,000 euro. However, 
all vessels are included in the calculations, which entails that the number of days at sea per vessel for some 
segments is very low. 
 
Table 6.1 Role of case study fisheries within national fishery sectors. Baltic Sea cod 
Member State Total fishery sector Case study fleets 
Total revenues 
(mln euro) 
Total fleet 
(number of vessels) 
Revenues 
(mln euro) 
Fleet 
(number of vessels) 
Germany (DEU) 156 2,134 41 38 
Denmark (DNK) 384 3,120 20 713 
Poland (POL) 41 965 16 733 
Sweden (SWE) 108 1,565 43 1,050 
 
The annual total allowable catch (TAC) for cod for the North Sea, the Skagerrak, the Kattegat, and the 
Baltic Sea was 90,000 tonnes in 2005-7. The TAC for the Baltic Sea was 66,000 tonnes, see Table 6.2. The 
total landings of the selected fleet segments constituted around two-third of the TAC in all waters. The 
Swedish gill netters are most extensively dependant on cod with a cod share of the total landing volume at 
almost 50%. 
 
Table 6.2 Role of target species. Estimated for the Baltic Sea, average 2005-7 
MS Gear Size No. 
vessels 
GT 
(1000) 
Landings (1000 t) Value (mln euro)
Cod Total Cod Total
DEU DTS 12-24 22 1.6 1.4 5.6 2.3 5.5
DEU DTS 24-40 16 9.9 5.6 36.0 11.7 35.5
DNK PGP 0-12 643 2.3 3.6 7.8 7.6 16.7
DNK DTS 12-24 70 2.4 2.5 17.9 4.8 15.8
POL PGP 0-12 630 2.7 3.4 12.6 4.3 10.4
POL DTS 12-24 103 4.5 3.1 7.5 3.8 5.9
SWE PGP 0-12 894 4.0 3.3 6.3 5.4 14.2
SWE DTS 12-24 156 9.5 5.2 22.3 8.6 29.2
Other   39.4 39.4 
Total 1)   66.0 66.0 
1) TAC for the Baltic Sea 
Source: AER and the Danish Fisheries Directorate 
 
6.2.2. Composition of landings 
 
The Baltic Sea is the most important in terms of cod catches with 60,000 tonnes in 2007 compared to 
18,000 tonnes from the North Sea. The fleet segments with the highest share of cod are the small vessels 
mainly fishing in the Baltic Sea. Table 6.3 shows the landings of seven species including cod for the 
selected segments in all fishing areas, not only the Baltic Sea. The group “Other” constitutes a relatively 
large share of the total landings and shows that a variety of other species constitutes important shares of 
the fleet segments’ landings. 
 
Table 6.3 Composition of landings by segment, all areas, average 2005-7 (1000 tonnes) 
MS Gear Length 
(m) 
Cod Haddock Saithe Plaice N. 
lobster
Sprat Herring Other Total
DEU DTS 12-24 4.8   1.5 0.2 12.9 19.4
DEU DTS 24-40 9.2 1.8 15.1 32.9 59.0
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DNK PGP 0-12 7.1   1.7 6.6 15.4
DNK DTS 12-24 9.3   5.5 1.6 50.0 66.4
POL PGP 0-12 3.4   2.7 6.6 12.6
POL DTS 12-24 3.1   1.3 3.2 7.5
SWE PGP 0-12 3.3   0.2 2.8 6.3
SWE DTS 12-24 5.2   0.8 7.9 8.5 22.3
 
The landings in value show that Norway lobster plays an important role for many trawler fleet segments, 
see Table 6.4. However, Norway lobster is found only in the waters outside the Baltic Sea, while saithe is 
important for the large German trawlers. Saithe are not caught in the Baltic Sea. For the Baltic Sea sprat 
and herring is to some importance, generally, but for some segments these species are hidden in the 
“Other” group.  
 
Table 6.4 Composition of landings by segment, average 2005-7 (mln euro) 
MS Gear Length 
(m) 
Cod Haddock Saithe Plaice N. 
lobster
Sprat Herring Other Total
DEU DTS 12-24 7.8   2.7 1.4 7.2 19.1
DEU DTS 24-40 19.2 2.8 11.6 24.5 58.1
DNK PGP 0-12 14.9   3.3 14.6 32.8
DNK DTS 12-24 17.6   10.3 14.1 16.6 58.6
POL PGP 0-12 4.3   0.7 5.4 10.4
POL DTS 12-24 3.8   0.3 1.8 5.9
SWE PGP 0-12 5.4   1.9 6.9 14.2
SWE DTS 12-24 8.6   7.7 1.3 11.6 29.2
 
 
6.3. Historical indicators  
 
In recent years the spawning stock biomasses of both the Eastern and the Western Baltic cod have been 
low and hence the catches and landings. The development in catches over the last 50 years shows large 
variations.  
 
From the Eastern Baltic stock the average catches 1966-2007 were 165,000 tonnes with a level above 
200,000 tonnes per year in 1979-1988. Catches peaked in the period 1980-1985 with more than 300,000 
tonnes per year. Since 1992 the landings have stayed below 100,000 tonnes with a decreasing trend and are 
now close to 50,000 tonnes yearly. The estimated discard in proportion to the catches is 4% on average 
for 1966-2007 for the Baltic Sea (ICES 2008). 
 
The spawning stock biomass, constituting fish at ~three years of age and older, is 50%-100% higher than 
the catches with the largest difference when the catches are highest. The average fishing mortality rate for 
the age groups 4-7 was on average 0.9, which implies that around 60% of the fish of these age groups are 
caught each year. The highest estimated fishing mortality rate is 1.4 implying that around 80% of the fish 
of the age groups 4-7 was caught 
 
The Western Baltic Sea cod stock is smaller than the Eastern stock and is generic different from the 
Eastern Baltic stock although some interaction between the stocks occur. On average 1970-2007 the 
landings were 36,000 tonnes per year. The development in landings could be described for three periods: 
In 1970-1985 landing were around 45,000 tonnes per year, in 1986-1993 they were around 22,000 tonnes 
and from 1994-2007 they were around 32,000 with a decreasing trend towards around 25,000 tonnes. 
 
For the Western stock the spawning stock biomass, constituting fish at ~three years of age and older, is 
about the same size as the annual landings. The cod is above the minimum size when it is 2-3 years old. 
The Western cod is subject to a very high fishing mortality rate at 1.1 on average (approximately 66% is 
removed) for the age groups 3-6.  
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6.4. Fleet efficiency  
 
Looking at the profit (gross revenue minus all costs) the Danish segments perform worse than the 
Swedish, the German and the Polish segments. Whether this is caused by different method of estimating 
the fixed costs, in particular, or it reflects real differences is difficult to say. The Danish data are 
considered reliable being collated on a regular basis since 1995, and there is no reason to expect that the 
Danish segments are performing significantly worse than the other fleet segments.  
 
The total landings in volume and value of the selected segments and the share of cod of the total landings 
combined with the economic indicators are presented in Table 6.5 which, in general, shows a very diverse 
picture.  
 
Table 6.5 Economic indicators on fleet segment level. Average 2005-7 
MS Gear Length 
(m) 
Gross 
value 
added 
(mln €) 
Profit
(mln €)
Employ-
ment 
(FTE or 
persons) 
Average 
price 
(€/t) 
Fuel 
costs of 
landings 
value 
Profit/ 
tonne 
landings 
CPUE 
total 
(t/day) 
CPUE 
target 
species 
(t/day) 
DEU DTS 12-24 11.7 2.5 160 990 0.12 129 2.145 0.532
DEU DTS 24-40 42.1 24.7 282 990 0.07 419 12.250 1.899
DNK PGP 0-12 19.5 -5.5 387 2,130 0.05 -357 0.293 0.136
DNK DTS 12-24 35.0 -1.6 519 880 0.11 -24 1.874 0.262
POL PGP 0-12 7.5 4.6 1,300 820 0.11 364 0.210 0.056
POL DTS 12-24 2.0 0.1 401 790 0.38 13 0.724 0.295
SWE PGP 0-12 6.4 4.1 1,099 2,260 0.08 655 0.095 0.050
SWE DTS 12-24 11.0 5.2 351 1,310 0.23 233 1.330 0.310
 
Economic indicators are shown in Figure 6.2. It is noticed that for the German trawlers (DEU DTS 24-
40m) the indicators are different in structure from the other fleet segments. These vessels are much larger 
than other vessels in the Baltic Sea. The German segment includes deep-sea trawlers which do not fish in 
the Baltic Sea but it is not possible to distinguish these vessels in the statistics. The segment is included in 
the analysis to achieve a fleet structure that shows a large difference.  
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For the Baltic Sea target fishing mortality rates (0.6 for age groups 3-6 for the Western stock and 0.3 for 
age groups 4-7 for the Eastern stock) are set and a 10% reduction from the current level is applied each 
year in pursuit of the target F. However, if the derived TAC is 15% lower or 15% higher than previous 
years TAC then this limit shall apply. Fishing area and period restrictions apply as well to the Baltic Sea 
cod fishery.  
 
Output property rights 34 
 
For cod Denmark has since 1993 applied a system with non-transferable individual quotas. From 2007 the 
system was transformed into a system with individual transferable quotas. The other member states have 
applied quota management supplemented with technical restrictions as regard fishing gear and fishing 
areas. 
 
6.5.3. Input management 
 
Effort restrictions  
 
No restrictions in number of days at sea have been used until 2009. 
 
Input property rights 
 
The Baltic Sea fleets have been subject to the fleet limitation programmes, set by the EU, in term of 
capacity ceilings. These ceiling have increased the value of the vessels in the fleet. 
 
 
6.6. Management costs 
 
The impact of an accession fee has been tested on the profit of the fleet segments and the consequences 
for the investments i.e. lower profit would lead to lower investments and hence lower fishing mortality. 
From fishermen point of view an accession fee is considered a cost, but from society it is considered part 
of the resource rent and should be subtracted to estimate the “real” resource rent. 
 
Only incomplete information about financial transfers from the Government to the fisheries sector is 
available. One source is the OECD as shown in Table 6.6, while other sources are the allocation from the 
European Fisheries Fund (EEF), see Table 6.7, and estimated made by MRAG, see Table 6.8.  
 
The financial transfers are made on a national basis and the transfers have been allocated to the fleet 
segments according to their landings value in proportion to the total landings value.  
 
The costs estimated by MRAG for management and control (Table 6.8) are used in the model to test the 
impact of cost recovery for these management items. 
 
6.6.1. Summary of OECD data 
 
The OECD data has been distributed among fleet segments according to the value of landings in the 
segment in proportion to the total number of vessels. The level of detail of the OECD data varies 
significantly between member states.  
 
  
                                                     
34 Info on property rights should be drawn from the MRAG – RBM study 
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Table 6.6 Management costs according to OECD, average 2004-2006* , (mln euro): Baltic Sea cod 
DEU 
12-24 
DTS 
DEU
24-40 
DTS 
DNK
0-12 
PG 
DNK
12-24 
DTS 
POL
0-12 
PG 
POL
12-24 
DTS 
SWE
0-12 
PG 
SWE 
12-24 
DTS Total 
Direct Payments 0.1 0.9 0.6 0.5 na na 0.3 0.5 
 - Decommissioning 0.5 0.5 na na  
 - Fleet renewal and modernization 0.1 0.1 na na  
 - Other 0.0 0.0 na na 0.4 0.7 
General Services 2.0 1.9 na na 3.5 6.6 
 - Management and enforcement 1.2 1.1 na na  
 - Research  0.3 0.3 na na  
 - Other 0.6 0.5 na na  
Total 0.1 0.7 2.6 2.5 na na 4.2 7.9 
*sum of national and EU contributions regarding marine capture fisheries. 
 
6.6.2. Support to fishing sector (EFF) 
 
The data from the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) have been distributed on fleet segments in the same 
way as above.  
 
Table 6.7 Average annual support to the marine fisheries from EFF, (mln euro). Baltic Sea cod 
DEU 
12-24 
DTS 
DEU 
24-40 
DTS 
DNK
0-12 
PG 
DNK
12-24 
DTS 
POL
0-12 
PG 
POL
12-24 
DTS 
SWE 
0-12 
PG 
SWE 
12-24 
DTS Total 
EFF - Axis 1 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.0 8.1 4.7 0.5 0.9 14.9 
 
6.6.3. Costs of research and management 
 
Table 6.8 shows the estimated management and research costs from the MRAG-RBM study and the DCF 
up-grade by 30% distributed on fleet segments in the same way as above. The MRAG data have been used 
in the model in the costs recovery scenario. 
 
Table 6.8 Estimated management and research costs, (mln euro). Baltic Sea cod 
DEU 
12-24 
DTS 
DEU 
24-40 
DTS 
DNK
0-12 
PG 
DNK
12-24 
DTS 
POL
0-12 
PG 
POL
12-24 
DTS 
SWE 
0-12 
PG 
SWE 
12-24 
DTS Total 
Management, control, 
enforcement 1.0 6.7 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.2 2.4 4.5 16.8 
Research (DCF+30%) 0.3 1.7 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.9 1.8 5.6 
Sources: MRAG (2008) and Com. Decision 811/2009 
 
 
6.7. Estimation of the resource rent 
 
6.7.1. Comparison of scenarios   
 
The analyses are designed in such a way that the species of the fleet segment’s catch compositions are 
caught in a mixed fishery. One scenario covers the case where the fishery stops as soon as the quota of the 
most restrictive species is taken (TAC min scenario) while another scenario considers the case where the 
fishery stops when the quota of the least restrictive quota is taken (TAC max scenario). Further the model 
evaluates in a similar manner two scenarios where the fishery stops when the most restrictive number of 
days at sea (Effort min scenario) or the least restrictive days at sea (Effort max scenario) are reached. In 
the effort scenarios the days at sea are estimated from the Htarget in proportion to the current H 
multiplied to the effort the year before starting with the baseline effort, while in the TAC scenarios the 
TACs are estimated from the Htarget/H proportion applied to the stock in the baseline (start year). 
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Further an Open access scenario has been tested in which there are no restrictions apart from the physical 
number of days at sea and the speed and magnitude of the invest- and disinvestments.. The latter is 
limited such that investments in new capacity can at most constitute 10% of the capacity in the year 
before, while disinvestments can at most constitute 20% of the previous year’s capacity. Finally, a Min min 
scenario, in which the model currently chooses the most restrictive effort from either TAC or effort 
management, has been tested. 
 
These six scenarios are used to test implications of different types of TAC and effort policies. Further, the 
impact of the magnitude of the discount rate is investigated in scenario 1 (TAC min), which is considered 
to be the baseline policy scenario. A discount rate of 2% is compared to the default of 3.5% in scenario 7 
and a discount rate of 5% in scenario 8. In scenario 9 the impact of cost recovery of the management and 
control costs is estimated. 
 
Finally, based on the policy option of TAC management scenarios 10-12 have been estimated where the 
present number of vessels have been kept constant for the whole simulation period (scenario 10), the 
minimum present number of vessels required if all vessels are using their maximum number of days at sea 
per year is kept constant (scenario 11), and eventually (scenario 12) the minimum number of vessels in 
scenario 11 is allowed to change by use of the investment function which is disregarded in scenario 10 and 
11. 
 
The analyses are closed by scenario 13 which is a dynamic optimization (non-linear programming) where 
optimal effort and cod stock are determined by maximising the gross value added (GVA) over 15 years. In 
scenario 14 the profit is maximized. By this procedure an estimate of the maximum resource rent is 
obtained i.e. an estimate of the MEY. 
 
The model can work with several species/stocks subject to quota restrictions. A meaningful inclusion 
requires that future quotas are known or could be estimated based on stock assessment. Further, some 
importance of each single species in the catch composition is also required to be used as a meaningful 
restriction (see table 6.3). This is necessary to avoid that the species which in practice are disregarded by 
the fishermen and the managers play a role in the analysis. None of these assumptions are fulfilled, and 
there is a risk that “strange” results may occur if species/stocks for which the conditions are not fulfilled 
are included in the model and admitted to control the fishery. Therefore, only one target (quota) species, 
cod, is included in the model, and catch of other species is a function of the cod fishery. Including only 
one quota species entails that the TAC min and the TAC max as well as the Effort min and Effort max 
scenarios are the same. Therefore scenario 3 and 4 are left blank in Table 6.9. 
 
In order to match the cod landings of the selected fleet segments with the total quota it is necessary to 
allocate shares of the total quota to the fleet segments and use a scaling procedure to secure that cod 
landings of other segments are taken into account. The landings of cod of other segments are a fixed share 
of the landing of the selected fleet segments. 
 
The start values for days at sea per vessel per year are lower for all segments that the assumed maximum 
number, in particular, for gill netters for which many inactive vessels is included in the statistics. The 
maximum number of days per vessel per year is, arbitrarily as no precise information is available, set at 120 
days for gill netters 0-12m, 200 days for trawler 12-24m and for trawlers 24-40m as the latter is expected 
to be similar to the 12-24m. 
 
The shape of the stock growth function is extremely important for the results. For the Baltic Sea the SSB 
is used in the model as no information for the total stock is available. The SSB is estimated to be able to 
grow to 2-3 times the size of the present SSB. In the TAC scenarios the effort is determined by the cod 
TAC. Therefore, there is no discard of over-sized fish. The discard of undersized fish is 10% which is 
high compared to the estimates made by ICES suggesting 3-4% in weight (ICES 2008). In the effort and 
open access scenarios it is assumed that all over-quota fish is permitted to be landed. 
 
Table 6.9 shows that the effort and capacity could be reduced in almost all scenarios if the cod stock is 
recovered. Landings (catch) of cod will increase 1.5-2 times compared to the baseline, which could be 
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caught without an increase in effort. Note that the catches shown in Table 6.9 are the catches taken by the 
selected fleet segments, which is about 42% of the quota. The low share of the selected segments is caused 
by the problems with the distribution of the catches on the Baltic and the North Sea.  
 
Table 6.9 Comparison of the scenarios (mln euro) 
Scenario  
no. 
Effort 
(1000 DAS) 
Fleet
(no. vessels) 
Catch of cod
(1000 t) 
Profit year 15 
discounted 
NPV Profit15
 Average values 2005-7
2005-7  194 2,533 28.0 381) 
 Values in year 15 of the scenario 
1. TAC min 86 1,828 47.5 73 969
2. Effort min 186 2,246 55.9 83 1,190
3. TAC max - - - - -
4. Effort max - - - - -
5. Open access 663 5,000 0 -88 510
6. Min min 86 1,828 47.5 73 969
7. Discount rate 2% 86 1,828 47.5 91 1,109
8. Discount rate 5% 86 1,828 47.5 59 850
9. Recovery mgt. costs 86 1,828 47.5 43 774
10. Static present fleet 86 2,533 47.5 65 834
11. Static minimum fleet 86 1,474 47.5 74 1,007
12. Dynamic minimum fleet 86 1,360 47.5 75 1,039
13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 300 2,304 66.0 93 1,370
14. Optimum fleet (profit) 407 3,041 76.1 112 1,630
1) year 1 
 
The effort scenarios are performing better than the TAC scenarios. The open access (scenario 5) is 
apparently performing very well. But the fishery collapses after year 15 indicated by the negative profit in 
year 15. Finally, the Min min is controlled both by TACs and effort restrictions. This scenario 6 is the 
same as scenario 1 because the TAC restrictions are binding.  
 
6.7.2. Policy options  
 
Summary 
 
Table 6.10 shows specific indicators for specific policy options which is TAC management, effort 
management, open access (no TAC of effort management), and both TAC and effort management. 
 
Effort management performs better than TAC management comparing the net present value of the profit 
over 15 years (NPV profit15), but this is partly because the TAC management is not fine-tuned in terms of 
the harvest ratio with respect to rate of increase in the fishery from present to year 12 where the stock is 
built up to a long term sustainable level. The built up rate of the stock is determined by the interaction of 
the stock growth, the investment behaviour and the management restrictions. 
 
The harvest ratio is defined as the proportion between the catches and the catchable stock and cannot be 
compared directly with the “biological” harvest ratios that are determined for age groups 2-4. The present 
harvest ratio is 0.68 e.g. 68% is taken of the catchable biomass approximated by the spawning stock 
biomass in the model for the Baltic Sea. This rate is halved under the TAC and effort management 
programmes. The Open access scenario shows a rate at 1, this entails that the whole biomass is fished 
down.  
 
It is important to emphasize that the results are strongly dependant on the assumption made for other 
species, which is that these are basically “overfished” as cod is. Therefore when cod landings increase 
other species increase too and this assumption probably overestimates the magnitude of profit and effort. 
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If the calculations are performed based on the assumption that the landing value of other species than cod 
is constant the effort and the capacity will built up alongside the recovery of the cod stock. However, after 
year 10-15 year the profit of the fleet segments goes significantly down because the fleet is built up too 
much. This will not lead to disinvestments because the profit is still positive. Instead it will lead to capital 
stuffing. It happens because the fishery is managed via the harvest ratio which is transformed either into a 
TAC or an effort in terms of days at sea. Capital stuffing can be avoided either by direct control of effort 
or the number of vessels or by an ITQ-scheme. 
 
Table 6.10 Effects of different policies on profit, harvest ratio, catches, effort and fleet 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios**
1. TAC 
min 
2. Effort 
min 
3. TAC 
max 
4. Effort 
max 
5. Open 
access 
6. Min 
min 
NPV Profit15  969 1,190 - - 510 969
Profit year 15 
discounted 
381) 73 83 - - -88 73
Harvest ratio (year 15)*
Cod 0.68 0.24 0.30 - - 1 0.24
Catch in (1000 t, for scenarios year 15)
Cod 28.0 47.5 55.9 0 47.5
Effort (1000 DAS, for scenarios year 15)
Cod 194 86 186 - - 663 86
Fleet (no vessels, for scenarios year 15)
Cod 2,533 1,828 2,246 - - 5,000 1,828
1) year 1 
 
Further, it is assumed that the cod stock is able to increase if the present harvest ratio is reduced. It is 
difficult to judge whether this assumption is reasonable and to what extent the large pelagic stocks in the 
Baltic sea hinders recovery.  
 
In the following figures 6.3 – 6.12 including six sub-figures the development of some indicators is shown. 
The sustainable catch shows the catch according to the management rules be it TAC or effort. Landings 
net of discard are shown in the next one. Effort and capacity are shown in terms of total days at sea for 
the segments and the number of vessels. The two lower panels show the profit (gross revenue minus all 
costs) and the gross value added (remuneration of labour, capital and fish stocks).   
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Scenario 1. TAC min 
 
The fishery conducted by the eight fleet segments is driven by the TAC for cod. For each segment the 
landing value of all other species is estimated in proportion to the value of cod. It implies that the value of 
other species varies proportional to cod. The species compositions of the fleet segments are very different, 
but as cod constitutes the most important species it is assumed that the cod drives the fishery. There are 
no stock assessments for almost all the species except cod in the segments’ catch composition in the Baltic 
Sea.  
 
The fishery is carried out by small or medium sized trawler and small gill netter. For the latter group 
information is uncertain as a large part of the registered vessels are inactive in practice.  
 
The model calculations show that when the fishery is managed by TACs in pursue of the target H at 0.3 
applicable for the Eastern stock the landing will fall in year two and three (year 1 is the base) and then 
increase gradually to the MSY level. The number of days at sea will fall until year six and then increase. 
The number of vessels will decrease throughout the period compared to the current situation except for 
the gill netters from Poland and Sweden. There is no discard of over-quota catches in scenario 1. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Results of scenario 1. TAC min 
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Scenario 2. Effort min  
 
The effort is chosen by adjusting the number of days at sea in the baseline with the proportion between 
Htarget and the current H calculated each year. This development is restricted by the borders of the 
investment in vessels (10% up and 20% down as maximum each year). If the potential effort is less than 
the target effort then catches are based on the potential effort, leading to a lower harvest ratio than 
‘proposed’. In the effort managed fisheries there is no discard of over-quota catches as there are no 
quotas. In the effort managed fisheries there is no discard of over-quota catches as there are no quotas. 
 
Given these assumptions scenario 2 performs better than scenario 1. The net present value of the profit is 
higher in scenario 2 and so is the number of days at sea and the number of vessels. The reason for this 
result is that in scenario 1 the fleet is built down to a too low level and the stock to a too high level. 
Therefore potential landings are lost in scenario 1 compared to scenario 2.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 Results of scenario 2. Effort min 
 
 
 
Scenario 3. TAC max 
 
As only one species, namely cod, determines the effort, TAC max is the same as TAC min. If other 
species than cod are chosen as “drivers” e.g. by assuming that the catch of other species determines the 
catch of cod the tendency is that the cod will by overexploited and in certain cases driven to extinction.
  
Scenario 4. Effort max 
  
As for scenario 3. 
  
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
N
um
be
r
Years
Vessels
DEU DTS12-24m
DEU DTS24-40m
DNK PG0-12m
DNK DTS12-24m
POL PG0-12m
POL DTS12-24m
SWE PG0-12m
SWE DTS12-24m
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
To
nn
es
Years
Landings 
Cod
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
'0
00
 €
Years
Profit 
DEU DTS12-24m
DEU DTS24-40m
POL PG0-12m
DNK DTS12-24m
POL PG0-12m
POL DTS12-24m
SWE PG0-12m
SWE DTS12-24m
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
To
nn
es
Years
Sustainable catch
Cod
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
N
um
be
r
Years
Sea days
DEU DTS12‐24m
DEU DTS24‐40m
DNK PG0‐12m
DNK DTS12‐24m
POL PG0‐12m
POL DTS12‐24m
SWE PG0‐12m
SWE DTS12‐24m
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
'0
00
 €
Years
Gross value added
DEU DTS12-24m
DEU DTS24-40m
DNK PG0-12m
DNK DTS12-24m
POL PG0-12m
POL DTS12-24m
SWE PG0-12m
SWE DTS12-24m
137 
 
Scenario 5. Open access 
 
In the Open access scenario the catches are restricted by TAC/quota or days at sea limitations. It is, 
however, important to notice that the same upper and lower ceilings regarding investment in number of 
vessels applies as in scenario 1 and 2 to reflect that adjustments cannot be made instantly.  
 
Because the fleet segments are profitable in the baseline investments takes place, which entails that the 
landings increases but the stock biomass and the sustainable catch go down. There is no discard of 
oversized fish in this case because of the open access is by nature not limited by quotas. 
 
The result is that over a number of years the cod stock will be reduced to zero, as the fleet will not 
adjusted quickly enough when the profit goes down and becomes negative. It should be observed that 
over a 15 year period the fishery is performing just as well as the other scenarios under the given 
circumstances. It is not until after 15 years that the fishery breaks down. 
 
  
Figure 6.5 Results of scenario 5. Open access 
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6.7.4. Resource rent and recovery of management costs (scenario 9)  
 
MRAG data is used in the calculation of cost recovery. The scenario does not differ from the TAC min 
scenario (Figure 6.3) in the case of the Baltic Sea. The reason is that the investments are not affected 
although higher costs lead to higher break-even revenue. However, the profit is lower in scenario 9 than in 
scenario 1. If recovery of management costs is considered a tax it will not influence the gross value added. 
From the fishermen’s point of view cost recovery is considered a cost that affects the profit and eventually 
the investments. 
 
The conclusion is that the profit of the fishermen will decrease and thereby influence the economic 
performance of the fleet, but from a management point of view there will be no changes. Changes will 
happen if the recovery costs are higher.  
 
Table 6.12 The effect of recovery of management costs. Baltic Sea cod (mln euro) 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios* 
Main scenario:
No recovery of 
management costs 
9. Recovery of 
management costs 
NPV GVA15 (mln euro) 1,642 1,642 
Nominal GVA15 (mln euro) 89.6 197 197 
NPV Profit15 969 774 
Fixed payment for access (mln euro) 0 17 
NPV Payment for access15 0 194 
Nom Profit15 (mln euro) 38.1 122 105 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Results of scenario 9. Recovery of management costs 
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6.7.5. Optimization of capacity (scenarios 10-14) 
 
The scenarios shown in Table 6.13 deal with the question of instantaneous or gradual adaptation of the 
fleet. The baseline shows the present situation, while the main scenario is scenario 1 with TAC and 
investment restrictions. In the static present fleet the number of vessels is constant but the number of 
days at sea per vessel is allowed to vary subject to the management option which is TACs. In the 
minimum static fleet the number of vessels is reduced in year one to the number of vessels required if all 
vessels use the maximum number of days at sea per vessel. This number is then kept constant. The 
dynamic fleet is the minimum fleet with the investment behaviour re-introduced into the model. And 
finally the optimal case is shown.  
 
Table 6.13 Impact of optimization of the fleet size 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios*
  Main 
scenario 
TAC min
10.
Static 
present 
fleet 
11.
Static 
minimum 
fleet 
12.
Dynamic 
minimum 
fleet 
13. 
Optimum 
fleet 
(GVA) 
14.
Optimum 
fleet 
(profit) 
NPV Profit15 (mln euro)  969 834 1,007 1,039 1,370 1,630 
Nominal Profit15 (mln euro) 38 122 109 124 125 156 187 
Discounted Profit15 (mln 
euro) 38 73 65 74 75 93 112 
Fleet15 (no vessels) 2,533 1,828 2,533 1,474 1,359 2,304 3,041 
Effort15 (1000 DAS) 193.8 85.9 85.9 85.9 85.9 300.4 407.3 
Catch15 (1000 t) 28.0 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 68.2 76.1 
*NPV row refers to the sum, other rows refer to values in year 15 
 
The scenarios for optimization of the size of the fleet show that the NPV Profit with a static fleet 
(scenario 10 and 11) is almost the same as for the TAC min scenario. But there are large differences in the 
underlying number of vessels, days at sea and catches in year 15 after adjustments have taken place. There 
is very little effect of introducing investments to the static minimum fleet. A more comprehensive 
adjustment will take place in scenario 13 where caches are estimated at around 68,000 tonnes. This figure 
could be compared with the MSY for cod at around 200,000 tonnes. However, in scenario 13 the stock 
biomass is higher than in the MSY situation. The effect of a high stock is a high catch per unit effort and 
hence lower cost per catch unit but on the other hand the growth of the stock is lower than in the MSY 
case. The profit (revenue – all costs) is maximized in scenario 14. This scenario performs marginally better 
than scenario 13 and, in particular, the number of vessels in the segments PG 0-12m for Denmark, 
Sweden and Poland causes this difference. An increase at around 2% in NPV GVA15 is achieved by a 
substantial increase in the number of days at sea and the number of vessels; see Table 6.13.  
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Scenario 10. Static present fleet 
 
The assumption in this scenario is that the number of vessels is kept constant at the initial level (2005-7). 
The TAC min situation is chosen. The total number of days at sea for each segment is calculated, and this 
number of days is divided by the constant number of vessels. Therefore the number of days per vessel 
varies over time. If the number of days per vessel exceeds the maximum number of days at sea per vessel 
the maximum number of days is used. Such a situation does not occur for any of the fleet segments and 
indicates overcapacity with the current number of vessels even when the cod stock is recovered. 
 
As the Htarget management (scenario 1) is controlling scenario 10 the total number of days at sea will be 
the same as in scenario 1, entailing that the stock condition will be exactly the same in the two scenarios 
but the number of vessels in year 15 is almost 40% higher in scenario 10 and hence the gross value added 
and the profit will be lower. 
 
Figure 6.8 Results of scenario 10. Adaptation with ‘present’ fleet 
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Scenario 11. Static minimum fleet  
 
In scenario 11 the number of vessels is reduced to the minimum required level at the maximum days at 
sea per vessel year 1 and this number is maintained throughout the 25 years for each fleet segment. 
 
As the management is kept at TAC min (scenario one) the fish stock conditions is the same and the total 
number of days at sea is the same. The economic performance is further improved, however, as the 
number of vessels is around 20% lower as in scenario one. The profit is only slightly higher in scenario 11 
than in scenario one. 
 
Figure 6.9 Results of scenario 11. Static minimum fleet 
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Scenario 12. Dynamic minimum fleet  
 
Compared to scenario 11 it is now allowed to invest in scenario 12 according to the same rules as in 
scenario 1. The TAC min management is the same as for scenario 1. The stock conditions are therefore 
the same and there are no differences from scenario 1. The economic performance is further improved as 
the number of vessels in year 15 is 25% lower than in scenario 1. The difference between scenario 12 and 
1 is the initial number of vessels being 2533 in scenario 1 and 1474 (around 40% lower) in scenario 12. 
The difference between scenario 12 and 11 is not big in terms of gross value added and profit over time, 
but in year 15 the number of vessels in scenario 12 is 1,360 compared to 1,474 in scenario 11. 
 
Figure 6.10 Results of scenario 12. Dynamic minimum fleet 
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Scenario 13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 
 
In the scenario for the optimal fleet the objective is to maximize gross value added over 15 years. The 
applied method is non-linear programming. There are no management restrictions in this version i.e. no 
TAC or effort limitations apart from the natural physical limitations such as the growth conditions for the 
stocks and that the number of days per vessels cannot exceed the maximum number of days. This means 
that the model chooses the number of vessels and hence the size of the fish stock that maximizes gross 
value added. 
 
One restriction is kept, however, and this is the investment limits according to which the number of 
vessels cannot change upwards by more than 10% and downwards by more than 20% per year. 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Results of scenario 13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 
 
 
Compared with TAC min (scenario one) a number of interesting differences appear. In the optimum 
scenario 13 the net present value of gross value added is 45% higher than in scenario one. The landings in 
year 15 is 37% higher and the number of se days 300,400 vs 85,900) and the number of vessels (2,304 vs 
1,878) is also higher in scenario 13 vs scenario one. The reason for this surprising result is that because of 
the investment behaviour the number of vessels in scenario one is driven to a too low level and the stock 
to a too high level compare to scenario 13. In scenario one this leads to a stock growth that is lower than 
it could have been and therefore catches are lower. 
 
However to obtain the results in scenario 13 full transparency into the future and complete control over 
the effort is required which may not be possible in practice. 
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Scenario 14. Optimum fleet (profit) 
 
This scenario is carried out under the same assumptions as for scenario 13. The difference is that in 
scenario 14 profit (revenue – all costs) is maximized contrary to the GVA in scenario 13. Scenario 14 is 
performing slightly better than scenario 13. The number of vessels in the segment PG 0-12m changes 
significantly. The Danish decrease while the Swedish and the Polish increases. Although the totals of 
GVA and profit do not differ much, there are differences in the composition on profit, crew share and 
capital remuneration, see Table 6.14.  
 
Figure 6.12 Results of scenario 14. Optimum fleet (profit) 
 
 
 
 Table 6.14 Comparison of scenarios 13 and 14 (values in mln euro, fleet number of vessels) 
 Scenario 13 Scenario 14 
NPV GVA15 2,384 2,435 
NPV profit15 1,370 1,630  
NPV Crew costs15 903 707  
NPV capital costs15 111 98  
GVA year 15 261 292 
Profit year 15 156 187 
Crew costs year 15 95 91 
Capital costs year 15 10 14 
Fleet – average 1-15 2,295 2,166 
Fleet – year 15 2,304 3,041 
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Information about the size of the total stock biomass is not always available in the ICES reports and 
therefore the spawning stock biomass is used for the estimation of the relationship between growth and 
stock biomass. The estimated functional form for the Eastern stock is a 2’nd degree polynomial relation: 
 
Recruits = 1.8870*SSB – 0.00000312*SSB2 
 
The intersection is forced through zero although it could be argued that once the SSB goes below a 
certain level no growth is possible. Both parameters are significant at a 5% level. The recruits are in 
number of fish (1000) and the SSB (in tonnes). The peak point of the function equal to maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY) is SSB at 302 361 tonnes and 285 mln recruits at age two. The recruits are 
transformed to weight by use of 0.65 kg as a measure for the yield per recruit (ICES 2008). 
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7. ATLANTIC NORTHERN HAKE FISHERIES 
 
 
7.1. Summary and conclusions 
 
Main conclusion 
 
The five segments analysed in this fishery realized in 2005-7 on average a total net loss of 56 mln euro. 
Average annual discounted net profit ranges under most scenarios between 60 and 116 mln euro. 
Elimination of overcapacity and recovery of stocks would produce a discounted net profit of 59-105 mln 
euro by the year 15. (see Figure 7.1) 
 
Summary of the case study 
 
The Northern Hake fishery is part of a mixed fishery in which vessels from seven MS are included 
although vessels from Spain and France can be considered as the mayor contributors. Gears taking part in 
this fishery are nets, trawls and hooks with vessels of a length range that goes from 12 to 40 meters. 
 
Northern hake is managed by means of TACs and quotas, among some other technical measures 
(restrictions in mesh sizes, area closures,…) and in some cases (Spain) by the means of transferable fishing 
rights, even if it can be considered that, currently, output measures are the most restrictive management 
tools. Furthermore, since, the beginning of 21st century northern hake has been involved in an emergency 
plan, a recovery plan (in both some input, output and control measures have been applied) and currently a 
long term management plan is to be implemented. 
 
As a regulated multi-fleet, multi-species fishery, performance is principally driven by the policy option 
(PO) selected. In the simulations performed in this work there are two different general management 
strategies, i.e., safe or restrictive options (TAC min and Effort min) and extreme or non-restrictive options 
(TAC max and Effort max). Nevertheless, it is better to start with the Open access situation. Results from 
this policy option show that when using it a result compatible with the sustainability concept cannot be 
achieved. It implies that some kind of management is required. Looking at the more extreme options 
Effort max produces clearly unsustainable results and TAC max provides results which are not completely 
compatible with sustainability (even if the results are less extreme).  
 
Following the discussion above there are two possible candidates compatible with the sustainability 
concept, TAC min and Effort min (three if one includes Min min, but this PO almost replicates the TAC 
min policy). Both POs produce results compatible with the biological sustainability. It implies that the 
selection of the baseline PO has to be done using other criteria. The concepts of MEY and MSY arise in 
this discussion. The highest yield (of all the species considered) is obtained using the Effort min PO. In 
that sense this policy option can be related to the MSY concept. TAC min shows the highest NPV Profit15 
therefore it can be related to the MEY. 
 
As a baseline policy option TAC min has been selected. First of all this PO provides the highest NPV 
Profit15 which given that the work deals with resource rent is an important indicator for the selection. 
Secondly, TAC is the main management tool in this fishery. Following these two indicators, selecting TAC 
min as the PO provides the highest sustainable NPV Profit15 and does not imply any breakdown in the 
current management system. 
 
When rent is considered as a target it has to be said that one single value cannot be determined. Apart 
from the conceptual definition, future benefits have to be discounted and in reality there is not a single 
discount rate. In that sense there have been made comparisons between different discount rates and the 
absolute values differ considerably. Furthermore, it has to be noted that the discount rate can determine 
not only the real value of the rent but also the PO required to maximize it, due to the different timings of 
the stream of benefits. 
 
 
 Figure 7.
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In the case study some scenarios on changes in the capacity have been tested. Results show how smaller 
fleets do not immediately create higher rents. Overcapacity has to be seen in terms of the number of 
vessels and characteristics of each particular segment, in terms of the total catching capacity and also in 
terms of the technology and the economic performance of each segment. Vessels operating at their 
maximum possible effort do not necessarily generate higher rents (even with a reduction in the total 
number of vessels) at least not if all the simulation period is considered. Furthermore, the maximum rent 
(optimization scenario) is obtained with a higher number of vessels than in the baseline (average 2005-7) 
and the selected baseline scenario (TAC min). In that sense it is very important not only to consider the 
total number of vessels but the allocation of them within the segments. That is, overcapacity has to be 
measured at the segment level. 
 
Finally, in terms of the management costs, results are heavily dependent on how these costs are allocated 
to each segment. In the particular case in which income is used as the allocation criterion, it has been 
shown that a lump sum tax generates the right incentives to the fleet. The NPV Profit15 plus the cost 
recovery is higher than the NPV Profit15 when the same policy option without cost recovery is used. 
 
To sum up, using a discount rate of 3.5% resource rent (NPV Profit15) of this fishery ranges from 332 
million euro (open access) to 1,742 mln euro (optimum), depending on the PO used and the scenario 
considered. It implies that there is an 80% difference between the lowest and the highest PO. Meeting the 
criteria of sustainability, the rank is shorter, starting from 1,104 mln euro (Effort min) to 1,742 million 
euro (Optimum fleet) which reduces the possible differences to 37%. The base PO (TAC min) generates a 
rent of 1,222 million euro, which is 30% lower than the maximum rent that can be obtained (by 
optimizing the number of vessels). Other capacity alternatives create higher rents (<5% in static minimum 
fleet and <20% in the dynamic minimum fleet) than the base policy option. If the fleet is set at the 
baseline level (scenario 10) the reduction will be of 24%. If a system of recovery of management costs is 
implemented, it creates an increase in the total rent (NPV Profit15 and recovery of costs) of 25% 
comparing to the baseline PO. In other words, additional rents are created. Finally it should be noted that 
these values (and their relative differences) change with the discount rate. Reducing it from 3.5% to 2% 
increases the NPV Profit15 of the same PO (base) by 13%, on the other hand a discount rate of 5% 
reduces the NPV Profit15 of the same PO (base) by 11%. 
 
 
7.2. Case study definition 
 
7.2.1. Fleet and landings 
 
The catches of the Northern stock of hake made by the Spanish fleet are concentrated on a single fleet 
named the “300 fleet”. This fleet accounts for all the Spanish catches of Northern stock of hake. It is 
captured in a wide area covering the Western Atlantic Waters. The different segments existing in this fleet, 
catch hake as a single species fishery (longliners HOK 24-40) and pair trawlers DTS 24-40), as a target 
species in a mixed fishery netters (DFN 24-40) and part of the bottom trawlers (DTS 24-40), or as a 
fishery targeting some other species (mainly anglerfish and megrim) which is the case of the remaining 
bottom trawlers (DTS 24-40). 
 
For France around 650 vessels could be considered as belonging to the hake fishery35. These vessels 
(catching at least 1 tonne of hake per year) are heterogeneous in terms of gears used and size of the hull. 
On this basis, 4 segments are explicitly considered: demersal trawlers (DTS 12-24m), demersal trawlers 
(24-40m), netters (DFN 12-24m) and netters (DFN 24-40m). 
 
Netters are the major contributors to the French hake landings (71% in volume and value) with 78 vessels. 
Particularly, the large netters (24-40m) contribute almost 48% of the total landings of hake in France. The 
demersal trawler segment (DTS) contributes 26% to the total landings with 365 vessels. A brief analysis of 
the catch composition of each fleet segment shows the relative importance of nephrops and anglerfish for 
                                                     
35 Not all of them have been considered in the modelling part. 
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the DTS 12-24m “targeting nephrops” (respectively 45% and 12% of the total earnings), anglerfish for the 
DTS 12-24m “targeting fish” and DTS 24-40m (27% of the total earnings for each) and sole for the 
netters 12-24m (46% of the total earnings). 
 
The fleets of Spain and France account for around 90% of the catches of this stock of hake, and the 
contribution of the segments considered is around the 80%. It implies that the role of the remaining 
segments is limited. These remaining segments are gears using hooks in France, demersal trawlers (12-
24m) in the UK and demersal trawlers in Ireland (12-24m and 24-40m). In Spain in the mid 90’s of the 
past century a new gear was developed for fishing hake: the very high vertical opening net pair trawlers. 
These trawlers in contrast with the traditional otter trawlers catch almost exclusively hake (between 85% 
and 90 % of the landings). 
 
Hake, nephrops, megrims, sole and anglerfishes have been considered as target species. 
 
Table 7.1 Role of target species 
MS Gear Size No. 
vessels 
GT 
(1000) 
Landings (1000 t) Value (mln euro)
Target 
species 
Total Target 
species 
Total
ESP DTS 24m-40m 112 24 21.1 35.0 90.9 111.3
ESP HOK 24m-40m 79 19 11.1 16.2 49.5 77.4
FRA DTS 12m-24m 313 26 10.5 45.8 70.4 186.5
FRA  DTS 24m-40m 56 10 5.3 18.9 22.4 55.7
FRA DFN 12m-24m 60 3 4.6 5.3 37.5 66.2
FRA DFN 24m-40m 19 5 3.7 5.2 16.5 21.3
Total 639 87 56.3 126.4 287.2 518.4
Source: DCR 2007. ICES 2009 and SEC 2007  
 
Table 7.2 shows the role of the case study fleets within the national fishery sector. Spain has 13,725 
registered vessels and the case study accounts for 2% of them. France, had 4,737 vessels and the case 
study accounts for 10%. 
 
Table 7.2 Role of case study fisheries within national fishery sectors (average 2005-7) 
Member State Total fishery sector Case study fleets 
Total revenues 
(mln euro) 
Total fleet 
(number of vessels) 
Revenues
(mln euro) 
Fleet
(number of vessels) 
France 1,248 4,737 329 448 
Spain 1,735 13,725 188 191 
Source: DCR 2007 
 
7.2.2. Composition of landings 
 
Table 7.3. Composition of landings by segment (1000 tonnes) 
MS Gear Size Hake Nephrops Sole Anglerfish Megrim Others Total
ESP DTS 24m-40m 14.2 0 0 3.0 3.9 13.9 35.0
ESP HOK 24m-40m 11.1 0 0 0 0 5.1 16.2
FRA DTS 12m-24m 1.1 3.0 0.9 5.5 0 35.3 45.8
FRA DTS 24m-40m 1.1 0 0 2.3 1.9 13.6 18.9
FRA DFN 12m-24m 1.9 0 2.1 0.6 0 0.7 5.3
FRA DFN 24m-40m 3.7 0 0 0 0 1.5 5.2
Total 33.1 3.0 3.0 11.4 5.8 70.1 126.4
Source: DCR 2007. ICES 2009 and SEC 2007  
Table 7.3 shows the composition of the volume of landings by segment. Spanish DTS 24-40 and HOK 
24-40 account for a major part of the total landings of hake. Nevertheless depending on the segment there 
are some other important species such as anglerfishes for the French DTS 12-24 or sole for the French 
DFN 12-24. 
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Table 7.4. Composition of landings by segment (mln euro) 
MS Gear Size Hake Nephrops Sole Anglerfish Megrim Others Total
ESP DTS 24m-40m 63.3 0.0 0.0 14.7 12.8 20.4 111.3
ESP HOK 24m-40m 49.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.9 77.4
FRA DTS 12m-24m 4.9 27.4 11.2 27.0 0.0 116.1 186.5
FRA DTS 24m-40m 4.9 0.0 0.0 11.3 6.3 33.3 55.7
FRA DFN 12m-24m 8.5 0.0 26.1 2.9 0.0 28.7 66.2
FRA DFN 24m-40m 16.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 21.3
Total 147.6 27.4 37.3 55.9 19.1 231.2 518.4
Source: DCR 2007 and ICES 2009 and SEC 2007  
Table 7.4 shows the composition of the value of landings by segment. Hake is an important species for all 
the fleets. 
 
 
7.3. Historical indicators 
 
According to ICES, landings of northern stock of hake reached their maximum in 1955 when 155,000 
tonnes were landed. In recent years (only since 1978 ICES has a proper evaluation of this species been 
carried out –not as unique management unit yet) the maximum has been 66,500 tonnes in 1989. 
Nevertheless this cannot be considered a proxy of the sustainability maximum of the stock given that 
from this year, stock size has steadily decreased to reach its minimum in 1996. Landings have been at a 
level of around 42,000 tonnes from this period onwards.  
 
Anglerfish is managed under a single TAC even if two different species exists (black and white anglerfish). 
In comparison with hake, these two species have evolved differently. In the past (before 1960) there was 
not a directed fishery targeting anglerfish. Maximum landings were reached in 1985. Since these 
management stocks exist (from the beginning of 1986 when the northern stock of anglerfishes was 
separated from the southern one due to the entry of Spain and Portugal to the former EEC) the 
maximum level of landing of both species has occurred in 2007 (around 36,000 tonnes), even if according 
to ICES it is not likely to be sustainable. MSY level of production of anglerfish can be set at 27,000 
tonnes36. 
 
According to ICES, nephrops in the Bay of Biscay reached its maximum catches in 2006. However, it 
should be noted that more than 50% was discarded. There is not a full analytical assessment of this stock 
but according to recent catch trends, maintaining recent catches (2005-7) seems to be sustainable. Given 
that also in this period there has been the peak of the catches, MSY should be around 6000 tonnes1. 
 
Spain has had a large fleet targeting hake. In 1981 there were 416 vessels (trawlers, netters and longliners) 
involved in this fishery but by 2005-7 there were only 191 active vessels on average.  
 
The number of French vessels catching hake is much more variable given that the behaviour of many of 
them can be considered as ‘opportunistic’, i.e. flexibly adapting fishing strategy to availability of stocks. 
The average number of vessels catching hake is above 400. 
 
  
                                                     
36 ICES (2008) Report of the Working Group on the Assessment of Southern Shelf Stocks of Hake, Monk and 
Megrim (WGHMM). Copenhagen. 
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In terms of fleet efficiency an important conclusion can be drawn. Fixed nets seem to be more 
economically efficient. The reason for this is that, even technically, trawlers are able to produce a higher 
income using their capacity (GT) and effort (fishing days), higher fish prices and especially fuel lower 
consumption all of which make netters economically more efficient. Nevertheless it is important to 
mention that this does not necessarily imply that these are the vessels that would maximize resource rent, 
given the multi-species nature of the fishery. 
 
 
7.5. Management measures 
 
7.5.1. General description 
 
The main target species of this fishery (hake, nephrops, megrims, sole and anglerfish) are managed by 
TACs and quotas. However, there are also some other measures in place. 
 
Hake has always been the main driver in terms of additional management initiatives. In that sense 
following concerns in the late 1990s about the low level of the stock biomass and the possibility of 
recruitment failure a range of technical measures was introduced (Council Regulations N°1162/2001. 
2602/2001 and 494/2002) aimed at improving the selection pattern and protecting juveniles. Subsequently 
a recovery plan was introduced (Council regulation EC Reg. No 811/2004). 
 
The recovery plan consists of setting a TAC equivalent to a target H of 0.25 (Fpa) or a lower H to prevent 
decline in SSB and with the constraint that annual change in TAC should not exceed 15%. 
 
7.5.2. Output management 
 
Catch restrictions  
 
Main target species of this fishery (hake, nephrops, megrims, sole and anglerfish) are managed by TACs 
and quotas. Given the multi-species composition of the catches of the fleets involved in this fishery, some 
other species (that could be important at a métier level) are not under the TAC system (sea bass, squids, 
pouts, among others).  
 
Property rights  
 
Currently the implementation of an ITQ system for the Spanish fleet is under consideration for this 
fishery but it has not entered into force yet. There is a clear overlap of this system with the effort 
limitation system and with the transferability of the fishing rights, which makes it difficult to make it 
operational. 
 
In France, the State is responsible for ensuring it’s sustainable exploitation and for the allocation of rights 
to fish (fishing licence, catch quotas, effort quotas, etc) to avoid privatisation of fishing rights 
 
7.5.3. Input management 
 
Effort restrictions  
 
The Spanish fleet (“300 fleet”) has also been under the constraints of effort limiting system (fishing 
rights), even if nowadays this system cannot be considered as limiting the activity given that there are 
more fishing rights than the potential fishing effort.  
 
The system is based on a closed census created when Spain entered the EU in which there could be a 
replacement of capacity but not an increase of it. This census did not allow complete freedom to operate 
in this fishery. Only 145 of the initial 300 vessel could operate simultaneously. The system has been 
regulated through annual allowed number of days by ICES sub-area, which implies that not all vessels can 
access the whole spatial distribution of the stock of hake. 
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Both member state’s fleets have a technical measure which imposes a minimum 100 mm mesh size for 
otter-trawlers when hake represents more than 20% of the total amount of marine organisms retained on 
board, with a dispensation for vessels less than 12 m and which return to port within 24 hours of their 
most recent departure. Furthermore, two areas are defined, one in Sub area VII and the other in Sub area 
VIII, where a 100 mm minimum mesh size is required for all otter-trawlers, irrespective of the proportion 
of hake caught. 
 
Finally, since the end of 2005, the French vessels involved in the nephrops fishery in the Bay of Biscay are 
regulated by licenses. These licenses are given only to vessels using a square mesh panel allowing 20-30% 
escapement of undersized hake. This licence system will allow the fishermen’s organisations to apply 
further restrictions such as technical measures (gear modifications), temporal closures or individual quotas. 
 
Input property rights 
 
Within the census, effort fishing rights (fishing days) are property of the vessel owner. These fishing rights 
are fully transferable, even if under some conditions on the accumulation of them. Furthermore, the 
conditions imposed for the transferability have been the main driver of the evolution of the fleet. At a first 
stage the transferability was not compatible with the scrapping scheme, as the number of active vessels 
was not reduced. When both became compatible, the fleet was reduced by more than 30%. Afterwards 
some limits on the accumulation of fishing rights were imposed, which created changes in the regional 
distribution of the fleets but not in the total size of it. Currently, a system in which transferability is 
allowed, but with a reduction of the operational fishing rights, is under consideration (it will probably 
come into force in 2011). This reduction is going to be implemented by a mandatory purchase by the 
public authorities of a percentage of the fishing rights that are transferred. These fishing rights would be 
made available once the level of TACs would allow higher fishing effort. 
 
As commented above, the licence system allows individual quotas although they have not been 
implemented. In this particular topic it must be mentioned that French fishermen’s organisations strongly 
reject the implementation of IQs or ITQs. Moreover, since 1997 French law37 forbids the transferability 
of fishing rights.  
 
 
7.6. Management costs 
 
7.6.1. Summary of OECD data 
 
The allocation of OECD management costs to each fleet segment (Table 7.6) has been made using the 
relative weight of the income obtained by each segment to the total income of the MS to which each 
segment belongs. In that sense more than the 40% of the total management costs have been allocated to 
the FRA+ESP DTS 24-4038 segment even if the number of vessels of this segment is not the highest one 
(this is the case of the FRA DTS 12-24 segment). 
 
Among these two MSs several differences arise: 
 In the period 2004-06 management costs represented for France around 6.8% of the total income 
obtained by the fleets. This percentage is almost doubled for Spain (12%). 
 In the period 2004-06 management costs for Spain have had a decreasing trend. The structure of costs 
has been stable except for modernization and construction of new vessels for which the trend has 
                                                     
37 Act on Sea Fisheries and Aquaculture of 18 November 1997. 
38 DTS 24-40 segment of both member states have been merged into one to maintain the structure of a single gear 
by segment. Nevertheless, this segment is driven by the Spanish vessels which account for the 70% of the total 
vessels of this segment. For editing purposes in the figures it has been represented as ALL DTS 24-40). 
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been descending. For France a trend cannot be obtained. 2006 doubles the costs of 2005 which is 
again 30% higher than in 2004. 
 
Table 7.6 Management costs according to OECD, average 2004-2006. (mln euro) 
 
FRA
DTS 
12-24 
FRA+ESP
DTS 
24-40 
FRA
DFN 
12-24 
FRA 
DFN 
24-40 
ESP 
HOK 
24-40 
Total 
Direct Payments 5.2 11.3 1.1 0.6 5.6 23.8 
 - Decommissioning 2.1 2.7 0.4 0.2 1.2 6.6 
 - Fleet renewal and modernization 2.4 6.4 0.5 0.3 3.4 13.0 
 - Other 0.8 2.1 0.2 0.1 1.1 4.2 
General Services 6.3 6.0 1.3 0.7 2.1 16.5 
 - Management and enforcement 1.8 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.0 3.1 
 - Research  4.3 1.8 0.9 0.5 0.1 7.7 
 - Other 0.2 3.4 0.0 0.0 2.0 5.7 
Total 11.5 17.3 2.4 1.3 7.7 40.3 
 
 
7.6.2. Support to fishing sector (FIFG and EFF) 
 
In terms of the support to the fishing sector, Spain spends 89.6 million euro on EFF Axis 1 and France 
20.4 mln euro.  
 
Table 7.7 Average annual support to the marine fisheries from FIFG and EFF. (mln euro)  
 
FRA 
DTS 
12-24 
FRA+ESP
DTS 
24-40 
FRA
DFN 
12-24 
FRA
DFN 
24-40 
ESP 
HOK 
24-40 
Total 
FIFG - Axis 1 and 2 5.6 13.5 2.0 0.6 8.2 30.0 
EFF - Axis 1 3.0 6.7 1.1 0.3 4.0 15.1 
 
The allocation by fleet segment has been made using the same weights as for the OECD data, and 
FRA+ESP DTS 24-40 and ESP HOK 24-40 segments are those with highest allocation (the two segments 
including Spanish vessels). 
 
7.6.3. Costs of research and management  
 
In terms of the costs of research and management, Spain expends 27.6 million euro if management is 
considered and 16.7 million euro considering only research. The values for France are 16.8 million euro 
and 15.8 million euro, respectively. 
 
Table 7.8 Estimated management and research costs. (mln euro)  
 
FRA 
DTS 
12-24 
FRA+ESP
DTS 
24-40 
FRA
DFN 
12-24 
FRA
DFN 
24-40 
ESP 
HOK 
24-40 
Total 
Management 2.5 2.5 0.9 0.3 1.2 7.4 
Research 2.4 1.8 0.8 0.3 0.7 6.0 
Sources: MRAG (2008) and Com. Decision 811/2009 
 
The allocation by fleet segment has been made using the same weights as for the OECD data, and FRA 
DTS 12-24 and FRA+ESP DTS 24-40 segments are those with the highest allocation and represent 
around 70% of the costs of management and research. 
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7.7. Estimation of the resource rent 
 
7.7.1. Comparison of scenarios   
 
The Northern stock of hake is being managed by TACs and quotas as well as effort. Both possibilities can 
be selected as the main scenario. Nevertheless, as it has been mentioned earlier, effort restrictions do not 
impose an important constrain given the low number of vessels in relation to the total effort allocation.  
 
In Table 7.9 it can be seen that TAC min policy is providing the highest NPV Profit15 (1,222 mln euro).of 
all the POs analysed (scenarios 1 to 6). It is followed by Effort min (1,104 mln euro) and TAC max (901 
mln euro). In order to understand this result it is important to analyse the evolution of some indicators. 
 
In terms of the discounted Profit of year 15, TAC min policy is the one providing the highest value. It 
implies that in comparison with the TAC max scenario, TAC min sacrifices the short term in favour of the 
last years of the simulation (after year 4 of the simulation the total Profit of the TAC min policy is higher 
than total Profit of the TAC max policy). Furthermore, the NPV Profit15 is also higher than the Effort 
min policy option. 
 
Neither TAC max nor Effort max (and obviously Open access) can be considered as sustainable in the 
long run as it is shown in Table 7.10.  
 
Comparing TAC min and Effort min the differences come from the number of vessels and the total 
catches in year 15, for which Effort min has higher values for both. It will create higher total fixed costs 
which cannot be compensated with the higher revenues obtained from the higher catches. In general it 
can be said that the lower the total number of vessels the higher the resource rent. 
 
Effort min is limiting the activity too strictly. Obviously this is the most conservative policy option, but 
with a lower NPV Profit15 than the TAC min PO. 
 
Catches in year 15 are maximized by TAC max policy but only TAC min, Effort min and Min min can be 
considered as sustainable policies. The remaining three policy options result on an H level in year 15 (at 
least for some species) beyond the MSY level. TAC min and Effort min policy options have similar values 
in terms of catches but the NPV Profit15 of this last one is 10% lower. 
 
 All these characteristics imply that to follow the requirements of a sustainable policy in which rent is 
maximized, TAC min policy option has to be selected as the main scenario. 
 
Table 7.9 Comparison of the scenarios 
Scenario  
no. 
Effort
(1000 DAS) 
Fleet
(no. vessels) 
Catch
(1000 t) 
Profit15 
(mln euro) 
NPV Profit15
(mln euro) 
Average values 2005-7
2005-7  132 650 110 56 
Values in year 15 of the scenario
1. TAC min 123 547 63 72 1,222 
2. Effort min 143 636 66 57 1,104 
3. TAC max 192 723 66 48 901 
4. Effort max 205 735 54 9 603 
5. Open access 214 765 44 -18 332 
6. Min min 123 547 63 72 1,222 
7. Discount rate 2% 123 547 63 90 1,381 
8. Discount rate 5% 123 547 63 58 1,086 
9. Recovery mgt. costs 123 509 63 74 1,190 
10. Static present fleet 123 650 63 58 923 
11. Static minimum fleet 106 472 61 78 1,279 
12. Dynamic minimum fleet 123 440 63 85 1,461 
13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 198 705 68 70 1,481 
14. Optimum fleet (profit) 99 353 66 104 1,742 
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After selecting the TAC min as the main policy option other scenarios based on this PO have been run. 
The first two have considered a lower (2%) or a higher (5%) discount rate (scenarios 7 and 8). Scenario 9 
(Cost recovery) analyses the consequences of recovering the management costs allocated to each segment 
Last four scenarios explore possible adaptation paths of the fleets by fixing the number of vessels to the 
baseline level (scenario 10 – Static present fleet) and using the minimum number of vessels in a static 
sense (scenario 11 – Static minimum fleet) or in a dynamic sense (scenario 12 – Dynamic minimum fleet). 
 
Two final scenarios have been also run where the PO is not playing any role. Scenario 13 maximizes the 
NPV GVA15 while Scenario 14 maximizes the resource rent (NPV Profit15). In both cases the control 
variables are the number of vessels of each segment. 
 
The H target selected for the species are, 0.29, 0.30, 0.8, 0.55 and 0.37 for hake, nephrops, sole, anglerfish 
and megrim, respectively. TAC min, Min min and Effort min are producing results below the target F, and 
also below the baseline H (except for anglerfish) while the rest of the policy options are above the baseline 
and target F. TAC min, Min min and Effort min can be considered clearly as sustainable and Open access 
and Effort max as unsustainable given that hake, megrim and hake are above the H target. Furthermore 
using these last two policy options megrim is driven almost to extinction (F=1). TAC max can also be 
considered to be above the sustainability levels, especially for megrim and nephrops. 
 
TAC max gives the highest level of overall catches with 66.5 thousand tonnes. Effort min leads to the 
highest catches of hake and TAC max maximises the catches of the rest of the species, except anglerfish 
which are maximized under Effort max policy.  
 
The number of vessels in year 15 is reduced in TAC min, Effort min and Min min policy options 
compared to the baseline situation. In particular the lowest number of vessels is obtained using TAC min 
and Min min policy options reducing them by 19% compared to the base case. The highest number of 
vessels is obtained by the least restrictive policy (Open access) increasing the fleet by 16% compared to 
the base case. Looking at the evolution of the number of vessels by segment, TAC min is substantially 
reducing the number of vessels of two segments (FRA DFN 12-24 and ESP HOK 24-40) compared to 
the base case which implies that in year 15 the overall number of vessels will be 16% lower compared to 
the TAC max scenario (which is the one with the highest NPV Profit15). 
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Table 7.10 Effect of different policies on profit, harvest ratio, catches, effort and fleet 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios
1. TAC 
min 
2. Effort 
min 
3. TAC 
max 
4. Effort 
max 
5. Open 
access 
6. Min 
min 
NPV Profit15 1,222 1,104 901 603 332 1,222
Nominal Profit15  56 121 96 81 16 -30 121
Discounted Profit15 72 57 48 9 -18 72
Harvest ratio (year 15) 
Hake 0.36 0.24 0.30 0.29 0.42 0.86 0.24
Nephrops  0.24 0.23 0.19 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.23
Sole 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.30
Anglerfish 0.32 0.39 0.38 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.39
Megrim 0.27 0.32 0.34 0.47 1.00 1,00 0.32
Catch in (1000 t. for scenarios year 15)
Hake 33.3 40.6 43.2 41.4 33.9 24.2 40.6
Nephrops  3.1 3.7 3.5 4.1 4.1 4.1 3.7
Sole 3.1 2.9 3.2 3.7 3.6 3.6 2.9
Anglerfish 9.8 9.8 9.7 11.4 12.1 11.8 9.8
Megrim 5.8 5.5 5.8 5.8 0.0 0.0 5.5
Effort (1000 DAS. for scenarios year 15)
FRA DTS 12-24 67.6 84.7 73.4 109.4 108.3 107.8 84.7
FRA ESP DTS 24-40  30.6 29.8 33.2 37.4 56.9 50.9 29.8
FRA DFN 12-24 12.7 3.4 13.8 34.7 33.4 32.6 3.3
FRA DFN 24-40 4.8 1.4 5.2 7.2 6.0 5.1 1.4
ESP HOK 24-40 16.3 3.9 17.7 2.9 0.2 17.6 3.9
Fleet (no vessels. for scenarios year 15)
FRA DTS 12-24 313 352 302 391 387 385 352
FRA ESP DTS 24 40  168 156 164 171 203 182 156
FRA DFN 12-24 60 16 66 124 119 117 16
FRA DFN 24-40 19 7 24 26 21 18 7
ESP HOK 24-40 79 16 79 12 5 63 16
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Scenario 1. TAC min 
 
This scenario has been selected as the base scenario. Based on TAC limitations the logic of the dynamic of 
this scenario is to reduce the landings of the first years of the simulation by reducing the sustainable catch. 
It will also imply a reduction of the fishing effort. It also creates some adjustments in the number of 
vessels even if the trends are not the same for all segments. 
 
As can be seen in the figure below between years 3 and 4 of the simulation the target catches tend to rise 
and the landings with them. By year 9, landings are stabilized for the rest of the simulation period. 
Following that, the number of vessels and days at sea also stabilize around the same value as in year 15. 
There is a clear exception to this behaviour for the segment FRA DTS 12-24. This segment from year 3 to 
the end of the simulation is able to increase the catches of all the species except hake (for this species 5 
years are required). Consequently, profits and investment increase up to the 6th year of the simulation. The 
profits will start to decrease but their absolute positive level makes investments possible, and hence the 
number of vessels increases till the end of the simulation. Negative profits of FRA DFN 12-24, FRA 
DFN 24-40 and ESP HOK 24-40 lead to reduction of the fleet till year 7. After this year capacity of these 
three segments is stabilized. 
 
Overall, in year 15 there is a reduction of the total number of vessels compared to the baseline. But this is 
not general for all the segments. Profits and GVA in this year are the highest of the six policy options and 
the landings of all the species are stabilized at a sustainable level (slightly higher levels for anglerfish and 
megrims and lower for the rest of the species than in the base line). NPV Profit15 of the simulation is also 
the highest of the PO selected (Scenario 1 to 6). 
 
Figure 7.3 Results of scenario 1. TAC min 
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Scenario 2. Effort min 
 
Effort min policy gives a lower value (10% lower) in terms of the NPV Profit15 than the TAC min policy. 
Nevertheless this result is obtained in a different way. As in TAC min PO the initial years of the 
simulation present a reduction in the number of days at sea and landings of all the fleets, and this 
reduction is even higher than in TAC min. Landings are not stabilized until year 10 of the simulation.  
 
The main difference, comparing with the TAC min PO, comes from the distribution by fleet of these 
changes. FRA DTS 12-24 is reducing its number of vessels by 30% until period 5 of the simulation. ESP 
HOK 24-40 and FRA DFN 12-24 reduce their fleet by a similar percentage, but afterwards their levels are 
stabilized. In conclusion, TAC min policy option is more restrictive than Effort min policy option for 
these two fleets. 
 
Overall the number of vessels and the total days at sea in year 15 is lower than in the base case but higher 
than in the TAC min option. Considering also the redistribution of this effort among fleets, results show 
how Profit in year 15 and NPV Profit15 are lower than in the TAC min PO even if the trend followed by 
profits can be considered as similar. 
 
Figure 7.4 Results of scenario 2. Effort min 
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Scenario 3. TAC max 
 
TAC max is the policy option with the third highest NPV profit15 after the TAC min and Effort min POs. 
The problem with this PO is that it obtains these results in a non sustainable way. In this policy option 
landings of all the species are increased and in particular H in year 15 of nephrops and megrim are too 
high to be considered as sustainable. It is also possible to find differences in the trend of the landings, 
since the reduction of landings using Effort min or TAC min policy options in the first periods of the 
simulations is smaller than using TAC max. 
 
Total numbers of vessels and total days at sea have increased comparing to the baseline (except for ESP 
HOK 24-40 segment), which is a completely opposite result comparing to the most restrictive POs (TAC 
min and Effort min). This is the main reason for obtaining lower profits than in the previous two (and 
more restrictive) POs. 
 
This TAC max scenario is a clear example of a policy driven by the most abundant species (hake). This 
species is exploited up to the maximum sustainable catch, but in the meantime less abundant species such 
us megrim or nephrops suffer from this exploitation driving their respective fishing mortalities to non 
sustainable levels. 
 
Figure 7.5 Results of scenario 3. TAC max 
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Scenario 4. Effort max  
 
Effort max scenario can be interpreted in this case study as the one showing what happens when the 
policy option creates situations beyond the limits of the exploited system. Exploitation of the megrim is 
fully collapsed and the mortality of the rest of the species is above the H target. The only species that can 
be considered as sustainably exploited is sole.  
 
In the first years of the simulation number of vessels starts to rise or remains constant (for some 
segments). The deteriorated biological situation (see the decreasing trend of the sustainable catch of hake 
and megrim in the figure below) leads to falling profits and some fleets (such as ESP HOK 24-40) will 
disappear.  
 
Profits of all the segments analysed tend to zero and in fact big trawlers face negative profits in the last 
years of the simulation (years 10-15). The NPV Profit15 is lower than in TAC min, Effort min and TAC 
max scenarios. As a conclusion it can be said that the situation in year 15 is clearly unsustainable in 
biological and economic terms. 
 
Figure 7.6 Results of scenario 4. Effort max 
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Scenario 5. Open access 
 
The open access situation presents the results that can be seen in the vast literature describing the regime. 
The dynamics of the different indicators shown in the figure below are similar to the TAC max, but given 
that no limit is imposed in the effort, hake is also depleted.  
 
The overall result of this policy option is that the stocks considered are overexploited, except sole, and 
that overcapacity rises with the highest number of vessels of all the policy options tested (increasing the 
fixed costs). The total catches reach lowest level in year 15, combined with the highest overall effort and 
the lowest NPV Profit15. Again, it can be described as an unsustainable policy option in biological and 
economic terms. 
 
Figure 7.7 Results of scenario 5. Open access 
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Scenario 6. Min  min 
 
This policy is a mix between TAC min and Effort min in the first 4 years of the simulation. Afterwards it 
follows exactly the TAC min policy. In that sense the results obtained by this last policy can be 
extrapolated to the Min min policy option. 
 
Figure 7.8 Results of scenario 6. Min / min 
 
 
 
7.7.2. Role of discount rate (scenarios 7-8) 
 
Table 7.11 Effect of discount rate on profit 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenario
Main scenario 
Discount rate 3.5% 
7.
Discount rate 2% 
8. 
Discount rate 5% 
NPV Profit15  1,222 1,381 1,087
Nominal Profit15 56 121 121 121 
Discounted Profit15  72 90 58 
 
The discount rate affects the NPV of a flow of values; in this case it affects the flow of the profits. The 
first result that can be obtained from Table 7.11 is straightforward, the lower the discount rate the higher 
will be the NPV profit15 and the other way around. The same happens with the discounted value of the 
profit in year 15. 
 
The relative changes (comparing them to main scenario) are not so straightforward. Scenarios 7 and 8 
imply, respectively, a negative and a positive change of the discount rate (1.5 percentage points). The 
profit of year 15 is hence increased by a 25% and decreased by 20%, respectively. While the NPV profit15 
changes by a 13% and 11%, respectively. In other words the same change in absolute terms does not 
imply symmetric relative changes. 
 
The discounted profit in year 15 is always higher than the baseline, for this policy option and for the three 
discount rates selected. The discount rate required to obtain a value lower than the baseline has to be 
higher than 5.40% (note that this result is only valid for this policy option). 
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Scenario 7. Discount rate 2% 
 
The nature of this scenario is to give more weight to the future than to the present in comparison to the 
main scenario. Discounted profit is 90% higher than in the baseline and 25% higher than comparing it to 
the main scenario. In this case the NPV profit15 is 13% higher than in the main scenario. 
 
Scenario 8. Discount rate 5% 
 
The nature of this scenario is to give less weight to the future than to the present in comparison to the 
main scenario. Discounted profit is 3% higher than in the baseline and 19% lower than the main scenario. 
In this case the NPV profit15 is 11% lower than in the main scenario. 
 
7.7.3. Resource rent and recovery of management costs (scenario 9) 
 
This scenario has been selected in a way in which each segment has to make an annual payment equal to 
the management cost allocated to them. The exact allocations by segment, and hence the annual amount 
to recover by segment, is based on the cost of support (EFF Axis 1 in Table 7.7) and management and 
research costs (Table 7.8) are 7.9 mln euro for FRA DTS 12-24, 11 mln euro for FRA+ESP DTS 24-40, 
2.8 mln euro for FRA-DFN 12-24, 0.9 million euro for FRA DFN 24-40 and 5.9 mln euro for ESP HOK 
24-40. It implies approximately 28.5 mln euro per year or a NPV of 328 mln euro in the 15 years of the 
simulation (using a discount rate of 3.5%).  
 
In this scenario the NPV profit15 will be 1,190 mln euro and hence adding the NPV of the payments for 
access made (328 mln euro) the result is 1,518 million euro, that is, 296 mln euro above the main scenario 
(TAC min). It implies that additional rents are obtained given that the fixed payments are creating the 
right incentives. 
 
In particular there are two fleets affected in the simulation period; FRA DTS 12-24 will increase the 
investment and the fleet will be bigger after the period 4 of the simulation while the FRA+SP DTS 24-40 
segment will be reduced. The rest of the segments are not being affected until the period 7 of the 
simulation in which all the remaining segments face a small disinvestment. This re-distribution of the fleet 
induced by the cost recovery system is creating these higher NPV profits15 through a reduction of the total 
number of vessels while total catches are similar. 
 
Table 7.12 Resource rent and recovery of management cost 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios 
Main scenario: 
No recovery of management 
costs 
9. 
Recovery of 
management costs 
NPV GVA15 (mln euro)  3,477 3,137 
Nominal GVA15 (mln euro) 56 333 336 
NPV Profit15  1,222 1,190 
Fixed payment for access (mln 
euro)/year 
 0 28.5 
NPV Payment for access15  0 328 
Nom Profit (mln euro) 55.7 121 125 
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Figure 7.9 Results of scenario 9. Recovery of management costs 
 
 
 
7.7.4. Optimization of capacity (scenarios 10-14)  
 
Table 7.13 Impact of optimization of the fleet size 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios*
  Main 
scenario 
TAC min
10.
Static 
present 
fleet 
11.
Static 
minimum 
fleet 
12.
Dynamic 
minimum 
fleet 
13. 
Optimum 
fleet 
(GVA) 
14.
Optimum 
fleet 
(profit) 
NPV Profit15 (mln euro)  1,222 922 1,279 1,461 1,481 1,742
Nominal Profit15 (mln euro) 56 121 98 132 143 118 175
Discounted Profit15 (mln 
euro) 56 72 59 79 86 70 105 
Fleet15 (no vessels) 639 547 650 472 440 705 353
Effort15 (1000 DAS) 132 123 123 106 123 198 99
Catch15 (1000 t) 110 63 63 61 63 68 66
*NPV row refers to the sum, Other rows refer to the value in year 15. 
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Scenario 10. Static present fleet 
 
This scenario is based on maintaining the number and composition of the present (baseline) fleet 
throughout the whole simulation period and simultaneously using the TAC min policy option. As it can be 
seen in Table 7.13 the NPV Profit15 is lower than in the main scenario. The reason for this is that in the 
first years of the simulation the existing bigger fleet do not to follow the (dis)investment decisions 
reducing the total profits. This effect is maintained in all the years of the simulation. 
 
As it can be seen in the figure below, levels of landings, as well as the sustainable catches are almost the 
same as in the main scenario. The reason for that is that independently to the dynamics of the fleet, the 
TAC min policy option is the main driver of the fishery.  
 
Figure 7.10 Results of scenario 10. Adaptation with ‘present’ fleet 
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Scenario 11. Static minimum fleet  
 
In this scenario it is assumed that each vessel uses the maximum possible effort of the first year. Given 
that the current effort is lower than the maximum possible, the number of vessels of each segment will be 
reduced in the first year of the simulation. This number of vessels is maintained constant at this minimum 
level.  
 
The year 15 of the simulation shows a lower number of vessels than in the scenario 1. In this particular 
case study it reduces the number of vessels comparing to the main scenario obtaining a higher NPV 
profit15 than in the TAC min PO in which investment decisions are considered (scenario 1). Profit in year 
15 is a 9% higher than in the TAC min PO.  
 
Overall the profit shows an increasing trend until year 5 of the simulation and then it remains stable. 
Number of vessels, effort and catches are also stable through the simulation period. These catches can be 
considered to be sustainable. 
 
The policy can be considered as sustainable in biological and economic terms. 
 
 
Figure 7.11 Results of scenario 11. Static minimum fleet 
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Scenario 12. Dynamic minimum fleet  
 
In this scenario each vessel uses the maximum effort that they can in each year of the simulation. The 
total effort allowed follows from the policy option and this drives the evolution of the different segments. 
 
The number of vessels is reduced at the beginning of the simulation, but after year 4 it starts to rise. At the 
end the results present higher NPV profit15 and level of catches as in scenarios 10 and 11 (present fleet 
and minimum –static- fleet) and the lowest number of vessels of all the scenarios tested.  
 
The policy can be considered as sustainable in biological and economic terms. 
 
 
Figure 7.12 Results of scenario 12. Dynamic minimum fleet 
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Scenario 13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 
 
This scenario maximizes NPV GVA15. The optimization is free (no restrictions) under the following 
constraints:  
 The fishing mortalities (F) of all the species have to be equal or lower to 1. This constraint is simply 
considering than an H higher than 1 is unrealistic39. 
 At least 1 vessel per segment is required in all the periods. Furthermore, the number of vessels in each 
segment changes at most by +/-20% from one year to next. 
 
Results of the simulation show how the NPV GVA15 can be increased by 11% from 3,477 to 3,888 mln 
euro. This is not made by reducing the total number of vessels, at least in overall terms. Actually, the 
optimization procedure increases the number of vessels of the segments. In the first two periods of the 
simulation all the segments reduce their number of vessels. Afterwards there are small changes in the 
number of vessels of the segments but of minor magnitude except for the FRA DTS 12-24 and 
FRA+ESP DTS 24-40 segments. These two segments start to increase their number of vessels up to a 
level beyond (FRA DTS 12-24) or similar (FRA+ESP DTS 24-40) to the baseline situation.  
 
It is also remarkable that the GVA in year 15 is slightly lower than in scenario 12 even if the NPV GVA15 
is higher. 
Nevertheless and even if the NPV profit15 is higher than the rest of the fleet changes scenarios and also 
than the baseline scenario (1,481 mln euro) which implies that the maximization of the GVA goes in line 
with the maximization of the rent obtained, the maximum profit is not obtained, and obviously it will 
require a reduced number of vessels as it will be shown in scenario 14. 
 
  
                                                     
39 It is straightforward that this constraint is implicit in the other scenarios tested. Nevertheless for this scenario it 
has to be made it explicit for computing (optimization) purposes. 
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Figure 7.13 Results of scenario 13. Optimum fleet 
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Scenario 14. Optimum fleet (profit) 
 
This second optimum fleet scenario has been designed determining the number of vessels of each 
segment from the period 2 to the period 15 of the simulation in a way in which the NPV of the net profit 
is maximized. The optimization is free (no restrictions) except for some constraints that have been used in 
order to obtain “real” and interior solutions. In particular the constraints used are: 
 The fishing mortalities (F) of all the species have to be equal or lower to 1. This constraint is simply 
considering that an H higher than 1 is unrealistic40. 
 At least 1 vessel per segment is required in all the periods. Furthermore, the number of vessels in each 
segment changes at most by +/-20% from one year to next. 
 
Results of the simulation show how the NPV of the net profit can be increased by 42% from 1,222 to 
1,742 mln euro. This is made by reducing the total number of vessels in overall terms and by segment. 
NPV of the GVA will be slightly higher than in the base line scenario. 
 
It can be seen how profits of all the segments will steadily increase till period 10 of the simulation. 
Afterwards they will remain stable, while catches will remain at approximately the same level as in the 
baseline scenario. 
 
Figure 7.14 Results of scenario 14. Optimum fleet (profit) 
 
                                                     
40 It is straightforward that this constraint is implicit in the other scenarios tested. Nevertheless for this scenario it 
has to be made it explicit for computing (optimization) purposes. 
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These results can be better explained by comparing them with scenario 13. 
 
Figure 7.15 Comparison between scenario 13 and scenario 14.  
 
 
Table 7.14 Comparison of scenarios 13 and 14 (values in mln euro, fleet number of vessels) 
  Scenario 13 Scenario 14 
NPV GVA15 3,888 3,569  
NPV profit15 1,481 1,742  
NPV Crew costs15 2,114 1,671  
NPV capital costs15 292 156  
GVA year 15 354 367 
Profit year 15 118 175 
Crew costs year 15 205 175 
Capital costs year 15 31 17 
Fleet – average 1-15 573 281 
Fleet – year 15 705 353 
 
As it can be seen the main difference between scenarios comes from the fleet size. When GVA is 
maximized one fleet (FR DTS 12-24) increases their size compared to the baseline situation. When Profits 
are maximized all the fleets reduce their size at the beginning of the period. This can be easily seen in the 
figure above, where scenario 13 presents increasing trends for the fleet along the simulation while scenario 
14 presents a flat trend.  
 
In terms of the Gross profit and crew costs (per vessel) in both cases the trends are similar, but not the 
value of the index. It is clear how scenario 14 presents an index value for both indicators that double the 
one obtained in scenario 13. 
 
Considering the absolute values, scenario 14 always gives higher gross profit (except for the first three 
periods of the simulation in which the possible increments of the fleet sizes are constrained) but lower 
crew costs. This is a consequence of the nature of scenario 13 in which the maximum of the sum of these 
variables (discounted) is the target and hence the labour remuneration is optimized by increasing the 
number of vessels (scenario 13). 
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Both objectives (max profit and max GVA) are quite different in the results that are provided. Max GVA 
(scenario 13) is based on increasing the fleet (at least one segment) and by increasing the remuneration of 
the labour the value added is increased. On the other hand, scenario 14 increases the performance by 
vessel of each vessel individually, but with a much lower number of vessels on hence with lower absolute 
values on the labour remuneration. 
 
7.7.5. Assumptions and technical background (by main model modules)  
 
The main assumption considered in this case study is how to allocate AER 2009 data. 
AER 2009 provides data of the French and Spanish fleet segments targeting the northern stock of hake in 
a multispecies context. Nevertheless it has some limitations that have been solved, for the purpose of this 
study, combining the different sources of information. The main difficulties encountered are: 
 The fleet segments considered for Spain are not split for the Mediterranean and Atlantic areas. 
Furthermore for the case of the Atlantic some vessels only operate in the ICES Division VIIIc, which 
corresponds to the southern stock of hake (same species but different management stock. which is 
being exploited only by Spain and Portugal). 
 The fleet segments considered for France are not split for the Mediterranean and Atlantic areas.  
 AER 2009 does not provide capital costs for the Spanish segments  
 AER 2009 does not provide fixed costs for the French segments. 
 
Considering these limitations several assumptions and modifications have been done in order to extract 
from the AER 2009 the corresponding number of vessels and their economic performance variables. 
 
The data sources available and used, for doing so, are:  
 The AER 2009 
 SEC (2007). "Impact assessment of long-term management plans for northern hake”  
 (SGBRE-05-07) and the ICES (several years). Report of the Working Group on the Assessment of 
Southern Shelf Stocks of Hake, Monk and Megrim (WGHMM). I. C. A. 09. Copenhagen. 
 
The steps considered to convert the data of the segments of AER 2009 to data of the northern hake case 
study are: 
 Select the segments to be considered from SEC (2007) 
 Compare the data of both countries used in the SEC (2007) with the data of the AER and assume that 
the proportion of the vessels targeting northern hake by segment remains constant. 
 Capital cost for Spain has been obtained from a subset of vessels from which data exists and 
extrapolated to the rest of the fleet. This subset is for the vessels with base ports Ondarroa and Pasaia 
and accounts for approximately the 30% of the total Spanish fleets targeting northern stock of hake. 
 Fixed costs for France have been obtained from (SEC 2007). 
 Missing prices have been obtained from the AER 2009 assuming the same price/segment structure 
for France and Spain. 
 
Some other assumptions have been made through the estimation of the parameters: 
 Elasticity for biomass and effort of the production function have been obtained from M. Dolores 
Garza-Gil, Manuel M. Varela-Lafuente, Juan C. Surís-Regueiro (2003). European hake fishery 
bioeconomic management (southern stock) applying an effort tax. Fisheries Research 60. PP199–206. 
For the rest of the segments similarities between gears have been used to fix these parameters. 
 Finally some estimations of the growth function of some stocks (anglerfish and nephrops) have been 
made by fixing the carrying capacity at the maximum of a moving average. The reason for that is that 
given the available data it has been impossible to obtain a statistically significant estimation of intrinsic 
growth rate and carrying capacity simultaneously. 
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8. ATLANTIC ANCHOVY FISHERIES 
 
 
8.1. Summary and conclusions 
 
Main conclusion 
 
The four segments analysed in this fishery realized in 2005-7 on average a total net loss of 21 mln euro. 
Average annual discounted net profit ranges under most scenarios between 7 and 66 mln euro. 
Elimination of overcapacity and recovery of stocks would produce a discounted net profit of 5-507 mln 
euro by the year 15. (see Figure 8.1) 
 
Summary of the case study 
 
Anchovy of the Bay of Biscay is a short-lived pelagic fish. The stock experiences large inter-annual 
fluctuations in abundance caused mainly by variations in recruitment mostly driven by environmental 
factors. Recruitment has been very low since 2001. In particular, recruitment of the year 2004 was 
classified as a failure. This has resulted in a decline of the stock and led to the closure of the fishery in the 
second half of 2005 until 2009. In year 2010 the fishery has been reopened with a low TAC of 7,000 
tonnes. The anchovy has historically been one of the main resources of revenues for the Spanish purse 
seiner fleet and for French purse seiners and trawlers. 
 
Anchovy fishery has traditionally been managed through annual TACs shared between France and Spain. 
Currently a Long Term Management Plan for this species is under development.  
 
A variety of policy scenarios has been tested in this multi-species and multi-fleet fishery. Three of the 
policy options are restrictive (TAC min and Effort min and Min min) and the others are less restrictive 
(TAC max and Effort max). Restrictive policies options produce biologically sustainable results (F below 
the H target) while non-restrictive policies do not.  
 
Among all the sustainable policies, the one with the highest sustainable NPV Profit15 is the Effort min and 
it is also the one giving the highest sustainable catches, in that sense this policy option (PO) is the one 
closest to the MSY concept of the policy options analysed. Following these two characteristics this policy 
has been selected as the baseline scenario.  
 
The discount rate is an important factor that has to be taken into account to calculate the net present 
value of the profit. It makes it necessary to test different discounts rates. As expected, depending on the 
discount rate selected the NPV Profit15 differs considerably. For the baseline policy option the NPV 
Profit15 is a 15% lower than when the discount rate used is 5% rather than 3.5% and 18% higher when the 
discount rate used is 2.5%.  
 
Several scenarios deal with the question of instantaneous or gradual adaptation of the fleet. These 
scenarios show how when the fleets are set constant at the initial level and when the fleets are reduced to 
the minimum required level in year one and this level is maintained throughout the period, the NPV 
Profit15 is lower than in the baseline PO. However, the dynamic minimum fleet scenario gives higher rents 
than the baseline scenario.   
 
The optimum fleet size, calculated by maximizing the NPV Profit15, is higher than in the baseline scenario, 
but this conclusion can vary if each segment is analysed separately. In that sense it can be concluded that 
the overcapacity has to be measured at the segment level and not at a fishery level. 
 
The feasibility and consequences of the full recovery of management costs have been also analysed. The 
management costs allocated to each segment are assumed fixed. In this case, additional rents can be 
captured by society because they set the right incentives. In this particular case study the NPV Profit15 are 
higher when the management costs are recovered than when they are recovered (without adding up the 
net present value of the payments).  
 Figure 8.
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the fleet is, the rents are higher or lower than the rents given by the baseline PO. The implementation of 
the system of recovery of management costs creates additional total rents which including the payments 
are around the 84%.  
 
 
8.2. Case study definition  
 
8.2.1. Fleet and landings 
 
Anchovy of the Bay of Biscay is exploited by the Spanish purse seiner fleet, French purse seiner fleet and 
French pair trawler fleet. Two different segments exploit anchovy in each country (SP PTS 12-24 and SP 
PTS 24-40 in Spain and in France the segments are FR PTS 12-24 and FR PTS 24-40). 
 
The number of Spanish vessels operating in the fishery is around 150. 20 of them belong to the SP PTS 
12-24 segment and 130 of them to the SP PTS 24-40 segment. For France, the segment FR PTS 12-24 has 
96 vessels and the segment FR PTS 12-24 has 49. As  Table 8.1 shows, the Spanish PTS 24-40 segment 
has the highest total gross tonnage (18,600 GT), followed by French PTS 24-40 (7,900 GT).  
 
The specified fleets account for the 100% of the TAC of anchovy of the Bay of Biscay. Role of anchovy 
in total landings has been very low in the last few years as fishery has been closed since 2005. However, 
before the fishery closure the anchovy used to contribute between 25% and 40% of the total revenues for 
Spanish fleets and around 30% of the total of fishing value of the French fleet. The fishery has been 
reopened in 2010, with a TAC of 7,000 tonnes. 
 
Volume of landings of anchovy in the Bay of Biscay decreased from 37,000 tonnes in 2000 to 16,000 
tonnes in 2004. Apart from 2000 and 2001, the French pelagic trawlers and purse seines accounted for the 
biggest share of the landing value. In year 2010 80% of the TAC is going to be exploited by Spain and 
20% by France. 
 
The French anchovy fishery in ICES area VIII has been under license schemes since the end of 2007. The 
decommissioning schemes were implemented, especially in 2007, to reduce the size of the fleet. The 
Spanish fleet has been also reduced considerably in the last years (40% approximately). 
 
Apart from anchovy, these fleets also exploit other species. Spanish fleet exploits mackerel, bluefin tuna 
and albacore, which currently is the main source of revenues of SP PTS 24-40. France exploits pilchard, 
bluefin tuna and European seabass. Species considered in this case study are mackerel, bluefin tuna, 
albacore and pilchard given that these species have the highest percentage of catches for the entire fleet as 
a whole. 
 
Table 8.1 Role of target species (average 2005-7) 
MS Gear Size No. 
vessels 
GT 
(1000) 
Landings (1000 t) Value (mln euro)
Target species Total Target species Total
SP PTS 12-24 20 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.2 1.9
SP PTS 24-40 130 18.6 23.7 26.1 44.9 45.9
FR PTS 12-24 96 7.4 22.6 32.3 17.0 36.5
FR PTS 24-40 49 7.9 22.0 25.1 32.6 39.3
Total  295 34.4 68.6 83.9 94.7 235.0
Source: DCR 2007 
 
As it can be seen in Table 8.1 target species in this case study accounts for 40% of the total revenues.  
 
Table 8.2 Role of case study fisheries within national fishery sectors (average 2005-7) 
Member State Total fishery sector Case study fleets 
Total revenues 
(mln euro) 
Total fleet 
(number of vessels) 
Revenues
(mln euro) 
Fleet 
(number of vessels) 
France 1,248 4,737 47.8 143 
Spain 1,735 13,725 75.8 152 
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Table 8.2. shows how Spanish fleet of this case study accounts for 1% of the total fleet of the fishery 
sector. In France this fleet represents around the 3% of the total national fleet. 
 
8.2.2. Composition of landings 
 
Table 8.3 Composition of landings by segment (1000 tonnes) (average 2005-7) 
MS Gear Size Anchovy Mackerel Bluefin 
tuna 
Albacore Pilchard Other Total
SP PTS 12-24 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.41
SP PTS 24-40 0.24 4.1 3.2 10.9 5.5 2.4 26.3
FR PTS 12-24 0.02 6.2 0.4 2.2 13.9 9.7 32.4
FR PTS 24-40 0.02 5.1 5.5 0.1 11.3 3.1 25.1
Total  0.30 15.5 9.1 13.3 30.7 15.4 84.3
Source: DCR 2007 
 
Table 8.4 shows the composition of the value of landings by segment. Pilchard is an important species for 
French fleets, and albacore for Spanish fleets. The amount of anchovy landings is very low in general 
terms due to the anchovy closure from 2005 to 2007. Mackerel has an important amount of landings for 
all the segments analysed. Segments with a longer size have higher landings of bluefin tuna, while the 
albacore landings are different between all segments but especially important for the biggest Spanish 
segment (SP_PTS 24_40). 
 
Table 8.4 Composition of landings by segment (mln euro) (average 2005-7) 
MS Gear Size Anchovy Mackerel Bluefin 
tuna 
Albacore Pilchard Other Total
SP PTS 12-24 0.07 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.7 1.9
SP PTS 24-40 1.44 2.5 14.0 26.0 2.5 0.9 47.3
FR PTS 12-24 0.17 3.7 1.9 5.2 6.2 19.5 36.7
FR PTS 24-40 0.17 3.1 24.1 0.3 5.1 6.7 39.5
Total  1.85 9.3 40.1 31.5 13.8 28.9 125.45
Source: DCR 2007 
 
As it can be seen in Table 8.4 anchovy contribution to these fleets is very low from 2005 to 2007 due to 
the closure of the fishery. Compared to other segments, SP PTS 12-24 catches relatively low quantities of 
bluefin tuna and albacore while other species play an important role in the total landings. On the contrary, 
the catch of the segment SP PTS 24-40 is mainly composed of target species and only 9% is related to 
other species. Pilchard is more important for the French fleet than for Spanish fleet. 
 
 
8.3. Historical indicators  
 
Highest catch records of anchovy in Subarea VIII (Bay of Biscay) was 83,61541 tonnes in 1965. After this 
year catches of anchovy sharply decreased, and have never again risen above 48,400 tonnes.  
 
Catches of mackerel were low in the 1960s, but increased up to more than 800,000 tonnes in 1993. The 
1996 catch and TAC were reduced by 200,000 tonnes compared with 1995. The catches have been stable 
since 1998. The SSB of the Western stock declined in the 1970s from above 3.0 mln tonnes to 2.2 mln in 
1994, and then it increased up to 2.7 million tonnes in 1999. The precautionary management plan for 
Northeast Atlantic mackerel implies catches between 527,000 t and 572,000 t in 2010. The SSB is expected 
to remain stable in 2011 for a catch in this range. Consequently, the catches at MSY level could be around 
550,000 tonnes. 
 
                                                     
41 Ices Advice 2009. Book 7. 
180 
 
Declared catches of bluefin tuna in the East Atlantic and Mediterranean reached a peak of over 50,000 
tonnes in 1996, and then decreased substantially, stabilizing around TAC levels of 35,000 tonnes 
established by ICCAT for the most recent period. The 2007 and 2008 reported catches were at 34,514 
tonnes and 23,868 tonnes respectively. Although the results of the projections are highly dependent on the 
estimated state of the stock in 2007 and future recruitment levels (both being uncertain), ICCAT considers 
it unlikely that the stock can be rebuilt in 15 years, at 50% probability. This implies short term yields at 
15,000 tonnes or less, but the long-term gain could lead to catches of about 50,000 tonnes with substantial 
increases in spawning biomass. 
 
Total reported landings of albacore for the North Atlantic began to decline after 1986, due to a reduction 
of fishing effort by the traditional surface (trolling and bait boats) and longline fisheries. Some 
stabilization was observed in the 1990s, mainly due to the increased effort and catch by new surface 
fisheries (driftnets and mid-water pelagic pair trawl) with a maximum catch in 2006 at 36,989 tonnes. Since 
2006 a decreasing trend of catch is observed in the North Atlantic. According to ICCAT, the catch limit 
of 29,000 tonnes can be considered as an estimate of MSY. 
 
The current fishing mortality of pilchard does not appear detrimental for the development of the stock, 
which is largely driven by the incoming recruitment. Therefore, ICES advises on the basis of exploitation 
boundaries in relation to precautionary considerations that the current level of fishing mortality (0.2) could 
be maintained as a guide for management. This corresponds to a catch of 75,000 tonnes in 2010. The 
average catches of the recent years have been around 96,000 tonnes. 
 
Fleet size of this case study has been decreasing over time. Spanish fleet has decreased by 32% from 2000 
to 2007, and the French fleet by about 17%.  
 
 
8.4. Fleet efficiency  
 
Table 8.5 Economic indicators (average 2005-7) 
MS Gear Size Gross 
value 
added  
(mln euro) 
Profit 
(mln euro)
Employ-
ment 
(FTE) 
Average 
price 
(euro/t) 
Fuel costs 
as % of 
income 
Profit / 
tonnes 
landings 
CPUE 
total 
(t/day) 
CPUE 
target 
species 
(t/day) 
SP PTS 12-24 0.5 -0.9 107.0 1,1 13% -2.9 0.5 0
SP PTS 24-40 17.6 -12.9 1,9 1,6 14% -0.6 12.5 0
FR PTS 12-24 18.1 -1.8 551 1,2 15% -0.06 16.8 0
FR PTS 24-40 12.1 -1.3 312 1,9 19% -0.06 9.3 0
Total  48.3 -16.9 2,9 5,8 15% -3.6 39.1 0
Source: DCR 2007 and ICES 2009 and SEC 2007  
 
Table 8.5 shows how segment FR PTS 24-40 has the highest income per vessel followed by FR PTS 12-24 
and SP PTS 24-40. The segment FR PTS 24-40 has also the highest GVA per vessel and GVA per FTE. 
On the other hand, the segment SP PTS 12-24 has the lowest indicators, except for the income per GT 
and the GVA per man-day. With regard to the GVA per man-day the segment SP PTS 24-40 has the 
lowest value. In conclusion, French fleets are economically more efficient than Spanish purse seiner fleet. 
The larger the vessel the higher the efficiency (GVA/vessel and GVA/FTE) it achieves. 
Nevertheless in terms of rent generated, all segments present negative profits which imply that an 
efficiency indicator such as the ratio of profit by landed tonne will also be negative, specially for the 
Spanish segments. 
 
  
 Figure 8.
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if STECF advises that the spawning stock biomass at spawning time in 2006 is less than 28,000 tonnes”. 
As the anchovy spawning stock biomass in 2006 was below the threshold of 28,000 tonnes42, the fishery 
was banned on the 21st July of 2006 (Commission Regulation (EC) Nº 116/2006, 20th July 2006). 
Anchovy fishery has been closed for five years. In 2010 the fishery has been reopened with a TAC of 
7,000 tonnes. Mackerel, bluefin tuna and albacore are also managed by TACs and quotas. Pilchard, on the 
contrary, does not have any explicit management objectives. 
 
The European Commission has adopted a proposal for a long-term plan to manage the anchovy stock in 
the Bay of Biscay (Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a long- term plan for the anchovy stock 
in the Bay of Biscay and the fisheries exploiting that stock (SEC (2009) 1076 final). This plan proposes a 
rule to determine the TAC based on the biological situation of the stock 
 
8.5.2. Output management 
 
Property rights 43 
 
In case of Spain, TURFs44 are implemented in the anchovy fishery in the Bay of Biscay through Spain’s 
fishing guilds. Fishing guilds have managed to survive by adapting to the changing political conditions in 
recent years and to the collapse of key resources such as anchovy. The rights to exploit the anchovy in the 
Bay of Biscay belong to the fishing guilds. Rights are allocated for an indefinite period of time. The civil 
society and law recognize the role of fishing guilds and their traditional rights to coastal areas and their 
exploitation. Territorial rights are not transferable. 
 
In France, the licences are coupled with other rights-based arrangements such as geographical limits, 
community based catch quota and individual non-transferable quotas. Rights are transferable between 
POs (Community Catch Quota), not between individuals. Quotas may be divided into sub-quotas per PO 
if the level of quota usage exceeds 70% during at least one of the three previous years. The calculation of 
the sub-quotas is a function of three criteria: i) track record of each PO member vessel: ii) market 
orientation; iii) socioeconomic equilibrium. 
 
8.5.3. Input management 
 
Effort restrictions  
 
In the case of Spain, the fishing guilds play a key role (non-profit bodies of public law, Fisheries Law 
Article 45). The fishing guilds have the right to regulate some aspects of the management of the anchovy 
fishery. They regulate the entry of vessels and fishermen in the fishery so that anybody aiming to fish must 
become a member of the fishing guilds. Entry of new fishing vessels is regulated by the DGPE45. Fishing 
guilds also play a constitutionally recognized role as providers of advice to the state and autonomous 
government with regards to technical measures. There is no direct access to fishing rights for newcomers. 
Rights are tradable only among vessels which are already permitted to participate in the fishery. Thus 
newcomers can only access rights by purchasing the triad vessel-license-right from the active boat owners. 
 
In case of France, newcomers must acquire a licence for stocks under special fishing permit or national 
licence and submit a demand of transfer of quotas. A reserve of quotas has also been created to provide 
some track record for new entrants to the sector. The concentration of fishing rights was partly frozen 
                                                     
42 The threshold is used to prevent stock collapse along with the Minimum Biological Acceptable Level based (Blim) 
on spawning stock biomass, currently implemented for small pelagic fish and other species. The Article 5 of Council 
Regulation 51/2006 requires the Commission to prohibit fishing activities if STECF advises that the spawning stock 
size in 2006 is less than 28,000 tons. Nowadays the biomass precautionary reference (Bpa) point of 33,000 tonnes is 
established by the European Union, the limit which would allow the reopening of the anchovy fishing grounds. 
43 “ An analysis of existing Rights – Based Management (RBM) instruments in Member States and on setting up best 
practices in the EU. Final Report: Part II. Catalogue of Rights-Based Management Instruments in coastal EU 
Member States”. European Commission. 
44 TURF is Territorial Use Right in Fisheries. 
45 DGPE denotes Directorate General of State Property. 
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under control related to modification of quotas sharing rules in 2006: there is a fixed reference year for 
quota sharing and professional and administrative arrangements to control transfer of quota. 
 
Input property rights 
 
In Spain rights have been concentrated in Galician fleets because they seem to be more economically 
efficient. This has caused a restructuring of the fleet. The fleet of the Basque region has been reduced in 
terms of rights and number of vessels. The current regulation APA/3773/2006 does not specify any limits 
on concentration of fishing rights.  
 
Regarding France, fishing enterprise/fishermen must first obtain an exploitation authorisation for its 
vessels and a Community fishing licence. Set up in 1988, the PME46 is the main instrument of fishing 
capacity control set up in relation to the Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGP). It is the main 
instrument to control capacity and the geographical distribution of the different segments of the French 
fishing fleet. It is a general requirement and each fishing vessel must obtain a PME before being allowed 
to fish. The PME determines a number of the vessel’s technical characteristics such as length (loa), power 
(kW), and tonnage (GT or UMS). Therefore it is directly related to the EU Fleet Register. 
 
8.6. Management costs 
 
8.6.1. Summary of OECD data 
 
The allocation of OECD management costs to each fleet segment (Table 8.6) has been made using the 
relative weight of the income obtained by each segment to the total income of the MS to which each 
segment belongs. In that sense more than the 60% of the total management costs have been allocated to 
the SP PTS 24-40 followed by FR PTS 12-24 with 30%.  
 
Table 8.6 Management costs according to OECD, average 2004-2006 (mln euro) 
 
FRA
PTS 
12-24 
FRA
PTS 
24-40 
ESP
PTS 
12-24 
ESP 
PTS  
24-40 Total 
Direct Payments 1.1 1.1 0.2 3.8 6.2 
 - Decommissioning 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.8 1.7 
 - Fleet renewal and modernization 0.5 0.5 0.1 2.3 3.4 
 - Other 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.7 1.1 
General Services 1.3 0.1 0.1 1.4 2.9 
 - Management and enforcement 0.4 0.4 0 0 0.8 
 - Research  0.9 0.9 0.0 0.1 1.9
 - Other 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.4 1.5 
Total 2.3 0.5 0.2 5.2 8.2 
 
 
8.6.2. Support to fishing sector (FIFG and EFF) 
 
In terms of the support to the fishing sector, Spain spends 89.6 million euro on EFF Axis 1 and France 
20.4 mln euro.  
 
Table 8.7 Average annual support to the marine fisheries from FIFG and EFF, (mln euro) 
 
FRA
PTS 
12-24 
FRA
PTS 
24-40 
ESP
PTS 
12-24 
ESP 
PTS  
24-40 Total 
FIFG - Axis 1 and 2 1.2 1.2 0.2 5.1 7.7 
EFF - Axis 1 0.3 0.4 0.2 3.8 4.8 
 
                                                     
46 PME is the “Permis de mise en exploitation”. 
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The allocation by fleet segment has been made using the same weights as for the OECD data. As Table 
8.7 shows, the amount allocated in FIFG (Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 2002 – 2006) is 
almost the double of EFF (European Fisheries Fund 2007 -2013). Again SP PTS 24-40 is accounting for 
more than the 65%. 
 
8.6.3. Costs of research and management  
 
In terms of the costs of research and management, Spain expends 27.6 million euro if management is 
considered and 16.72 million euro considering only research. The values for France are 16.8 million euro 
and 15.78 million euro, respectively. 
 
Table 8.8 Estimated management and research costs, (mln euro) 
 
FRA
PTS 
12-24 
FRA
PTS 
24-40 
ESP
PTS 
12-24 
ESP 
PTS 
24-40 Total 
Management, control, enforcement  0.5 0.5 0.0 0.8 1.8 
Research (DCF+30%) 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.5 
Sources: MRAG (2008) and Com. Decision 811/2009 
 
The allocation by fleet segment has been made using the same weights as for the OECD data (see Table 
8.8). In respect to management, control and enforcement costs, ESP PTS 24-40 has the highest allocation. 
On the contrary, in respect to research costs French fleets have the highest allocation. 
 
 
8.7. Estimation of the resource rent 
 
8.7.1. Comparison of scenarios  
 
The first six scenarios in Table 8.9 can be divided in two types: more restrictive policies (TAC min, Effort 
min and Min min) and non-restrictive policies (TAC max, Effort Max and Open access). The non-
restrictive scenarios give higher (almost two times) NPV Profit15 than the more restrictive policies. The 
problem in non-restrictive scenarios is that they are unsustainable given that some target species become 
overexploited. Therefore, the only sustainable policies in the present case study are TAC min, Effort min 
and Min min. Among all these sustainable policies Effort min is the one with a highest NPV Profit15.  
 
The two following scenarios are related to the discount rate. Scenarios 7 and 8 have considered a lower 
(2%) and a higher (5%) discount rate and their impact on NPV Profit15. There is an increase of 18% in the 
NPV Profit15 when the discount rate is 2%, while when the discount rate increases to 5% NPV Profit15 
decreases by 15%. 
 
Last four scenarios explore possible adaptation paths of the fleets by fixing the number of vessels to the 
baseline level (scenario 10), using the minimum number of vessels in a static sense (scenario 11) or in a 
dynamic sense (scenario 12). In scenario 13 the optimum fleet that maximizes the NPV GVA15 has been 
estimated. Finally a maximization of the rent has been estimated by changing the fleet size and 
composition (scenario 14). In this case the rent that can be obtained (NPV Profit15) is the highest one and 
has been calculated to be 985 mln euro. 
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Table 8.9 Comparison of the scenarios 
Scenario  
no. 
Effort 
(1000 DAS) 
Fleet
(no. vessels) 
Catch
(1000 t) 
Profit year 15 
(mln euro) 
NPV Profit15 
(mln euro) 
Average values 2005-7
2005-7  48.1 295.0 90.1 -20.8 
Values in year 15 of the scenario
1. TAC min 16.8 94 53.5 16.28 103.84 
2. Effort min 24.5 153 70.2 16.12 160.98 
3. TAC max 64.4 330 133.2 25.24 308.99 
4. Effort max 70.8 361 134.2 25.26 347.25 
5. Open access 70.8 361 134.2 25.26 347.25 
6. Min min 16.9 94 53.5 16.32 100.33 
7. Discount rate 2% 24.5 152 70.2 20.07 190.37 
8. Discount rate 5% 24.5 152 70.2 12.99 136.30 
9. Recovery mgt. costs 24.1 146 68.7 17.30 169.89 
10. Static present fleet 24.5 295 70.2 4.84 -4.98 
11. Static minimum fleet 24.5 251 70.2 8.36 57.34 
12. Dynamic min. fleet 24.5 127 70.2 17.74 235.39 
13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 100 498 137 33.42 594.16 
14. Optimum fleet (profit) 36 176 89 50.40 985.20 
 
8.7.2. Policy options (scenarios 1-6)  
 
Table 8.10 Effect of different policies on profit, harvest ratio, catches, effort and fleet 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios**
1. TAC 
min 
2. Effort 
min 
3. TAC 
max 
4. Effort 
max 
5. Open 
access 
6. Min 
min 
NPV Profit15 103.84 160.98 308.99 347.25 347.25 100.33
Nominal Profit15 -20.8 27.28 27.01 42.29 42.33 42.33 27.35
Discounted Profit15 16.28 16.12 25.24 25.26 25.26 16.32
Harvest ratio (year 15)*
Anchovy 0.81 0.17 0.25 0.69 0.78 0.78 1.00
Mackerel 0.18 0.06 0.08 0.26 0.31 0.31 1.00
Bluefin tuna 0.24 0.09 0.11 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Albacore 0.29 0.07 0.11 0.23 0.22 0.22 1.00
Pilchard 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.26 0.31 0.31 1.00
Catch in (1000 t, for scenarios year 15)
Anchovy 22 16.3 21.9 35.6 33.0 33.0 16.3
Mackerel 15 8.6 11.4 25.7 25.9 25.9 8.6
Bluefin tuna 10 6.4 6.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 6.5
Albacore 15 8.0 11.4 21.7 21.4 21.4 8.0
Pilchard 28 14.2 19.1 49.7 53.9 53.9 14.2
Effort (1000 DAS, for scenarios year 15)
ESP PS 12-24 3 1 1 3 3 3 1
ESP PS 24-40 20 7 10 19 18 18 7
FRA PS 12-24 18 5 9 23 22 22 5
FRA PS 24-40 8 4 4 20 27 27 4
Fleet (no vessels, for scenarios year 15)
ESP PS 12-24 20 5 8 19 19 19 5
ESP PS 24-40 130 42 61 104 102 102 42
FRA PS 12-24 96 23 60 110 108 108 23
FRA PS 24-40 49 24 24 97 133 133 24
*F=1 implies that the stock is almost extinct. 
 
The H target selected for the species are for anchovy 0.63, mackerel 0.27, bluefin tuna 0.11, albacore 0.41 
and pilchard 0.41. In scenarios TAC max, Effort max and Open access the harvest ratio of bluefin tuna in 
year 15 is 1 (Table 8.10), consequently these scenarios were considered as unsustainable. If the analysis is 
focused on the NPV Profit15, the highest values are obtained in those scenarios which are biologically 
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unsustainable. Among the sustainable scenarios Effort min is the best one, where the NPV Profit15 is half 
of those obtained in scenarios 3, 4 and 5. The most restrictive scenarios lead to a reduction of fleet size of 
around 68%. 
 
Catches by species vary according to the policies adopted. In the more restrictive policies catches of all 
species are lower than in the baseline scenario, but in the more expansive policies catches of all species are 
higher than in baseline scenario, except for bluefin tuna whose catches are near to zero. 
 
Focusing on fleet segments, using expansive policy options the fleet size varies its trend between 
segments. French fleet size rises significantly in those scenarios, specially the segment FRA PTS 24-40, 
whose fleet increases around 400%. The reason for this increase is that the break-even revenues (BER) are 
lower than the realized revenues. This implies that they can assign a part of their revenues to investments 
in new vessels. For the Spanish fleets, on the contrary, the BER is below the revenues in all years 
predicted; consequently, they do no have any means to invest. 
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Scenario 1. TAC min 
 
TAC min is sustainable scenario from the biological point of view as the H in year 15 is lower than the H 
target selected. Nevertheless this scenario is providing the second lowest NPV Profit15 of all the POs 
tested (scenarios 1 to 6). The reason for that is that the fleet size of all segments decreases during the first 
7 years of the simulation, after which it stabilizes. Effort and landings also decrease significantly, but the 
profit and the gross value added increase until year 9 and remain constant thereafter. Compared to the 
initial situation, in year 15 the fleet size has decreased in total by around 68%, the effort by 65% and 
catches by about 41%. Sustainable catches increases significantly for all the species considered but it can 
be said that this PO is too restrictive in this sense. 
 
Figure 8.3 Results of scenario 1. TAC min 
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Scenario 2. Effort min  
 
Effort min scenario produces a NPV Profit15 of 161 mln euro, the highest rent of all the sustainable 
scenarios tested. The fleet size of all the segments decreases until year 7 and stabilises thereafter. The 
effort in year 15 is half of the baseline situation, and catches decrease by 22%.  
 
This policy option reduces the effort of all the segments in the first years of the simulation, and then after 
the 3rd year it stabilizes. Profit has an increasing trend for all the segments after year two of the simulation 
and stabilizes after year five. 
 
Numbers of vessels have also a decreasing trend at the beginning and the stabilization of the fleet size 
occurs in the 7th period of the simulation.  
 
Figure 8.4 Results of scenario 2. Effort min 
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Scenario 3. TAC max 
 
This scenario is completely different from the previous two scenarios. The NPV Profit15 is 309 million 
euro, higher than in scenario 2, nevertheless it behaves in a clearly unsustainable way. Landings of bluefin 
tuna are reduced to levels close to zero in year 15. Landings of anchovy and albacore increase in the first 5 
years and then they maintain their level.  On the other hand mackerel and pilchard landings increase until 
year 15, even if sustainable catch of these two species is stable from the period 5 of the simulation. 
  
Regarding the fleet, Spanish fleets are reduced, but the French fleets grow, especially in the FRA PTS 24-
40 segment which goes from 50 vessels in the baseline period to 100 vessels after 15 years. Profit is 
increased for all the segments in the first two years of the simulation but afterwards it stabilizes or 
decreases. 
 
Figure 8.5 Results of scenario 3. TAC max 
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Scenario 4. Effort max 
  
This policy option provides one of the highest NPV Profit15 but as it will be shown it provides the same 
values as the open access scenario policy option. The reason for this is that this policy option is not 
limiting the effort of any segment and hence the effort selected by each segment will be the maximum that 
they can generate. 
 
As a consequence bluefin tuna landings from year 13 are zero while the landings of the remaining species 
are increasing. By contrast sustainable catch shows a decreasing trend after year 7 (approximately) of the 
simulation for these species. As a consequence this PO can be considered as a biologically unsustainable 
policy. 
 
In the meantime the size of the French fleet increases, especially the segment FRA PTS 24-40 (and their 
profits). The Spanish fleet decreases slightly and their profits are stable or slightly increasing after year two 
of the simulation. 
 
Figure 8.6 Results of scenario 4. Effort max 
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Scenario 5. Open access 
 
The Open access model provides exactly the same results as the Effort max policy.  
 
Figure 8.7 Results of scenario 5. Open access 
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Scenario 6. Min min 
 
In this scenario, either the minimum effort or the minimum TAC are combined, depending on which is 
most restrictive. The NPV Profit15 is the lowest one of all the POs analysed (100 mln euro). This policy 
follows almost the same trends as the TAC min PO which shows that the results obtained for this PO can 
be extrapolated to the Min min PO. 
.  
 
Figure 8.8 Results of scenario 6. Min / min 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vessels
0
50
100
150
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
N
um
be
r SP_PS_12_24
SP_PS_24_40
FR_PS_12_24
FR_PS_24_40
Landings 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
To
nn
es
Anchovy
Mackerel
Bluefin
Tuna
Albacore
Pilchard
Profit
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
Th
ou
sa
nd
 €
FR_PS_24_40
Sustainable catch
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
To
nn
es Anchovy
Bluefin
Tuna
Albacore
Sea days
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
N
um
be
r SP_PS_12_24
SP_PS_24_40
FR_PS_12_24
FR_PS_24_40
Gross value added
0
20.000
40.000
60.000
80.000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
Th
ou
sa
nd
 € SP_PS_12_24
SP_PS_24_40
FR_PS_12_24
FR_PS_24_40
Sustainable catch
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
To
nn
es
Mackerel
Pilchard
Profit
-25000
-20000
-15000
-10000
-5000
0
5000
10000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
Th
ou
sa
nd
 €
SP_PS_12_24
SP_PS_24_40
FR_PS_12_24
193 
 
8.7.3. Role of discount rate (scenarios 7-8)  
 
Table 8.11 Effect of discount rate on profits 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenario
Main scenario 
Discount rate 3.5% 
7.
Discount rate 2% 
8. 
Discount rate 5% 
NPV Profit15  160.98 190.37 136.30
Nominal Profit15 -20.8 27.01 27.01 27.01
Discounted Profit15  16.12 20.07 12.99
 
As Table 8.11 shows how the NPV Profit15 varies with the change of the discount rate. 
 
Scenario 7. Discount rate 2% 
 
When the discount rate is 2% instead of 3.5% the discounted profit in year 15 increases by a 25% and the 
net present value by 18%.  
 
Scenario 8. Discount rate 5% 
 
The nature of this scenario is to give less weight to the future than to the present in comparison to the 
main scenario. In the scenario 8, where the discount rate is 5%, the discounted profit decreases around 
19%, and the net present value of profit around 15%. 
 
8.7.4. Resource rent and recovery of management costs (scenario 9)  
 
This scenario has been selected in a way in which each segment has to make an annual payment equal to 
the management cost allocated to them. The exact allocations by segment, and hence the annual amount 
to recover by segment, is based on the cost of support (Axis 1 in Table 8.7) and management and research 
costs in Table 8.8 are: 252 thousand euro for SP PS 12-24, 6.3 mln euro for SP PS 24-40, 2.2 mln euro for 
FR PS 12-24 and 2.2 mln euro for FR PS 24-40. It implies 10.9 mln euro per year or a NPV of 127 mln 
euro in the 15 years of the simulation (using a discount rate of 3.5%).  
 
In this scenario the NPV Profit15 is 170 mln euro. Adding to it the NPV of the payments for access made 
(127 mln euro) the result is 297 million euro, that is, 136 mln euro above the baseline scenario (Effort 
min). Consequently, there are additional rents that could be captured by society when this tax is imposed. 
 
The reason for this is that when this system of a fixed payment is set the number of vessels of all the 
segments  are decreased. 
 
Table 8.12 Resource rent and recovery of management cost 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios* 
Main scenario: 
No recovery of management 
costs 
9. 
Recovery of 
management costs 
NPV GVA15 (mln euro) 1,983 1,855 
Nominal GVA15 (mln euro) 137 202 201 
NPV Profit15 161 170 
Fixed payment for access (mln euro) 0 11 
NPV Payment for access15 0 127 
Nom Profit15 (mln euro) -21 27 29 
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Figure 8.9 Results of scenario 9. Recovery of management costs 
 
 
 
8.7.5. Optimization of capacity (scenarios 10-14)  
 
Table 8.13 Impact of optimization of the fleet size 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios*
  Main 
scenario 
Effort 
min 
10.
Static 
present 
fleet 
11.
Static 
minimum 
fleet 
12. 
Dynamic 
minimum 
fleet 
13. 
Optimum 
fleet 
(GVA) 
14.
Optimum 
fleet 
(profit) 
NPV Profit15 (mln euro)  161 -4.98 57 235 594 985
Nominal Profit15 (mln euro) -21 27 8.11 14 29 56 84
Discounted Profit15 (mln euro)  16 4.81 8.36 17 33 50
Fleet15 (no vessels) 295 153 295 251 127 498 176
Effort15 (1000 DAS) 48 24 24 24 24 100 36
Catch15 (1000 t) 90 70 71 71 71 137 89
*NPV row refers to the sum, other row refer to the value in year 15. 
 
The fleet size varies between all these scenarios. Focusing in scenarios 10, 11 and 12, Table 8.13 shows 
that the lower the fleet size the higher the rents are, given that, the best way to adjust the fleet is forcing 
each vessel to use the maximum effort that they can in each step of the simulation. 
 
Compared with the Effort min, in scenario 13 the number of vessels increases by 68%, and the rents that 
this scenario gives are the highest of all the scenarios tested. 
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Scenario 10. Static present fleet 
 
Landings and DAS in scenario 2 are very similar to scenario 10 but the number of vessels has increased by 
93% and therefore DAS/vessel decreases considerably in scenario 10: from 157 to 81. Profit15, in scenario 
2 is positive (161 million euro) but in scenario 10 it is negative (around minus 5 million euro). 
 
Figure 8.10 Results of scenario 10. Adaptation with ‘present’ fleet 
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Scenario 11. Static minimum fleet  
 
The total catches and total effort (DAS) are identical to the selected baseline scenario, and the fleet size 
increases by 64% compared to Effort min scenario. Days per vessel in this scenario are around 96.  
 
Figure 8.11 Results of scenario 11. Static minimum fleet 
Vessels
0
50
100
150
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
N
um
be
r SP_PS_12_24
SP_PS_24_40
FR_PS_12_24
FR_PS_24_40
Landings 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
To
nn
es Anchovy
Mackerel
Pilchard
Profit
-30000
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
Th
ou
sa
nd
 €
SP_PS_12_24
SP_PS_24_40
FR_PS_12_24
FR_PS_24_40
Sustainable catch
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
To
nn
es
Mackerel
Pilchard
Sea days
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
N
um
be
r SP_PS_12_24
SP_PS_24_40
FR_PS_12_24
FR_PS_24_40
Gross value added
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
Th
ou
sa
nd
 € SP_PS_12_24
SP_PS_24_40
FR_PS_12_24
FR_PS_24_40
Sustainable catch
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
To
nn
es Anchovy
Bluefin
Tuna
Albacore
Landings 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Years
To
nn
es
Bluefin
Tuna
Albacore
197 
 
Scenario 12. Dynamic minimum fleet 
  
In this scenario the fleet is maintained at the minimum level and there are no constraints to 
(dis)investments. The number of vessels of all segments decreases in the first year, and then it remains 
constant. Comparing these results with the main scenario, effort and catches do not change, but the fleet 
size decreases. Finally, the NPV Profit15 is 46% higher than in the baseline scenario. 
 
 
Figure 8.12 Results of scenario 12. Dynamic minimum fleet 
 
 
Scenario 13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 
 
In scenario 13 the number of vessels by segment is selected in such a way where NPV GVA15 is 
maximized. Nevertheless the result of this optimization is giving the result of maximizing the segment FP 
PTS 24-40 leaving the others segments with zero vessels. 
 
In order to provide an interior solution, a constraint in which FRA PTS 24-40 cannot be increased more 
than 300%47 in comparison with the baseline situation is introduced. With this constraint, the solution is 
again to maximize the number of vessels of the segment FRA PTS 24-40 and then to maximize the 
number of vessels of the segment FRA PTS 12-24 while the remaining segments disappear. Again 
imposing the 300% restriction to this last segment an interior solution is obtained where catches are the 
highest of all the scenarios analysed and by the nature of this scenario the highest NPV GVA15 of 5,442 
                                                     
47 This constraint has been defined on an arbitrary basis. 
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million euro is obtained. In the meantime NPV Profit15 is also well above the baseline policy option and 
around 594 mln euro. As it can be seen in the figures below there are jumps in almost all the variables 
analysed. It implies that this scenario is not sustainable. Furthermore some species such as bluefin tuna 
will be completely exploited by the year 15 of the simulation. 
  
Figure 8.13 Results of scenario 13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 
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Scenario 14. Optimum fleet (profit) 
 
This second optimum fleet scenario has been designed determining the number of vessels of each 
segment from the period 2 to the period 15 of the simulation in a way in which the NPV of the net profit 
is maximized. The optimization is free (no restrictions) except for some constraints that have used in 
order to obtain “real” and interior solutions. In particular the constraints used are: 
 The harvest rates (H) of all the species have to be equal or lower to 1. This constraint is simply 
considering than an H higher than 1 is unrealistic48. 
 At least 1 vessel per segment is required in all the periods. Furthermore, the number of vessels in each 
segment changes at most by +/-20% from one year to next. 
 
In order to provide an interior solution a constraint in which FR PTS 24-40 cannot be increased more 
than 300%49 in comparison with the baseline situation. With this constraint, the solution is again to 
maximize the number of vessels of the segment FR PTS 24-40 and then to maximize the number of 
vessels of the segment FR PTS 12-24 while the remaining segments disappear. Again, imposing the 300% 
restriction to this last segment an interior solution is obtained. 
 
With these restrictions (the same as in scenario 13) results of the simulation show how the NPV of the net 
profit can be increased by 66% from 594 to 985 mln euro. In the meantime there is a reduction of the 
NPV GVA of 54%. This result is obtained reducing the total number of vessels in overall terms. All 
segments will be eliminated from the fishery except the French PS 12-24. NPV of the GVA will be slightly 
lower than in the baseline scenario. 
 
It can be seen how profits of all the segments are zero (or almost French PS 24-40) except for French PS 
12-24. They will rapidly increase at the beginning of the simulation and steadily fall till period 10 of the 
simulation. Afterwards they will remain stable, while catches will remain at a lower level than in the 
baseline scenario. 
 
 
  
                                                     
48 It is straightforward that this constraint is implicit in the other scenarios tested. Nevertheless for this scenario it 
has to be made it explicit for computing (optimization) purposes. 
49 This constraint has been defined on an arbitrary basis. 
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Figure 8.8.14 Results of scenario 14. Optimum fleet (profit) 
 
 
Table 8.14 Comparison of scenarios 13 and 14 (values in mln euro, fleet number of vessels) 
  Scenario 13 Scenario 14 
NPV GVA15 5,442 2,529  
NPV profit15 594 985  
NPV Crew costs15 4,517 1,301  
NPV capital costs15 331 243  
GVA year 15 479 209 
Profit year 15 56 84 
Crew costs year 15 385 105 
Capital costs year 15 38 20 
Fleet – average 1-15 419 191 
Fleet – year 15 498 176 
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These results can be better explained by comparing them with scenario 13. 
 
Figure 8.15 Comparison between scenario 13 and scenario 14.  
 
 
 
As it can be seen the main difference between scenarios comes from the fleet size. When GVA is 
maximized one fleet (FR PS 12-24) increases their size compared to the baseline situation. When profits 
are maximized all the fleets reduce their size at the beginning of the period and in overall terms and then 
in this segment (FR PS 12-24) which is the one that is stable until the end of the simulation. This can be 
easily seen in the figure above, where scenario 13 presents increasing trends for the fleet along the 
simulation while scenario 14 presents first a decreasing trend and after period 3 a flat trend.  
 
In terms of the gross profit and crew costs (per vessel) in both cases the trends are similar, but not the 
value of the index. It is clear how scenario 14 presents an index value for both indicators that doubles the 
one obtained in scenario 13. 
 
In absolute values scenario 14 has always higher gross profit and lower crew costs. This is a consequence 
of the nature of scenario 13 in which the maximum of the sum of these variables (discounted) is the target 
and hence the labour remuneration has to be increased by increasing the number of vessels and hence the 
crew remuneration (scenario 13). 
 
Both objectives (max profit and max GVA) are quite different in the results that are provided. Max GVA 
(scenario 13) is based on increasing the fleet (at least one segment) and by increasing the remuneration of 
the labour the value added is increased. On the other hand, scenario 14 increases the performance by 
vessel of each vessel individually, but with a much lower number of vessels and hence with lower absolute 
values on the labour remuneration. 
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8.7.6. Assumptions and technical background (by main model modules)  
 
Due to the lack of data, some assumptions have been made to estimate the economic value of the 
segments which are involved in the Bay of Biscay anchovy fishery. AER provides the data of the Spanish 
and French segments in general, and values have been extracted for the anchovy of Bay of Biscay fishery. 
For this purpose, some other sources of information have been used with the aim to improve the 
estimations. These sources are: “Long-term Management of Bay of Biscay Anchovy (SGBRE-08-01)”, the 
ICES and the ICCAT. 
 
The steps considered to convert the data of the segments of AER 2009 to data of the Anchovy of the Bay 
of Biscay fishery case study are: 
 Select the segments to be considered from “Long-term Management of Bay of Biscay (SGBRE-08-
01)”. 
 Compare the data of both countries used in the SGBRE-08-01 with the data of the AER and assume 
that the proportion of the vessels targeting anchovy of the Bay of Biscay by segment remains 
constant. 
 It has been assumed that the capital cost for the Spanish fleet is equal to the French fleet. 
 Fixed costs for France are assumed equal to the Spanish fleet. 
 
Another assumption that has been made through the estimation of the parameters: 
 The estimation of the growth function of anchovy has been made by fixing the carrying capacity as 
the maximum of a moving average (5 years). The reason for that is that given the available data it has 
been impossible to obtain a statistically significant estimation of intrinsic growth rate and carrying 
capacity simultaneously. 
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9. MEDITERRANEAN ANCHOVY FISHERIES (GSA 16) 
 
 
9.1. Summary and conclusions 
 
Main conclusion 
 
The main segment analysed in this fishery realized in 2005-7 on average a net profit of 5 mln euro. 
Average annual discounted net profit oscillates under most scenarios around 5 mln euro. Elimination of 
overcapacity and recovery of stocks would produce a discounted net profit of 3-5 mln euro by the year 15. 
(see Figure 9.1) 
 
Brief description of the case study 
 
The case study analyses the pelagic fishery in the southern coast of Sicily (GSA 16), which is the most 
important fishing area for the Sicilian fleets. In this area, pelagic fisheries are exclusively practiced by 
vessels authorized to mid-water pair trawl and purse seine with an overall length between 12 and 24 
meters. In accordance with the fleet segmentation adopted in the DCR, these vessels are classified as 
pelagic trawls and seiners (PTS 1224). In 2007, this fleet segment consisted of 51 vessels with an average 
capacity of 63 GT per boat. The main target species include European anchovy and European pilchard. 
These species accounted for a 53% of all landings in terms of volume and 34% in value. European 
anchovy represents the most important species in terms of both landings and revenues with 29% of total 
landings in weight and 25% in value. European pilchard represents the second most important species in 
terms of landings amounting to 24% of total production. In terms of value, given the low average price 
(1.12 euro/kg), this species contributes for just a 9% to total revenues. 
 
Divergence / convergence of the results 
 
Comparing the different scenarios, the level of landings varies from 9,600 tonnes in scenario 11 to 19,200 
tonnes in scenario 14. The level of landings is a function of the fishing effort applied on the biomass. 
Consequently, also the minimum level of fishing effort, equal to 7,000 days at sea, is achieved in scenario 
11, and the maximum level of 18,000 in scenario 14. Fishing effort consists of two components, number 
of vessels and average fishing days per vessel. The minimum number of vessels are registered in scenario 
11 (45 vessels), while the maximum number in scenario 14, where the fleet size is estimated in 116 vessels. 
Generally, scenarios applying higher levels of fishing effort are also those with higher profits. The highest 
value of profit is found in scenario 14 (5 million euro), while the maximum NPV profit15 (88 million euro) 
is estimated in scenario 7. However, this is due to the use of a discount rate (2%) lower than that used in 
other scenarios (3.5%). The maximum values in NPV profit15 at a discount rate of 3.5% is registered in 
scenario 14, with a value of 85 million euro. The lowest value is estimated at 71 million euro in scenario 8. 
Also this result is affected by the interest rate, which is set at 5%. Among scenarios with an interest rate at 
3.5%, the lowest value, estimated in 75 million euro, is in scenario 11. 
 
All scenarios, with the exception of scenario 11, lead to an increase in the fleet size. This is due to the 
under-exploitation status of the two stocks. The most significant increases are in scenario 14. In these 
scenarios, the fishermen behaviour leads to an increasing overexploitation of European anchovy and 
consequently its extinction. Based on this, scenarios 4 and 5 are unsustainable from an environmental 
point of view.  
 
Choice of baseline policy 
 
Scenario 2 (Effort min) has been selected as “main scenario” or the scenario reflecting better than others 
the actual management system. Scenario 2 simulates a policy option directed to achieve the MSY for the 
stock showing the maximum overexploitation rate (difference between current and target harvest ratio) or 
the minimum under-exploitation rate (when all stocks are underexploited). In the present case study, both 
European anchovy and pilchard are underexploited and the stock with the minimum under-exploitation 
rate is European anchovy. As for the other options, scenario 4 (Effort max) is directed to achieve the 
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MSY for the stock showing the minimum overexploitation rate (when all stocks are overexploited) or the 
maximum under-exploitation rate (when at least a stock is not overexploited), while scenario 5 simulates 
an Open access situation. As the actual management system is not open access, but consists of a number 
of management measures directed to safeguard all the stocks exploited by fishing activities, scenario 5 
cannot be adopted as main scenario. Furthermore, as in the present case study all stocks are 
underexploited, both scenarios 2 and 4 suggest an increase in fishing effort. However, scenario 2 is more 
conservative than scenario 4. For this reason, scenario 2 has been selected as the main scenario. 
 
Achieving MSY  
 
Scenario 2 simulates a policy option directed to achieve the MSY for the stock showing the minimum 
under-exploitation rate. As this is selected as the “main scenario”, also the scenarios from 7 to 12, based 
on the main scenario, operate to achieve the same objective. The stock with the minimum difference 
between H target and H current is European anchovy. MSY cannot be achieved for both species at the 
same time. The level of fishing effort corresponding to the MSY for anchovy will maintain a status of 
under-exploitation for sardine (the harvest ratio will be lower than the target F). Among the scenarios 
directed to achieve MSY for European anchovy, scenario 9 is the most efficient showing the best 
economic performance (83 million euro in NPV profit15). 
 
Achieving MEY (NPV profit15) 
 
Even though scenario 9 is the most efficient among the scenarios directed to achieve MSY, results do not 
match with the MEY solution. The scenario showing results closest to the MEY solution are scenarios 13 
and 14. Both scenarios are directed to achieve the MEY by optimizing the number of vessels of all fleet 
segments over the simulation period, but MEY is expressed in terms of GVA in scenario 13 and profit in 
scenario 14. In terms of profits, scenario 14 shows the best economic performance among the simulated 
scenarios. The maximum resource rent over the first 15 years of the simulation period, equal to 85 million 
euro, has been estimated in this scenario as the NPV of profit. In year 15, a fleet of 116 vessels is active in 
scenario 14. This represents an increase of 120% compared with the baseline, and 4% with the fleet in the 
main scenario.  
 
Role of discount rate 
 
Scenarios 7 and 8 differ from each other scenario as discount rates of 2% and 5% respectively have been 
applied instead of 3.5%. However, compared with the main scenario, variations in the discount rate have 
not produced any effect on the dynamics of the system. The same nominal profit is registered in year 15 
for the three scenarios. Regarding the NPV profit15 and the discounted profit of year 15, obviously the 
highest values are estimated at the lowest discount rate. 
 
Impact of eliminating overcapacity 
 
In this case study, the two stocks included in the model, European anchovy and European pilchard, show 
levels of harvest ratio lower than those matching with the MSY. As a consequence, these stocks cannot be 
considered overexploited and these fisheries do not require a reduction of fishing effort. Given the status 
of these stocks, overcapacity is not an issue in any of the scenarios and the number of vessels can be 
increased. 
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Management costs and rent recovery 
 
The introduction of a fixed payment for access has reduced the profitability and made the sector less 
attractive. As a consequence, investments in new vessels are lower than those in the main scenario. A total 
of 87 vessels would operate in year 15 for this scenario compared to a number of 112 in the main 
scenario. However, the increase in the average days at sea per vessel produced a level of fishing effort 
higher than that in the main scenario. Even though fishing effort is higher in this scenario, landings are 
almost equal in the two scenarios. The different composition of fishing effort highlights a higher 
efficiency when a payment for access is introduced. Indeed, reducing the number of vessels and increasing 
the average number of fishing days allows the fleet to reduce fixed and capital costs (which depend on the 
number of vessels). Nominal profit in year 15 for this scenario amounts to 5.2 million euro, higher than 
the value of 3.6 million euro in the main scenario. The difference between these value is due to the fixed 
and capital costs. Even after deducting the 1.6 million euro, as the payment for access, estimated profits 
remain positive. 
 
 
9.2. Case study definition 
 
9.2.1. Fleet and landings 
 
The case study deals with the pelagic fishery along the southern coast of Sicily (GSA 16), which is the 
most important fishing area for the Sicilian fleets. In this area, pelagic fisheries are exclusively practiced by 
vessels authorized to mid-water pair trawl and purse seine with an overall length between 12 and 24 
metres, which are concentrated in the port of Sciacca. In accordance with the fleet segmentation adopted 
in the DCR, these vessels are classified as pelagic trawls and seiners (PTS 1224). In 2007, this fleet 
segment consisted of 51 vessels with an average capacity of 63 GT per boat. The main target species 
include European anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus) and sardines (Sardina pilchardus). These species 
accounted for a 53% of all landings in volume and 34% in value. 
 
Table 9.1 Role of case study fisheries within national fishery sectors 
Member State Total fishery sector Case study fleets 
Total revenues 
(mln euro) 
Total fleet
(number of vessels) 
Revenues
(mln euro) 
Fleet 
(number of vessels) 
Italy  1,426 14,428 21.6 51 
Source: IREPA, 2007 
 
Table 9.2 Role of target species 
MS Gear Size No. 
vessels 
GT 
(1000) 
Landings (1000 t) Value (mln euro)
Target 
species 
Total Target 
species 
Total
ITA GSA16 PTS 12-24 51 3,193 4.0 7.6 7.4 21.6 
Total 51 3,193 4.0 7.6 7.4 21.6 
Source: IREPA, 2007 
 
9.2.2. Composition of landings 
 
European anchovy represents the most important species in terms of both landings and revenues. This 
species accounts for 29% of total landings in weight and 25% in value. European pilchard represents the 
second most important species with 24% of total volume. In terms of value, given the low average price 
(1.12 euro/kg), this species contributes only 9% of total revenues. In 2007, the group of other species 
contributed around 47% of the total volume and 66% in value. Other important species are Northern 
bluefin tuna and greater amberjack. Northern bluefin tuna accounts for 19% of total revenues and 9% of 
catches, while greater amberjack for a 17% in value and 5% in weight. 
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Table 9.3 Composition of landings by segment (tonnes) 
MS Gear Size European 
anchovy 
European 
pilchard 
Other Total
ITA GSA16 PTS 12-24 2.2 1.8 3.5 7.6 
Total 2.2 1.8 3.5 7.6 
Source: IREPA, 2007 
 
Table 9.4 Composition of landings by segment (mln euro) 
MS Gear Size European 
anchovy 
European 
pilchard 
Other Total
ITA GSA16 PTS 12-24 5.4 2.0 14.2 21.6 
Total 5.4 2.0 14.2 21.6 
Source: IREPA, 2007 
 
 
9.3. Historical indicators 
 
Trends in the levels of landings for anchovy and sardine in GSA 16 are reported in Figure 9.2 for the 
period 2004-2008. The highest levels of landings are registered in 2006 for both anchovy and sardine. In 
that year landings achieved 4,000 tonnes for European anchovy and 2,200 for European pilchard. 
Landings dynamics are similar between the two pelagic stocks showing an increase from 2004 to 2006, a 
reduction in 2007, particularly significant for anchovy, and a new increase in 2008 reporting the values 
close to the maximum of the period analysed. 
 
Figure 9.2. Landings by target species (2004-2008 data) 
 
Source: IREPA  
 
The fleet dynamic in the period 2004-2007 in terms of number of vessels is shown in Figure 9.3. The 
pelagic fleet in GSA 16 shows a strong reduction of almost 20% in the number of vessels, passing from 62 
vessels in 2004 to 51 in 2007. The most significant reduction in the size of pelagic fleet took place in 2005, 
when the number of vessels was reduced by 7 units.  
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Figure 9.3 Change in vessels number (2004-2007 data) 
 
Source: IREPA  
 
 
9.4. Fleet efficiency  
 
As pelagic fishery in GSA 16 is practiced by a single fleet segment, comparison of fleets in terms of 
efficiency is not applicable. Economic indicators for the fleet segment PTS 1224 are presented in Table 
9.5.  
 
Table 9.5 Economic indicators 
MS Gear Size Gross 
value 
added 
(mln euro) 
Profit
(mln euro)
Employ-
ment 
Average 
price 
(euro/t)
Fuel costs 
as % of 
income 
Profit / 
tonne 
landings 
(euro/t) 
CPUE 
total 
(t/day) 
CPUE 
target 
species 
(t/day) 
ITA 
GSA 16 PTS 
12-
24 41.36 13.5 1,276 2,540 14.3 580 1,133.1 708.4 
Total 41.36 13.5 1,276 2,540 14.3 580 1,133.1 708.4
Source: IREPA, 2005-7  
 
Figure 9.4 Economic indicators 
Not applicable for the case study 
 
 
9.5. Management measures 
 
9.5.1. General description 
 
 The small pelagic fishery in GSA 16 is regulated by a series of technical measures limiting both the input 
and the output.  
 
Pelagic fisheries can be exerted only by vessels authorized to mid-water pair trawl and purse seine. The 
fleet segment PTS 1224 includes both purse seiners and pelagic trawlers. All vessels are required to hold a 
licence, which is centrally managed by the General Direction of Fishery of the Ministry of Agriculture 
Food and Forestry Policy. Licences are issued by the Ministry to the ship-owner and they are not 
transferable. The licence specifies detailed terms and conditions for the operations, including limitations 
on fishing areas and gear used. The licence identifies the vessel through a European code and other 
information concerning the vessel characteristics (i.e. name, authorized gear, GT, kW, LOA etc.). 
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Consequently, one fishing licence corresponds exclusively to one fishing vessel. Licences are valid for 
eight years and are renewed on the request of the ship-owner.  
 
9.5.2. Input management 
 
Effort restrictions  
 
In addition to the fishing licence, for the mid-water pair trawlers in the port of Sciacca, each year the 
national authority authorises a limited number of vessels to engage small pelagic fishery with mid-water 
trawls. This number varies from one year to another, according to the scientific advices and the market 
conditions. Fishing with mid-water trawl is also subject to annual, temporary suspensions, which is usually 
foreseen from August to September for a minimum of 30 days.  
 
The minimum mesh size is 20 mm for mid water pair trawlers and 14 mm for purse seiners. With 
reference to the current legislation at European level (Council Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006) and 
national legislation (Law 963, 14 July 1965, as further amended, and Presidential Decree 1639 of 2 
October 1968, as further amended), minimum size for anchovies is 9 cm overall length, while 11 cm is 
established for sardines. The measure relating to minimum landing sizes is linked to other technical 
measures, such as the ban to fish within the 3-miles from the coast to prevent fishing in the areas where 
juveniles are concentrated 
 
Input property rights 
 
As the licences are not transferable, there are no input property rights in this fishery. 
 
 
9.6. Management costs 
 
9.6.1. Summary of OECD data 
 
Detailed data on management costs are not available at GSA level. For this reason the management costs 
of each case study have been assumed proportionate to the share of the fleet segment in the total national 
revenues. GSA 16 PTS 1224 on average represents 12% of the Italian management costs, i.e. 1.6 million 
euro. 
 
On the basis of the OECD statistics on government financial transfers, management cost are primarily 
destined for direct payments (62%), while general services represent 38% of total management costs. 16% 
of direct payments consists of decommissioning costs (0.2 million euro) and 8% of renewal and 
modernization costs (0.1 million euro). 38% of direct payments are other costs, which include temporary 
withdrawal, joint venture, support to small scale fishery, support to freshwater fishery and to protection 
and development.  
 
In relation to general services, enforcement and research costs represent 13% and 5% respectively of total 
management costs. Management and enforcement amount to 0.2 million euro, while research to 0.1 
million euro. 
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Table 9.6 Management costs according to OECD, average 2004-2006* , (mln euro) 
 PTS 12-24 GSA 16
Direct Payments 1.0 
 - Decommissioning 0.3 
 - Fleet renewal and modernization 0.1 
 - Other 0.6 
General Services 0.6 
 - Management and enforcement 0.2 
 - Research 0.1 
 - Other 0.3 
Total 1.6 
*sum of national and EU contributions regarding marine capture fisheries. 
** share of national costs allocated to individual segments have been assumed proportionate to the share of the 
segment in the total revenues of the national marine fisheries sector. 
 
9.6.2. Support to fishing sector (FIFG and EFF) 
 
In order to evaluate the FIFG and the EFF support to the caching sector, the measures under the FIFG 
axis 1 and 2 have been compared with the measures foreseen under the EFF priority axis 1. In both cases 
they have been estimated on the basis of the share in the total national revenues and they represent 1.6% 
of the EFF and FIFG funds allocated to Italy. Average annual FIFG allocation amounts to 4.8 million 
euro, while average annual EFF support amounts to 0.7 million euro. 
 
Table 9.7 Average annual support to the marine fisheries from FIFG and EFF, (mln euro)* 
 PTS 12-24 GSA 16 
FIFG - Axis 1 and 2 4.8 
EFF - Axis 1 0.7 
 
9.6.3. Costs of research and management  
 
In absence of detailed data, management, control and enforcement costs are those estimated from the 
OECD statistics. Research costs have been estimated as a quota of the national DCF budget augmented 
of a 30%. The quota related to the pelagic fishery in GSA 16 has been calculated according to its share in 
national landings value.  
 
Table 9.8 Estimated management and research costs, (mln euro) 
 PTS 12-24 
Management, control, enforcement 0.2 
Research (DCF+30%) 0.1 
Sources: OECD and Com. Decision 811/2009 
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9.7. Estimation of the resource rent 
 
9.7.1. Comparison of scenarios  
 
Table 9.9 Comparison of the scenarios 
Scenario  
no. 
Effort 
(1000 DAS) 
Fleet
(no. vessels) 
Catch
(1000 t) 
Profit year 15 
discounted 
(mln euro) 
NPV Profit15 
(mln euro) 
Average values 2005-7 
2005-7  7 53 7.7 4.5 
Values in year 15 of the scenario 
1. TAC min   
2. Effort min 11 112 13.1 2.1 79.0
3. TAC max     
4. Effort max 17 112 17.1 3.5 82.6
5. Open access 17 112 17.1 3.5 82.6
6. Min min     
7. Discount rate 2% 11 112 13.1 2.7 88.1
8. Discount rate 5% 11 112 13.1 1.7 71.3
9. Recovery mgt. costs 13 87 13.1 3.4 82.6
10. Static present fleet 8 53 10.8 4.3 79.3
11. Static minimum fleet 7 45 9.6 4.1 75.4
12. Dynamic min. fleet 12 80 13.9 4.1 80.4
13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 15 98 16.1 4.3 83.2
14. Optimum fleet (profit) 18 116 19.2 5.0 85.0
 
Table 9.9 shows the main results by scenario. As the fisheries in this case study are multi-species and 
managed by an input control regime, scenarios 1, 3 and 6 (based on TAC policies) are not applicable. 
Among the applicable scenarios, scenario 2 (Effort min) has been selected as “main scenario” or the 
scenario reflecting better than others the actual management system. Scenario 2 simulates a policy option 
directed to achieve the MSY for the stock showing the maximum overexploitation rate (difference 
between current and target harvest ratio) or the minimum under-exploitation rate (when all stocks are 
underexploited). In the present case study, both European anchovy and pilchard are underexploited and 
the stock with the minimum under-exploitation rate is European anchovy. As for the other options, 
scenario 4 (Effort max) is directed to achieve the MSY for the stock showing the minimum 
overexploitation rate (when all stocks are overexploited) or the maximum under-exploitation rate (when at 
least a stock is not overexploited), while scenario 5 simulates an Open access. As described above, the 
actual management system is not open access, but consists of a number of management measures directed 
to safeguard all the stocks. As in the present case study all stocks are underexploited, both scenarios 2 and 
4 suggest an increase in fishing effort. However, scenario 2 is more conservative than scenario 4. For this 
reason, scenario 2 has been selected as the main scenario.  
 
Scenarios from 7 to 14 are based on the main scenario, but include specific assumptions described in the 
detail in the related sections. In particular, scenarios 13 and 14 are aimed to estimate the optimum fleet 
maximizing NPV GVA15 and NPV profit15 respectively. A general overview of the simulated scenarios 
highlights that values of fishing effort and landings are generally higher than those realized in the baseline. 
Compared with the main scenario, the NPV profit15 is lower in scenarios 8 and 11, and higher elsewhere. 
 
Comparing the different scenarios, the level of landings varies from 9,600 tonnes in scenarios 11 to a  
19,200 tonnes in scenario 14. The level of landings is a function of the fishing effort and the biomass. 
Consequently, also the minimum level of fishing effort, equal to 7,000 days at sea, is found in scenario 11, 
and the maximum level of 18,000 results from scenario 14. Fishing effort consists of two components, 
number of vessels and average fishing days per vessel. The different combinations of these components 
can be derived by comparing the columns of effort and fleet in Table 9.9. The minimum number of 
vessels is in scenario 11 (45 vessels), while the maximum number is in scenario 14, where the fleet size is 
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estimated in 116 vessels. Generally, scenarios applying higher levels of fishing effort are also those with 
higher profits. 
 
Table 9.9 shows the discounted profit of year 15 and the NPV profit15 for each of the simulated scenarios. 
The highest values of profit is in scenario 14 (5 million euro), while the maximum NPV profit15 (88 
million euro) is estimated in scenario 7. However, this is due to the use of a discount rate (2%) lower than 
that used in other scenarios (3.5%). The maximum values at a discount rate of 3.5% is realized in scenario 
14, with an NPV profit15 of 85 million euro. The lowest value is estimated at 71 million euro in scenario 8. 
Also this result is affected by the interest rate, which is set at 5%. Among scenarios with an interest rate at 
3.5%, the lowest value, estimated in 75 million euro, is in scenario 11. 
 
Scenario 2 simulates a policy directed to achieve the MSY for the stock showing the minimum under-
exploitation rate. As this is selected as the “main scenario”, also the scenarios from 7 to 12, based on the 
main scenario, pursue same objective. The stock with the minimum difference between H target and H 
current is European anchovy. MSY cannot be achieved for both species at the same time. The level of 
fishing effort corresponding to the MSY for anchovy will maintain a status of under-exploitation for 
sardine (the harvest ratio will be lower than the target H). 
 
Among the scenarios directed to achieve MSY for European anchovy, scenario 9 is the most efficient 
showing the best economic performance (NPV profit15 of 83 million euro). However, this cannot be 
considered as a scenario directed to achieve the MEY. The scenario showing results closest to the MEY 
solution are scenarios 13 and 14. Both scenarios are directed to achieve the MEY by optimizing the 
number of vessels of all fleet segments over the simulation period, but MEY is expressed in terms of 
GVA in scenario 13 and profit in scenario 14. As profit is maximized in scenario 14, this scenario shows 
the highest NPV profit15 among all scenarios. 
 
 
All scenarios, with the exception of scenario 11, lead to an increase in fleet size. This is due to the under-
exploitation status of the two stocks. The most significant increase is in scenario 14. In these scenarios, 
the fishermen behaviour leads to an increasing overexploitation of European anchovy and consequently 
its extinction. Based on this, scenarios 4 and 5 are unsustainable from an environmental point of view.  
 
As reported above, the maximum NPV profit15 is produced by scenario 14. This result is related to the 
pelagic fisheries in GSA 16 as a whole. In multi-species fisheries, the economic performance depends on 
the contribution of a number of stocks. The contribution of each stock can be estimated proportionately 
to the share of total revenues coming from that stock. In all scenarios, the target species contributing the 
most to the total revenues is European anchovy. In particular, in the main scenario this quota is estimated 
at around 32%. 
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9.7.2. Policy options (scenarios 1-6) 
 
Summary 
 
Table 9.10 Effect of different policies on profit, harvest ratio, catches, effort and fleet 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios**
1. TAC 
min 
2. Effort 
min 
3. TAC 
max 
4. Effort 
max 
5. Open 
access 
6. Min 
min 
NPV Profit15  79.0 82.6 82.6 
Profit year 15 
discounted 
4.5  2.1 3.5 3.5 
Harvest ratio (year 15)*
European pilchard 0.2  0.3 0.4 0.4 
European anchovy 0.6  0.8 1.5 1.5 
Catch in (1000 t, for scenarios year 15)
European pilchard 1.8  3.2 4.3 4.3 
European anchovy 3.1  5.0 6.4 6.4 
Effort (1000 DAS, for scenarios year 15)
PTS 12-24 7  11 17 17 
Fleet (no vessels, for scenarios year 15)
PTS 12-24 53  112 112 112 
*F=1 implies that the stock is almost extinct. 
 
As reported above, scenario 2 (main scenario) and all the scenarios based on the “main scenario” 
(scenarios from 7 to 12) simulate a policy option directed to achieve the MSY for the stock showing the 
minimum under-exploitation rate. This stock is European anchovy, which H target is estimated in 0.79. 
Table 9.10 shows that a value close to this has been achieved in year 15 by scenario 2. In multi-species 
fisheries, MSY cannot be achieved for all species at the same time. The level of fishing effort determining 
MSY for European anchovy allows under-exploitation of the other stocks. Indeed, the harvest ratio in 
year 15 for European pilchard is lower than the related target F.  
 
The other two scenarios reported in Table 9.10 show identical results. Even though scenario 4 pursues the 
MSY for the stock showing the maximum under-exploitation rate, for reasons explained in the scenario 
section, simulation results are driven by fishermen behaviour under an open access system. As a 
consequence, H target is not achieved for any of the stocks. On the contrary, these scenarios lead to the 
extinction of European anchovy after year 17.  
 
In terms of economic performance, Table 9.10 shows a higher value for scenarios 4 and 5 compared with 
the result obtained in scenario 2. Profit in year 15 for scenarios 4 and 5 is 65% higher than that estimated 
in scenario 2, while the NPV profit15 in scenarios 4 and 5 is 4% higher than that obtained in the main 
scenario. However, the economic performance in scenarios 4 and 5 is not sustainable and declines 
dramatically after year 17 with the extinction of European anchovy. 
 
Comparing the results in year 15 of scenario 2 with the baseline, Table 9.10 shows a significant increase in 
harvest ratio for both stocks. The strongest increase occurs for European pilchard. Harvest ratio for this 
species rises by 40% compared with the baseline. This is also the species showing the strongest increase in 
landings (more than 80%). As for European anchovy, this stock shows an increase in harvest ratio and 
landings of 33% and 63% respectively.  
 
 
Scenario 1. TAC min 
 
Figure 9.5 Results of scenario 1. TAC min 
Not applicable for the case study. 
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Scenario 2. Effort min  
 
The policy option aims to achieve MSY for at least one stock in the long run. Given a number of species, 
the model calculates the ratio between the target and the current harvest ratio in each time period for each 
of the species considered and selects the minimum value of these ratios. Fishing effort is changed 
proportionately to this ratio. As the minimum value is associated to the stock showing the maximum 
overexploitation rate, this policy option is directed to safeguard the most depleted stock. However, when 
all stocks are underexploited (F current is lower than H target), the policy option increases fishing effort to 
achieve the MSY for the stock with the minimum under-exploitation rate. 
 
As reported above, both stocks appear underexploited in the baseline and European anchovy is the 
species with the minimum under-exploitation rate. As a consequence, the change of fishing effort is driven 
by the status of this stock.  
 
The two stocks are exploited to a different extent by the only one fleet, PTS 1224. At the baseline, the 
fishing effort is 7,000 days at sea. The total landings are in the baseline 7,730 tonnes.  
 
Fishing effort shows an increasing trend in the first 12 years, as the stock was underexploited at the 
baseline, and a tendency to the long term equilibrium thereafter. The level of fishing effort corresponding 
to the MSY for European anchovy can be estimated in around 12,400 days at sea. However, this level is 
not achieved in the first 15 years of the simulation period. This is also due to the changes in the number 
of vessels due to the investment function. In the first 12 years of the simulation, the increase in fishing 
effort is due to the investment in new vessels, while after that year the policy option tends to reduce 
fishing effort or maintain it at a constant level. As European pilchard remains underexploited and the 
marginal productivity of effort is particularly high, the number of vessels tends to increase. The increase in 
the number of vessels is compensated by reducing the average days at sea (by the policy option). As the 
average number of days at sea per vessel falls, profitability turns negative and the number of vessels is 
reduced. These interactions between fishermen and policy behaviours explain the up-and-down 
fluctuations in the number of vessels in Figure 9.6. The link between the number of vessels and the levels 
of profitability appears also by comparing the related graphs in Figure 9.6. Variations in profit are opposite 
to variations in number of vessels.  
 
The trend in profit shows an increase in the first 12 years and a reduction thereafter at lower levels. The 
level of profit in the long run seems to move around that estimated at the baseline.  
 
In year 15, the system has not achieved its long term equilibrium. There is a peak in the number of vessels, 
and a lowest point in days at sea, landings and profit. The total fishing effort, equals to 11,000 days at sea, 
is almost 70% higher than the level estimated at the baseline. The fleet increases more than double 
compared to the baseline, from 53 to 112 vessels, while the number of days at sea per vessel per year 
decreases of 21%. The total catch shows an increase of 70% from 7,730 tonnes at the baseline to 13,130 
tonnes in year 15. Landings of European pilchard and anchovy show increases of 80% and 63% 
respectively. 
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9.7.3. Role of discount rate (scenarios 7-8) 
 
In the main scenario, a discount rate of 3.5% has been used to calculated the NPV profit15. Scenarios 7 
and 8 differ from the main scenario as discount rates of 2% and 5% respectively have been applied.  
 
Variations in the discount rate have no effect on the dynamics of the system. The nominal profit in year 
15 is same for the three scenarios. This value is lower than that estimated at the baseline. Regarding the 
NPV profit15, obviously the highest values are obtained at the lowest discount rate. 
 
Table 9.11 Effect of discount rate on profit 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenario
Main scenario 
Discount rate 3.5% 
7.
Discount rate 2% 
8. 
Discount rate 5% 
NPV Profit15   79.0 88.1 71.3 
Nominal Profit15* 4.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Discounted Profit15*   2.1 2.7 1.7 
*this is the value in year 15, not the sum of profits 
 
Scenario 7. Discount rate 2% 
 
Comparing scenario 7 with the main scenario (scenario 2) shows that the changes in discount rate have no 
effect on nominal profit, while discounted profit is 24% higher when the discount rate is set at 2%. 
Regarding the net present value of profit, a discount rate of 2% leads to an increase of 11% in this 
indicator. 
 
 
Scenario 8. Discount rate 5% 
 
Comparing scenario 8 with the main scenario (scenario 2) shows that the changes in discount rate have no 
effect on nominal profit, while discounted profit is 20% lower when the discount rate is set at 2%. 
Regarding the net present value of profit, a discount rate of 5% leads to a decrease of 10% in this 
indicator. 
 
 
9.7.4. Resource rent and recovery of management costs (scenario 9) 
 
The full recovery of management costs is simulated in this scenario by adding a fixed payment for access 
to each fleet segment. These amounts are estimated as an average of OECD data in the period 2004-2006. 
This scenario is based on the “main scenario”, (Effort min).  
 
Results obtained in scenario 9 are similar to the scenario 2. Comparing Figure 9.11 with Figure 9.6  shows 
similar trends in the main variables. The main difference is related to the level in the number of vessels, 
which determines also differences in fishing effort, landings and economic indicators. The introduction of 
a fixed payment for access has reduced the profitability. As a consequence, investments in new vessels are 
lower than those in the main scenario. There are in total 87 vessels in year 15 in scenario 9 compared to 
112 in scenario 2. However, the increase in the average days at sea per vessel produced a level of fishing 
effort (13,000 fishing days) higher than that in the main scenario (11,000 fishing days). Even though 
fishing effort is higher in this scenario, landings are almost equivalent in the two scenarios. 
 
The different compositions of fishing effort highlights a higher efficiency in scenario 9. Indeed, reducing 
the number of vessels and increasing the average number of fishing days allows the fleet of scenario 9 to 
reduce fixed and capital costs (which depend on the number of vessels). In Table 9.12, nominal GVA in 
year 15 amounts to 21.1 million euro, slightly higher than the value of 20.4 million euro estimated in 
scenario 2. The difference between these values is due to the fixed costs. When comparing profits, the 
difference between scenario 9 and 2 is higher as this includes also the additional benefit deriving from the 
reduced capital costs.  
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9.7.5. Optimization of capacity (scenarios 10-14) 
 
Scenarios 10 to 14 simulate the main optimum paths to achieve MSY or MEY. In particular, the level of 
fishing effort corresponding to MSY can be obtained at different combinations of its components, 
number of vessels and average days at sea per vessel. In the main scenario, MSY for European anchovy is 
achieved by one combination of fishing effort components given by the interactions between the 
management policy and the fishermen behaviour in terms of new investments. Scenarios 10 to 12 are 
directed to reach the MSY for European anchovy by using the same management option (Effort min), but 
imposing constraints on the system. The fleets in scenarios 10 and 11 are supposed to be stable, and equal 
respectively to the fleet operating at the baseline and the minimum fleet able to produce the same fishing 
effort at the baseline. In scenario 12, the average days at sea per vessel are supposed to be constant and 
equal to an assumed maximum level, while the fleet is modified each year by the policy option. Differently 
form the other scenarios, scenarios 13 and 14 are directed to achieve the maximum contribution to GNP 
and the MEY (i.e. maximum NPV GVA15 in scenario 13 and maximum NPV profit15 in scenario 14 
respectively) by optimizing the number of vessels of all fleet segments over the years from 2 to 15. 
 
 
Table 9.13 Impact of optimization of the fleet size 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios*
  Main 
scenario 
TAC min
10.
Static 
present 
fleet 
11.
Static 
minimum 
fleet 
12.
Dynamic 
minimum 
fleet 
13. 
Optimum 
fleet 
(GVA) 
14.
Optimum 
fleet 
(profit) 
NPV Profit15 (mln euro)   79.0 79.3 75.4 80.4 83.2 85.0
Nominal Profit15 (mln euro) 4.5 3.6 7.2 6.9 6.9 7.1 8.3
Discounted Profit15 (mln euro) 4.5 2.1 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.3 5.0
Fleet15 (no vessels) 53.0 112.0 53.0 45.0 80.0 98.0 116.0
Effort15 (1000 DAS) 6.8 11.4 8.1 6.9 12.2 14.8 17.7
Catch15 (1000 t) 7.7 13.1 10.8 9.6 13.9 16.1 19.2
*NPV row refers to the sum, other rows refer to values in year 15 
 
Table 9.13 shows the values of the main variables in year 15 for each of the scenarios described above, 
and provides a comparison with the baseline. The main scenario and scenarios form 10 to 12 are directed 
to achieve the MSY of European anchovy. This should be obtained at a level of fishing effort estimated in 
around 12,400 days at sea. However, the only scenario able to achieve the MSY is the scenario 12, where 
this level is reached at the end of the simulation period. On the contrary, fleet in scenarios 10 and 11 
cannot increase sufficiently to achieve this level of fishing effort given the constraints on the number of 
vessels and the maximum average days at sea per vessel. Therefore, no scenario achieves MSY for 
European anchovy in year 15. The closest value is in scenario 12, which shows also the highest level of 
landings (13,930 tonnes). This level of landings is only lower than those obtained in scenario 13 (16,150 
tonnes) and scenario 14 (19,200 tonnes). Those represent the optimal levels from an economic point of 
view as scenario 13 is directed to maximize GVA and scenario 14 is aimed to maximize profit over the 
first 15 years of simulation. According with the theory, as stocks are not overexploited, the landings 
increase when fishing effort increases.  
 
As scenario 14 is aimed to maximize profits, nominal and discounted profits in year 15 and NPV profit15 
in scenario 14 are higher than those estimated in other scenarios. As for the other scenarios in Table 9.13, 
NPV profit15 raises with increases in the level of landings, and landings raise with increases in the level of 
fishing effort. 
 
 Scenario 1
 
The fleet
average d
However
days, the
conseque
simulatio
 
Results o
constant 
show a s
(2,485 to
similar tr
respectiv
 
Given th
scenario 
almost e
scenario 
 
Figure 9.
  
 
0. Static prese
 in scenario 
ays at sea p
, even thoug
se cannot i
nce, fishing 
n period.  
btained by s
and equal to
light increas
nnes for pil
end. Consta
ely after the 
e lower num
10 is poore
quivalent to 
10. 
12 Results of
nt fleet 
10 is suppos
er vessel are
h the policy 
ncrease mor
days per ves
cenario 10 s
 8,000 days 
e in the first
chard and 4,
nt values of 
year 6.  
ber of vess
r than that i
that estimate
 scenario 10
ed to remain
 changing ac
option tends
e than a an
sel increase 
how change
after year 2. 
 6 years and
289 tonnes 
19 million eu
els and day
n the main 
d in scenari
. Adaptation
 stable and e
cording to t
 to increase 
 assumed 
in year 2 and
s only in the
The levels o
 remain at t
for anchovy)
ro and 7.2 m
s at sea, the
scenario. On
o 2. This is 
with ‘presen
qual to the f
he fishing ef
fishing effor
maximum n
 remain at t
 first years o
f landings fo
he correspon
 thereafter. 
illion euro 
 economic p
 the contrar
due to the re
t’ fleet 
leet operatin
fort selected 
t by modifyin
umber of d
he maximum
f the simula
r European 
ding long te
The econom
are estimated
erformance 
y, NPV pro
duced labou
g at the base
by the polic
g the averag
ays per ves
 level over 
tion. Fishing
anchovy and
rm equilibriu
ic indicators
 for GVA a
in terms of
fit15 in scena
r and capita
221 
line. The 
y option. 
e fishing 
sel. As a 
the entire 
 effort is 
 pilchard 
m levels 
 follow a 
nd profit 
GVA in 
rio 10 is 
l costs in 
 
 Scenario 1
 
The fleet
fishing e
are chang
 
Scenario 
value. Th
lower lev
level afte
lower tha
 
The gros
nominal 
scenario 
to 75.4 m
 
Given th
main sce
 
Figure 9.
 
 
1. Static minim
 in scenario 
ffort as the b
ing accordin
11 is very sim
is is equal t
el (45 vessel
r year 2 and
n in scenario
s value adde
profit in ye
10. In terms 
illion euro, a
e lower num
nario. In par
13 Results of
um fleet  
11 is suppose
aseline given
g to the fishi
ilar to scen
o the baselin
s). Also in t
 maintained 
 10, and so a
d reported i
ar 15 amoun
of NPV pro
gainst 79.3 m
ber of vesse
ticular, NPV 
 scenario 11
d to be stab
 a maximum
ng effort sel
ario 10. The 
e fleet in sc
his scenario 
constant ove
re harvest ra
n Figure 9.13
ts to 6.9 m
fit15, scenario
illion euro i
ls and fishin
profit15 is 5%
. Static minim
le and equal 
 days at sea
ected by the 
only differen
enario 10 (5
the average 
r the simulat
tio and level
 is lower th
illion euro in
 11 shows a 
n scenario 10
g effort, resu
 lower than 
um fleet 
to the minim
 per vessel. 
policy option
ce is related 
3 vessels), w
days at sea p
ion period. A
s of landings
en in Figure
 scenario 1
value over th
.  
lts in scenar
in the main 
um fleet able
The average 
. 
to the fleet si
hile in scena
er vessel are
s a consequ
.  
9.12 (scenar
1, lower tha
e first 15 yea
io 11 are poo
scenario. 
 to produce
days at sea p
ze selected a
rio 11 this i
 set to the m
ence, fishing
io 10). In T
n 7.2 million
rs of simulat
rer than tho
222 
the same 
er vessel 
s starting 
s set at a 
aximum 
 effort is 
able 9.13, 
 euro in 
ion equal 
se in the 
 
223 
 
Scenario 12. Dynamic minimum fleet  
 
In scenario 12, the average days at sea per vessel are supposed to be constant and equal to an assumed 
maximum level, while the fleet is changing each year in accordance with the fishing effort selected by the 
policy option.  
 
This is the only scenario where fishing effort is exclusively driven by the policy option. As a result, this is 
also the only scenario able to achieve the MSY for European anchovy. Fishing effort shows a clear trend 
to the level corresponding to the MSY. This level, estimated at 12,400 days at sea, is achieved at the end of 
the simulation period. Variations in fishing effort are determined by changes in the number of vessels as 
the average fishing days is set constant. In the year 15, there are 80 vessels, 52% more than those active in 
the baseline and 28% less than those in the main scenario.  
 
Landings of both species show an increase in the first four years of the simulation period, and fluctuate 
around 5,500 tonnes for anchovy and 3,400 tonnes for pilchard thereafter. Total catches in year 15 are 
equal to 13,930 tonnes, a level higher than that registered in the previous scenarios, main scenario 
included, which shows a maximum level of 13,130 tonnes in the same year.  
 
The gross value added reported in Figure 9.14 is higher than in Figure 9.6  
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Scenario 13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 
 
Differently from other scenarios, scenario 13 is directed to achieve the maximum contribution to GNP 
(maximum NPV GVA15) by optimizing the number of vessels of all fleet segments over the simulation 
period. 
 
Compared with other scenarios, very different results are produced by scenario 13. While fishing effort in 
previous scenarios was driven by management rules aimed at achieving the MSY for the most or the least 
depleted stock, scenario 13 is directed to find the optimum solution over the first 15 years in terms of 
GVA maximization. The optimum fleet is estimated by maximizing NPV GVA15, while average days at 
sea per vessel are derived by the policy option selected in the main scenario (Effort min) with constraints 
given by the number of vessels and the maximum average level of fishing days registered in the period 
2005-7 used as an upper bound. After year 15, fishing effort is driven by the same policy option adopted 
in the main scenario. 
 
Trend in fishing effort does not show a tendency to equilibrium in the first 15 years. Corrections are 
related to the optimization process, while the policy option is not affecting fishing effort as increases in 
the average number of fishing days are not allowed over the maximum level. In the year 15, there are 98 
vessels, 87% more than in the baseline and 12% less than in the main scenario.  
 
During the 15 years when the GVA is maximized, fishing effort and harvest ratio are maintained at levels 
lower than those needed to achieve the MSY for European anchovy. Only in year 15 this level is exceeded.  
 
Landings of both species increase in the first four years of the simulation period, and fluctuate around 
5,500 tonnes for anchovy and 3,300 tonnes for pilchard thereafter. This is due to the increase in fishing 
effort. Total catches in year 15 are equal to 16,150 tonnes, a level higher than in the other scenarios based 
on the same policy option, main scenario included, which reach a maximum of 13,130.  
 
Scenario 13 shows the best economic performance in terms of GVA among the scenarios based on the 
policy option “Effort min”. In the year 15, total nominal profit is estimated at more than 7 million euro, 
almost double than the value in the main scenario. Table 9.13 shows also a level of NPV profit15 of 83 
million euro, 5% higher than the value of 79 million euro in the main scenario. Profit shows an increase in 
the first three years, a stable level until year 15, and strong variations thereafter.  
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10. MEDITERRANEAN HAKE FISHERIES (GSA 9) 
 
 
10.1. Summary and conclusions 
 
Main conclusion 
 
The three segments analysed in this fishery realized in 2005-7 on average a total net profit of 28 mln euro. 
Average annual discounted net profit ranges under most scenarios between 17 and 32 mln euro. 
Elimination of overcapacity and recovery of stocks would produce a discounted net profit of 15-28 mln 
euro by the year 15. (see Figure 10.1) 
 
Brief description of the case study 
 
This case study analyses the fishing vessels registered in the maritime areas of Liguria, Tuscany and Lazio 
(GSA 9), authorized for trawling and passive gears such as drift nets, lines, pots and other traditional 
techniques in demersal fisheries. The main target species include European hake, Norway lobster, striped 
mullet and horned octopus. Three fleet segments are mainly involved in this fishery: demersal trawlers 
with an overall length between 12 and 24 meters (DTS 12-24), small fishing boats with an overall length of 
less than 12 meters using passive gear (PGP 0-12), and polyvalent and passive gears vessels (PGP 12-24) 
with an overall length between 12 and 24 meters. The “other” segment includes trawlers and passive gears 
vessels less than 12 metres. In 2007 the selected target species amounted to 31% of total demersal 
landings and revenues. European hake is the most important demersal species representing 13% of 
landings in weight and 14% of landings in value. Norway lobster is the second most important species in 
terms of value. Even though this species represents just a 2% of total landings, this contributes to total 
revenues for almost 7%. Other important species in terms of value are striped mullet and horned octopus, 
which contributions are 6% and 5% respectively. 
 
Divergence / convergence of the results 
 
Comparing the different scenarios, the level of landings varies from 3,410 tonnes in scenarios 4 and 5 to a 
level of 11,840 tonnes in scenario 13. The level of landings is a function of the fishing effort applied on 
the biomass. Consequently, also the minimum level of fishing effort, equal to 74,000 days at sea, is 
achieved in scenario 4 and 5, and the maximum level of 176,000 in scenario 13. Fishing effort consists of 
two components, number of vessels and average fishing days per vessel. The minimum number of vessels 
is registered in scenarios 4 and 5 (461 vessels), while the maximum number in scenario 10, where the fleet 
is assumed to be constant and equal to that estimated at the baseline (1,729 vessels). Among the scenarios 
with the same level of fishing effort, those using a lower number of vessels show also higher profits. The 
highest values for discounted profit of year 15 and NPV profit15 are in scenario 14, while the lowest values 
are in scenarios 4 and 5. 
 
Choice of baseline policy 
 
Scenario 2 (Effort min) has been selected as “main scenario” or the scenario reflecting better than others 
the actual management system. Scenario 2 simulates a policy option directed to achieve the MSY for the 
stock showing the maximum overexploitation rate (difference between current and target harvest ratio). In 
the present case study, this stock is represented by European hake. As for the other options, scenario 4 
(Effort max) is directed to achieve the MSY for the stock showing the minimum overexploitation rate 
(when all stocks are overexploited) or the maximum under-exploitation rate (when at least a stock is not 
overexploited), while scenario 5 simulates an Open access situation. As the actual management system is 
not open access, but consists of a number of management measures directed to safeguard all the stocks 
exploited by fishing activities, scenario 5 cannot de selected as main scenario. Furthermore, the main 
management measures are directed to reduce fishing effort. As in the present case study some stocks are 
underexploited, scenario 4 suggests an increase in fishing effort. Then, this cannot be considered as 
representative of the real system. 
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Achieving MSY 
 
Scenario 2 simulates a policy option directed to achieve the MSY for the stock showing the maximum 
overexploitation rate. As this is selected as the “main scenario”, also the scenarios from 7 to 12, based on 
the main scenario, operate to achieve the same objective. The stock with the maximum difference 
between H current and H target is European hake. All these scenarios determine the application of a level 
of fishing effort equal to 138,000 days at sea, which is equivalent to the target harvest ratio for European 
hake. However, MSY cannot be achieved for all species at the same time. The level of fishing effort 
resulting from these scenarios determines a status of under-exploitation for the other three stocks (the 
harvest ratio in year 15 is lower than target F). All the scenarios directed to achieve MSY for European 
hake apply the same level of fishing effort. However, the optimal combination of effort components 
(number of vessels and number of average fishing days per vessel) is different. The optimal combination 
of effort components producing the highest resource rents is obtained reducing the number of vessels at 
the minimum level. Comparing the scenarios directed to achieve MSY, scenario 12 shows the minimum 
number of vessels and the maximum resource rent, estimated in 392 million euro. This scenario is then 
the most efficient and shows the best economic performance in this group of scenarios. 
 
Achieving MEY (NPV profit15) 
 
Even though scenario 12 is the most efficient compared with the other scenarios directed to achieve MSY, 
results do not match with the MEY solution. The scenarios showing results closest to the MEY solution 
are scenarios 13 and 14. Both scenarios are directed to achieve the MEY by optimizing the number of 
vessels of all fleet segments over the simulation period, but MEY is expressed in terms of GVA in 
scenario 13 and profit in scenario 14. Compared with the other scenarios, scenario 14 shows the best 
economic performance. The maximum resource rent over the first 15 years of the simulation period, equal 
to 486 million euro, has been estimated in this scenario as the NPV of profit. The optimization process 
suggests a strong reduction in all fleet segments. In the year 15, the total number of vessels in scenario 14 
is 1192, 30% lower than those in the baseline. Compared with the baseline, PGP 0012 are reduced of 
20%, DTS 1224 of two-thirds and PGP 1224 of more than 70%. Compared with the main scenario, the 
total fleet is just 1% lower in scenario 14, but significant  differences are in the fleet composition. PGP 
0012 increases by 20%, while DTS 1224 and PGP 1224 show reductions of almost 60%. The optimal fleet 
size and its composition indicate that PGP 0012 represents the most efficient fleet segment in terms of 
long term profitability. Indeed, this fleet segment shows the lowest weight of fixed and capital costs on 
total income (less than 18%).  
 
Role of discount rate 
 
Scenarios 7 and 8 differ from each other scenario as discount rates of 2% and 5% respectively have been 
applied instead of 3.5%. However, compared with the main scenario, variations in the discount rate have 
not produced any effect on the dynamics of the system. The same nominal profit is registered in year 15 
for the three scenarios. Regarding the NPV profit15 and the discounted profit of year 15, obviously the 
highest values are estimated at the lowest discount rate. 
 
Impact of eliminating overcapacity 
 
In this case study, four of the main target species are included in the model. Based on the biological 
approach adopted to estimate stock-recruitment relationships, only European hake and horned octopus 
are overexploited at the baseline (average data over the period 2005-7). On the contrary, Norway lobster 
and striped mullet show levels of current H lower than target F. European hake is the species with the 
maximum overexploitation rate. All the scenarios directed to achieve MSY for this stock show a reduction 
in the number of vessels. This reduction is estimated in 30%, from 1,729 to 1,204 vessels, in the main 
scenario. The elimination of overcapacity in this scenario determines a NPV profit15 over the first 15 years 
of the simulation period equal to 328 million euro. However, the path to achieve MSY can be different 
and so the composition of fishing effort both in terms of effort components (number of vessels and 
number of average fishing days per vessel) and fleet structure. Scenario 12 shows the best combination of 
fishing effort components reducing the number of vessels of 45%, from 1,729 to 957 vessels, and  
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increasing the average days at sea per vessel. The economic performance for this solution is estimated in 
392 million euro as NPV profit15. However, optimal solutions optimizing the efficiency of the fleet from 
an economic point of view are provided by scenario 13 and 14. Scenario 13 shows a higher number of 
vessels, 1244, but removes completely the fleet segment PGP 1224 and increases the number of small 
scale vessels. The NPV profit15 estimated in this scenario is equal to 449 million euro. Scenario 14 shows 
a number of 1192 vessels maintaining active the fleet segment PGP 1224, and a value of 486 million euro 
for NPV profit15. 
 
Management costs and rent recovery 
 
The introduction of a fixed payment for access has reduced the profitability and made the sector less 
attractive. As a consequence, investments in new vessels are lower than those in the main scenario for 
DTS 12-24 and PGP 12-24. On the contrary, the number of vessels of PGP 00-12 is higher in the present 
scenario. A total of 1,328 vessels would operate in year 15 for this scenario compared to a number of 
1,204 in the main scenario. Notwithstanding, the level of fishing effort remains the same as this is defined 
by a policy option common to both scenarios. The same fishing effort determines also an equal harvest 
ratio, exploitation rate and level of landings. The different compositions of fishing effort in the two 
scenarios highlights a higher efficiency when a payment for access is introduced. Indeed, reducing the 
number of vessels for DTS 12-24 and PGP 12-24 and increasing the vessels of PGP 00-12 allows the 
entire fleet to reduce fixed and capital costs (which are higher for bigger size vessels) maintaining variable 
costs (which are dependent on fishing effort) at the same levels of the main scenario. Therefore, as largely 
expected, the introduction of a payment for access increases the efficiency of the fleet. Nominal profit for 
the entire fleet in year 15 amounts to 32.3 million euro, higher than the value of 31.3 million euro in the 
main scenario. The difference between these value is due to the fixed and capital costs. However, after 
deducting the amount of 11.8 million euro, as the payment for access for the entire fleet, the economic 
performance results significantly reduced. Indeed, payment for access is particularly relevant representing 
around 37% of total profits. However, among the three fleet segments considered, only PGP 12-24 will 
register negative profits as a consequence of the introduction of a fixed payment for access. 
 
 
10.2. Case study definition 
 
10.2.1. Fleet and landings 
 
This case study deals with the fishing vessels registered in the maritime areas of Liguria, Tuscany and 
Lazio (GSA 9), authorized for trawling and passive gears such as drift nets, lines, pots and other traditional 
techniques in demersal fisheries. The main target species include European hake, Norway lobster, Striped 
mullet and Horned octopus. 
 
Three fleet segments are mainly involved in this fishery: demersal trawlers with an overall length between 
12 and 24 meters (DTS 12-24), small fishing boats with an overall length of less than 12 meters using 
passive gear (PGP 00-12), and Polyvalent and Passive Gears vessels (PGP 12-24) with an overall length 
between 12 and 24 meters. The “other” segment includes trawlers and passive gears vessels less than 12 
meters. 
 
In 2007 the trawling segment (DTS 12-24) amounted to 335 boats having an overall tonnage of almost 
13,000 GT. This fleet segment represents 19% of the total number of vessels operating in the area and 
78% of total GT. More than 1,300 vessels, 75% of the total number and 16% of total GT, are small 
fishing boats (PGP 00-12). The third group of vessels, PGP 12-24, consists of 71 units equivalent to 5% 
of the total GSA 9 demersal fleet, measured both in number and tonnage.  
 
The main fleet segments contributed for around 97% to the total landings in GSA 9, both in quantity and 
in value. Trawlers account for above 78% of target landings, small scale fishery for 15% and Polyvalent 
and Passive Gears segment for another 4%. 
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Table 10.1 Role of case study fisheries within national fishery sectors (2005-7) 
Member State Total fishery sector Case study fleets 
Total revenues 
(mln euro) 
Total fleet 
(number of vessels) 
Revenues
(mln euro) 
Fleet 
(number of vessels) 
Italy GSA 9 1,426 14,428 123.7 1,709 
Source: IREPA, 2007 
 
Table 10.2 Role of target species 
MS Gear Size No. 
vessels 
GT 
(1000)
Landings (1000 t) Value (mln euro)
Target species Total Target species Total
ITA GSA9 DTS 12-24 335 13.0 3.1 7.5 31.0 66.9
ITA GSA9 PGP 0-12 1,303 2.6 0.6 4.4 6.7 50.7
ITA GSA9 PGP 12-24 71 0.9 0.2 0.7 1.3 6.2
Other 25 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 3.4
Total GSA9 1,734 16.7 4.0 13.0 39.8 127.2
Source: IREPA, 2007 
 
10.2.2. Composition of landings 
 
In 2007 the selected target species account for 31% of total demersal landings and revenues. European 
hake is the most important demersal species representing 13% of landings in weight and 14% in value. 
Norway lobster is the second most important species in terms of value. Even though this species 
represents just 2% of total landings, an average price of around 34 euro/kg determines a contribution to 
total revenues of almost 7%. Other important species are striped mullet and horned octopus which 
contributions to total landings value account for 6% and 5% respectively. 
 
As for the composition of landings by fleet segment, the selected target species represent 41% of the total 
production and 46% of total revenues for demersal trawlers (DTS 12-24). The same species amount to 
13% of the production in weight and in value for PGP 00-12, and to around 23% for PGP 12-24.  
 
European hake results to be an important species for all fleets both in weight and in value. Striped mullet 
and horned octopus represent almost a quarter of total landings for demersal trawlers, while their 
incidence on the production of the other fleet segments is lower than 1%. Also Norway lobster is caught 
almost exclusively by DTS 12-24, representing 13% of their revenues. 
 
Table 10.3 Composition of landings by segment,  (fleet active in GSA 9, tonnes) 
MS Gear Size European 
hake 
Horned 
octopus 
Norway 
lobster 
Striped 
mullet 
Other Total
ITA  DTS 12-24 1,007.7 836.3 260.0 1,013.3 4,423.1 7,540.5
ITA  PGP 00-12 571.2 18.2 0.2 20.2 3,813.5 4,423.3
ITA  PGP 12-24 156.0 0.3 0.0 1.3 526.2 683.8
ITA  Other  18.0 32.9 0.3 61.2 272.7 385.1
Total  1,752.8 887.7 1,752.8 887.7 260.6 1,096.0
Source: IREPA, 2007 
 
Table 10.4 Composition of landings by segment ((fleet active in GSA 9, 1000 euro) 
MS Gear Size European 
hake 
Horned 
octopus 
Norway 
lobster 
Striped 
mullet 
Other Total
ITA  DTS 12-24 9,129 5,959 8,850 7,068 35,891 66,897
ITA  PGP 00-12 6,587 60 5 98 43,948 50,698
ITA  PGP 12-24 1,343 2 0 6 4,808 6,158
ITA  Other  129 156 11 354 2,770 3,419
Total  17,187 6,176 8,866 7,526 87,417 127,172
Source: IREPA, 2007 
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10.3. Historical indicators 
 
Trends in the levels of landings for the selected target species in the demersal fisheries in GSA 9 are 
reported in Figure 10.2 for the period 2002-2008. The highest levels of landings are concentrated in the 
years 2003 and 2006. The only exceptions are represented by striped mullet with a level of landings of 
1,096 tonnes in 2007. In 2006 European hake and Horned octopus show their maximum levels of 
landings: almost 2,330 tonnes for European hake and 945 tonnes for Horned octopus. In 2003 the highest 
levels are registered for Norway lobster with 331 tonnes.  
 
 
Figure 10.2 Landings by target species (2002-2008 data) 
 
Source: IREPA  
 
The evolution in the period 2004-2007 of the three fleet segments operating in demersal fisheries in GSA 
9 in terms of changes in the number of vessels is reported in Figure 10.3. Fleet segments DTS 12-24 does 
not show significant variations in the number of vessels. PGP 00-12 shows a small reduction of almost 
2% from 2004 to 2007. On the contrary, the number of vessels classified as PGP 12-24 has increased 
significantly during the period analysed. In 2007, an increase of more than 30% compared with 2004 has 
been registered for this fleet segment.  
 
Figure 10.3 Change in vessels number by fleet segment (2004-2007 data) 
 
Source: IREPA  
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Table 10.5 Economic indicators (fleet active in GSA 9) 
MS Gear Size Gross 
value 
added 
(mln 
euro) 
Profit
(mln 
euro) 
Employ-
ment 
Average 
price 
(euro/t) 
Fuel costs 
as % of 
income 
Profit / 
tonne 
landings 
(euro/t) 
CPUE 
total 
(t/day) 
CPUE 
target 
species 
(t/day) 
ITA DTS 12-24 112.9 28 2,724 9,040 0.3 4532 135.7 65.9
ITA  PGP 0-12 114.2 52 4,674 11,089 0.1 8059 27.3 7.2
ITA  PGP 12-24 10.8 3 402 9,229 0.2 6057 59.4 22.0
 Other  7.2 3 179 8,966 0.2 294 104.4 16.4
Total GSA9  245.2 86 7,980 9,725 0.2 3752 57.0 22.4
Source: IREPA  
 
 
10.5. Management measures 
 
10.5.1. General description 
 
The Italian management system for demersal fisheries is mainly based on input control measures 
(limitation of licences, time and area closures, mesh size restrictions) and partly on output control 
measures (landings minimum size). 
 
All vessels are required to hold a licence, which is centrally managed by the General Direction of Fishery 
of the Ministry of Agriculture Food and Forestry Policy. Licences are issued by the Ministry to the ship-
owner. The licence specifies detailed terms and conditions for the operations, including limitations on 
fishing areas and gear used. The licence identifies the vessel through a European code and other 
information concerning the vessel characteristics used (i.e. name, authorized gear, GT, kW, LOA, etc.). 
Consequently, one fishing licence corresponds exclusively to one fishing vessel. Licences are valid for 
eight years and are renewed on the request of the ship-owner. In the last years a limit on the issue of new 
licences has been imposed by the administration. This limit has been set in order to comply with the 
capacity reduction planned first, under the European Multiannual Guidance Programs (MAGPs), in force 
in the period 1983-2002, and then under the EC Reg. 1438/2003, establishing the new entry-exit regime. 
To comply with the capacity objectives, the national Administration sets that for those segments where 
overcapacity has been assessed (as in case of bottom trawl fishery) no new licence can be issued and 
transferability of the existing licence on another vessel can only be authorized in case the other vessel has 
at least the same tonnage and power of the old one.  
 
10.5.2. Input management 
 
Effort restrictions 
 
The main fishing effort control variables are technical measures, as mesh size, and area and time closures. 
As far as the time closure, the seasonal withdrawal is, perhaps, the most efficient effort control measure of 
the Italian fishery management system, both in terms of resources conservation and in terms of 
enforcement control. It has been applied continuatively since 1988 and applies both to trawlers and to 
mid-water pelagic nets as its main aim is the safeguard of the juveniles of demersal species. In particular, 
the seasonal withdrawal is intended to safeguard demersal species during their recruitment seasons. 
Considering the multispecificity of the Italian fishery, these periods vary from species to species and the 
period provided each year by the seasonal withdrawal represent a compromise, based on scientific advice, 
for the main species caught by trawlers and mid-water pelagic nets. It should be outlined that this measure 
is applied in different periods and, depending on the areas of the Italian coastline, it can be compulsory or 
facultative. In particular, for GSA 9 (as for the all Tyrrhenian fleets) the seasonal withdrawal has been 
compulsory until 1997, facultative in the years 1998-1999, compulsory again in 2000 and 2001 (only in 
some harbours), facultative in the period 2002-2007. In 2007 it has been applied again in a compulsory 
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way. Beside the seasonal withdrawal the bottom trawlers fishing activity is regulated by forbidding the 
fishing activity during week end and other national days. 
 
The trawling fishery is largely influenced by the implementation of a number of area closures, among 
which the most important are Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), fishing protected areas and some technical 
measures defining limits from the shore for the trawling activity. As far as MPAs, in the GSA9 area 4 
MPAs already exist, for 5 areas the administrative process to become MPAs has started and 2 further areas 
have been individuated as possible future MPAs. Italian MPAs are generally divided into 3 different zones 
according to their different environmental features (A, B and C), where the fishing restrictions are 
gradually less restrictive. Generally, fishing activities are allowed partly in zone B and in zone C, but only 
by resident fishermen and by the use of traditional fishing technique (i.e., in the zone C of the Portofino 
MPA professional fishing is permitted only by resident fishermen and by the use of a fishing tool called 
“tonnarella”, which is a traditional fixed trap - very similar to the tuna traps – used to capture white fish as 
greater amberjack and saddled seabream.  
 
As far as the fishing protected areas, two zones have been established in GSA 9. They respond to the need 
to protect juveniles concentration of some species in specific areas. In these zones the fishing activity is 
completely banned. The two zones, one in the waters of the Tucsonan archipelago and the other in the 
waters opposite to the Gaeta promontory represent nursery area for European hake. The first one, 
especially in spring, is a nursery area also for blue whiting and horned octopus. 
 
Beside the above measures, the trawling activity in Italy is regulated by a series of technical measures 
limiting both the input (mesh size and area restrictions) and the output side (size selectivity). Since the 
beginning of 2007, the main reference of the technical measures regulating the trawling fishery in GSA 9 is 
the EC Reg. no 1967/2006 which amends the EC Reg. no. 2847/93, abrogates the EC Reg. 1626/1994 
and establishes new management measures for the sustainable exploitation of fishery resources in the 
Mediterranean Sea.  
 
As far as the net used by trawlers, the above regulation establishes a set of technical rules that can be 
summarized in: 
1. Minimum mesh size:  
 until 31.12.2007: >40 mm;  
 since 1.7.2008 the mesh can be 40 mm squared or 50 mm rhomboidal. 
2. Minimum size (and the way to measure it) for some landed species (Annex III of the above 
regulation). A number of species listed in the Annex III represent target species of the bottom 
trawling fishery in GSA 9. Some minimum sizes are the following: 
 European hake: 20 cm; 
 Mullet: 11 cm; 
 Lobster: 70 mm total length; 20 mm carapace length; 
 Shrimp: 20 mm carapace length. 
3. Fishing at distance < 1.5 nautical miles from the coast (until 31.12.2007 trawling net can fish < 1.5 
nautical miles but not < 50 m isobaths).  
 
Input property rights 
 
As the licences are not transferable, there are no input property rights in this fishery. 
 
 
10.6. Management costs 
 
10.6.1. Summary of OECD data 
 
Detailed data on management costs are not available at GSA level. For this reason the management costs 
of each case study have been assumed proportionate to the share of the fleet segment in the total national 
revenues. GSA 9 DTS 12-24 on average represents 12% of the Italian management costs, equal to 6.7 
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million euro. PGP 00-12 and PGP 12-24, with 4.7 and 0.4 million euro, account for 3.7% and 0.3% of 
total management costs respectively.  
 
On the basis of the OECD statistics on government financial transfers, management cost are primarily 
destined for direct payments (62%), while general services represent 38% of total management costs. 16% 
of direct payments consists of decommissioning costs and 8% of renewal and modernization costs. 38% 
of direct payments are other costs, which include costs for temporary withdrawal and joint venture, 
support to small scale fishery, support to freshwater fishery and to protection and development.  
 
In relation to general services, enforcement and research costs represent 13% and 5% of total 
management costs respectively.  
 
Table 10.6 Management costs according to OECD, average 2004-2006* , (1000 euro) 
 
GSA 9 GSA 9 GSA 9 
Total GSA9 DTS 12-24 PGP 00-12 PGP 12-24 
Direct Payments 4.2 2.9 0.2 8.3 
 - Decommissioning 1.1 0.8 0.1 2.2 
 - Fleet renewal and modernization 0.6 0.4 0.0 1.1 
 - Other 2.6 1.8 0.2 5.1 
General Services 2.6 1.8 0.2 5.1 
 - Management and enforcement 0.8 0.6 0.1 1.7 
 - Research 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.6 
 - Other 1.4 1.0 0.1 2.8 
Total 6.7 4.7 0.4 13.4 
*sum of national and EU contributions regarding marine capture fisheries. 
**share of national costs allocated to individual segments have been assumed proportionate to the share of the 
segment in the total revenues of the national marine fisheries sector. 
 
10.6.2. Support to fishing sector (FIFG and EFF) 
 
In order to evaluate the FIFG and the EFF support to the caching sector, the measures under the FIFG 
axis 1 and 2 have been compared with the measures foreseen under the EFF priority axis 1. In both cases 
they have been estimated on the basis of the share in the total national revenues.  
 
Table 10.7 Average annual support to the marine fisheries from FIFG and EFF, (mln euro)* 
 
GSA 9
DTS 12-24 
GSA 9
PGP 00-12 
GSA 9 
PGP 12-24 
Total
FIFG - Axis 1 and 2 17.1 11.9 1.3 30.3
EFF - Axis 1 2.7 1.9 0.2 4.7 
 
10.6.3. Costs of research and management  
 
In absence of detailed data, management, control and enforcement costs are those estimated from the 
OECD statistics. Research costs have been estimated as a quota of the national DCF budget augmented 
of a 30%. The quota related to the demersal fishery in GSA 9 has been calculated according to its share in 
national landings value.  
 
Table 10.8 Estimated management and research costs, (mln euro) 
 
GSA 9
DTS 12-24 
GSA 9
PGP 00-12 
GSA 9 
PGP 12-24 
GSA 9
Total 
Management, control, enforcement  0.84 0.59 0.05 1.48 
Research (DCF+30%) 0.47 0.33 0.03 0.83 
Sources: MRAG (2008) and Com. Decision 811/2009 
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10.7. Estimation of the resource rent 
 
10.7.1. Comparison of scenarios 
 
Table 10.9 Comparison of the scenarios 
Scenario  
no. 
Effort 
(1000 DAS) 
Fleet
(no. vessels) 
Catch
(1000 t) 
Profit year 15 
discounted 
(mln euro) 
NPV Profit15 
(mln euro) 
Average values 2005-7
2005-7  244 1,729 13.6 27.6 
Values in year 15 of the scenario
1. TAC min   
2. Effort min 138 1204 10.7 18.7 327.9
3. TAC max     
4. Effort max 74 461 3.4 0.9 -29.9
5. Open access 74 461 3.4 0.9 -30.0
6. Min min     
7. Discount rate 2% 138 1204 10.7 23.2 369.0
8. Discount rate 5% 138 1204 10.7 15.0 292.9
9. Recovery mgt. costs 138 1328 10.7 19.3 336.4
10. Static present fleet 138 1729 10.7 14.8 263.7
11. Static minimum fleet 138 1697 10.7 15.3 273.5
12. Dynamic min. fleet 138 957 10.7 21.9 391.8
13. Optimum fleet (GVA) 176 1244 11.8 22.0 449.0
14. Optimum fleet (profit) 164 1192 11.1 27.9 486.3
 
Table 10.9 shows the main results by scenario. As the fisheries under analysis in this case study are multi-
species and managed by an input control regime, scenarios 1, 3 and 6 (based on TAC policies) are not 
applicable. Among the applicable scenarios, scenario 2 (Effort min) has been selected as “main scenario” 
or the scenario reflecting better than others the actual management system. Scenario 2 simulates a policy 
option directed to achieve the MSY for the stock showing the maximum overexploitation rate (difference 
between current and target harvest ratio). In the present case study, this stock is represented by European 
hake. As for the other options, scenario 4 (Effort max) is directed to achieve the MSY for the stock 
showing the minimum overexploitation rate (when all stocks are overexploited) or the maximum under-
exploitation rate (when at least a stock is not overexploited), while scenario 5 simulates an Open access. 
As described above, the actual management system is not open access, but consists of a number of 
management measures directed to safeguard all the stocks. Furthermore, the main management measures 
are directed to reduce fishing effort. As in the present case study some stocks are underexploited, scenario 
4 suggests an increase in fishing effort. Then, this cannot be considered as representative of the real 
system.  
 
Scenarios from 7 to 14 are based on the main scenario, but include specific assumptions described in the 
detail in the related sections. In particular, scenarios 13 and 14 are aimed to estimate the optimum fleet 
maximizing NPV GVA15 and NPV profit15 respectively. A general overview of the simulated scenarios 
highlights values generally lower than those registered at the baseline for all the variables reported in Table 
10.9. However, as data simulated in year 15 are related to sustainable solutions, these are not comparable 
with data estimated in a non-equilibrium status at the baseline. In particular, the average catch in the 
period 2005-7, equal to 13,620 tonnes, is not sustainable in the long term given the status of 
overexploitation of the main target species, while the values estimated in year 15 are generally sustainable 
or very close to the sustainable level. 
 
Comparing the different scenarios, the level of sustainable landings varies from 3,410 tonnes in scenarios 
4 and 5 to a level of 11,840 tonnes in scenario 13. The level of landings is a function of the fishing effort 
and the biomass. Consequently, also the minimum level of fishing effort, equal to 74,000 days at sea, is 
found in scenario 4 and 5, and the maximum level of 176,000 results from scenario 13. Fishing effort 
consists of two components, number of vessels and average fishing days per vessel. The different 
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combinations of these components can be derived by comparing the columns of effort and fleet in Table 
10.9. The minimum number of vessels is in scenarios 4 and 5 (461 vessels), while the maximum number is 
in scenario 10, where the fleet is assumed to be constant and equal to that estimated at the baseline (1729 
vessels). Among the scenarios with the same level of fishing effort, those using a lower number of vessels 
show also higher profits. Table 10.9 shows the discounted profit of year 15 and the NPV profit15 of 
simulation for each of the simulated scenarios. The highest values for both indicators are in scenario 14, 
while the lowest values are in scenarios 4 and 5. 
 
Scenario 2 simulates a policy directed to achieve the MSY for the stock showing the maximum 
overexploitation rate. As this is selected as the “main scenario”, also the scenarios from 7 to 12, based on 
the main scenario, pursue same objective. The stock with the maximum difference between H current and 
H target is European hake. All these scenarios determine the application of a level of fishing effort equal 
to 138,000 days at sea, which is equivalent to the target harvest ratio for European hake. However, MSY 
cannot be achieved for all species at the same time. The level of fishing effort resulting from these 
scenarios determines a status of under-exploitation for the other stocks (the harvest ratio in year 15 is 
lower than the target F). 
 
All the scenarios directed to achieve MSY for European hake apply the same level of fishing effort. 
However, the optimal combination of effort components (number of vessels and number of average 
fishing days per vessel) is different. The optimal combination from an economic viewpoint, given by the 
lower number of vessels, is realized in scenario 12. This scenario is then the most efficient and shows the 
best economic performance among this group of scenarios. However, this cannot be considered as a 
scenario directed to achieve the MEY. The scenarios showing results closest to the MEY solution are 
scenarios 13 and 14. Both scenarios are directed to achieve the MEY by optimizing the number of vessels 
of all fleet segments over the simulation period, but MEY is expressed in terms of GVA in scenario 13 
and profit in scenario 14. However, these results are partially affected by the policy option defined in the 
main scenario, which represents the basis for scenarios 13 and 14 as well. Scenario 13 (proxy for MEY 
scenario) shows a NPV profit15 higher than that estimated in scenario 12 (best economic performance in 
MSY scenarios). A difference of 57.2 million euro is registered, equivalent to a 15% more for scenario 13. 
Scenario 14, which is specifically directed to maximize profit, shows a NPV profit15 higher than those 
estimated in scenarios 12 and 13. 
 
All the scenarios have shown a reduction in the fleet size. The most significant reduction has been 
registered in scenarios 4 and 5 with more than 70% of the vessels removed. However, this reduction is not 
directly produced by the policy option, which is instead directed to increase fishing effort. The 
management policy determines an increasing overexploitation of some stocks and consequently their 
extinction. European hake and  horned octopus result completely depleted in year 15. This determines the 
exit of a significant part of the fleet. Given these results, scenarios 4 and 5 can be defined as unsustainable 
from both an environmental and an economic point of view. Another scenario determining the exit of a 
relevant part of the fleet is scenario 13. In this case, the optimum fleet maximizing NPV GVA15 consists 
of only two of the existing fleet segments. To achieve the MEY (in terms of GVA) solution, PGP 12-24 
should be removed. On the contrary, MEY expressed in terms of profit in scenario 14 can be achieved 
maintaining active all fleet segments, but reducing significantly their size. 
 
As reported above, the maximum NPV profit15 is produced by scenario 14. This result is related to the 
demersal fisheries in GSA 9 as a whole. In multi-species fisheries, the economic performance depends on 
the contribution of a number of stocks. The contribution of each stock can be estimated proportionately 
to the share of total revenues coming from that stock. In all the scenario based on the main scenario 
(Effort min), the target species contributing the most to the total revenues is European hake. In scenarios 
4 and 5, as European hake does not produce landings as well as horned octopus, the target species 
contributing the most to the total revenues is striped mullet.  
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10.7.2. Policy options (scenarios 1-6)  
 
Summary 
 
Table 10.10 Effect of different policies on profit, harvest ratio, catches, effort and fleet 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios
1. TAC min 2. Effort 
min 
3. TAC max 4. Effort 
max 
5. Open 
access 
6. Min / 
min 
NPV Profit15     327.9 -29.9 -30.0 
Profit year 15 
discounted 
27.6   18.7 0.9 0.9 
Harvest ratio (year 15)*
European hake 1.0   0.8 47.7 47.7 
Norway lobster 0.5   0.3 0.3 0.3 
Striped mullet 0.7   0.3 0.4 0.4 
Horned octopus 0.9   0.6 46.3 46.3 
Catch in (1000 t, for scenarios year 15)
European hake 2.0   1.5 0.1 0.1 
Norway lobster 0.3   0.2 0.2 0.2 
Striped mullet 1.0   0.9 1.0 1.0 
Horned octopus 0.9   0.7 0.1 0.1 
Effort (1000 DAS, for scenarios year 15)
DTS 12-24 61  35 44 44 
PGP 00-12 173  97 28 28 
PGP 12-24 10  6 2 2 
Fleet (no vessels, for scenarios year 15)
DTS 12-24 339  275 235 235 
PGP 00-12 1,327  887 216 215 
PGP 12-24 63  42 10 10 
*F=1 implies that the stock is almost extinct. 
 
As reported above, scenario 2 (main scenario) and all the scenarios based on the “main scenario” 
(scenarios from 7 to 12) simulate a policy option directed to achieve the MSY for the stock showing the 
maximum overexploitation rate. This stock is European hake, which H target is estimated in 0.77. Table 
10.10 shows that this level has been achieved in year 15 by scenario 2. In multi-species fisheries, MSY 
cannot be achieved for all species at the same time. The level of fishing effort determining MSY for 
European hake allows under-exploitation of the other stocks. Indeed, the harvest ratio in year 15 for 
Norway lobster, striped mullet and horned octopus is lower than the related target F. MSY for European 
hake is obtained in scenario 2 by applying a level of fishing effort equal to 138,000 days at sea. Fishing 
effort is distributed among fleet segments as reported in Table 10.10. However, this effort distribution 
represents just one of the infinite potential fleet structures able to achieve the MSY.  
 
The other two scenarios reported in Table 10.10 show almost equivalent results. Even though scenario 4 
pursues the MSY for the stock showing the minimum overexploitation rate, for reasons explained in the 
scenario section, simulation results are driven by fishermen behaviour under an open access system. As a 
consequence, H target is not achieved for any of the stocks. On the contrary, these scenarios lead to the 
extinction of European hake and horned octopus as shown in Table 10.10. The exclusion of these species 
from landings produces a dramatic decrease in fisheries profitability and the exit of a large part of the fleet.  
In terms of economic performance, Table 10.10 show values very low for scenarios 4 and 5 compared 
with the results obtained in scenario 2. Profit in year 15 for scenario 4 is just 5% of that estimated in 
scenario 2, while the NPV profit15 in scenario 4 is negative (-30 million euro). 
 
Comparing the results in year 15 for scenario 2 with the baseline, Table 10.10 shows a significant 
reduction in harvest ratio for all stocks. The strongest reduction occurs for striped mullet. Harvest ratio 
for this species declines of around an half compared with the baseline. However, this is also the species 
showing the lower reduction in landings (just 10%). On the contrary, European hake, which shows the 
lowest reduction in harvest ratio (24%), registers an high decrease in landings of 26%. This is due to the 
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different sensitivity of each stock to changes in fishing effort. A total reduction in fishing effort of 44% is 
equally distributed among fleet segments. This is due to the policy option which affects all fleet segments 
at the same extent. In terms of number of vessels, PGP segments show reductions higher than 30%, while 
the decrease in DTS 12-24 is limited to 20%.  
 
 
Scenario 1. TAC min 
Figure 10.5 Results of scenario 1. TAC min 
Not applicable for the case study 
 
 
Scenario 2. Effort min  
 
The policy option simulated in this scenario aims to achieve MSY for at least one stock in the long run. 
Given a number of species, the model calculates the ratio between the target and the current harvest ratio 
in each time period for each of the species considered and select the minimum value of these ratios. 
Fishing effort is changed proportionately to this value. As the minimum value is associated to the stock 
showing the maximum overexploitation rate, this policy option is directed to safeguard the most depleted 
stock. 
 
Based on the biological approach adopted to estimate stock-recruitment relationships, only European 
hake and horned octopus appear overexploited in the baseline (average data over the period 2005-7). On 
the contrary, Norway lobster and striped mullet show levels of current H lower than the target F. 
European hake is the species with the maximum overexploitation rate. As a consequence, the change in 
fishing effort levels is driven by the status of this stock.  
 
The four stocks are exploited to different extent by each of the three fleet segments. At the baseline, the 
fishing effort is 244,000 days at sea. More than 70% is due to PGP 00-12, a quarter to DTS 12-24, and the 
remaining 5% to PGP 12-24. The total landings are in the baseline 13,600 tonnes. However, given the 
different levels of catchability, most of landings are produced by DTS 12-24 (more than 60%).  
 
As all fleet segments catch European hake, the reduction in fishing effort produced by the policy option 
equally affects each of them. Indeed, the same percent variations are applied to all fleet segments. Days at 
sea in Figure 10.6 shows a similar trend for the three fleet segments. The only difference is related to the 
starting levels of fishing effort. Fishing effort is significantly reduced in the first 5 years of the simulation 
as the level in the baseline was unsustainable for European hake. In the following years, days at sea show a 
tendency to the level, estimated in 138,000 days for the entire fleet, corresponding to the MSY for this 
species. However, this level is not completely stable as small corrections are needed to compensate the 
changes in the number of vessels due to the investment function.  
 
As some stocks are underexploited at the level of fishing effort corresponding to the MSY for European 
hake and the marginal productivity of effort is particularly high, the number of vessels tends to increase. 
The increase in the number of vessels is compensated by reducing the maximum average days at sea (by 
the policy option). As the average number of days at sea per vessel falls, profitability turns negative and 
the number of vessels is reduced. The interactions between fishermen and policy behaviours explain the 
fluctuations in the number of vessels in Figure 10.6. The link between the number of vessels and the levels 
of profitability appears also by comparing the two graphs in Figure 10.6. Variations in profit are opposite 
to variations in number of vessels.  
 
The main trend in profit shows a strong decrease in the first years of the simulation, and a recover 
thereafter. The level of profit in the long run seems to be higher than that in the baseline for DTS 12-24, 
and very close to those levels for the other fleet segments.  
 
In the year 15, the system seems to have already achieved its long term equilibrium. The total fishing 
effort, equals to 138,000 days at sea, represents 56% of the level estimated at the baseline. The fleet 
decreases of 30%, from 1729 to 1204 vessels, and the number of days at sea per vessel per year decreases 
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Scenario 5. Open access 
 
In this scenario there is no management policy. Variations in days at sea and number of vessels are defined 
by fishermen behaviour under the assumptions on the maximization of average days at sea per vessel and 
the investment function described in section 2.3 (FISHRENT model). 
 
The maximum number of average days at sea for each of the fleet segments is reached by assumption in 
year 2. As a consequence, the evolution of total days at sea (given by maximum number of days per vessel 
multiplied by the number of vessels) shows the same trend as the number of vessels. In the first 5 years, 
there is a significant investment in new vessels with an increase in the fleet of around 20%. This increase is 
particularly relevant for PGP segments (+22%), while the number of DTS 12-24 raises of just over 10%. 
However, the augmented fishing effort and harvest ratio impact negatively on the status of stocks. In 
particular, increasing the exploitation of European hake and horned octopus, the most depleted stocks, 
leads to their “extinction” in year 5 and 6 respectively. As the model does not allow depleted stocks to 
recover, variations in the following period of simulation are based only on the remaining stocks, Norway 
lobster and striped mullet.  
 
The exclusion of these species from landings makes the fishing activities unprofitable for all fleet 
segments. As a consequence, many vessels leave the activity in the following years. However, the effect on 
fleet segments are not homogeneous. As in the model total revenues of PGP segments depend almost 
exclusively on European hake, the exclusion of this species determines a very strong damage to the 
economic sustainability of these fleets. On the contrary, the more diversified landing composition in the 
model of DTS 12-24 allows these vessels to be less vulnerable to the “extinction” of a species. Indeed, 
vessels belonging to PGP segments show a reduction of more than 80% in year 15 compared with the 
baseline, while DTS 12-24 declines of less than 30% in the same period. It is important to highlight that 
this result depends on the inclusion of just four species in the model. The diversification of landing 
composition by fleet segment in the model could be not representative of the real system.  
 
The decrease in the number of vessels allows the fleet to return in a situation of profitable fisheries but at 
levels very much lower than those registered in the baseline. 
 
In the year 15, the system has not yet achieved its long term equilibrium. The number of vessels of PGP 
segments is still declining, while DTS 12-24 shows an increasing trend. The total fishing effort, 74,000 
days at sea, is 30% of the level estimated in the baseline due to a reduction of 73% in the fleet, from 1729 
to 461 vessels, and an increase in the number of days at sea per vessel to the maximum level. As described 
above, the decrease in the number of vessels is particularly strong for PGP segments.  
 
The total catch shows a reduction of 75% from 13,620 tonnes in the baseline to 3,410 tonnes in year 15. 
Landings of European hake and horned octopus are null for the reasons described above (values reported 
in Table 10.10 are due to model numerical approximation), while Norway lobster shows a reduction of 
10% and striped mullet an increase of 1% compared with the baseline.  
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Scenario 7. Discount rate 2% 
 
Comparing scenario 7 with the main scenario (scenario 2) shows that the changes in discount rate have no 
effect on nominal profit, while discounted profit is 24% higher when the discount rate is set at 2%. 
Regarding the NPV profit15, a discount rate of 2% leads to an increase of 13% in this indicator. 
 
Scenario 8. Discount rate 5% 
 
Comparing scenario 8 with the main scenario (scenario 2) shows that the changes in discount rate have no 
effect on nominal profit, while discounted profit is 20% lower when the discount rate is set at 2%. 
Regarding the NPV profit15, a discount rate of 5% leads to a decrease of 10% in this indicator. 
 
 
10.7.4. Resource rent and recovery of management costs (scenario 9) 
 
The full recovery of management costs is simulated in this scenario by adding a fixed payment for access 
to each fleet segment. These amounts are estimated as an average of OECD data in the period 2004-2006. 
This scenario is based on the main scenario (Effort min). 
  
Results of scenario 9 are very similar to the scenario 2. Comparing Figure 10.11 with Figure 10.6 shows 
the same trends in the main variables. The only differences are related to the levels in the number of 
vessels and consequently in profit and gross value added. The introduction of a fixed payment for access 
has reduced the profitability and made less attractive the sector. As a consequence, investments in new 
vessels are lower than those in the main scenario for DTS 12-24 and PGP 12-24. On the contrary, the 
number of vessels of PGP 00-12 is higher in the present scenario. There are in total 1328 vessels in year 
15 in scenario 9 compared to 1204 in scenario 2. Notwithstanding, the level of fishing effort remains the 
same as this is defined by the policy option common to both scenarios. The same fishing effort 
determines also an equivalent harvest ratio, the same exploitation rate and levels of landings.  
 
The different composition of fishing effort in the two scenarios highlights a higher efficiency in scenario 
9. Indeed, reducing the number of vessels for DTS 12-24 and PGP 12-24 and increasing the vessels of 
PGP 00-12 allows the entire fleet of scenario 9 to reduce fixed and capital costs (which are higher for 
bigger size vessels) maintaining variable costs (which depend on fishing effort) at the same levels of 
scenario 2. Therefore, as largely expected, the introduction of a payment for access increases the efficiency 
of the fleet. The GVA reported in Figure 10.11 shows levels higher than those reported in Figure 10.6 
(main scenario) for each of the fleet segments considered. In Table 10.12, nominal GVA for the entire 
fleet in year 15 amounts to 68.9 million euro, higher than the value of 68.6 million euro estimated in 
scenario 2. The difference between these value is due to the fixed costs. When comparing profits, the 
difference between scenario 9 and 2 is higher as this includes also the additional benefit deriving from the 
reduced capital costs.  
 
Obviously, profits in Table 10.12 do not include the payment for access. This amounts to 11.8 million 
euro. When this cost is deducted from profit, the economic performance in scenario 9 will be lower than 
that estimated in the main scenario. Figure 10.11 and Figure 10.6 show the profits after the deduction of 
payments for access. Payment for access is particularly relevant representing around 37% of total profits. 
However, among the three fleet segments considered, only PGP 12-24 shows a level of profits lower than 
the payment for access in years 2 and 3. 
 
Table 10.12 Consequences of recovery of management costs 
Indicator 005-7 Scenarios* 
Main scenario: 
No recovery of management 
costs 
9. 
Recovery of management 
costs 
NPV GVA15 (mln euro) 754.7 757.7 
Nominal GVA15 (mln euro) 79.3 68.6 68.9 
NPV Profit15 327.9 336.4 
 Fixed pay
NPV Paym
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10.7.5. Optimization of capacity (scenarios 10-14) 
 
Scenarios 10 to 14 simulate the main optimum paths to achieve MSY or MEY. In particular, the level of 
fishing effort corresponding to MSY can be obtained at different combinations of its components, 
number of vessels and average days at sea per vessel. In the main scenario, MSY for European hake is 
achieved by one combination of fishing effort components given by the interactions between the 
management policy and the fishermen behaviour in terms of new investments. Scenarios 10 to 12 are 
directed to reach the MSY for European hake by using the same management option (Effort min), but 
imposing constraints on the system. The fleets in scenarios 10 and 11 are supposed to be stable, and equal 
respectively to the fleet operating at the baseline and the minimum fleet able to produce the same fishing 
effort at the baseline. In scenario 12, the average days at sea per vessel are supposed to be constant and 
equal to an assumed maximum, while the fleet is modified each year by the policy option. Differently form 
the other scenarios, scenarios 13 and 14 are directed to achieve the MEY (i.e. maximum NPV GVA15 in 
scenario 13 and maximum NPV profit15 in scenario 14) by optimizing the number of vessels of all fleet 
segments over the years from 2 to 15. 
 
Table 10.13 Impact of optimization of the fleet size 
Indicator 2005-7 Scenarios*
  Main 
scenario 
TAC min
10.
Static 
present 
fleet 
11.
Static 
minimum 
fleet 
12.
Dynamic 
minimum 
fleet 
13. 
Optimum 
fleet 
(GVA) 
14.
Optimum 
fleet 
(profit) 
NPV Profit15 (mln euro)   327.9 263.7 273.5 391.8 449.0 486.3
Nominal Profit15 (mln euro) 27.6 31.3 24.8 25.7 36.6 36.8 46.7
Discounted Profit15 (mln euro) 27.6 18.7 14.8 15.3 21.9 22.0 27.9
Fleet15 (no vessels) 1,729 1,204 1,729 1,697 957 1,244 1192
Effort15 (1000 DAS) 244 138 138 138 138 176 164
Catch15 (1000 t) 13.6 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 11.8 11.1
*NPV row refers to the sum, other rows refer to values in year 15 
 
Table 10.13 shows the values of the main variable in year 15 for each of the scenarios described above and 
provides a comparison with the baseline. The main scenario and scenarios form 10 to 12 are directed to 
achieve MSY of European hake, and this is obtained at a level of fishing effort equal to 138,000 days at 
sea. This level of fishing effort produces a total amount of catches equal to 10,670 tonnes. As reported 
above, the main difference among these scenarios is related to the composition of fishing effort. Scenario 
12 shows the minimum number of vessels, while scenario 10 the maximum number equal to the baseline. 
Very different results are reported in scenarios 13 and 14, with levels of fishing effort higher than those 
estimated for the other scenarios. In year 15, scenario 13 shows a level of fishing effort equal to 176,000 
days at sea, corresponding to 11,840 tonnes of landings, while scenario 14 shows a level of effort equal to 
164,000 days at sea, corresponding to 11,120 tonnes of landings. These are the optimal levels obtained by 
maximizing GVA and profit respectively over the first 15 years of simulation. 
 
As scenario 14 is aimed to maximize profits, nominal and discounted profits in year 15 and NPV profit15 
in scenario 14 are higher than those estimated in other scenarios. The second best scenario from an 
economic perspective is represented by scenario 13, which is directed to maximize GVA. As for the other 
scenarios in Table 10.13, profit in year 15 and NPV profit15 increase with reductions in the number of 
vessels. Scenario 12 shows the lowest number of vessels and the highest NPV profit15, while scenario 10 
shows the highest number of vessels and the lowest NPV profit15. 
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Differently from other scenarios, scenario 13 is directed to achieve the MEY (maximum NPV GVA15) by 
optimizing the number of vessels of all fleet segments over the simulation period. 
 
Compared with other scenarios, very different results are produced by scenario 13. While fishing effort in 
previous scenarios was driven by management rules aimed at achieving the MSY for the most or the least 
depleted stock, scenario 13 is directed to find the optimum solution over the first 15 years in terms of 
GVA maximization. The optimum fleet is estimated by maximizing the NPV GVA15, while average days 
at sea per vessel are derived by the policy option selected in the main scenario (Effort min) with 
constraints given by the number of vessels and the maximum average level of fishing days registered in the 
period 2005-7 used as an upper bound. After year 15, fishing effort is driven by the same policy option 
adopted in the main scenario. 
 
Trend in fishing effort does not show a tendency to equilibrium in the first 15 years. Corrections are 
probably due to the policy option, which affects the average number of fishing days per vessel for the fleet 
segment PGP 00-12 in some years. When the policy option determines a change in the average fishing 
days, the optimal fleet changes for all fleet segments. Even though a clear trend in fishing effort is not 
identified, the optimization process suggests the removal of the fleet segment PGP 12-24, a strong 
reduction of DTS 12-24 (at least in the first period) and the conservation of PGP 00-12 at a level close to 
that in the baseline. In year 15, there are 1244, 28% lower than in the baseline. PGP 00-12 are reduced of 
23%, DTS 12-24 of 34% and PGP 12-24 completely removed. The differences in fleet segments are even 
more significant if compared with the main scenario. The total fleet is a 3% higher in scenario 13, but this 
difference is due to only PGP 00-12 (+15%), while DTS 12-24 are reduced of almost 20%. The optimal 
fleet size and its composition indicates that PGP 12-24 represents the lowest efficient fleet segment in 
terms of long term profitability. Indeed, fixed and capital costs represent almost a quarter of total income 
for this fleet segment, while this quota is under 20% for DTS 12-24 and PGP 00-12. In particular, PGP 
00-12 shows the lowest weight of fixed and capital costs on total income (less than 18%).  
 
During the 15 years when the profit is maximized, fishing effort and harvest ratio are maintained at levels 
lower than those needed to achieve the MSY for European hake. As this is the most overexploited stock, 
harvest ratio is also lower than the target H estimated for the other stocks at MSY. Therefore, in 
accordance with the theory, H at MEY is lower than H at MSY. 
 
Landings of all species show a strong reduction in year 1, and an increasing trend thereafter. This is mainly 
due to the decrease in the fishing effort of DTS 12-24 and PGP 12-24. Total catches in year 15 are equal 
to 11,840 tonnes, a level higher than in the other scenarios, main scenario included, which shows a 
maximum level of 10,670 tonnes in the same year. GVA for DTS 12-24 and PGP 00-12 show similar 
trends, while the economic indicators (GVA and profit) for PGP 12-24 decline to zero given the 
elimination of this fleet segment.  
 
Obviously, scenario 13 shows the best economic performance in terms of GVA among the simulated 
scenarios. Regarding the level of profits, total nominal profit in year 15 is estimated at almost 37 million 
euro, 18% more than in the main scenario. Table 10.13 shows also a value of NPV profit15 equal to 449 
million euro in scenario 13, 37% higher than the level of around 328 million euro in the main scenario. 
Profits of PGP 00-12 show a reduction in year 1, an increasing trend until year 13, and a return to the 
starting values in the following years. Profits of DTS 12-24 show a similar trend, but anticipated of a year. 
Profits increase since the beginning of the simulation, while the declining trend starts in year 13.  
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10.7.6. Assumptions and technical background (by main model modules) 
 
The main assumption is related to the estimation of the current status of demersal stocks. The status of 
stocks has been derived from time series data on biomass indexes and harvest ratio collected in the 
GRUND project. These data have been combined with landings data collected by IREPA to estimate a 
logistic function for each stock. However, stocks landed in Italian demersal fisheries are generally more 
than 50. Unfortunately, data are available only for few of them. Therefore, an additional assumption is 
related to the representativeness of the four target species included in the model. It is assumed that 
variations in the total landings and revenues are driven by variations in the landings of these species. 
  
258 
 
 
ANNEX 1. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL FISHRENT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The FISHRENT model was developed on the basis of earlier experiences of the team in bio-economic 
modelling, inter alia EIAA, BEMMFISH, TEMAS, AHF and others which were evaluated within the 
project ‘Survey of existing bio-economic models’ (Prellezo et.al. 2009). However, none of these models 
was appropriate to estimate resource rents under different conditions and management regimes, as 
required in the present project. 
 
On the basis of the review of models and the objective of the project, it became evident that a new model 
had to be constructed which would meet the following requirements: 
 Integrate simulation (application of different management strategies) and optimization (to determine 
optimum value of resource rent and other variables). This is implemented by having a simulation 
model in which optimization can be achieved by using the Excel Solver. 
 Integrate output- and input-driven approaches, so that one model could be consistently applied to 
different situations in the EU, particularly the Atlantic and the Mediterranean / Black Sea areas. 
 Accommodate multi-species / multi-fleet fisheries, with flexible number of species and segments. 
 Close link to available economic and biological data, to allow empirical applications. 
 Balanced composition between various components: biology-economics-policy. 
 Dynamic behaviour over a long period, including stock-growth, investment and effort functions, to 
allow simulation of adjustment paths to an optimum. 
 Flexibility for applications of various types of relations (e.g. different stock-growth functions, 
approaches to payment for access, etc.). 
 Use of a well-known language (Excel) to allow a broad introduction and accessibility to different 
users. 
 
The FISHRENT model contains six modules: 
1. Biological module 
2. Economic module 
3. Interface module 
4. Market module 
5. Behaviour module 
6. Policy module 
 
The main characteristics of the FISHRENT model are: 
 The model accounts for eight species and eight fleet segments (4*4 version is also available), but can 
be extended to a larger number if required, or reduced to a smaller size. The procedures for 
adaptations are described in Annex 1.  
 The model is a dynamic simulation model, running for a period of 25 years. Extension to a longer 
period is possible. 
 By using the Excel Solver tool, the model can be used as an optimization model, which is particularly 
relevant in relation to the estimation of the resource rent. 
 The model combines input and output based management, as well as their combinations. This has 
been achieved by a two stage calculation, in which first relevant combination of effort and catch is 
determined and subsequently applied in the actual simulation model. 
 The model contains various options for the collection of rent (payment for access), including fixed 
payment per unit of capacity (vessel), payment per unit of effort (day-at sea) and tax on revenues or 
profits.  
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 The model contains a large number of features, including parameter for technological progress, 
discards of sized and undersized fish, various options for simulation of investments, etc. Details 
description is presented below. 
 
In table A.1 The FISHRENT rent model is compared to several main models, which have been developed 
and applied recently. The comparison shows that the model integrates various features, which have not 
been integrated in a similar way before: 
 
Table A.1 Comparison of FISHRENT with selected bio-economic models 
Criteria FISHRENT EIAA BEMMFISH World Bank EMMFID Norwegian 
model 
Model 
objective 
Estimation of 
resource rent 
for specific 
fisheries 
Economic 
evaluation of 
biologic advice 
Modelling of 
Mediterranean 
fisheries 
Estimation of 
resource rent 
on global level
Estimation of 
resource rent 
for the whole 
Danish fishery 
Estimation of 
resource rent 
for the major 
part of the 
Norwegian 
fishery 
Estimates 
resource rent 
Per year, NPV 
of profits  
Annual profit Per year and 
NPV of profits
Point estimate 
of max. rent 
Point estimate 
of max. rent 
Point estimate 
of max. rent = 
net profit 
Simulation / 
optimization 
Simulation and 
optimization 
Simulation Simulation Optimization 
by solving the 
profit equation
Optimization 
using linear 
programming 
Optimization 
using linear 
programming 
Input / 
output driven 
Input and 
output 
Output Input Output Input and 
output 
Input and 
output 
Policy options Free access, 
TAC and Effort 
restriction 
TAC Fishing time 
(effort), 
vessels, taxes 
None Free access, 
TAC and 
Effort 
restriction 
Free access, 
TAC and 
Effort 
restriction 
Fish prices 
elasticity 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Accounting 
for exogenous 
fuel price 
changes 
yes No No No No No 
Investment 
function 
Yes No Yes No No No 
Biological 
input 
Biomass. Stock-
growth function 
in a flexible 
format.  
Source ICES 
and Italian 
institutes 
Yield in terms 
of TACs and 
abundances of 
spawning stock 
biomasses.  
Source: ICES 
Stock-growth 
function 
Single species 
model Logistic 
(=2nd degree 
polynomial) 
Fox. Sources: 
FAO and 
other 
TAC/catch 
restrictions 
TAC/catch 
restrictions 
Economic 
input 
Multi fleet. 
DCF data, 
distinguishing 5 
cost 
components 
Multi fleet. 
DCF data, 
distinguishing 5 
cost 
components 
DCF with 
minor 
assumptions 
Distinguishes 
between 
variable and 
fixed costs, 
Source: large 
variety of data 
Detailed cost 
structure 
Detailed cost 
structure 
Number of 
years 
25 years, 
expandable 
3 point 
estimates 
Current year, 
next year, and 
long term. 
40 years Static Static Static 
HCR / 
management 
plans 
Multi-species, 
Six policy 
options: 
- TAC min 
- TAC max 
Single species,  
management 
plans in terms 
of TAC/quotas
No No Single species, 
management 
plans in terms 
of 
TAC/quotas 
- 
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- Effort min 
- Effort max 
- Min-Min 
- Open access 
and effort 
Discards  Two types: 
undersized and 
over-quota. 
No No No No No 
Software Excel Excel Java None GAMS/Excel Matlab
Dynamic / 
Static 
Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Static Static 
Dimensions:    
 Fleets Up to eight, 
expandable 
Unlimited Multi-fleet
 
Single fleet 26 
 
25 aggregated 
to 11 
 Species Up to eight, 
expandable 
25 species; 110 
stocks  
Unlimited Single species 118 10 
 Area unit Fishery areas 
based on stock 
definitions 
Based on stock 
management 
definition 
None
 
Single area 
(earth) 
34 fishing areas 
based on stock 
definitions;  
14 regions 
None 
 Time unit Year Year Year NA Month Year 
 
 
The FISHRENT is a full feed-back model, containing independent procedures for the development of the 
stock (stock-growth function), production and effort (production and investment function). Consequently  
the model can shift according to the most restrictive constraint, be it the total available effort of each fleet 
segment or the TAC/quotas of specific species. This approach allows to simulate the economic 
performance of individual fleet segments independently of each other over a long period of time. 
 
The following description presents fully all features of the FISHRENT model. For the purpose of the 
‘Study on remuneration of spawning stock biomass’ some of these features have been disabled, by setting 
specific parameters at a specific value(see table A.3). 
 
 
CONCEPTS 
 
Modelling in general 
 
Mathematical model links a set of variables with mathematical equations in order to simulate a certain 
development. The solution is determined by these equations and various types of constraints to which 
they may be subject. In case of optimization, the model is extended with an ‘objective function’ or 
‘objective variable’.  
 
There are two types of variables: 
 Endogenous (or dependent) variables – the values are determined in the model. 
 Exogenous (or independent) variables – the values come from other sources. Two types of exogenous 
variables can be distinguished: 
 Equation parameters, which may have been estimated on the basis of available statistics; assumed or 
calibrated (i.e. determined by trial and error so that the model produces certain results – e.g. 
reproduces historical values); 
 Baseline data, i.e. starting values of the endogenous variables - year 1 in a dynamic model, and various 
constants. 
 
The model consists of two types of relations: 
 Mathematical equations, linking the endogenous variables. Once set, the equations do not change. 
 Constraints and decision rules, steering the calculations along a certain path or constraining the 
endogenous variables to remain with specified boundaries. Regarding constraints and decision rules, 
distinction can be made again between endogenous and exogenous: 
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 Variable costs – depend proportionately on fishing effort. 
 Crew costs – based on a share of revenues and if appropriate taking account of fuel and/or variable 
costs. 
 Fixed costs – are a fixed value per vessel. Change with the size of the fleet. 
 Capital costs – as fixed costs, constant per vessel, changing with size of the fleet. 
 Gross cash flow – according to definition. 
 Profit – according to definition revenues minus all costs. 
 Payment for access – allows for different kinds of payments: 
 Lump-sum 
 Share of profit 
 Payment per unit of effort 
 Share of revenues per species 
 Profit after payment for access 
 Gross value added – according to definition 
 Fuel use – fuel costs divided by fuel price. 
 Break-even revenues – according to definition, but crew costs are considered as fixed costs, on the 
basis of the expectation that fishing may not be an attractive profession at a level of income lower 
than the level realized in a given year. 
 
The economic module also generates net present values of profit and gross value added over 15 and 25 
years. This distinction was introduced in particular in relation to the optimization runs of the model. 
When a model is run for 15 years and profit or gross value added are maximized over that period, the 
model will tend to fish out all the stocks at the end of the period as it does not take into account what 
happens beyond that time horizon. This is evidently not desirable. This problem has been resolved by 
‘optimizing’ over a period of 25 years, but using the net present value of the first 15 years only. In this way 
destruction of stocks is avoided within the first 15 years. 
 
Interface module 
 
The interface module contains three functions for each combination of fleet segments and species: 
1. Catch – based on a standard Cobb-Douglas production function. Power of ‘effort’-variable contains 
an additional parameter which represents the technological progress. 
2. Discards – over-quota catch is discarded. Catch is confronted with ‘Target landings’ (segment share of 
TAC, see policy module) and if catch exceed Target landings, part of the excessive catch can be 
discarded. An assumed value of a discard parameter determines which percentage is discarded and 
consequently also how much is landed, albeit illegally. Discards of undersized fish are accounted for in 
the catchable biomass equation. 
3. Landings – difference between catch and discards. 
 
The selected production function in the interface is a Cobb Douglas production function in which fishing 
effort in terms of days at sea and catchable biomass determines the catches. Technical progress is included 
in the production function. 
 
Price module 
 
Price module contains two equations: 
1. Prices of fish, which include a price elasticity for each species. Furthermore, price differentials for 
specific segment-species combinations can be accounted for using specific parameters. 
2. Fuel price can be adapted for one-time rise or for annual trend. 
 
Behaviour module 
 
The behaviour module simulates the level of fishing effort trough changes of the number of vessels 
and/or the number of days-at-sea per vessel. It contains the following relations: 
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 Fleet (number of vessels) – the fleet of preceding year plus or minus investments (fleet change). 
 Days at sea/vessel – operational – total effort (see policy module) divided by the number of vessels. 
 Days at sea/vessel – maximum – constant value, which can be annual adapted by a assumed 
parameter. 
 Effort (Fleet * days) – follows from the production function, in combination with the selected policy 
option. 
 Investment (number of vessels) – it is assumed that the fleet changes, i.e. (dis)investments take place, 
proportionately to the relation between the break-even revenues and the realized revenues. However, 
maximum limits to annual increase or decrease of the fleet can be imposed in terms of the percentage 
change of the fleet. The two limits can be different, which creates an asymmetric (dis)investment 
behavior. Furthermore, there are no investments if the average number of days at sea per vessel falls 
below a specified level of the maximum number of days at sea. The maximum increase from one year 
to next has been set at 10% and the maximum decrease at -20% of the number of vessels. These 
percentages are based on the DCF data 2002-2008, which show that 75-85% of annual changes of the 
size of the fleet fall in this range. The precise percentage depends on the sample of selected segments. 
 
Policy module 
 
Finally, the policy module determines level of landings and/or effort. It contains harvest control rules in 
terms of TAC/quotas and effort. Although payment for access is also a policy decision, it is incorporated 
in the economic module, due to its different impact. The policy module contains a set of decision or 
selection rules the level of landing and/or effort is determined, starting either from the a decision on TAC 
or from a decision on total allowable effort. Through these selection procedures it is possible to integrate 
input and output driven policy into one model.  
 
Furthermore, the policy module contains two other features: 
1. Constraints on maximum change of TAC from one year to another, the +/-15% as applied in various 
fisheries. 
2. The ‘policy intensity factor’, which is value between 0 and 1 reflecting the extent to which policy 
decisions follow the biologic advice. This factor allows to simulate the consequences of taking into 
account ‘socio-economic dimensions’ of taking restrictive management measures. 
 
The policy choice is made within a multi-species context and therefore the policy must decide whether the 
most or the least restrictive biologic advice (in relation to harvest ratio of a given set of species) should be 
taken as a starting point. For example, species A may be relatively abundant, but effort (harvest ratio) 
which could be allowed on this species may lead to overfishing (too high ha 
revest ratio)) of a species B. On the other hand, taking species B as a starting point of the policy will lead 
to underutilisation of species A. The policy module contains six policy choices, which precisely highlight 
this policy dilemma: 
 TACmin – The most restrictive TAC is used to determine the level effort which the fleet can exert. 
This may lead to underutilization of other species. 
 Effortmin – Most restrictive effort level is allowed, which leads to relatively low catches. 
 TACmax - The least restrictive TAC is used to determine the level effort which the fleet can exert. This 
may lead to overfishing of other species. 
 Effortmax - Least restrictive effort level is allowed, which leads to relatively high catches. 
 Open access – Fishery is driven by economic incentives. Neither TAC nor effort constraints are 
imposed.  
 Min min – Minimum level of TAC and effort is imposed. Depending on the definition of the TACmin 
and Effortmin options, this option will produce same results as one of those two. 
 
Effort which follows from an ‘Effort policy option’ is inserted in the production function and generates 
catch. When a ‘TAC police option’ is selected, than a corresponding level of effort is calculated from an 
‘inverse production function’, where effort is the endogenous variable (on the left side of the equation). 
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Both effort and TACs are derived from the present and target harvest ratio in combination with other 
variables in the model.  
Structure of the workbook 
 
The workbook distinguishes input, calculation and output worksheet, plus two intermediate sheets. 
 Input sheets: Drivers and Model parameters 
 Calculation: Multi-year model 
 Output: Drivers and DB2 (DB = database) 
 Intermediate: Model input and DB1 
 
The model is run with several macros, so it must be run in macro enabled mode.  
 
The workbook contains six sheets, which have the following functions. The different modules of the 
model are coloured differently for easier navigation in a worksheet with more than 800  rows. 
 
1. Drivers sheet contains the following components: 
 Choice of the six policy options; 
 Policy intensity factor i.e. to which extent the manager will follow the biologic advice or enforce 
the policy restrictions (harvest control rules); 
 Input area for ‘scenario number’, to distinguish the results of each model run in subsequent 
analysis (see DB2) 
 Input areas for the names of the relevant species and segments; 
 Input area for setting the discount rate 
 Output area with the main results regarding net present value of gross value added, profit and 
payment for access over 15 and 25 years. 
 Output area with selected graphics showing the development of the main indicators over the 
simulated period of 25 years. 
 
The Drivers sheet allow to run various policy scenario and see the results immediately. 
 
2. Model parameters (MP) contains: 
 Full list of all parameters of the model, which have to be either estimated or assumed; 
 Full list of the initial values of all variables, which must be inserted there. 
 Other technical information: distinction between formulas, constraints and initial values (column 
C), dimensions of variables (column G), acronyms of variables (column H) definitions of the 
parameters (column Z), etc.. 
 
Areas where values have to or can be inserted are white, while all other areas are coloured. 
 
3. Model input (MI) – contains all equations for one year. It is constructed parallel to the Multi-year 
model sheet. Contains general description of the variables, dimensions and relations. It serves as a 
guideline to the use of the model. 
 
4. Multi-year model (MYM) – contains the calculation for a 25 years period. It also contains the 
calculation of the net present values of gross value added and profit over 15 and 25 years and infinity. 
Inclusion of these net present values is necessary on this sheet in order to allow the use of the Excel 
Solver. Namely, the Solver can be run on one sheet only and cannot refer to objectives or constraints 
on other sheets. 
 
5. DΒ1 - copies the MYM  sheet for database use. DΒ1 contains a macro ‘Convert’ which converts a 2-
dimensional table to a 1-dimnesional table in DB2, generating a database format. 
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6. DΒ2 – contains the complete MYM sheet in a database format, which than can be analysed using 
Pivot table(s) or MS Access. The results of each scenario (model run) can be copied from DB2 into a 
new database or workbook and compared, as each run bears a different number. 
 
 
Model definition 
 
The MP sheet contains all input and the year 1 as the baseline for the MYM sheet. The following sections 
present the mathematical formulation and discuss their meaning. 
 
All variables are composed as follows:  
Name_xy,   x = segment index, y = species index;  
when index = a means, sum of all species and/or segments 
Parameters are composed as:  
Name_xyz,  x = segment index, y = species index and  
z = sequential number of the parameter in a relation; 
 
This notation and the names of the variables and parameters are as in the model. Parameters are written in 
italics, variables in normal. In most equation, only variables of the same year are related, so that time 
denomination is not required. When referring to preceding year, time denomination (t-1) is stated. 
 
The model makes a distinction between ‘target’ and ‘non-target’ species. Target species are species 
included explicitly in the model with their biological functions.. Non-target species are all other species 
caught / landed by the segment. Non-target species must be included to obtain the total revenues of the 
segment. 
 
The model distinguishes segments and ‘other segment’. Segments are those explicitly included in the 
model with their economic functions. Other segments are segments are segments catching target species. 
The other segments must be included to obtain the correct harvest ratio of each target species. 
 
Catches of ‘other species’ by  ‘other segments’ are not included in the model. 
 
 
Biological module 
 
Growth function 
 
The biological module simulates the growth for each species using 3rd degree polynomial stock-growth 
function.  
  
(1) Rec-ay = Rec-ay0 + Rec-ay1*CB-a1^Expo-ay1 - Rec-ay2*CB-a1^Expo-ay2 + Rec-ay3*CB-a1^Expo-ay3 
 
Where:  CB  = catchable biomass52 
 Rec = parameters 
 Expo = exponents / parameters 
 
The advantage of the 3rd degree polynomial is that it is easy to estimate by use of Excel’s standard 
functions.  
 
It is well known that stock-growth and stock-recruitment functions are statistically weak. The function 
selected in the model is just one of many possibilities and may be replaced by functions like Ricker of 
hockey-stick. By using the RANDBETWEEN function in Excel, it is also possible to run the model 
stochastically, with random growth (only limited by the known minimum and maximum values). This 
                                                     
52 SSB has been used as a proxy 
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would require to run the model many times and subsequently analyse the boundaries of such ‘chaotic’ 
system. 
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Biomass function 
 
The biomass function contains the following elements: 
 Biomass of the preceding year; 
 Recruitment; 
 Catch of the individual segments, upgraded for discards of undersized fish (not part of TAC).  
 Upgrade of the catch of segments 1-8 for catch by other segments, expressed as (1- sum of TAC 
shares); 
 Lower limit CB=1, not allowing the species to be fished out completely. In this case CB is set at a 
low value of 0.000001 as otherwise the catch may exceed the biomass and in this way this anomaly is 
reduced to a very low value. The problem that Catch may exceed CB could be resolved by 
introducing a CBproxy, which would first check whether Catch<CBproxy. However, this would 
further complicate the model and the numerical results would not be significantly improved. 
 
(2) CB-ay = IF {(CB-ayt-1 + Rec-ayt-1 – [Σx Catch-xyt-1 * (1+Disc_xy0)]) / (Σx TACsh_xy0)} < 1, 
0.000001,  {(CB-ayt-1 + Rec-ayt-1 – [Σx Catch-xyt-1 * (1+Disc_xy0)]) / (Σx TACsh_xy0)} 
 
Where  CBt-1  = catchable biomass in year t-1 
  Rect-1  = growth in year t-1 
  Catch = catch in year t-1 
  Disc = discards of undersized fish 
  TAC = TAC share of the segment 
 
Economic module 
 
Revenues 
 
Gross revenue is estimated for each fleet segment taking the landings net of discards and multiplied with 
constant fish prices. Prices differ for the species but are constant for all segments. Revenues from target 
species are upgraded by revenues from other species, either by a lump sum or a percentage. Specific price 
differential of the segment from the average is also included. 
 
(3) Rev-xa = (Σy Land-xy * FishPr-ay * PrSeg_xy0) * (1 + OtSpR_xa0) + OtSpF_xa0 * Eff-xa  
 
Where   Land = landings 
  FishPr = fish price 
  PrSeg = price differential for the segment from the average price 
  Eff = effort 
  OtSpR = revenues from non-target species as a percentage of target species 
  OtSpF = revenues from non-target species per unit of effort 
  
Fuel costs 
 
The fuel costs depend on fuel use per unit of fishing effort, effort and fuel price. Fuel price may be 
differentiated between segments. 
 
(4) FuC-xa = FuC_xa0 * Eff-xa * FuelPr_1a0 
 
Where  FuC = fuel use per unit of fishing effort 
  Eff = effort 
  FuelPr = fuel price 
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Crew costs 
 
Crew costs are often calculated as a share of the gross revenues after deduction of fuel costs and/or 
variable costs.  
 
(5) CrC-xa = (Rev-xa - CrC_xa1*FuC-xa -  CrC_1a2 * VaC-xa) * CrC_xa0 
 
Where  Rev  = revenues 
  FuC  = fuel costs 
  VaC  = variable costs 
  CrC_xa0 = crew share 
  CrC_xa1 and CrC_xa2 are either 0 or 1 to take the fuel costs or variable costs 
into account. 
 
Variable costs 
 
Variable costs, being e.g. costs of landings, auction and harbour fees, depend on gross revenues. 
 
(6) VaC-xa = Rev-xa * VaC_xa0 
 
Where  Rev  = revenues 
   VaC_xa0 = variable costs as percentage of gross revenues 
 
Fixed costs 
 
The fixed costs, also named vessel costs or semi-fixed costs are administration, insurance, maintenance 
etc. It is assumed that these costs are dependent on the value of the segment. The value of the segment is 
separated in a unit price per vessel and the number of vessels. In this way fixed costs will change with the 
changing size of the fleet in the segment. 
  
(7) FxC-xa = FxC_xa0 * Fle-xa * InvPrice_xa  
 
Where  Fle  = number of vessels 
   FxC_xa0 = fixed costs per vessel  
   InvPrice_xa  = percentage change in the vessel price  
 
The unit price (InvPrice-xa) is determined taking the total fixed costs for a segment in the base year 
divided by the number of vessels.  
 
Capital costs 
 
Capital costs are calculated in the same way as fixed costs, 
 
(8) CaC-xa = CaC_xa0 * Fle-xa * InvPrice_xa  
 
 Where  Fle  = number of vessels  
CaC_xa0 = capital costs per vessel 
   InvPrice_xa  = percentage change in the vessel price 
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Gross cash flow 
 
The gross cash flow is the difference between revenues and all operational costs. 
 
(9) GCF-xa = Rev-xa - FuC-xa - CrC-xa - VaC-xa - FxC-xa 
  
Where  Rev = revenues 
   FuC = fuel costs 
   CrC = crew costs 
   VaC = variable costs 
   FxC = fixed costs 
 
Profit 
 
Profit is calculated before and after payment for access. 
 
(10) Prf-xa = GCF-xa - CaC-xa 
 
Where  GCF = gross cash flow 
   CaC = capital costs 
 
(11) PrfaTax-xa= Prf-xa – FpfAcc-xa 
 
Where  Prf = profit 
   FpfAcc = full payment for access 
 
Payment for access is a policy (control) variable and the function form is included under the policy 
module. 
 
Profit discounted, sum over 15 years and sum over infinity 
 
The discounted profit has meaning only in the dynamic model working for a number of years. Different 
discount rates are allowed for the different segments to reflect different time preferences although it 
seems most meaningful to use the same discount rate for all segments as default. The net present value is 
computed for a 15 years period and for infinity using the profit before access and tax payments. 
 
(12) Npv15-xa = Σt Prf-xat * [1 - (1+Dis_xa0)^-(DisPeriod-xa1/Dis_xa0)]  
 
Where  Prf  = profit 
  Dis_xa0  = discount rate 
DisPeriod-xa1  = year t 
 
The net present value for infinity may be also used to estimate the maximum resource rent from a fully 
adjusted fishery.  In principle the maximum resource rent over 15 years will occur when the stocks 
become extinct.  
 
NPV-xa=Npv15-xa+Prft=15/Dis_xa0*(1+Dis_xa0)^-(15+1) 
 
As a 15 years period normally is long enough to assure fully adjustment it is assumed that the profit in year 
15 will continue infinitely. Therefore, this profit is discounted to period 16 in time and further discounted 
to period 0.  
 
The model also calculates the net present value over 25 years, but this is done by the NPV-function of 
Excel. 
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Break-even revenues 
 
The break-even revenue shows the gross revenue with given capital costs that yields a zero profit at. It is a 
useful indicator showing how far away a fishery is from making profit and thereby also provides 
information about overcapacity in term of excess capital costs. 
 
The break-even revenues consider crew costs as fixed costs. This approach is justified on the basis of 
three related arguments: 
 In the EU fisheries is skipper ownership commonplace. This implies that there is no clear distinction 
between remuneration of labour and capital.  
 Crews are remunerated on share basis, which could lead in a break-even situation to unacceptably low 
crew share. It would be unrealistic to expect that operation at break-even level could be continued 
indefinitely, while that is precisely the principle of break-even.  
 Inclusion of crew costs among ‘fixed costs’ reduces the fluctuations of investments throughout the 
simulated period. 
 
Ratio of break-even revenues to realized revenues determines the level of investments in the following 
period. 
 
(13) BER-xa = (CrC-xa + FxC-xa + CaC-xa) /  
  [(1 - FuC-xa/Rev-xa - VaC-xa/Rev-xa - FPfAcc-xa/Rev-xa)] 
 
Where  CrC = crew costs 
FxC = fixed costs 
CaC  = capital costs 
FuC = fuel costs 
Rev = revenues 
VaC = variable costs 
FPfAcc = full payment for access 
 
Fuel use 
 
Fuel use is for some fisheries an important indicator. Therefore a fuel use relation has been included in the 
model. 
 
(14) FuU = Eff-xa * FuU_xa0 
 
Where  Eff = Effort 
   FuU_xa0 = Fuel use per unit of effort 
 
Interface 
 
Catch 
 
The core equation of the model is the Cobb-Douglas production function. The catch (excl. undersized 
discards) is a function of effort, stock abundance and technological progress.  
 
(15) Catch-xy = Catch-xy0 * Eff-xa^Catch-xy1 * CB-ay^Catch-xy2 * (1+Catch-xy3)  
 
Where  Eff =Effort 
   CB = Catchable biomass 
   Catch_xy3    = Rate of technological progress 
   Catch_xy0, Catch_xy1, Catch_xy2  = estimated parameters 
   Catch_xy1 + Catch_xy2   = 1 
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The total catch of a species must also account for catch by ‘other segments’, which has been accounted 
for in the biomass function (2). 
 
The parameters of the function are estimated based on theory and few empirical studies. The 
technological progress is hardly above 1.5% per year (Frost et al, 2009). For trawlers that are less impacted 
by stock abundance than by vessels technology the exponent for effort is between 0.6-0.9 while the 
exponent for the stock is between 0.1-0.4. For gillnet the opposite is to be expected. For pelagic and 
demersal species with schooling behaviour the exponent for the stock is low while it is higher for demersal 
species. Setting these parameters makes it possible to estimate the Catch-xy0 parameter.  
 
The importance of the exponents is significant as shown in Figure A.3 in which the catch and the fishing 
costs (being a function of the effort) is shown for different harvest ratios. For further explanation see 
Frost et al. (2009). It is seen that the optimal fishing mortality rate may not differ in the two examples but 
the size of the resource rent, and what could be gained by optimal adaptation differs significantly. 
 
Figure A.3. Catches and costs under different assumptions about the relationship between 
harvest ratio and effort. 
2.1 Cobb-Douglas 
production function 
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2.2 Cobb-Douglas 
production function 
 
α= 0.9 
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Source: Frost et al (2009) figure 7. 
Costs (E) = assumes linear relation between costs, effort and mortality. 
Costs (F) = assumes non-linear relation between costs, effort and mortality. 
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Over-quota discards 
 
The landings are derived from the catches after subtraction of over-quota catches, which must be 
discarded.   
 
(16) Disc-xy = IF(Catch-xy > LandT-xy, Disc_xy1 * (Catch-xy - LandT-xy), 0) 
 
Where Catch = catch 
  LandT = target catch, based on segment share in TAC (see policy module) 
  Disc = share of over-quota catch which is discarded 
 
Behaviour 
 
The behaviour module determines the (dis)investment and changes in effort level (days-at-sea per vessel).  
 
Investment function 
 
Theoretically the investments are determined by expectations of future profit, but there is no empirical 
data, which could be used to support such theorem in the model. Instead, perceived profitability in the 
preceding year, expressed as ratio between break-even revenues minus realized revenues divided by 
realized revenues is used to determine in the (dis)investments in each year. When break-even revenues 
exceed realized revenues than the fleet will expand and vice versa. 
 
This leads in some years to quite substantial changes in the number of vessels in a fleet segment, which 
can be justified as vessels from other segments may enter the given fishery. At the same time, it was 
recognized that the inertia of the system does not allow such full flexibility. Consequently, parameters 
have been introduced as limits to maximum annual (dis)investments. As different parameters have been 
applied to investments and disinvestments, an asymmetric investment behaviour can be simulated.  
 
Furthermore, it has been assumed that the active fleet will first achieve a certain minimum number of 
days-at-sea per vessel before the number of vessels will be expanded. This assumption was introduced to 
avoid continuous growth of the fleet, while at same time the number of days-at-sea per vessel would be 
proportionately falling53. 
 
(17) Inv-xa = IF(DASope-xa < InvDays_xa3 * DASmax-xa, -(InvLimd_xa2 * FLE-xa),  
     IF(BER-xa < 0, -(InvLimd_xa2 * FLE- xa), 
          IF(PrfShare_xa0 * (REV-xa - BER-xa)t-1 / REV-xat-1 > InvLimu_xa1,  
 InvLimu_xa1 * FLE- xa, 
     IF(PrfShare_xa0 * (REV-xa - BER-xa)t-1 / REV-xat-1 < -InvLimd_xa2,  
          InvLimd_xa2 * -FLE- xa, 
          PrfShare_xa0 * (REV-xa-BER-xa)t-1 / REV-xat-1 * FLE- xa)))) 
 
 Where  Rev  = revenues 
   BER  = break-even revenues 
   Fle  = fleet, number of vessels 
   DASope = operational (actual) number of days-at-sea per vessel 
   DASmax = maximum number of days-at-sea per vessel 
PrfShare_xa0   = share of profit dedicated to investments, 
InvLimu_xa1  = upper limit for investments, as a relative change of the fleet 
InvLimd_xa2  = lower limit for investments, as a relative change of the fleet 
InvDays_xa3  = minimum level of capacity utilization, under which no 
investments take place 
 
                                                     
53 Such situation has occurred in practice in the past, e.g. the king crab fishery in Alaska. 
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The behaviour module assumes that only segments which historically participated in the fishery will be 
able to do so also in the future. While the size of these segments may be reduced almost to zero, there is 
no provision to allow new types of vessels (technologies) to enter into the fishery. 
 
Effort function 
 
Effort is measured as the total number days-at-sea for each fleet segment. This is the product of the 
number of vessels and the operational number of days at sea per vessel per year. Total effort which a 
segment can exert depends on the selected policy option (see policy module). However, that effort level 
may be higher than the maximum effort which the segment can generate. Therefore, the appropriate 
effort level has to be selected. 
 
(18) Eff-xa = IF(Eselect-xa>Fle-xa * DASmax-xa, Fle-xa * DASmax-xa, Eselect-xa) 
 
Where  Eselect  = effort selected in the policy module 
  Fle  = fleet 
  DASmax = maximum number of days-at-sea per vessel 
 
The model also operates with the maximum number of days at sea per vessels per year.  
   
Fleet (number of vessels)  
 
Number of vessels in a segment is equal to the fleet of preceding year plus the (dis)investments in that 
year. 
 
(19) Fle-xa = Fle-xat-1 + Inv-xat-1 
 
Where  Fle  = fleet 
  Inv  = (dis)investments 
 
The number of vessels is constant if the investment function is turned off e.g. by setting the profit 
investment share, PrfShare-xa0, at zero. Changes in the number of vessels affect the number of days-at-
sea, fixed and capital costs and ultimately the profit. 
 
 
Price module 
 
Fish prices  
 
Fish prices are based on the prices of the baseline year, possibly adapted by a price elasticity. However, 
this is only relevant if the fishery lands a significant share of the total supply of a species.  
 
(20) FishPr-ay = FishPr_ay0 * (Land-a1 / Land-a1t-1)^(-PrEl_a11) 
 
Where  FishPr  = fish price 
  Land  = landings 
  PrEl  = price elasticity 
 
Fuel price  
 
The fuel price level can be adjusted by an annual percentage change (FuelPr-xa0), which can be also 
differentiated between fleet segments. 
 
(21) FuelPr-xa = FuelPr-xat-1 * (1 + FuelPr_xa0) 
 
Where  FuelPr_1a0  = is annual percentage change of fuel price 
275 
 
Policy module 
 
Policy choice 
 
The fisheries management pursues the achievement of long term sustainable exploitation of fish stocks at 
MSY level. There are in principle two approaches: output (TAC) driven approach and effort driven 
approach. Although in some fisheries constraints in both areas exist, one of them is always most binding. 
However, in a multi-species multi-fleet situation, it is fundamentally impossible to achieve the MSY level 
for all species concurrently. This gives rise to two situations: 
 One species is fished at MSY level, while other species are overfished. Policy focusing on this species 
will be least restrictive, using the TAC or effort related to that species as benchmark for the overall 
activity of the fleet. 
 One species is fished at MSY level, while other species remain underutilized. Policy focusing on this 
species will be most restrictive, using the TAC or effort related to that species as benchmark for the 
overall activity of the fleet. 
These two options have been included in the model. A third option, which would take some ‘average’ 
value as a starting point has not been modelled, as it is not clear how such ‘average’ should be determined 
and because the two ‘extreme’ options provide information about the ‘limits of the system’ within which 
all other options fall. 
 
The model requires determining a unique and consistent composition of three elements: 
 catches, which affect biomass,  
 landings, which determine revenues, and  
 effort, which determines part of the costs. 
 
This is achieved in the policy module in principle as follows: 
1. The MSY level of biomass and growth (sustainable harvest) of each species is calculated from the 2nd 
degree polynomial stock-growth function, by setting the first derivative equal to zero. 
2. The resulting ratio (Catch/Biomass)msy is interpreted as Hmsy. 
3. Current harvest ratio (H) realized in each year is compared to Hmsy and the ratio (Hmsy/H) 
determines the biologic advice - either effort or TAC is adjusted by that ratio. Evidently, the ratios are 
different for each species, which creates the need to select from the most or the least restrictive 
approach. 
4. It is than a policy choice to determine whether output or input driven policy should be implemented 
and whether the most or the least restrictive approach should be followed. This leads to four possible 
choices, which have been supplemented by further two choices: open access (free fishing) and pursuit 
of most restrictive policy possible. Consequently six the model contains 6 policy choices: 
a. TAC min; choose the effort required to catch the most binding TAC/quota 
b. Eff min; choose the lowest effort determined by the target H in proportion to the current H for 
all the species  
c. TAC max; choose the effort required to catch the most binding TAC/quota 
d. Eff max; choose the highest effort determined by the target H in proportion to the current H for 
all the species 
e. Ope access; no restrictions imposed 
f. Min min; choose the effort required to catch the most binding TAC/quota or the lowest effort 
(combine 1 and 2). 
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Sustainable catch and selected TAC 
 
Sustainable catch is calculated as the growth of the biomass, including natural mortality and adapted to the 
ratio harvest ratio divided by total harvest. In some fisheries it has been agreed that the TACs would 
change at most by X% from one year to another. Therefore, this constraint has been also incorporated. 
The constrained can be lifted by setting TAC-ay0=0. 
 
(22) TAC-ay = IF(CB-ay * (1 - EXP(-(Htarget_ay0+M_ay0))) * Htarget_ay0 / (Htarget_ay0 + M_ay0) <  
(1 - TAC_ay0) * TAC-ayt-1, (1 - TAC_ay0) * TAC-ayt-1,  
IF(CB-ay * (1 - EXP(-(Htarget_ay0+M_ay0))) * Htarget_ay0 / (Htarget_ay0 + M_ay0) >   
(1 + TAC_ay0) * TAC-ayt-1,  (1 + TAC_ay0) * TAC-ayt-1,  
CB-ay * (1-EXP(-(Htarget_ay0+M_ay0))) * Htarget_ay0 / (Htarget_ay0 + M_ay0))) 
 
Where  CB-ay   = catchable biomass 
Htarget-ay0  = target (msy) harvest ratio 
M-ay0  = natural fishing mortality 
TAC-ay0 = maximum change of TAC from one year to another 
TAC-ayt-1  = TAC preceding year 
 
Target landings  
 
Target landings are equal to the historical segment share in the TAC. Target landings are required to 
compute the effort level required to exploit the set TACs and the over-quota catches. 
 
(23) LandT-xy = TAC-ay * TACsh_xy0  
 
Where  TAC  = total allowable catch 
   TACsh  = segment share in the EU TAC 
 
Landings 
 
Landings of a segment are catches minus over-quota discards. 
 
(24) Land-xy = Catch-xy - Disc-xy 
 
Where  Catch  = catch 
   Disc  = over-quota discards 
 
Minimum and maximum effort computed from TAC 
 
As elaborated above, when TAC policy is selected, the TAC resulting from equation (25) is inserted in the 
inverse production function to determine the effort required to catch each species. The effort levels are 
compared and the lowest or highest effort level is selected to be used in the model for the calculation of 
catch of other species and costs. 
 
(25) MinEfTAC-xa = MIN{[(LandT-xy / (Catch_xy0 * CB-ay ^ (Catch_xy2*(1+Catch_xy3))]^(1/Catch_xy1)}  
(26) MaxEfTAC-xa = MAX{[(LandT-xy / (Catch_xy0 * CB-ay ^ (Catch_xy2*(1+Catch_xy3))]^(1/Catch_xy1)}  
 
Where  LandT-xy  = target landings 
CB-ay   = catchable biomass 
Catch-xy0,  Catch-xy1, Catch-xy2, Catch-xy3 = parameters of the production 
function 
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Minimum and maximum effort from target Ht 
 
When effort policy is selected, allowable effort for each species is adjusted by the ratio between target 
harvest ratio and partial harvest ratio caused by the segment. The ratios regarding all species are compared 
and minimum or maximum is selected according to the policy choice. Adjustment from one year to the 
next is not constrained by an X% limit, as in case of TACs. 
 
(27) MinEfC = MIN(Eff-xat-1 * Htarget-ay0 / (H-ayt-1)) 
(28) MaxEfC = MAX(Eff-xat-1  * Htarget-ay0 / (H-ayt-1) 
 
Where  Eff-xat-1 = effort preceding year 
Htarget-ay0  = target harvest ratio 
H-ayt-1   = harvest ratio in preceding year 
 
Total and partial harvest ratio 
 
The total harvest ratio is calculated as catch divided by biomass. However, as the segments in the model 
do not necessarily catch the whole TAC, their catch is extrapolated to total catch by dividing by their 
aggregate TAC share. Partial fishing mortalities of all segments are also calculated, but not used. 
 
(29) H-ay = [Catch-ay / (Σx TACsh-xa)] / CB-ay 
(30) Hpar-xy  = Catch-xy / CB-ay  
 
Where  Catch  = catch 
  CB  = biomass 
  
 
Effort in open access fishery 
 
In case of free fishery it can be expected that the present fleet will exert the maximum number of days-at-
sea per vessel. 
 
(31) FreeE-xy = Fle-xy * DASmax-xy 
 
Where  Fle   = fleet (number of vessels) 
  DASmax = maximum number of days-at-sea per vessel 
 
Effort selection 
 
Appropriate level of effort is selected on the basis of the policy choice. The last term “Policy type?” is 
included as a warning should an invalid number of policy type be inserted. 
 
(32) Eselect =IF(PolT=1, MinEfTAC-xa, IF(PolT=2, MinEffC-xa,  
IF(PolT=3, MaxEfTAC-xa, IF(PolT=4, MaxEfC-xa,  
IF(PolT=5, FreeE-xa, IF(PolT=6, MIN(MinEfTAC-xa, MinEfC-xa),  
"Policy type?")))))) 
 
Payment for access 
 
The formula for payment for access allows to account for four different types of payments, all being 
differentiated by segment specific fees: 
 Lump sum 
 Payment per unit of effort 
 Profit tax 
 Payment as percentage of value of landed fish 
By setting the parameters at 0 or a non-0 value, various combinations of payments can be simulated. 
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(33) PfAcc-xa = PfAcc_xa0 + PfEff_xa0*Eff-xa + ProTax_xa0*Prf-1a +  
Σx(PfFish_ay0*Land-ay*FishPr-ay) 
  
Where PfAcc_xa0     = lump sum payment 
PfEff_xa0 = payment per unit of effort 
Eff = effort 
ProTax_xa0 = profit tax 
Prf = profit 
PfFish_ay0 = payment for landed value 
Land = landings 
FishPr = fish price 
 
Totals 
 
At the bottom of the worksheet, totals of all relevant variables are calculates as sums of segments and/or 
species. 
 
(34) Catch Catch-ay = Σx Catch-xy 
(35) Discards Disc-ay = Σx Catch-xy 
(36) Landings Land-ay = Σx Land-xy 
(37) Target landing LandT-ay  = Σx LandT-xy 
(38) Revenues Rev-aa = Σx Rev-xa 
(39) Fuel costs FuC-aa = Σx FuC-xa 
(40) Crew costs CrC-aa = Σx CrC-xy 
(41) Variable costs VaC-aa = Σx VaC-xy 
(42) Fixed costs FxC-aa = Σx FxC-xa 
(43) Capital costs CaC-aa = Σx CaC-xa 
(44) Gross cash flow GCF-aa = Σx GCF-xa 
(45) Profit Prf-aa = Σx Prf-xa 
(46) Full payment for access  FPfAcc-aa  = Σx FPfAcc-xa 
(47) Profit after access payment PrfaTax-aa  = Σx PrfaTax-xa 
(48) Profit discounted PrfDis-aa  = Σx PrfDis-xa 
(49) NPV 25 years Npv25-aa  = Σx Npv25-xa 
(50) NPV infinity Npv-aa = Σx Npv-xa 
(51) Break-even revenues BER-aa  = Σx BER-xa 
(52) Gross value added GVA-aa = Σx GVA-xa 
(53) Fuel use FuU-aa = Σx FuU-xa 
(54) Fleet (number of vessels)  Fle-aa  = Σx Fle-xa 
(55) Days at sea/vessel – operational  DASop-aa  = Eff-aa / Fle-aa 
(56) Effort – segment Eff-aa = Σx Eff-xa 
(57) Total investment TotInv-aa = Σx TotInv-xa 
(58) Investment (number of vessels)  Inv-aa  = Σx Inv-xa 
 
 
Other indicators 
 
Three other indicators are calculated as well, although they are not used in the model. 
 
(59) Catchability Catchability  = Fpar-xy / Eff-xy 
(60) Catch per unit effort CPUE-xy  = Catch-xy / Eff-xy 
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Adaptation of the  model to fewer fleet segments and species 
 
The model is constructed for eight fleets segments and eight species (8x8 version) but is available in 
smaller versions (4x4 and 2x2). These versions can be used for fewer fleet segments and species.  
However, the model will produce errors on two occasions: 
 Division by zero 
 Choosing effort according to the policy choice of effort determined by the most restrictive TACs or 
effort.  
 
Division by zero 
 
Number of vessels set at zero for a segment implies zero revenue, but as revenue is used as denominator 
in the break-even and hence the investments calculations this leads to an error. Therefore, the number of 
vessels for segments that are not used must be set close to zero e.g. 0.0001.  
 
Species in terms of fish stocks set at zero imply an error in the number of days at sea as stocks are used as 
denominator in some of the effort equations depending on H and Htarget. Therefore the stocks that are 
not used must close to zero e.g. 0.0001.  
 
In the model the stocks are not allowed to go below 1 (could be substituted by a small number close to 
zero) to make sure that the model does not work with negative stocks and that a stock can grow again 
after having been depleted. Therefore the stocks will always be 1 even if set close to zero in the parameter 
sheet. This will cause a small error (over estimation) in the in the results for the fleet segments.  
 
Choosing effort according to minimum TAC or effort. 
 
This adjustment is related to the choice of policy and is only needed if fewer species are used than the 
models dimension for species. If species are omitted by setting the initial stocks at zero the model still 
takes these species into account in the choice of TAC or effort in the policy equations. As the model in 
the MIN case chooses effort according to the most restrictive quota of the species or the most restrictive 
effort, the effort will be determined by the species and hence the effort will be zero. 
 
Therefore it is necessary to delete the species not used from the policy equations in the model. This is 
done in the Policy section of the model, which comprises four sub-sections: A choice of the most 
restrictive and the least restrictive TAC, and a choice of the most restricted or the least restrictive effort. 
There is one equation for each fleet segment i.e. 32 equations must be addresses. However, only the 
equations for the most restrictive TACs or effort constraints (the MIN cases) need to be adjusted and only 
for the equations including the active fleets segments. If, for example, the 8x8 version is used for six fleet 
segments and eight species no adjustment is necessary as all species are used. But if the model is used for 6 
species 12 equations need adjustment in order to delete the two species “positions” not used in the 
equations for the six fleet segments. 
  
Running the Excel Solver 
 
When using the FISHRENT model for optimization it must be born in mind that the Solver may not 
produce optimum results in its first run. The default settings of the Options are set at maximum time of 
100 seconds and maximum 100 iterations, which may not be sufficient. Increasing the default settings 
does not provide a guarantee that the optimum values will be found. Therefore it is recommended to run 
the Solver in several consecutive steps until the results do not change any more. After each run the Excel 
file must be stored under a new name and the Solver must be run again in this new file. 
 
The Solver must be set according to the desired values, on the sheet ‘Multi year model’, example being 
presented in the following figure: 
 Target set points to required value in column I or K 
 Changing cells are the cells containing the number of vessels 
  Con
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Table A.3 List of parameters and their settings 
 
Name Acronym Units Value Comment
Target harvest 
ratio  
Htarget-ay0 Coefficient Calculated From the relevant advisory body (ICES) 
Mortality - 
natural  
M-ay0 Coefficient Species 
specific 
From the relevant advisory body (ICES) 
TAC constraint Tac-ay0 Coefficient Species 
specific 
From the relevant advisory body (ICES) 
Payment – lump 
sum 
PfAcc-xa0 1000 euro 0 Is the payment for the license  
Payment per unit 
of effort 
PfEff-xa0
 
Coefficient 0 Related to the effort
Payment – profit 
tax 
ProTax-xa0 
 
Coefficient 0 Related to the effort
Payment – fish 
value 
PfFish-ay0 
 
Coefficient 0 Related to the landings
Fleet  
(no. of vessels) 
Fle-xa 
 
Number Segment 
specific 
Number of vessels of the segment 
Days at 
sea/vessel - 
operational 
DASope-xa 
 
Number Calculated Operational days at sea per vessel 
Days at 
sea/vessel - 
maximum 
DASmax-xa 
 
Number Assumed Maximum number of operational days at sea per 
vessel 
Days at sea / 
vessel - 
maximum 
DASmax-xa1 
 
Percentage 0 Potential percentage increase of the maximum 
number of fishing days Not used 
Investment price 
vessel 
InvPrice-xa 
 
1000 € 1 Total investment of the total segment divided by the 
number of vessels in 1000 €. Not used 
Investment  
(no. of vessels) 
InvPrice-xa0 
 
Percentage 0 Not used
Investment  
(no.  of vessels) 
PrfShare-xa0 
 
Coefficient 0.2 It is a Boundary coefficient. The share between the 
(Rev-BER)/Rev. 
TAC share 
 
TACsh-110 
 
Coefficient Calculated It is the share of the landings made by the segment to 
the total landings of the stock.  
Catchable 
biomass 
CB-ay 
 
Tonnes Species 
specific 
Spawning stock biomass used as a proxy. 
Growth 
 
Rec-ay 
 
Tonnes Species 
specific 
Growth is estimated by recruitment (number of fish) 
multiplied by yield per recruit.  
The function include M and r.  
Growth Rec-ay0 Coefficient Estimated (intercept)
Growth Rec-ay1 Coefficient Estimated (order 1)
Growth Rec-ay2 Coefficient Estimated (order 2)
Growth Rec-ay3 Coefficient Estimated (order 3)
Growth Expo-ay1 Coefficient 1
Growth Expo-ay2 Coefficient 2
Growth Expo-ay3 Coefficient 3
Catch Catch-110 Coefficient Estimated Constant in the production function 
Catch Catch-111 Coefficient 0.2 or 0.6 Exponent of effort
Catch Catch-112 Coefficient 0.8 or 0.4 Exponent of biomass
Catch Catch-113 Percentage 0 The annual technical progress, (note that the function 
is not linear) 
Discards – 
undersized fish 
Disc-110
 
Percentage 0 Percentage of the discards
Discards – quota 
fish 
Disc-111
 
0 to 1 0 1:  can land all caches
0: cannot land over-quota catch. 
Fuel price 
 
FuelPr-xa
 
Coefficient 1 It is the nominal increased of the fuel cost relative to 
base case year: =1: Fuel cost as in the base case 
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>1 Fuel cost higher than in the base case 
<1 Fuel cost lower than in the base case Not used 
Fuel price 
 
FuelPr-xa0 
 
Percentage 0 Annual growth of the fuel cost relative to the 
previous year. 
Fish prices 
 
FishPr-ay €/kg Calculated
Fish prices 
 
PrEl-ay1
 
Coefficient 0
Fish prices PrSeg-110
 
Coefficient 1 If > 1 the price of this segment /species is increased
Revenues 
 
OtSpR-xa0 
 
Percentage Calculated Percentage of the revenue obtained by the other 
species. 
Revenues 
 
OtSpF-xa0 
 
1000€ Calculated Fixed amount of the other species by vessel 
Revenues 
 
Related to the 
effort 
1000€/fishing 
day 
Calculated Not done yet Not used
Fuel costs FuC-xa0 Coefficient Calculated Total fuel cost in 1000 € divided by total fishing days
Crew costs 
 
CrC-xa0
 
Coefficient Calculated Depends on the drivers (CrC-1a1 and CrC-1a2)
Crew costs 
 
CrC-xa1
and 
CrC-xa2 
 
0 or 1 Calculated If 
(0,0) total crew cost divided by total revenues 
(1,0) total crew cost divided by (total revenues – fuel 
cost) 
(0,1) total crew cost divided by (total revenues – 
variable costs) 
(1,1) total crew cost divided by (total revenues – 
variable costs –fuel costs) 
Variable costs 
 
VaC-xa0
 
Coefficient Calculated Total variable costs divided by total revenues 
Fixed costs 
 
FxC-xa0
 
1000€/vessel Calculated Fixed costs divided by number of vessels 
Capital costs 
 
CaC-xa0
 
1000€/vessel Calculated Capital costs divided by number of vessels 
Discount rate 
 
Dis-xa0 
 
Coefficient 3.5% and 
2% resp. 
5% 
At a first stage Common for all the fleets but with a 
sensitive analysis of it. 
Fuel use 
 
FuU-xa0 1000 liters 
/sea day  
Calculated Not a role in the model but the result is calculated. 
Not used 
Policy intensity 
factor 
PIF 0 to 1 1 =1: strictly follows biologic advice 
>1: less strict than biologic advice 
<1:  more strict than biologic advice 
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LIST OF VARIABLES AND SYMBOLS 
 
Biological module 
Catchable stock biomass  CB 
Yield per recruit  YpR 
Recruitment  Recr 3rd degree polynomial or Ricker 
Parameters  Rec (4 coefficients) and Expo (3 exponents) 
 
Policy module 
TAC constraint  TAC 
Effort constraint  EfC 
Payment for access  PfAcc 
Payment for fish  PfFish 
Target harvest ratio  Htarget, 
Natural fishing mortality  M    
Tac band  Tac 
 
Economic module 
Revenues  Rev 
Fuel costs  FuC 
Crew costs  CrC 
Variable costs  VaC 
Fixed costs  FxC 
Capital costs  CaC 
Gross cash flow  GCF 
Profit  Prf 
Payment for access  FPfAcc 
Profit after tax  PrfaTax 
Profit discounted  PrfDiS 
NPV 15 years  Npv15 
NPV infinity  Npv 
Break-even revenues  BER 
Fuel use  FuU 
Discount factor  Dis 
Discount period  DisPeriod 
 
Interface  
Target landings (quotas)  LandT 
Catch including under- and oversized discard  CatchT 
Catch excluding undersized discards  Catch 
Discards oversized fish  Disc 
Landings  Land 
Catch-xy0  catch coefficient 
Catch-xy1  exponent for effort (days at sea) 
Catch-xy2  exponent for stock size 
Catch-xy3  coefficient for technical progress (%) 
 
Prices 
Fuel price  FuelPr 
Fish prices  FishPr 
Price elasticity  PrEl 
 
Behaviour 
Effort (Fleet * days)  Eff 
Investment (number of vessels)  Inv 
Fleet (number of vessels)  Fle 
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Days at sea/vessel - operational DASope 
Days at sea/vessel - maximum DASmax 
Investment price vessel InvPrice 
Investment share of profit PrfShare 
Interest rate Int 
Time horizon for investment Period 
Price for vessel entry OppIn 
Price for vessels exit OppOut 
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ANNEX 2. ESTIMATION OF EU MANAGEMENT COSTS 
 
Table A2.1 Estimation of annual EU management budgets related to the catching sector by MS  
(mln euro) 
MS 
Landings 
value 
(average 
2005-7) 
DCF 2009 EFF Annual average budget54 Enforcement 
etc.55 (2007) 
Annual 
average 
budget 
De minimis Budget
56 Budget +30% Axis 1 
50% Axis 
3+4 
BE 86 1.42 1.84 2.16 1.77 1.35 3.9 
BG 0.37 0.48 1.52 3.05 0.1 
CY 11 0.46 0.60 0.63 1.99 0.51 0.5 
DE 155 5.78 7.51 1.90 9.84 29.41 16.3 
DK 393 5.98 7.77 6.10 8.35 32.15 19.2 
EE 14 0.58 0.75 2.91 3.86 1.99 1.2 
ES 1,735 12.86 16.72 89.57 50.60 27.60 42.6 
FI 25 1.65 2.15 1.14 3.06 1.36 2.4 
FR 1,248 12.14 15.78 20.36 12.03 16.80 46.2 
GR 776 4.44 5.77 13.97 6.33 35.65 6.0 
IE 224 6.10 7.93 6.62 1.43 52.43 2.8 
IT 1,426 6.36 8.27 47.28 18.79 65.50 31.4 
LT 4 0.38 0.49 2.36 1.52 0.26 1.7 
LV 21 0.44 0.58 3.97 5.05 1.11 1.3 
MT 11 0.60 0.78 0.41 0.39 0.49 0.1 
NL 383 3.88 5.04 6.37 3.86 16.23 12.0 
PL 42 1.03 1.34 32.16 36.36 1.25 7.0 
PT 343 2.96 3.85 9.57 10.18 23.67 5.2 
RO 0.57 0.74 1.90 10.00 0.00 0.2 
SE 114 5.12 6.66 3.25 3.90 16.86 3.7 
SV 1 0.19 0.25 0.41 0.93 0.05 0.4 
UK 822 9.34 12.14 7.85 8.94 30.19 34.2 
Total 7,708 82.67 107.47 262.43 202.23 354.85 238.7 
 
Table A2.2 Summary of EU management budgets related to the catching sector (mln euro) 
Item Amount 
EFF57, axis 1 (average 2007-2013) 262.4 
EFF, 50% axis 2 202.2 
Administration, enforcement and control (2007) 354.8 
Research (DCF+30%) (2009) 107.5 
Third countries 58 150.0 
De minimis59 (average 2007-2013) 238.7 
EAGF60 (expenses 2008) 52.0 
Total 1,367.6 
                                                     
54 Based on National Operational Programmes (prices 2007-8), EU and National contribution 
55 Values in italics are extrapolations on the basis of available average Enforcement costs / Value of landings,  
based on MRAG Ltd., Oceanic Développement, Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management Ltd, Lamans s.a., Institute 
of European studies and IFM (2008). ‘Impact Assessment of a Proposal to Reform and Modernise the Control 
System applicable to the Common Fisheries Policy’ 
56 Council Dec. 811/2009 
57 The total annual EFF budget amounts to almost 1 bln euro. 
58 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/external-relations/bilateral-agreements-en.htm, accounting for a 4-year average 
payment to Mauritania, annual averages for the period 2005/6-2010/12 depending on the duration of the 
agreements. 
59 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/external-relations/bilateral-agreements-en.htm, accounting for a 4-year average 
payment to Mauritania. 
60 SEC(2009)1368 PART II, Annexes to the Commission staff working document accompanying the 2nd financial 
report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the European Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund – 2008 financial year, Brussels, 21.10.2009 
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Budgets EU level (CFCA and DG MARE) have not been included, but will not significantly affect the 
total costs. 
 
The indicated budgets are not necessarily identical to expenses. 
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ANNEX 3. ESTIMATION OF THE RESOURCE RENT 
 
Introduction 
 
The main text of the report presents the results of the scenarios in terms of net profit, which can be 
calculated from the available data. However, the data on capital costs has not been homogenized under 
DCR, so that it was not considered reliable enough to calculate Resource rent for all fisheries and 
scenarios individually and give this value such a pronounced place in the report. 
 
The formula of net profit applied in the main text is: 
 
Net profit = Revenues – operational costs – capital costs 
 
It is not clear how the capital costs have been estimated in different MS because: 
 There exist different approaches to valuation of capital, which is the basis for  the calculation of 
depreciation and interest costs. In particular it is not clear whether historical or replacement values 
have been used and how they have been determined. 
 There are different possible depreciation schemes. 
 It is not clear whether interest costs have been included or not and if so, which interest rates have 
been used. 
 Some MS did not report any capital costs or capital values at all under DCR (e.g. Spain) so that 
additional information had to be drawn from other sources. 
 Normally it could be expected that depreciation costs amount to 8-12% of the historical price61. 
However, some MS report values which produce ratios of 25-35%, which raises questions of 
reliability.  
 
Fisheries economics literature, based on the neoclassical economic theory, defines the resource rent as 
‘excessive profits’, over what could be considered the normal profit. This can be summarized in a formula: 
 
Resource rent = Revenues – operational costs – depreciation – normal profit 
 
In this formula : Net profit = Revenues – operational costs – depreciation;  
and normal profit includes opportunity costs of capital (interest costs) and profit as a reward for risk, etc. 
 
Estimating capital value, depreciation and normal profit 
 
To calculate depreciation and normal profit requires determination of the capital value, to which relevant 
percentages can be applied. Three options of capital value were tested: 
1. DCR data 2005-7 
2. Nominal  values of observations of 50 historical prices of new vessels in France and the Netherlands. 
3. Indexed observations of the 50 historical prices. 
 
DCR 2005-7 contains information on capital value and capital costs for 75 fleet segments with a total of 
about 25,000 vessels. This excludes all segments for which data was incomplete for the considered period. 
On the basis of this data average capital value and capital costs were estimated for the four main size 
groups 0-12m, 12-24m, 24-40m and 40+m. 
 
Under the Irepa study1., some information was compiled on costs of construction of fishing vessels – 
mainly beam trawlers of 24, and 40m in the Netherlands and trawlers (mostly 23-24m) and passive gear 
vessels  (6-13m) in France. All these vessels were built in between 1983 and 2002. 
 
                                                     
61 See Irepa onlus et.al., Evaluation of the capital value, investments and capital costs in the fisheries sector, Final report, 
November 2006. 
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Regression analysis of the nominal prices of these 50 observations, where prices is function of the length, 
gives the following result:  
 
Price1 = 108.6*m - 902.6,  with R2 = 0.92 (price is in 1000 euro) 
 
In order to account for the different construction years, the vessels prices were recalculated to the year 
2005, under the assumption of 1% annual increase of the construction costs. This new price series 
generated a slight improvement in the regression coefficient: 
 
Price2 = 0.546 * m^2 + 98.7 * m - 789, with R2 = 0.95 
 
Under the assumption of average length of the vessels in each length group of, 9m, 16m, 28m and 42m 
respectively, the three approaches generated the following average prices per vessel and total capital values 
in the year 2005-7 (Table A3.1). 
 
Table A3.1 Prices per vessel by length group (1000 euro) 
Length group DCR value / vessel Price 1 Price 2 Assumed price per 
vessel  
0-12m 28 75 144 125 
12-24m 196 835 930 900 
24-40m 859 2,138 2,403 2,300
40+m 1,778 3,659 4,320 4,000
 
The above average prices give ‘impression’ that most MS report depreciated value of theirs, although it is 
not clear whether this value is based on historical or replacement price. For estimation of depreciation and 
net profit the total capital value is required. For this purpose, an assumed price, based on prices 1 and 2 
was set.  
 
In 2005-7 the total fleet operating in the 7 analysed fisheries was composed of 7,361 vessels. According to 
DCR the capital value of these vessels was 1.4 bln euro and capital costs 179 mln euro / year. The value 
of the fleet was recalculated on the basis of assumed prices and amounts than to 4.8 bln euro. Taking an 
average of 7% for depreciation costs implies annual depreciation costs of 336 mln euro in 2005-7, almost 
double the value of the DCR. The 7% linear depreciation costs is based on the following structure 
proposed by the Irepa study: 
 
Table A3.2 Total value of the fleet in 2005-7 according to DCR and assumed price 
Length group Number of vessels Value DCR
(mln euro) 
Value based on assumed 
price 
(mln euro)  
0-12m 4,110 113 514 
12-24m 2,405 471 2,164 
24-40m 742 637 1,707 
40+m 104 185 417 
Total 7.361 1,407 4,802 
 
Table A3.3 Derivation of average depreciation rate 
 Linear depreciation 
rate Renovation every X years Share in total investment 
Hull 2.5% 40 60% 
Engine 10% 10 20% 
Electronics 20% 5 10% 
Other equipment 16% 7 10% 
Average  7% 
Source: IREPA, 2006, p.31 
 
Considering the significant difference between the capital costs reported under DCR (which also contain 
costs of interest) and the more realistic ‘assumed price’ per vessel, the depreciation costs in the present 
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resource rent calculation is based on the above estimated value in combination with the 7% average 
depreciation rate.  
 
Normal profit 
 
While there is a vast literature discussing the theory of ‘normal’ and ‘super’ profits, the quantifications of 
these concepts are scarce. Normal profit is the remuneration of the capital and entrepreneurship. It 
depends inter alia on conditions for availability of capital, (perception of) risk, scarcity of required skills, 
intertemporal preferences, expectations, etc. An objective determination of normal profit is probably not 
possible. Therefore normal profit is assumed at the level 15% of the capital value62.  
 
Resource rent – baseline scenario 
 
On the basis of the above re-evaluation of the capital value and costs and the results of the baseline 
scenarios, it is possible to make an approximation of the resource rent, in its original meaning. 
 
Table A3.4 shows that the total landings value of the seven considered fisheries would increase by 65% in 
15 years. The gross profit (before accounting for capital costs) would increase threefold in that period. 
The average annual discounted gross profit is about 50% higher than the gross profit in 2005-7. 
 
 On the basis of the above elaborated approach and assumptions, the resource rent of the seven fisheries 
amounted in 2005-7 to -425 mln euro. The baseline scenarios indicate that a significant improvement 
could be achieved. In 15 years the resource rent could increase to almost 500 mln euro. The average 
discounted resource rent over the 15-year period would reach about -15 mln euro.  
 
Further comments on table A3.4: 
 Total fuel costs decrease due to smaller fleet, which operates at a higher level of capacity utilization. 
 Nominal crew costs increase very significantly, due to lower employment. 
 Total landings increase by 35% in 15 years, although average landings are only marginally higher than 
in 2005-7. 
 The number of vessels below 12m decreases and remains at a new lower level. The numbers of the 
larger vessels decrease as well in the beginning of the period, but increase when stock recovery allows 
it. This shows the changes in the structure of the fleet. 
 
Resource rent – optimization scenario 14 
 
Scenario 14 optimizes the size of the fleet in order to achieve maximum net profit (using DCR capital 
costs). The average NPV Prf15 amounts in the baseline scenario to -15 mln euro, and in scenario 14 to 258 
mln euro..  
 
Figure A3.1 shows that the potential for improvement is different in different fisheries. As stated in the 
main text, it is not clear which measures should be put in place to promote the optimum development of 
scenario 14. 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
62 Eurostat published non-harmonized retail bank interest rates to companies for loans over 1 year until 2002. 
Between 2000 and 2002 the rates ranged for the EU-15 MS between 5% and 7% (as far as available at all). 
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Table A3.4 Main results of the baseline and scenario 14 and estimation of resource rent, all 7 fisheries  
Baseline scenario Scenario 14 
Economic indicators 
(mln euro) Year 2005-7 
Year 15 
(nominal) 
Average NPV 
/ year 
Year 15 
(nominal) 
Average NPV 
/ year 
Revenues 1,832 3,019 1,681 3,467 2,052 
Fuel costs 344 300 191 345 212 
Crew costs 594 948 524 985 586 
Variable costs 245 385 223 419 255 
Fixed costs 257 215 149 228 132 
Capital costs 179 146 102 159 98 
Net profit 212 1,025 493 1,331 769 
 
Gross profit 391 1,171 595 1,490 867 
Depreciation 336 280 194 332 194 
Normal profit, 10% 720 600 416 711 416
Resource rent -665 291 -15 447 258
Other indicators Year 1 Year 15 Average 1-15 Year 15 Average 1-15 
Landings (1000 t) 262 346 273 426 265 
Fleet (number of vessels) 7,361 5,668 5,621 7,017 5,664 
 0-12m 4,110 2,669 3,100 3,793 3,219 
 12-24m 2,405 2,396 1,951 2,291 1,752 
 24-40m 742 527 501 898 643 
 40+m 104 75 68 35 50 
 
 
Sensitivity analysis – baseline scenario 
 
Resource rent, being the bottom line of the calculation, is very sensitive to minor changes in revenues, 
being result of price and/or volume fluctuations. It is much less sensitive to other production parameters, 
as indicated in Table A3.5. 
 
Reduction of revenues by about 10% would reduce the resource rent in the year 15 of the baseline 
scenario to zero.  The average NPF Prf15 is slightly negative, so that the average revenues would have to 
increase by about 1% to bring the resource rent to zero.  To eliminate the negative average resource rent 
(average NPV Prf15), the fuel price would have to decrease by about 5% and the variable costs (excl. fuel) 
by 13%. 
 
Table A3.5 Baseline scenario - sensitivity of resource rent to change in main economic parameters  
(change of resource rent,  mln euro) 
Year 2005-7 Year 15 Average NPV 
Resource rent (baseline value) -665 291 -15 
Revenues, -15% -275 -453 -252 
Normal profit, +1% -48 -40 -28 
Error in capital value, -10% 1) 82 68 47 
Depreciation, 10% 2) -144 -120 -83 
Fuel price, +50% -172 -150 -96 
Variable costs, +20% -61 -96 -56 
1) Effect of valuation of the capital by 10% less than the present calculation. 
2) Depreciation set at 10% instead of the assumed 7%. 
 
In addition, it should be noted that the management costs have not been accounted for. These costs were 
estimated at 117 mln euro for the seven case study fisheries. If the management costs would remain 
constant, the average annual NPV of the management costswould amount to 90 mln euro, reducing the 
average NPV of the resource rent to about -132 mln euro. 
 
Resource rent by fishery 
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Table A3.6 Estimation of the resource rent per fishery, baseline scenario (mln euro) 
North Sea flatfish North Sea cod Baltic Sea cod Atlantic hake Atlantic anchovy 
Mediterranean 
anchovy Mediterranean hake 
Yr 1 Yr 15 
Aver. 
NPV Yr 1 Yr 15
Aver. 
NPV Yr 1 Yr 15
Aver. 
NPV Yr 1 Yr 15 
Aver. 
NPV Yr 1 Yr 15
Aver. 
NPV Yr 1 Yr 15
Aver. 
NPV Yr 1 Yr 15 
Aver. 
NPV 
Revenues 391 548 275 391 1,195 543 152 257 148 519 594 419 224 287 192 21 33 25 133 104 78 
Fuel costs 130 91 60 38 66 28 17 13 8 97 94 67 29 15 11 3 5 4 30 17 13 
Crew costs 117 178 75 105 324 147 40 68 39 159 180 127 131 161 109 7 11 9 36 25 19 
Variable costs 45 63 32 39 120 54 17 28 16 79 93 65 47 66 44 2 4 3 15 12 9 
Fixed costs 71 42 34 45 63 32 28 19 15 91 75 55 11 5 5 2 4 2 9 7 6 
Capital costs 52 31 25 33 46 23 11 7 6 37 31 23 27 14 13 3 6 3 16 12 10 
Profit -24 143 50 130 577 259 38 122 65 56 121 81 -21 27 11 5 4 5 28 31 22 
 
Gross profit 28 173 75 163 623 282 49 129 70 93 152 105 6 41 24 7 9 8 44 43 32 
Depreciation 188 45 65 173 101 79 106 29 40 164 52 64 88 18 30 8 7 5 90 28 37 
Normal profit 166 96 78 152 217 110 94 62 51 145 112 85 77 38 37 7 15 8 79 59 47 
Resource rent -326 32 -68 -162 304 93 -150 38 -20 -215 -11 -45 -159 -16 -43 -8 -13 -5 -125 -44 -52 
Other indicators Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. 
Landings (1000 t) 53.4 75.1 52.4 25.6 77.9 48.8 28.0 47.5 37.0 55.2 62.6 57.5 90.1 71.3 65.8 5.3 8.2 8.3 4.1 3.2 3.1 
Fleet  626 317 338 1,475 1,506 1,148 2,533 1,828 2,001 650 547 522 295 153 179 53 112 79 1,729 1,204 1,354 
 0-12 617 167 266 2,166 1,616 1,787 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,327 887 1,048 
 12-24 365 153 176 739 1,181 779 351 197 203 379 368 335 116 68 73 53 112 79 402 317 307 
 24-40 157 90 94 119 158 104 16 15 11 271 179 186 179 85 106  
 40+ 104 75 68  
Capital c. adapted include depreciation (7%) and normal profit (15%) of the estimated capital value. 
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Table A3.7 Estimation of the resource rent per fishery, scenario 14 (maximum net profit) (mln euro) 
North Sea flatfish North Sea cod Baltic Sea cod Atlantic hake Atlantic anchovy 
Mediterranean 
anchovy Mediterranean hake 
Yr 1 Yr 15 
Aver. 
NPV Yr 1 Yr 15
Aver. 
NPV Yr 1 Yr 15
Aver. 
NPV Yr 1 Yr 15 
Aver. 
NPV Yr 1 Yr 15
Aver. 
NPV Yr 1 Yr 15
Aver. 
NPV Yr 1 Yr 15 
Aver. 
NPV 
Revenues 391 508 297 391 1,486 826 152 432 229 519 587 366 224 294 238 21 48 26 133 111 71 
Fuel costs 130 63 61 38 107 54 17 47 20 97 82 44 29 26 21 3 8 4 30 13 8 
Crew costs 117 169 86 105 401 230 40 91 47 159 175 111 131 105 87 7 17 9 36 27 16 
Variable costs 45 58 34 39 144 82 17 46 25 79 96 59 47 57 45 2 6 3 15 12 7 
Fixed costs 71 33 28 45 95 49 28 47 21 91 41 25 11 3 3 2 4 2 9 5 3 
Capital costs 52 24 20 33 72 37 11 14 7 37 17 10 27 20 16 3 6 3 16 8 5 
Profit -24 162 67 130 667 373 38 187 109 56 175 116 -21 84 66 5 8 6 28 47 32 
 
Gross profit 28 185 88 163 739 410 49 201 115 93 192 127 6 104 82 7 14 9 44 55 37 
Depreciation 77 38 31 71 143 76 44 61 29 68 38 21 36 28 23 3 7 4 37 17 11 
Normal profit 166 82 66 152 306 162 94 130 62 145 81 46 77 59 49 7 16 8 79 37 24 
Resource rent -215 66 -9 -61 290 172 -88 10 25 -119 73 59 -107 17 10 -3 -9 -3 -72 0 3 
Other indicators Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. Yr 1 Yr 15 Aver. 
Landings (1000 t) 53 65 42 26 115 62 28 76 41 55 66 40 90 89 72 5 12 6 4 3 2 
Fleet  626 388 321 1,475 1,750 1,526 2,533 3,041 2,166 650 353 281 295 176 191 53 116 74 1,729 1,192 1,104 
 0-12 617 219 343 2,166 2,512 1,856 1,327 1,062 1,021 
 12-24 365 291 195 739 1,080 932 351 473 279 379 194 177 116 6 11 53 116 74 402 130 83 
 24-40 157 62 76 119 452 252 16 56 31 271 159 104 179 170 180  
 40+ 104 35 50  
Capital c. adapted include depreciation (7%) and normal profit (15%), of the estimated capital value. 
 
 
 
  
294 
 
ANNEX 4. RESOURCE RENT BY SPECIES 
 
Table A4.1 Average NPV Prf15 (mln euro) 
Fishery / scenario 01 02 03 04 05 06 10 11 12 13 14 
Atlantic anchovy    
Total 12.9 20.3 39.5 44.4 44.4 12.4 -0.9 7.1 30.0 75.7 126.6 
Anglefish 3.7 5.3 9.0 9.5 9.5 3.6 -0.2 1.9 7.9 11.0 27.1 
Mackerel 0.3 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.3 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.7 1.5 5.3 
Bluefin tuna 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.6 2.6 1.6 -0.1 0.7 3.0 3.7 9.9 
Albacore 1.4 2.0 4.2 4.8 4.8 1.3 -0.1 0.7 3.0 4.4 2.4 
Pilchard 0.4 0.7 1.5 1.9 1.9 0.4 0.0 0.2 1.0 2.4 8.4 
Atlantic hake    
Total 156.6 141.6 115.8 78.2 43.8 156.5 118.3 164.0 187.6 190.4 223.5 
Hake 45.6 43.6 32.0 21.6 12.0 45.6 34.3 48.9 54.3 52.8 71.3 
Nephrops 9.2 7.4 6.8 4.6 2.6 9.1 7.0 9.2 11.0 11.5 10.9 
Sole 10.2 10.0 8.4 5.6 3.2 10.2 7.7 10.8 12.3 13.1 16.0 
Anglerfish 13.2 11.4 10.2 7.3 4.1 13.2 10.0 13.6 15.9 16.5 17.1 
Megrim 5.1 4.6 3.9 2.2 1.2 5.1 3.8 5.5 6.1 6.0 7.4 
Baltic Sea cod    
Total 123.6 152.0 67.2 122.4 106.4 126.9 130.8 175.3 208.4 
Cod 45.7 57.0 24.9 45.3 39.3 46.8 48.4 65.4 73.9 
Mediterranean anchovy    
Total  10.2 10.6 10.6  10.2 9.7 10.3 8.7 10.9 
Eur. pilchard  1.2 1.2 1.2  1.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.2 
Eur. anchovy  3.3 3.4 3.4  3.3 3.2 3.3 2.8 3.5 
Mediterranean hake    
Total  42.1 -3.7 -3.7  33.9 35.1 50.3 57.7 62.4 
Hake  5.8 -0.3 -0.3  4.7 4.8 6.9 7.8 8.6 
Nephrops  2.9 -0.5 -0.5  2.4 2.5 3.5 3.4 2.8 
Striped mulliet  2.3 -0.4 -0.4  1.9 1.9 2.8 2.7 2.2 
Horned octopus  1.9 -0.1 -0.1  1.5 1.5 2.2 2.2 1.9 
North Sea cod    
Total 495.0 479.2 337.9 493.5 462.4 457.8 505.3 704.4 715.8 
Cod 76.9 85.6 88.3 76.7 74.3 72.9 78.5 135.0 128.5 
North Sea flatfish    
Total 95.4 91.3 -0.8 -3.1 -4.3 118.8 25.0 70.2 117.0 97.0 128.4 
Sole 26.4 28.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 35.1 6.9 19.7 32.2 21.0 33.1 
Plaice 21.0 20.0 -0.2 -0.9 -1.2 24.4 5.5 15.2 25.9 20.3 28.2 
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 Table A4.2 Nominal net profit in year 1 (all scenarios) and in year 15 
Fishery / scenario Baseline - Yr 1 01 02 03 04 05 06 10 11 12 13 14 
Atlantic anchovy   
Total -41.6 54.6 54.0 84.6 84.7 84.7 54.7 16.2 28.0 59.5 112.0 168.9 
Anglefish -14.2 14.4 14.0 19.7 18.5 18.5 14.5 4.2 7.3 15.4 18.3 39.8 
Mackerel -1.6 1.4 1.3 2.5 2.6 2.6 1.4 0.4 0.7 1.4 2.2 7.4 
Bluefin tuna -8.0 7.4 5.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 7.5 1.6 2.8 6.0 3.1 0.2 
Albacore -6.8 4.9 5.1 8.4 8.4 8.4 4.9 1.5 2.6 5.6 7.0 2.0 
Pilchard -2.3 1.7 1.6 3.6 4.0 4.0 1.7 0.5 0.8 1.8 3.9 11.8 
Atlantic hake   
Total 111.5 242.2 192.2 161.8 31.4 -60.9 242.2 197.0 264.5 287.3 236.3 350.6 
Hake 32.0 73.8 60.7 46.2 8.5 -13.5 73.8 60.0 83.7 87.6 66.2 119.5 
Nephrops 6.1 13.9 10.1 9.5 2.1 -4.7 13.9 11.3 14.2 16.4 14.7 15.4 
Sole 8.2 15.0 12.6 11.4 2.5 -5.6 15.0 12.2 16.3 17.8 15.6 21.2 
Anglerfish 10.4 19.6 15.0 13.9 3.3 -7.2 19.6 16.0 20.7 23.3 20.6 25.5 
Megrim 4.1 7.4 6.1 4.8 0.0 0.0 7.4 6.0 8.4 8.7 6.4 12.7 
Baltic Sea cod   
Total 76.3 243.9 276.5 -294.5 243.9 217.4 247.7 251.0 311.2 374.6 
Cod 28.2 90.0 103.8 -103.0 90.0 80.2 91.4 92.6 116.1 131.8 
Mediterranean 
anchovy 
  
Total 9.3 7.2 11.8 11.8 14.5 13.7 13.9 9.4 16.7 
Eur. pilchard 1.1 0.9 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.9 
Eur. anchovy 2.9 2.3 3.7 3.7 4.7 4.5 4.4 3.0 5.4 
Mediterranean 
hake 
  
Total 55.8 62.5 2.9 3.0 49.6 51.4 73.3 73.6 93.4 
Hake 8.1 8.6 0.0 0.0 6.8 7.0 10.0 9.8 13.0 
Nephrops 3.8 4.3 0.6 0.6 3.4 3.6 5.1 5.1 4.9 
Striped mulliet 2.7 3.5 0.5 0.5 2.8 2.9 4.1 4.1 3.9 
Horned octopus 2.6 2.7 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
North Sea cod   
Total 260.3 1,154.1 1,059.0 647.0 1,154.1 992.4 903.1 1,183.9 1,288.2 1,334.1 
Cod 40.8 179.7 188.4 174.0 179.7 165.3 147.2 181.7 264.8 245.8 
North Sea flatfish   
Total -48.3 285.6 107.0 27.5 22.8 17.5 233.0 183.5 260.1 291.2 216.9 323.4 
Sole -14.6 87.8 35.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 72.2 55.8 80.0 88.2 53.3 86.3 
Plaice -9.7 57.5 23.8 9.3 7.8 6.0 45.7 36.8 51.5 58.6 40.9 61.9 
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This annex presents an estimation of the resource rent (average NPV Prf15) by species and the total for each fishery. The resource rent has been allocated ot 
individual species on the basis of their relative role in the total revenues of the fishery. It is noted that: 
1. The difference between the sum of specified species and Total is the resource rent allocated to ‘Other’ species. 
2. Scenarios 7-9 would present same relative distribution as the baseline scenarios 1 or 2 (according to fishery) and therefore are not presented. 
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